CIHS – Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies

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Bias or Blind Spot?

Freedom House’s Western Biases, Methodological Flaws & Lack of Understanding of India’s Democratic Realities  N. C. Bipindra American think tank Freedom House’s latest 2026 annual report rates India as “Partly Free” with a score of 62 on maximum 100 points. This has once again triggered a debate on how global democracy indexes assess nations, particularly large and complex ones like India. The report posits India within the broader narrative that Freedom House is building off twenty-year global decline in freedoms. A closer look at the assessment shows that Freedom House conclusions rest on methodological limitations, normative biases and insufficient contextualisation of India’s democratic ecosystem. The Freedom House’s methodological framing aggregates diverse indicators such as political rights, civil liberties, media freedom and minority protection into a single numerical score. While Freedom House may be targeting simplicity while quantifying the complex study, this clearly risks obscuring the immense heterogeneity of India’s federal structure. India’s governance standards, political competition and civil liberties vary significantly in different states and the entire nation is not universally governed by one single political formation or a uniform demographic composition. India is not a monolithic political entity but a vast and layered democracy of over 1.4 billion people. Reducing its democratic health to a single number inevitably leads to analytical compression or deviations where localised or episodic concerns are interpreted as systemic decline. Moreover, critics have long argued that Freedom House’s framework reflects a Western and liberal template of democracy, shaped by political and historical experience of United States and Europe. This raises questions about whether the same benchmarks can be uniformly applied to societies grappling with different challenges, including post-colonial state-building, socio-economic inequality and persistent security threats. In India’s case, the need to balance civil liberties with national security concerns, particularly in the context of cross-border terrorism and internal insurgencies, complicates any straightforward classification. The report’s broader claim of a continuous global decline in freedom over two decades also warrants scrutiny. While there is no denying the rise of authoritarian tendencies in certain regions, such a sweeping narrative risks over-generalisation. It tends to overlook democratic resilience in parts of the Global South and conflates governance challenges with democratic backsliding. In India, visible tensions within the political system may, in fact, reflect democratic contestation rather than erosion. A noisy, conflict-ridden public sphere is not necessarily evidence of authoritarianism; it can also indicate a system where competing interests continue to be negotiated in the open. One of the central concerns raised by the report is the alleged harassment of journalists, civil society organisations and political opponents. While individual cases and controversies undoubtedly exist, it is important to situate them within the broader landscape of Indian public life. India hosts one of world’s most expansive and diverse media ecosystems, spanning print, television and digital platforms. Critical reporting on government policies is widespread and investigative journalism continues to shape public discourse. Legal actions against media entities or non-governmental organisations are often framed in the report as politically motivated. But in many instances, they are rooted in regulatory compliance issues, particularly concerning financial transparency and foreign funding norms. The distinction between the enforcement of law and the suppression of dissent is crucial and often blurred in external assessments. Similarly, the claim that political opposition is under systematic pressure must be weighed against empirical realities. Opposition parties continue to win elections at the state level, govern key regions and mount significant electoral and political challenges. The regularity of elections, high voter turnout and peaceful transitions of power underscore the continued vitality of India’s democratic framework. Institutions such as the Election Commission of India play a central role in ensuring electoral integrity and despite criticisms, they remain broadly functional and credible. All criticisms of India’s Election Commission haven’t stood judicial scrutiny in the last decade. This goes on to prove that the poll body’s institutional functioning met quality standards in consonance with the constitutional framework and election laws. The report’s emphasis on the marginalisation of minority communities, including Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, touches upon a deeply important issue. However, it is essential to distinguish between structural socio-economic inequalities and deliberate state-led democratic regression. India’s social fabric has long been shaped by hierarchies and disparities that predate contemporary political developments. Successive governments have implemented policies aimed at addressing these challenges, including affirmative action, targeted welfare schemes and financial inclusion initiatives. While gaps remain and must be addressed, framing these issues solely as indicators of declining freedom risks overlooking both historical context and ongoing policy interventions. Another area of concern highlighted in the report is the perceived weakening of political pluralism, including practices such as “resort politics” and challenges in implementation of the Right to Information framework. Yet, these phenomena are not unique to India and are often characteristic of competitive democracies. Political manoeuvring, party defections and coalition instability are features seen in many parliamentary systems. Crucially, such developments in India are subject to legal scrutiny and institutional oversight. The Right to Information Act, despite implementation challenges, continues to empower citizens and remains one of the most robust transparency mechanisms globally. Isolated administrative bottlenecks do not necessarily amount to a systemic erosion of accountability. The report also draws attention to the controversial practice of punitive demolitions, sometimes described as “bulldozer justice,” and references a 2024 ruling by the Supreme Court of India that deemed such actions unconstitutional. While the concerns surrounding due process are valid, the very fact that the judiciary intervened to check executive overreach highlights the resilience of India’s institutional framework. The availability of legal remedies, the role of an independent judiciary and the intensity of public debate all point to a system capable of self-correction. Rather than indicating authoritarian drift, such episodes demonstrate the dynamic tension between different arms of the state, which is intrinsic to a functioning democracy. A comprehensive evaluation of India must also take into account the scale and complexity of its electoral processes. Regular elections involving hundreds of millions of voters are conducted with remarkable logistical

