Bharat Disinformation Hindus Media Misinformation World

Reheating the “Fascist” Leftovers: A Methodological Deconstruction of the TNI “Global Far-Right” Narrative

The Transnational Institute (TNI) report, “Hindutva as a Global Far-Right Project” (Shayan Shaukat, 2026), represents a quintessential exercise in Polemical Historiography. It is a document that uses the veneer of academic/scholarly inquiry to pursue a pre-determined political objective, failing the fundamental tests of Mechanism Demand and Inferential Necessity. By imposing Western socio-political categories – specifically 20th-century European Fascism, Neoliberalism, and Surveillance Capitalism onto a decentralised Indian civilizational phenomenon, the author commits a series of persistent category errors. Additionally, the report appears to have been created, as is the research pre-work, in isolation by compiling publicly available information into a bouquet of tropes. The report does not cite a single first-person interaction or provide even an orthogonal quote, which suggests the ends were established before the means. This essay demonstrates that the “global fascist nexus” described by the TNI is an analytical mirage created by Adversarial Semantic Laundering – a process where organic cultural affinity is recoded as a centralised command-and-control conspiracy. Utilizing the Starfish model in Organisational Theory, we show that the phenomenon is better explained as a distributed, open-source cultural protocol rather than a monolithic “Spider” hierarchy. The following deconstruction identifies the persistent evidentiary voids and logical contradictions that render the TNI’s thesis analytically inert, offering instead a superior/better model grounded in civilizational sociology and state capacity restoration.

Bharat Media Misinformation United States

744

Bias or Blind Spot?

Freedom House’s Western Biases, Methodological Flaws & Lack of Understanding of India’s Democratic Realities N. C. Bipindra American think tank Freedom House’s latest 2026 annual report rates India as “Partly Free” with a score of 62 on maximum 100 points. This has once again triggered a debate on how global democracy indexes assess nations, particularly large and complex ones like India. The report posits India within the broader narrative that Freedom House is building off twenty-year global decline in freedoms. A closer look at the assessment shows that Freedom House conclusions rest on methodological limitations, normative biases and insufficient contextualisation of India’s democratic ecosystem. The Freedom House’s methodological framing aggregates diverse indicators such as political rights, civil liberties, media freedom and minority protection into a single numerical score. While Freedom House may be targeting simplicity while quantifying the complex study, this clearly risks obscuring the immense heterogeneity of India’s federal structure. India’s governance standards, political competition and civil liberties vary significantly in different states and the entire nation is not universally governed by one single political formation or a uniform demographic composition. India is not a monolithic political entity but a vast and layered democracy of over 1.4 billion people. Reducing its democratic health to a single number inevitably leads to analytical compression or deviations where localised or episodic concerns are interpreted as systemic decline. Moreover, critics have long argued that Freedom House’s framework reflects a Western and liberal template of democracy, shaped by political and historical experience of United States and Europe. This raises questions about whether the same benchmarks can be uniformly applied to societies grappling with different challenges, including post-colonial state-building, socio-economic inequality and persistent security threats. In India’s case, the need to balance civil liberties with national security concerns, particularly in the context of cross-border terrorism and internal insurgencies, complicates any straightforward classification. The report’s broader claim of a continuous global decline in freedom over two decades also warrants scrutiny. While there is no denying the rise of authoritarian tendencies in certain regions, such a sweeping narrative risks over-generalisation. It tends to overlook democratic resilience in parts of the Global South and conflates governance challenges with democratic backsliding. In India, visible tensions within the political system may, in fact, reflect democratic contestation rather than erosion. A noisy, conflict-ridden public sphere is not necessarily evidence of authoritarianism; it can also indicate a system where competing interests continue to be negotiated in the open. One of the central concerns raised by the report is the alleged harassment of journalists, civil society organisations and political opponents. While individual cases and controversies undoubtedly exist, it is important to situate them within the broader landscape of Indian public life. India hosts one of world’s most expansive and diverse media ecosystems, spanning print, television and digital platforms. Critical reporting on government policies is widespread and investigative journalism continues to shape public discourse. Legal actions against media entities or non-governmental organisations are often framed in the report as politically motivated. But in many instances, they are rooted in regulatory compliance issues, particularly concerning financial transparency and foreign funding norms. The distinction between the enforcement of law and the suppression of dissent is crucial and often blurred in external assessments. Similarly, the claim that political opposition is under systematic pressure must be weighed against empirical realities. Opposition parties continue to win elections at the state level, govern key regions and mount significant electoral and political challenges. The regularity of elections, high voter turnout and peaceful transitions of power underscore the continued vitality of India’s democratic framework. Institutions such as the Election Commission of India play a central role in ensuring electoral integrity and despite criticisms, they remain broadly functional and credible. All criticisms of India’s Election Commission haven’t stood judicial scrutiny in the last decade. This goes on to prove that the poll body’s institutional functioning met quality standards in consonance with the constitutional framework and election laws. The report’s emphasis on the marginalisation of minority communities, including Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, touches upon a deeply important issue. However, it is essential to distinguish between structural socio-economic inequalities and deliberate state-led democratic regression. India’s social fabric has long been shaped by hierarchies and disparities that predate contemporary political developments. Successive governments have implemented policies aimed at addressing these challenges, including affirmative action, targeted welfare schemes and financial inclusion initiatives. While gaps remain and must be addressed, framing these issues solely as indicators of declining freedom risks overlooking both historical context and ongoing policy interventions. Another area of concern highlighted in the report is the perceived weakening of political pluralism, including practices such as “resort politics” and challenges in implementation of the Right to Information framework. Yet, these phenomena are not unique to India and are often characteristic of competitive democracies. Political manoeuvring, party defections and coalition instability are features seen in many parliamentary systems. Crucially, such developments in India are subject to legal scrutiny and institutional oversight. The Right to Information Act, despite implementation challenges, continues to empower citizens and remains one of the most robust transparency mechanisms globally. Isolated administrative bottlenecks do not necessarily amount to a systemic erosion of accountability. The report also draws attention to the controversial practice of punitive demolitions, sometimes described as “bulldozer justice,” and references a 2024 ruling by the Supreme Court of India that deemed such actions unconstitutional. While the concerns surrounding due process are valid, the very fact that the judiciary intervened to check executive overreach highlights the resilience of India’s institutional framework. The availability of legal remedies, the role of an independent judiciary and the intensity of public debate all point to a system capable of self-correction. Rather than indicating authoritarian drift, such episodes demonstrate the dynamic tension between different arms of the state, which is intrinsic to a functioning democracy. A comprehensive evaluation of India must also take into account the scale and complexity of its electoral processes. Regular elections involving hundreds of millions of voters are conducted with remarkable logistical