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Rebuttal of USCIRF India Entry and Issue Update on Alleged Religious Persecution

Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) has released a comprehensive rebuttal of the USCIRF Annual Report 2026 and its accompanying Issue Update on India. The rebuttal finds that USCIRF’s recommendation to designate India a Country of Particular Concern rests on methodological failures, unsourced assertions, and recommendations disconnected from the document’s own findings. Most strikingly, the report proposes sanctioning Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the world’s largest voluntary organisation and India’s Research and Analysis Wing without a single evidentiary basis anywhere in its text. CIHS concludes that documents of this kind, issued under the authority of a U.S. government commission, do not serve the cause of religious freedom. They damage the mutual respect on which one of the world’s most consequential democratic partnerships depends.

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Khalistani Terror Propaganda Put Bharat, US on Edge

Free run given to SFJ that equated Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iran’s Khamenei reflect insensitivity of US & Canada.  N. C. Bipindra Latest provocative images and videos posted on social media by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) have triggered a controversy intersecting free speech, diaspora politics, territorial integrity, global diplomacy and international relations.  SFJ frames its posts and messages as a free speech exercise asserting democratic rights within United States. But, the content portraying Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed in airstrikes by US and Israel on February 28, 2026 is of serious concern. Such messaging not only constitutes indecency and insensitivity but crosses limits and enters the realm of hostile propaganda, incitement of violence, deliberate misinformation and intolerable provocation. US authorities, particularly President Donald Trump, who calls Modi his good friend, should not turn a blind eye to such provocative content. For New Delhi, such freedom to propagate violence against India’s elected prime minister on US soil should have potential consequences for India-US relations. To understand why the SFJ’s post and its contents are contentious and objectionable, it is important to consider both the nature of messaging and broader political context in which the proscribed terrorist organisation operates. SFJ has no ground support in India, particularly the Sikh-majority Punjab province, but it operates freely in US and neighbouring Canada with impunity. SFJ advocates balkanisation of India, in particular, creation of imaginary Khalistan, a proposed independent theocratic Sikh state carved out of only Indian territories. An illegal Khalistan map that SFJ has released in last few years conveniently ignores territories that are now part of Pakistan but were historically ruled by Sikh emperors. But, the map includes present-day Indian provinces of Punjab, Haryana, Sikh-majority areas of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh with Shimla as its future capital. The reasons for not claiming Pakistan’s Punjab and other provinces that were part of the erstwhile Sikh kingdom’s rule are not so difficult to fathom. Trump administration and Mark Carney government must read two key research reports released by US-based Hudson Institute and Canada-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI). Hudson Institute’s ‘Destabilisation Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism within the US’ authored by Aparna Pande, Husain Haqqani, C. Christine Fair and others present two main arguments that warrant attention of Trump administration. The Hudson Institute’s September 2021 report calls for investigations into Khalistani groups’ activities in US noting that these were directly involved in numerous terror attacks around the world including 1985 Air India’s ‘Kanishka’ bombing