Bharat Defence Security Technology

380

INS Aridaman: Designed, Built and Armed at Home

No foreign blueprints. No borrowed reactor. No licensed hull. India built its third nuclear-powered submarine from scratch.Rahul PAWA | X – @imrahulpawa The commissioning of INS Aridhaman on 3 April 2026 completes a threshold that India’s strategic community has been working toward for the better part of three decades. With three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines now in the active fleet, India crosses from a state that possesses a nuclear triad in principle to one that can sustain it in practice. The distinction matters more than it might appear. A single hull proves a concept. Two hulls suggest a programme. Three hulls represent a fleet, with the rotation depth, maintenance margins and operational flexibility that serious continuous deterrence requires. That this fleet was designed, engineered and built within India, without a foreign prime contractor and without publicly acknowledged technology transfer, places the programme in a category occupied by very few states. The platform’s sovereign character is not peripheral context. It is central to understanding what Aridhaman’s induction actually signals, both regionally and globally. To appreciate what Aridhaman represents, the fundamentals of Submarine Submerged Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) strategy are worth stating plainly. A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine is the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, and among the three legs, land, air and sea, it is the one that gives deterrence planners the most confidence and adversaries the least. Land-based missiles are fixed, mappable and theoretically destroyable in a coordinated first strike. Aircraft require airfields that can be struck before bombers scramble. A submarine running silent at operational depth in three-dimensional oceanic space presents an entirely different targeting problem. It cannot be located with confidence, which means it cannot be neutralised with confidence, which means any adversary contemplating a nuclear first strike against India must factor in near-certain retaliation from a platform they cannot find. That is the essence of second-strike credibility, and it is the foundation upon which India’s No First Use doctrine ultimately rests. Aridhaman makes that foundation harder to crack and India built it entirely herself. The boat emerged from the Advanced Technology Vessel programme, one of the most closely guarded and strategically consequential defence programmes India has ever run. Displacement is reported at approximately 7,000 tonnes. The propulsion plant is a pressurised water reactor, almost certainly an evolved version of the 83-megawatt unit fitted in INS Arihant, itself designed and built in India. The missile payload architecture is where Aridhaman steps forward most visibly. The boat carries both the K-15 Sagarika, a two-stage solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of approximately 750 kilometres, and the considerably more capable K-4, with an estimated range of 3,500 kilometres and a nuclear warhead in the sub-tonne class. Both missiles are Indian. Critically, some reporting attributes eight vertical launch tubes to Aridhaman, against the four fitted in INS Arihant. If accurate, this doubles the platform’s operational magazine, a meaningful increase in what India can hold at risk from a single submerged hull, and a significant qualitative step beyond its predecessors. The strategic arithmetic follows directly from that technical baseline. A submarine carrying eight K-4 missiles, operating from the Bay of Bengal at patrol depth, can range targets across virtually the entire Chinese landmass. India’s nuclear posture against Pakistan has long been addressed adequately by land-based Agni variants and air-delivered weapons. China presents a structurally different problem. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force fields a large and increasingly survivable land-based arsenal. The People’s Liberation Army Navy operates its own SSBN fleet, with Type 094 Jin-class boats based at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island, armed with the JL-2 with range sufficient to cover major Indian cities. For India to maintain credible deterrence against a nuclear adversary of that scale and sophistication, it requires a platform that can hold Chinese strategic assets at risk from a position Beijing cannot locate or neutralise in advance. A submerged SSBN operating in the eastern Indian Ocean addresses that requirement on India’s own terms, with India’s own technology. The question of sustainability is where Aridhaman’s induction carries the most analytical weight. INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, established that India possessed the scientific and industrial capacity to build and operate a nuclear submarine indigenously, an achievement that took decades of investment to realise. INS Arighaat, commissioned in August 2024, demonstrated that the capability was replicable and that a production line existed. Aridhaman now gives India three hulls in the active fleet, which is the threshold at which Continuous At-Sea Deterrence becomes operationally achievable. CASD, the standard maintained by the United Kingdom and France among others, requires a minimum one submarine on patrol at all times. With three hulls, accounting for maintenance cycles, crew rotations and refit schedules, that standard moves from aspirational to realistic. India has not formally declared CASD status, but the structure of the programme makes the intent evident. The strategic signalling embedded in Aridhaman’s commissioning operates across multiple audiences simultaneously. For Pakistan, it reinforces an already understood reality: India’s second-strike capability is secure and expanding. For China, it introduces a more capable and considerably harder-to-track underwater threat at strategic depth, one armed with missiles of Indian design and sufficient range to cover targets deep within Chinese territory. For Washington and its partners, it underscores the character of India’s deterrent posture, sovereign in the most complete sense, designed, built and operated without dependence on any external power, which has direct implications for how India’s strategic autonomy is read within the broader Indo-Pacific architecture. Reports of a fourth and fifth SSBN in various stages of development indicate the programme’s ambition has not peaked. In deterrence theory, credibility rests on two pillars: capability and survivability. India has now demonstrated both, and it has done so entirely on its own terms. The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and HolisticStudies (CIHS).