that left 329 people including Canadians dead and to shed reluctance to act on intelligence provided by India. MLI’s September 2020 report authored by senior Canadian journalist Terry Milewski, titled ‘Khalistan: A Project of Pakistan’ argues that the separatist movement was designed to subvert national security of both Canada and India, a serious threat that Carney’s government should be vigilant about. Those two reports would help Western democracies that are open to understand dangers of allowing SFJ and self-styled general counsel Gurpatwant Singh Pannun to be haughty. SFJ was banned in India in 2019 for threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, US and Canada are inviting such treacherous tendencies to grow within their territory without realising that the snake they feed would come back to bite them tomorrow, if not today. Indian proscription notwithstanding, SFJ continues to hold farcical “referendums” in US, Canada United Kingdom and Australia attempting to mobilise sections of Sikh diaspora around Khalistani cause. The latest social posts along with a video shared by SFJ are controversial due to their tone, tenor and intent. Equating Modi with Ali Khamenei is a clear attempt to draw parallels between a democratically elected popular leader of India and head of a theocratic state, often regarded as adversarial to West, particularly the US. This can’t be just criticism of Indian government or simply free speech, but rather a deliberate bid to delegitimise and demonise the Indian state, its political leadership and 1.4 billion Indians before the global audience and calling for destablising India through elimination of its prime minister or overthrowing the existing regime. Hudson Institute and Macdonald-Laurier Institute reports point to “playbook” and “project” against India, its political leadership and its people. In particular, use of “India’s Khamenei Alive” slogan juxtaposed with reference to Iran’s Ali Khamenei is a calculated attempt to evoke hostility, suspicion in US to frame India as a strategic adversary of West alongside Iran. Contrasting the phrase “Iran’s Khamenei dead” with “India’s Khamenei alive” is suggestive and goes beyond political free speech and commentary. It stops short of an explicit call to assassinate Indian prime minister. It normalises the idea of dastardly outcomes that can be interpreted as endorsement or glorification which is more troubling. Such rhetoric in democratic societies may not meet strict legal threshold for incitement but is nonetheless considered irresponsible and potentially vicious. SFJ’s post escalates issue by portraying India as an “enemy” of US. This messaging contradicts reality of India-US ties that have grown into a comprehensive strategic partnership since 2007 encompassing defence cooperation, economic ties and shared strategic interests in Indo-Pacific region grounded in values common to both nations. SFJ’s narrative-building is an attempt to influence public opinion and policy discourse in the West particularly United States. This messaging is sensitive, as it weaponises diaspora activism to advance geopolitical perceptions. The objection to such content is rooted in broader pattern associated with SFJ activities. Over the years, the proscribed fringe outfit has carried on inflammatory and divisive campaigns from controversial slogans to provocative demonstrations at Khalistan-related events. Its members have defaced Hindu temples in US and attacked Indian diplomatic missions. These actions have regularly pushed the boundaries of acceptable political expression and free speech. While some such instances have drawn condemnation in host nations, they highlight the fine line between activism and provocation that governments such as Trump’s and Carney’s should be mindful of. The US may have protection for free speech under First Amendment in its Constitution, but highly offensive and objectionable messages directly incite violence and

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A Mirage: Islamic Unity & Security