Bharat Geopolitics

439

From Vision to Strategy: India-Japan Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Vivek Raina The partnership between Japan and India has developed into a key component of modern Indo-Pacific geopolitics, signifying a change from an economic partnership to a full strategic alignment. This collaboration, which is based on a commitment to a rules-based system, mutual trust and shared democratic principles, is now crucial in tackling new regional issues. This document highlights how India and Japan are changing their engagement from transactional cooperation into a forward-looking strategic enterprise by further aligning their views and capacities to foster stability, resilience and inclusive prosperity as the Indo-Pacific power dynamics continue to change. Context India-Japan collaboration has become one of the key strategic alliances of the twenty-first century, with results that go well beyond bilateral interaction. A fully institutionalised, all-encompassing strategic alliance based on common democratic ideals, the rule of law and a shared commitment to regional stability has developed from what started as an economic association focused on the trade of cars and electronics. These days, this partnership is motivated by a distinct convergence of geopolitical interests, especially in reaction to the Indo-Pacific region’s changing power dynamics. Its fundamental goal is to maintain a rules-based international order and guarantee the continued freedom, openness, inclusivity and security of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to enhancing bilateral relations, India and Japan are influencing the larger regional architecture through collaboration in vital areas like supply chain resilience, infrastructure development, maritime security and emerging technologies. As a result, this collaboration is now transformational rather than transactional, establishing both countries as key players in preserving security and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific. Strategic Importance of the Indo-Pacific Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a central pillar of global geopolitics and economics, making it critically important for both India and Japan. Spanning Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas, it accounts for over 60% of global GDP and nearly 65% of the world’s population, positioning it as the core of global economic activity. The region hosts vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, through which a significant portion of global trade and energy supplies flow, making maritime security and stability in areas like the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal essential. For India and Japan, the Indo-Pacific is also a strategic space to counterbalance China’s growing influence, particularly through coordinated infrastructure and connectivity initiatives in countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative, alongside cooperation with partners such as the United States, Australia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Both countries advocate a Free and Open Indo-Pacific based on rule of law, freedom of navigation and an inclusive, rules-based economic order. The region’s strategic importance is further reinforced by ASEAN’s central role in linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with India supporting a unified ASEAN to ensure regional stability and prevent fragmentation. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific sits at the crossroads of global energy flows and supply chains, with a substantial share of global exports and millions of barrels of crude oil transiting through it annually, making its security vital for economic resilience. Together, these factors underscore why the Indo-Pacific is not only a geographic construct but a strategic imperative for India and Japan in shaping a stable, balanced, and prosperous regional order. India–Japan Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision has emerged as one of the most influential strategic frameworks shaping regional geopolitics over the past decade. Conceived to ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains free, inclusive, rules-based, and open to commerce, FOIP reflects Tokyo’s response to shifting power balances, maritime insecurity and the growing salience of connectivity and economic resilience. For India, FOIP has not only complemented its own strategic outlook but has also deepened one of its most consequential partnerships with Japan. At its core, FOIP is anchored in three principles: the rule of law, freedom of navigation and the promotion of connectivity through quality infrastructure. These principles resonate strongly with India’s own vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and its broader Indo-Pacific policy. The convergence is not accidental. Both India and Japan are maritime democracies with a shared interest in maintaining stability across vital sea lanes that carry energy supplies, trade and digital connectivity. The India–Japan partnership has evolved significantly in tandem with FOIP. What began as an economic relationship has matured into a comprehensive strategic partnership encompassing defence, infrastructure, technology and multilateral coordination. The institutionalisation of this partnership is evident in regular 2+2 ministerial dialogues, defence exercises such as Malabar and increasing interoperability between the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. These developments are not merely symbolic; they reflect a shared understanding that maritime security is central to regional stability. A key dimension of FOIP is connectivity, where Japan has played a pivotal role in supporting infrastructure development across the Indo-Pacific. In India, Japanese investments in projects like the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Corridor and industrial corridors underscore a commitment to high-quality, transparent and sustainable infrastructure. Beyond India, both countries have collaborated in third-country projects, particularly in South Asia and Africa, offering alternatives to debt-driven infrastructure models. This cooperative approach strengthens regional resilience while reinforcing norms of transparency and sustainability. FOIP also intersects with the evolving role of minilateral groupings, most notably the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising India, Japan, the United States, and Australia. While FOIP predates the revival of the Quad, it has provided an intellectual and strategic foundation for its agenda. For India and Japan, the Quad is not a military alliance but a platform for coordinating responses to shared challenges, including maritime security, disaster relief, supply chain resilience and emerging technologies. This flexible, issue-based cooperation reflects the pragmatic nature of FOIP. The economic dimension of FOIP is equally significant. The Indo-Pacific accounts for a substantial share of global GDP and trade and disruptions in this region have far-reaching consequences. India and Japan have increasingly aligned their economic strategies, particularly in supply chain diversification. Initiatives such as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) aim to

Bharat Pakistan Terrorism United States USA War World

373

Pakistan May Use Iran as a Smokescreen to Spread Terror in India

Intelligence warnings are flashing red. The arrests are piling up. Pakistan does not need a reason to export terror to India. It needs an opportunity. And right now, with West Asia in open conflict, Pakistan’s deep state believes it has exactly that. Rahul PAWA | X – @imrahulpawa Every major world crisis has provided Pakistan’s terror machinery with operational cover to strike India, timed with cold precision to moments of maximum international distraction or diplomatic leverage. On March 20, 2000, the eve of Bill Clinton’s arrival in India, 35 Sikh men were lined up and shot dead in Chittisinghpora village in Jammu and Kashmir’s Anantnag district. The terrorists wore Indian Army uniforms and spoke Punjabi and Urdu, a calculated false flag designed to hand the visiting American president fresh images of fabricated Indian Army atrocities in Jammu and Kashmir. It was Lashkar-e-Taiba, operating under the Pakistan Army’s direction and its foreign intelligence agency ISI’s direct command. After 9/11, with American attention consumed by Afghanistan and the world watching Islamabad perform as a frontline ally in its “war against terror”, Pakistan’s deep state moved with characteristic audacity. On December 13, 2001, LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists stormed the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, killing nine security personnel and nearly triggering a full-scale war. The attack was not opportunistic. It was a calculated attempt to internationalise Jammu and Kashmir at a moment when the world was already in crisis and the Islamic world was split. In November 2008, as Gaza descended into violent escalation and global Islamic outrage peaked, ten Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists sailed into Mumbai and held the city hostage for sixty hours, killing 166 people across multiple coordinated sites including the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, and the Nariman House Jewish centre. The terrorist attack was meticulously planned, with Pakistan Army and its ISI providing training, logistics, and real-time operational guidance. This is not Pakistan-sponsored terrorism born of desperation. It was Pakistan Army strategy, executed with maximum cynicism. In 2001 it wore the mask of America’s indispensable ally against terror while simultaneously directing terror at India. Today it wears the mask of a responsible Islamic middle power and self-appointed Iran mediator while running active cells across Indian cities. The mask changes. The target never does. Domestically, the amendment of Article 370 of the Indian constitution in August 2019 began delivering what Pakistan had spent decades of propaganda insisting was impossible. Pakistani generals watched in horror as peace and normalcy returned to Jammu and Kashmir. Tourism surged. Investment flowed. A new generation of Kashmiris was experiencing connectivity and economic opportunity rather than terror branded as jihad. The Kashmir valley, whose civilisational roots run deep into Hindu tradition, whose saints and ancient temples reflect centuries of Hindu practice long preceding the region’s recent history, was beginning to rediscover itself on its own terms. The Pakistan Army could not allow this. A peaceful, prosperous Jammu and Kashmir demolished the foundational premise of Pakistan’s existence and its seventy-year investment in terror, war, and propaganda. So it recalibrated and struck. On April 22, 2025, three Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists armed with American M4 carbines, AK-47s, and a GoPro camera traced to a Chinese distributor and activated in Dongguan fourteen months before the attack, descended into Baisaran Valley and separated Hindu men from their wives and children before executing them in cold blood. They fled before Indian security forces arrived and were hunted down a few months later, with Home Minister Amit Shah confirming their elimination in Indian Parliament on July 29. From the bodies of attackers, investigators recovered Pakistani voter ID slips linked to Lahore constituency NA-125 and Gujranwala constituency NA-79, and biometric data from Pakistan’s National Database on a micro-SD card recovered from a broken satellite phone. The objective, as evidenced by the immediate operational claim on social media by The Resistance Front, a proscribed outfit and proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba operating out of Muridke, was precise. Blame Hindus, declare Kashmir exclusively Islamic land, and manufacture an outsider and insider narrative implying that the very Hindus who form the civilisational core of Kashmir since its existence were settlers and occupiers. A fabricated narrative lifted directly from recent collaborators Hamas and Hezbollah’s playbooks in West Asia, designed to erase the Hindu soul of a valley Pakistan has spent decades trying to destabilise. India’s response was decisive and precise. Operation Sindoor struck nine confirmed terrorist training sites: Markaz Taiba in Muridke, LeT’s headquarters where the 26/11 Mumbai attackers were trained; Markaz Subhan Allah in Bahawalpur, Jaish-e-Mohammed’s nerve centre; the Masjid Syedna Bilal camp in Muzaffarabad; the Gulpur camp in Kotli; the Sawai Nala camp in Muzaffarabad; the Abbas camp in Kotli; the Mehmoona Joya facility of Hizbul Mujahideen in Sialkot; the Barnala camp in Bhimber; and the Sarjal facility at Tehra Kalan, a key weapons storage site. These were not arbitrary targets. They were the nerve centres behind decades of attacks on India including the IC-814 hijacking, the 2001 Indian Parliament attacks, and the 2008 Mumbai carnage. Pakistan’s response was to have its generals and senior officers attend the funerals of globally proscribed terrorists and then escalate. Pakistani forces deployed KARGU-2 loitering munitions and Bayraktar TB2 drones procured from Turkey and China in waves against Indian civilian and military targets. On the night of May 9 to 10, Indian air defence intercepted a Pakistani Fatah-II hypersonic ballistic missile over Sirsa in Haryana, aimed at targets near Delhi. In response to Pakistani escalation, Indian armed forces struck eleven Pakistani airbases including Nur Khan in Rawalpindi, the Pakistan Air Force’s central command and logistics hub, Rafiqui in Shorkot, Sargodha’s Mushaf Base, Murid in Chakwal, Skardu in Gilgit-Baltistan, and Bholari in Sindh, degrading frontline squadrons, runway infrastructure, drone hubs, and radar installations across the country. SEAD operations disabled air defence radars in Lahore and Gujranwala. The Indian Navy’s Western Fleet, including an aircraft carrier, repositioned in the northern Arabian Sea within operational range of Karachi. The intensity and reach of India’s strikes forced Pakistan’s DGMO to call his Indian counterpart and