Pakistan trashed global Ummah at altar of its own selfish interests. Afghan fighters reframed to justify its attacks N. C. Bipindra At the very outset of holy month of Ramadan in February 2026, Pakistan carried out a series of overnight airstrikes across Afghan border characterizing them as “Intelligence-Based, Selective Operations” against seven alleged militant camps linked to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamabad stated that the strikes were a retributive response to a wave of recent attacks, including suicide bombings in Bannu, Bajaur and bombing of Khadija Tul Kubra Mosque in Islamabad that killed dozens of worshippers. Pakistani officials claimed that they possessed “conclusive evidence” that these attacks were orchestrated from Afghan soil and framed cross-border operation as an exercise of state’s intrinsic right to self-defense. Taliban administration in Kabul, on the other hand, emphatically refuted Islamabad’s claims. Ministry of Defence in Afghanistan asserted that airstrikes targeted civilian residences and a religious educational institution in the provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika, condemning these actions as infringements upon territorial integrity and violations of international law. In Behsud district of Nangarhar, local authorities and humanitarian organisations reported that between 16 and 18 members of a single family were killed, including an infant aged one year, as their residences were destroyed. Additional casualties were recorded in other areas, with several individuals presumed missing under debris. International Human Rights Foundation characterised the event as a total “destruction of a familial lineage” and advocated for an independent inquiry into potential violations of international humanitarian law. Timing of these attacks that coincided with beginning of Ramadan, a month associated with piety, gratitude and community unity, renders the incident of considerable analytical importance. It exemplifies how, in periods of heightened insecurity, strategic considerations may eclipse religious symbolism, thereby highlighting predominance of national security imperatives over Islamic moral frameworks in the conduct of state affairs. For decades, Pakistan has projected itself as custodian of Islamic solidarity and proponent of global ‘Ummah’. Through vocal advocacy regarding matters impacting Muslim communities and proposals for collective security frameworks akin to an “Islamic NATO,” Islamabad has meticulously crafted an image of authority and strategic importance. The term “Islamic NATO” typically denotes a prospective security coalition among nations such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, drawing inspiration from NATO’s principle of collective defence. This line is most pronounced in Pakistan’s intricate engagement with Afghanistan. Throughout two-decade-long US-led military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan publicly conformed to counterterrorism objectives while concurrently facing allegations from international analysts regarding its maintenance of links withTaliban as a strategic contingency. The disparity between its collective-security posturing on international stage and its selective partnerships locally has reinforced the perception that such alignments are motivated more by deterrent considerations than by ideological commitments in a dynamically evolving regional context. However, a meticulous examination of its regional conduct unveils a recurring pattern of inconsistencies, wherein ideological discourse frequently diverges markedly from geopolitical actions. This dissonance prompts essential inquiries: If Islamic unity and collective security serve as the foundational principles underlying proposals such as an “Islamic NATO,” how can one