Bharat Canada Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Khalistan Policy

396

Canada’s Bill C-9 and Its Implications for Hindus and Khalistani Extremism

With the enactment of Bill C-9 (Combatting Hate Act), Canada’s legislative stance on hate speech, extremist iconography and religious space protection underwent an important change. The law establishes penalties for intimidation at religious institutions motivated by hatred and makes it illegal to publicly display insignia associated with terrorist groups. The law is both a chance for legal protection and a test of the legitimacy of enforcement for Canada’s Hindu minority, which is dealing with an increase in temple destruction, intimidation, and hate speech related to Khalistan. The rule was passed in response to growing worries about targeted animosity toward Hindu populations, temple destruction, and radicalization of the diaspora.

Bharat Disinformation Hindus Human Rights Misinformation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

407

Rebuttal of USCIRF India Entry and Issue Update on Alleged Religious Persecution

Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) has released a comprehensive rebuttal of the USCIRF Annual Report 2026 and its accompanying Issue Update on India. The rebuttal finds that USCIRF’s recommendation to designate India a Country of Particular Concern rests on methodological failures, unsourced assertions, and recommendations disconnected from the document’s own findings. Most strikingly, the report proposes sanctioning Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the world’s largest voluntary organisation and India’s Research and Analysis Wing without a single evidentiary basis anywhere in its text. CIHS concludes that documents of this kind, issued under the authority of a U.S. government commission, do not serve the cause of religious freedom. They damage the mutual respect on which one of the world’s most consequential democratic partnerships depends.

Bharat Hindus

404

India’s Moral Diplomacy: Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam in an Age of Conflict