reconcile these ideals with military operations against a neighbouring Islamic nation? The resolution resides not in ideological frameworks, but in strategic calculations. Historically, Pakistan’s foreign and security policy has been primarily influenced by national interests, managing border security and ensuring internal stability, rather than adhering to a coherent Pan-Islamic solidarity. During Soviet–Afghan conflict of ‘80s, Pakistan seemed desperate to lead as principal operational base for Afghan mujahedin, accommodating millions of refugees while acting as primary channel for international assistance. Islamabad allocated billions in covert financing and expedited training of anti-Soviet fighters. This era significantly entrenched influence of security establishment in Afghan affairs and institutionalized Pakistan’s enduring engagement in cross-border militancy. Pakistan’s involvement with Taliban transcended passive tolerance. Throughout 1990s and again post-2001, it afforded diplomatic leeway and established cross-border networks that enabled the movement’s consolidation, viewing a favourable regime in Kabul as pivotal to curtailing Indian influence and ensuring strategic depth. The presence of Taliban leadership on Pakistani territory and the group’s battlefield capabilities were inextricably linked to these supportive frameworks. Nevertheless, following Taliban’s resurgence in power during 2021, bilateral relations soured. Instead of providing strategic depth and border stability, Taliban administration opposed Pakistan’s intent to control the regime and increased cases of border fortifications along Durand Line. As assaults within Pakistan escalated, Islamabad’s rhetoric underwent a pronounced transformation. Officials and state-affiliated clerics commenced labelling anti-state militants as “Khawarij,” invoking a classical Islamic term historically linked to an early sect that opposed authority of Hazrat Ali (RA). By employing this designation, the state aimed to religiously delegitimise TTP, framing it not merely as a militant entity, but as a deviant faction that had drifted from doctrinal tenets of Islam. This terminological shift holds considerable political implications. A movement once framed within narratives of Islamic resistance was recast as religiously deviant once it threatened Pakistan’s internal security, illustrating how ideological language adapts to strategic necessity. The state has formalised this rebranding effort by prohibiting religious honorifics such as “Mufti” and “Hafiz” for individuals associated with proscribed organisations and by officially appending the designation “Khariji” to their identities. By reframing counter-insurgency as a safeguard of Islamic authenticity rather than merely a security campaign, authorities sought to strip militants of symbolic religious capital, undermine their claim to “defensive jiha” and mobilise clerical support, proving once again that while religious framing shifts with circumstance, national interest remains the steadfast constant. Ultimately, Pakistan’s strategic stance embodies not merely a selective approach but rather a manifestation of strategic amnesia. The rhetoric surrounding ‘Ummah’, Islamic unity, shared dignity and mutual security, is invoked when it enhances diplomatic stature, yet recedes when it impedes critical security decisions. Ramadan airstrikes into Afghanistan, undertaken during a month associated with piety, restraint, forgiveness, and communal solidarity, illustrate this contradiction starkly: Religious symbolism yielded to national security doctrine. From advocacy concerning Muslim issues to proposition of an “Islamic NATO”, a collective defence arrangement among Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, modelled after NATO’s principle of mutual defence,

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Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh

Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.

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Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Situational Analysis: Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Khalistani support for Islamist-linked violence and minority killings in Bangladesh, and the appearance of anti-Hindu and anti-India sloganeering outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, reiterate that this is not simply a local Western “public order” problem. It is foreign territory being utilised as an outward-facing theatre for a Pakistan-rooted, anti-India orientation, where street spectacle and digital amplification do the work of deniable pressure.

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Ideology Before Inquiry? A Rejoinder to New York Times RSS Narrative

Ideology Before Inquiry? A Rejoinder to New York Times RSS Narrative

Dr. Aniket Pingley I am not a journalist by profession. But like any reader who values intellectual honesty, I expect journalism to adhere to its own stated standards of ethics, verification, and fairness. In its article published by NYT titled “From the Shadows to Power: How the Hindu Right Reshaped India,” that expectation is repeatedly taken for a toss. If the NYT is willing to relax on standards when writing about the RSS, readers are entitled to ask whether what is being offered is reporting at all, or merely a predetermined story wearing the language of journalism. This essay examines where and how the article by Mashal and Kumar departs from those standards. My critique does not rest on disagreement with conclusions alone, but on demonstrable violations of widely accepted journalistic ethics, as codified in the IFJ Global Charter of Ethics for Journalists, the Munich Charter, and the Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics. In the sections that follow, I identify specific statements from the article, map them to the standards they violate, and offer rewritten versions showing how the same points could have been presented in a professional manner. 1. Failure: Fact–Opinion Separation Violated Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “The far-right group known as the R.S.S. has spent a century trying to make India a Hindu-first nation.” “The journalist shall make sure to clearly distinguish factual information from commentary and criticism.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 2 Founded in 1925, the RSS has articulated a vision of national identity centered on Hindu cultural/civilizational unity. Critics interpret this vision as seeking a Hindu-first political order, an interpretation the organization has refuted consistently. India, that is Bharat, is a Hindu nation. The word Hindu transcends Hinduism (religion). Hindu is the collective identity of the people of this nation called Bharat. The nationhood of Hindus has evolved over thousands of years independently of the kingdoms in Bharat and their political boundaries. 2. Failure: Loaded Language Used as Factual Description Statement Violated standard How should it have been written Some common sense “The R.S.S. originated as a shadowy cabal for the revival of Hindu pride after a long history of Muslim invasions and colonial rule in India, its early leaders openly drawing inspiration from the nationalist formula of Fascist parties in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” “Avoid stereotyping. Journalists should examine the ways their values and experiences may shape their reporting.” – SPJ Code of Ethics The RSS began as a small, closely organized volunteer movement during the colonial period, operating primarily through local branches, called as shakhas, rather than public political platforms. An honest discussion with the RSS leadership reveals that the founder Dr. Hedgewar was inspired by the vision of Swami Vivekananda, Yogi Aurobindo, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Bal Gangadhar Tilak etc. The RSS was founded in 1925, about half a decade prior to the start fascism in Europe. Why would anyone in the RSS had to go to Europe to learn about martial discipline if they could simply observe the British exercise the same, first-hand and for free?     Suggested reading for NYT: Bhawani Mandir pamphlet written by Yogi Aurobindo in 1905. 3. Failure: Suppression of Essential Context Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “It’s philosophy casts India’s Muslims and Christians as descendants of foreign invaders who need to be put in their place.” “The journalist shall not suppress essential information or falsify any document.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 3 Some critics argue that certain Hindutva interpretations frame Indian history through a civilizational lens that emphasizes foreign invasions. RSS leaders, however, state that their definition of national belonging is cultural rather than religious and applies to all citizens. As a matter of fact, Sarasanghachalak Dr. Mohan Bhagwat has stated, on record, umpteen times that everyone in Bharat shares a “common DNA”, irrespective of their faith. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/living-in-harmony-is-our-culture-mohan-bhagwat-says-dna-of-people-in-undivided-india-same-for-40000-years-as-rss-marks-100-years/articleshow/123528212.cms The article itself states: “Their definition is a cultural one, and they consider everyone living in India as Hindu, he (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) said.” 4 & 5. Failure: Causal Claims Without Verification and Prediction Presented as Fact 2 Statements Violated standards How should it have been written “The R.S.S. has infiltrated and co-opted India’s institutions to such a degree …” “that its deep roots will ensure it remains a powerful force long after Mr. Modi is gone.” “Never confuse the work of a journalist with that of a publicist or a propagandist.” – Charter of Munich, Responsibility 9 “The notion of urgency or immediacy in the dissemination of information shall not take precedence over verification.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 5 Individuals associated with organizations that describe ideological affinity with the RSS are present across political parties, civil society groups, and public institutions in India. Scholars and analysts disagree on whether this presence reflects coordinated organizational strategy, informal ideological influence, or the broader political mobilization of Hindu nationalist ideas. However, no judicial findings or investigative agency has proven that the R.S.S exercises institutional control over state bodies or established centralized direction of such influence. 6. Failure: Unfounded Accusations by Association Statement Violated standard Counter question for the NYT “And when you see Hindu vigilantes parading through Muslim neighbourhoods or ransacking churches, you are seeing the R.S.S. affiliates exercising their vision of supremacy.” “Slander, libel, defamation, unfounded accusations are serious professional misconduct.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 10 The article itself states: “He (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) discouraged engaging in hooliganism and incitement of violence”. The basis of this article is a study conducted by Felix Pal that attempts to establish RSS having a tight control over all its affiliates. So does the RSS’s discouragement to incitement of violence and its affiliates’ “exercising their vision of supremacy” through hooliganism logically add up? 7. Failure: Unverified causal theory presented as settled fact Statement Violated standard Counter statement with similar flavour “But the formula has remained central to its success ever since: uniting Hindus around grievances from the past and injecting