R K Raina India’s engagement with the world has never been guided solely by strategic calculations or economic interests. For millennia, the country’s outlook toward humanity has been shaped by a deeper civilisational ethic Sharanagata Rakshanam, the sacred duty to protect those who seek refuge. Rooted in the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the world is one family, this principle has repeatedly guided India’s actions across history. India’s recent humanitarian gesture toward the Iranian naval vessel reflects the principle that offering protection in times of distress transcends political differences. It demonstrates that India’s approach to international engagement remains rooted in compassion, restraint, and moral responsibility. Leadership Anchored in Civilisational Values In recent years, India’s leadership has increasingly emphasised the Bharatiya ancient civilisational ethos as a guiding principle of its global engagement. Concepts such as Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, prominently articulated during India’s global diplomatic initiatives, reflect the continuity of this worldview. By reaffirming these values in practice, the present government has highlighted that India’s foreign policy cannot be separated from its cultural and civilisational foundations. Actions rooted in humanitarian responsibility reinforce India’s credibility as a nation that combines strategic strength with moral conviction. Rather than acting as a power seeking dominance, India has often positioned itself as a bridge-builder, encouraging dialogue and stability while maintaining a high moral ground. At a time when conflicts and geopolitical rivalries are destabilising many regions, India’s civilisational values provide a moral compass that continues to shape its foreign policy and humanitarian responses. The recent decision to provide shelter to an Iranian naval vessel in Indian coastal waters during heightened regional tensions reflects not merely a diplomatic gesture but a continuation of a long-standing moral tradition. A Tradition Older Than the State India’s civilisational memory is filled with examples that emphasise the protection of those who seek refuge. Historical texts and folklore highlight that safeguarding a person who comes under one’s protection is a sacred duty. One of the most powerful illustrations of this ethos is the legend of King Shibi, who chose to sacrifice his own flesh to save a dove that had sought refuge from a pursuing hawk. The story symbolizes a moral ideal deeply embedded in Indian consciousness, the obligation of the protector toward the protected. This civilisational ethos later translated into real historical practice. Over centuries, India became a sanctuary for communities fleeing persecution and displacement. The Syrian Christians, escaping religious persecution in the Middle East, arrived on the Malabar Coast between the first and fourth centuries and were welcomed by local rulers. They were granted land, social recognition, and the freedom to practice their faith while becoming part of the broader cultural fabric of India. Similarly, Jewish communities such as the Cochin Jews and the Bene Israel lived in India for centuries without facing the systemic persecution that marked their experience in many other parts of the world. Historical documents, including the copper plate grants of the Chera rulers, gave them autonomy and the freedom to maintain their religious institutions. The arrival of the Parsis in the eighth century offers another powerful example. Fleeing the Islamic conquest of Persia, they sought refuge on the western coast of India. According to the well-known narrative of Qissa-i-Sanjan, the local ruler initially indicated that his kingdom was already full. The Parsi priest responded by adding sugar to a bowl of milk, symbolising that his community would blend peacefully into society while enriching it. The Parsis were welcomed and allowed to preserve their faith while adopting aspects of the local culture, eventually becoming one of India’s most dynamic and respected communities. These examples reflect a distinctive Indian approach coexistence with identity, rather than forced assimilation. Modern India and the Continuity of Civilisational Values Independent India carried forward this civilisational legacy into its modern statecraft. India has repeatedly demonstrated humanitarian leadership during major crises. During World War II, Maharaja Digvijaysinhji Jadeja of Nawanagar opened his kingdom to more than a thousand Polish children who had escaped the devastation of Europe. He treated them not as refugees but as members of his own family, famously telling them that they were no longer orphans. In 1959, when the 14th Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans fled Tibet following the Chinese crackdown, India granted them asylum and enabled the Tibetan community to rebuild its cultural and religious life in exile. Today, the Tibetan presence in India stands as one of the most remarkable examples of cultural preservation in exile. Similarly, during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, India opened its borders to nearly ten million refugees fleeing violence in East Pakistan. Despite severe economic constraints at the time, India provided shelter, food, and humanitarian assistance on a massive scale. These actions were not merely political decisions but expressions of India’s enduring civilisational ethos of Karuna compassion. India’s Civilisational Responsibility in Today’s Conflicts In today’s volatile geopolitical environment, particularly amid tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, India’s role assumes special significance. The region stretching from the Middle East to South Asia has deep historical and cultural connections with India. Instability in this region affects not only geopolitical alignments but also shared civilisational linkages built over centuries. A Bridge Between Civilisations India’s engagement with the Middle East and neighbouring regions has historically been rooted in cultural exchange, trade, and spiritual interaction rather than confrontation. In moments of crisis, this civilisational perspective allows India to occupy a unique moral space one that emphasizes dialogue, stability, and the protection of human life. The expectation from India today is therefore not only strategic but also moral. The region looks toward India as a country capable of combining strategic prudence with civilisational wisdom. A Message to the World In a world often driven by narrow geopolitical interests, India’s civilisational philosophy offers a different vision one where compassion, protection, and moral responsibility remain central to international conduct. The ancient dictum “Udaar Charitanam Tu Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” reminds us that for the noble-minded, the entire world is one family. India’s long history of sheltering the persecuted and supporting the