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Hit Job Guised as Study

Caravan’s purported study on Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and like-minded organisations smack of framing agenda for future Dr Aniket Pingley “A plausible explanation is not necessarily a true one.” Dr. Richard Feynman, American Physicist & Nobel Laureate  Synopsis: The Caravan published a study on December 17, 2025 titled “Unveiling the RSS – Exposing the largest far-right network in history”. Its central hypothesis can be summarized as follows: The RSS is not a loose family of ideologically inspired but autonomous organizations, as claimed. Rather, it functions as a single, centrally coordinated political organism that strategically uses thousands of legally distinct civil-society entities as proxies to expand power, evade accountability, and manufacture the illusion of an organic grassroots movement. The study repeatedly asserts that what appears as decentralization has in fact concealed bureaucratic control and that RSS maintains a dual narrative: public denial of control and internal acknowledgment of centralized authority. The central hypothesis smuggles in multiple unstated claims that radically escalate its meaning. Here is what the study actually posits: The study advances several interlocking claims: This is not the first, nor the last, “study” that “attempts” to “demystify” RSS and a large bouquet of organizations with shared ideals. Keeping my subjective opinion about the intention behind this study aside, let us put it to an objective, rational and fundamental test. The test has three questions: “Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.” Supreme Court of India, February 2021 Mapping Caravan’s Claims Against Four Postulations The afore-stated verification framework which includes first-hand verification, evidentiary validity and inferential necessity, will be applied to all postulations. P1: “Claims of autonomy are intentionally deceptive; RSS is consciously lying.” This is an accusation of intentional deception and not mis-description. Here are Caravan’s claims. Failure on Verification Test: Caravan’s Proof #1: Caravan states that RSS public material states that it “runs” other organizations as well. The books by Rakesh Sinha and Ratan Sharda are used as a proof of RSS own public material. It also hand wavingly states, “It is, however, common knowledge that the RSS’s influence extends far beyond this limited circle.” Counter-questions for Caravan: What is the basis to qualify a certain literary work as RSS own public material? Does RSS own a publication or on the contrary publicly denies owning a publication? Are even the authors cited holding any official position in RSS? Did Caravan meet an RSS top-level functionary to ascertain if the authors in-fact officially represent RSS? How does Caravan define and measure extent of RSS’s circle of influence? Failure: By asserting and concluding, before offering any evidence, that any literary work by an RSS sympathizer, well-wisher or volunteer is automatically RSS public material, Caravan demonstrates that it treats its own conclusions as proof, rather than seeking actual substantiation. Caravan has accused RSS of obfuscation while it being blurry about the mechanism to measure RSS influence by making use of hand waving statements. Caravan’s Proof #2: Caravan states, “the RSS, as has been repeatedly noted, is —not registered—not as an NGO, not as a religious trust, nor as any other legal entity.” And, that “ … lack of traceability on paper allowed it to set up a headquarters in the heart of the national capital without having to disclose its sources of funding, or even who its members are.” Failure: Legalese, clearly, is not of Caravan’s botheration. RSS is legally recognized in India as a “body of individuals” under the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 2(31). This means that RSS, as a BOI, can be assessed for income tax purposes as a separate entity. Headquarters of RSS are built and operated under Dr. Hedgewar Smarak Samiti, an independent society registered under the Societies Act. Both these facts are (purposefully?) left-out from the study. A cursory reading on Internet shows several legal notices, defamation suits, sedition charges etc. levied against Caravan by a variety of individuals and entities. Perhaps, it is due to lack of rigour for the legalese. Counter questions for Caravan: Which legal obligation is actually being evaded by RSS? Provided its disregard for legal facts, should anything that Caravan states related to legality be taken seriously? Closing remarks: The “evidence” by Caravan supports an alternative explanation: a culturally networked movement with loose (or strong) coordination but no unitary legal control, since RSS is presented to be “not” a legal entity. If not legally backed, how is control defined or measured? P2: Decision-making authority flows from a central node; affiliates lack discretion Here are the claims made by Caravan: Failure on the Verification Test: Caravan’s Proof #3: I will take one example among a few similar ones. Caravan states “the Maharaja Pratap Singh Ved Vidyalaya was established by a Pune-based organisation, Maharshi Ved Vyas Pratishthan, whose founder, Govindadev Giri, is an RSS member, the treasurer of VHP-controlled trust Ramjanmabhoomi Tirth Kshetra and also sits on the advisory board of the Nagpur hospital Madhav Netralaya, named after former RSS chief Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. According to RSS mouthpiece, Organiser, Govindadev Giri’s “initial samskars as RSS swayamsevak are manifested in” the Pratishthan.” Counter-questions for Caravan: Is it being posited that Govinddev Giri (Maharaj) takes orders from RSS on how to conduct his activities? Even if Maharaj is advisor to Madhav Netralaya, does the eye hospital run on whims of RSS through him? If so, can the chain of command be established and proven to be enforced?   Counter-example for Caravan:  The creative director at Caravan happens to be alumni of the same University as many members of UK-based Conservative Party, so Caravan must be peddling Conservative views. Is there any apparatus to measure degree of ridiculousness of this “proof”? Failure: The establishment and operational excellence of Maharishi Ved Vyas Pratishthan is not being considered as a meritorious position of Govinddev Giri’s national influence; but his early association with RSS is posited as his de facto qualification. Caravan’s Proof #4: “Pracharaks are trained in central RSS mission and, upon qualifying, sent out to Sangh appendages to maintain and consolidate control over the network,

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Reject Hindu Label to Slow Growth

Hinduphobia, colonial enslavement led certain intellectuals, socialists to frame Hinduness for tardy progress. Real culprits are socialists and their handlers! K.A.Badarinath It’s a colonial era slur. None has the right to deride about two billion Hindus living in 100 countries on some pretext or the other. Debunking Hindutva as being somehow responsible for Bharat’s tardy progress or sub-optimal GDP growth of 3.5 per cent in 1950s and 1980s era reeks of hatred. At last week’s Hindustan Times annual leadership summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi rightly pointed to colonial mind-set for framing Hindu faith with tardy economic growth. Big question is why does one attribute slow economic progress and development to Hindutva? Why do some scholars make derogatory remarks and prejudiced framework to point fingers at Hindu people? Why do self-proclaimed intellectuals and economists ignore Bharat’s seven to eight per cent growth in last two decades was precisely due to these very Hindus? Colonial overhang and socialist underpinning of some intellectuals may have led to bracket low growth with Hindutva. As per The Oxford Companion to Economics in India, economist Raj Krishna made an attempt in 1982 to link the then 3.5 per cent economic growth to an inherent cultural phenomenon. Raj Krishna, a faculty member with Delhi School of Economics, blamed Hindus for not thinking big, staying reticent sans ambition etc. Well, Raj Krishna or his disciples’ arguments are not tenable. He may have grossly erred on intent and by design. Economic progress and development models hitherto adopted during Smt Indira Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru were largely socialist in orientation and governance. Till, economic reforms were unveiled in 1991, state controls were overbearing and stifled growth. In pre-liberation era, strangulating free enterprise, spirit of Bharat’s businesses and individuals was the norm. Even the governance model was socialist in nature with most power concentrated in Prime Minister like the communist oligarchy. Most annoying was accusing Hindus of strangulating socio-economic development in Bharat and slowing down fight against poverty. It’s rather well documented that economist Raghuram Rajan had revived the debate on linking Hindutva to slow growth rates in 2023. In last quarter ending September 2025, Bharat’s economy reported an expansion of 8.2 per cent with about 65 crore people going to work. Similarly, Bharat was the top major economy to report growth of 7.3 per cent globally, highest amongst G-20 nations with China and Indonesia at second and third position with 5.3 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively in 2024-25. Countries like Italy and Canada reported contractions in their economies during some quarters. Germany reportedly was at bottom of the pyramid with a feeble 0.2 per cent growth. Stellar economic performance by Bharat was not given a cultural, civilizational or Dharmic label? If it’s not Hinduphobic mind-set, why did self-proclaimed intellectuals bring in Hindu angle to lack of or slow economic progress? Consequence of this Hinduphobic mind-set was that ‘Hindu rate of growth’ gained credence internationally amongst academics and audience thereby driving wrong notion and reinforcing that Bharat and Hindus was incapable of development. Attaching a civilizational label or wrongly portraying Hindus as lethargic or not being innovative may be rejected lock stock barrel. In fact, socialist policies adopted in first four decades put Bharat’s economy on a slumber. Unleashing the potential in a free, flexible and predictable policy paradigm would allow Bharat to realize its potential and emerge the ace. Getting out of colonial mind-set and rejecting out-dated socialist doctrines is pre-requisite to further hastening growth the Bharatiya way. (author is Director & Chief Executive at New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

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