Bharat Hindus Human Rights Khalistan Pakistan

405

Khalistani Terror Propaganda Put Bharat, US on Edge

Free run given to SFJ that equated Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iran’s Khamenei reflect insensitivity of US & Canada. N. C. Bipindra Latest provocative images and videos posted on social media by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) have triggered a controversy intersecting free speech, diaspora politics, territorial integrity, global diplomacy and international relations. SFJ frames its posts and messages as a free speech exercise asserting democratic rights within United States. But, the content portraying Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed in airstrikes by US and Israel on February 28, 2026 is of serious concern. Such messaging not only constitutes indecency and insensitivity but crosses limits and enters the realm of hostile propaganda, incitement of violence, deliberate misinformation and intolerable provocation. US authorities, particularly President Donald Trump, who calls Modi his good friend, should not turn a blind eye to such provocative content. For New Delhi, such freedom to propagate violence against India’s elected prime minister on US soil should have potential consequences for India-US relations. To understand why the SFJ’s post and its contents are contentious and objectionable, it is important to consider both the nature of messaging and broader political context in which the proscribed terrorist organisation operates. SFJ has no ground support in India, particularly the Sikh-majority Punjab province, but it operates freely in US and neighbouring Canada with impunity. SFJ advocates balkanisation of India, in particular, creation of imaginary Khalistan, a proposed independent theocratic Sikh state carved out of only Indian territories. An illegal Khalistan map that SFJ has released in last few years conveniently ignores territories that are now part of Pakistan but were historically ruled by Sikh emperors. But, the map includes present-day Indian provinces of Punjab, Haryana, Sikh-majority areas of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh with Shimla as its future capital. The reasons for not claiming Pakistan’s Punjab and other provinces that were part of the erstwhile Sikh kingdom’s rule are not so difficult to fathom. Trump administration and Mark Carney government must read two key research reports released by US-based Hudson Institute and Canada-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI). Hudson Institute’s ‘Destabilisation Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism within the US’ authored by Aparna Pande, Husain Haqqani, C. Christine Fair and others present two main arguments that warrant attention of Trump administration. The Hudson Institute’s September 2021 report calls for investigations into Khalistani groups’ activities in US noting that these were directly involved in numerous terror attacks around the world including 1985 Air India’s ‘Kanishka’ bombing that left 329 people including Canadians dead and to shed reluctance to act on intelligence provided by India. MLI’s September 2020 report authored by senior Canadian journalist Terry Milewski, titled ‘Khalistan: A Project of Pakistan’ argues that the separatist movement was designed to subvert national security of both Canada and India, a serious threat that Carney’s government should be vigilant about. Those two reports would help Western democracies that are open to understand dangers of allowing SFJ and self-styled general counsel Gurpatwant Singh Pannun to be haughty. SFJ was banned in India in 2019 for threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, US and Canada are inviting such treacherous tendencies to grow within their territory without realising that the snake they feed would come back to bite them tomorrow, if not today. Indian proscription notwithstanding, SFJ continues to hold farcical “referendums” in US, Canada United Kingdom and Australia attempting to mobilise sections of Sikh diaspora around Khalistani cause. The latest social posts along with a video shared by SFJ are controversial due to their tone, tenor and intent. Equating Modi with Ali Khamenei is a clear attempt to draw parallels between a democratically elected popular leader of India and head of a theocratic state, often regarded as adversarial to West, particularly the US. This can’t be just criticism of Indian government or simply free speech, but rather a deliberate bid to delegitimise and demonise the Indian state, its political leadership and 1.4 billion Indians before the global audience and calling for destablising India through elimination of its prime minister or overthrowing the existing regime. Hudson Institute and Macdonald-Laurier Institute reports point to “playbook” and “project” against India, its political leadership and its people. In particular, use of “India’s Khamenei Alive” slogan juxtaposed with reference to Iran’s Ali Khamenei is a calculated attempt to evoke hostility, suspicion in US to frame India as a strategic adversary of West alongside Iran. Contrasting the phrase “Iran’s Khamenei dead” with “India’s Khamenei alive” is suggestive and goes beyond political free speech and commentary. It stops short of an explicit call to assassinate Indian prime minister. It normalises the idea of dastardly outcomes that can be interpreted as endorsement or glorification which is more troubling. Such rhetoric in democratic societies may not meet strict legal threshold for incitement but is nonetheless considered irresponsible and potentially vicious. SFJ’s post escalates issue by portraying India as an “enemy” of US. This messaging contradicts reality of India-US ties that have grown into a comprehensive strategic partnership since 2007 encompassing defence cooperation, economic ties and shared strategic interests in Indo-Pacific region grounded in values common to both nations. SFJ’s narrative-building is an attempt to influence public opinion and policy discourse in the West particularly United States. This messaging is sensitive, as it weaponises diaspora activism to advance geopolitical perceptions. The objection to such content is rooted in broader pattern associated with SFJ activities. Over the years, the proscribed fringe outfit has carried on inflammatory and divisive campaigns from controversial slogans to provocative demonstrations at Khalistan-related events. Its members have defaced Hindu temples in US and attacked Indian diplomatic missions. These actions have regularly pushed the boundaries of acceptable political expression and free speech. While some such instances have drawn condemnation in host nations, they highlight the fine line between activism and provocation that governments such as Trump’s and Carney’s should be mindful of. The US may have protection for free speech under First Amendment in its Constitution, but highly offensive and objectionable messages directly incite violence and

Bharat Defence Geopolitics International Policy United States War World

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A Fine Balancing Act!

Post-war uncertainty in West Asia pose serious challenges with jostle for control of oil assets, ruling Iran with an iron fist and Bharat has its task cut out. K.A.Badarinath US President Donald J Trump’s statement on ‘ending the war’ shortly cannot be taken on its face value. Nor do the markets, stakeholders expect the war on Iran unleashed by both US and Israel to end shortly. Also, consequences of this two-week war would be too enormous and spread across the globe even if it ended abruptly without key questions answered or objectives met with. For countries across continents, big and small, developed, developing or under-developed, the impact would be proportional whether one is a party to this war or stayed away. Beyond loss of lives in thousands, destruction of infrastructure built over a decade in West Asian countries, this war may not yield much substantively. Well, both Israel’s Benzamin Netanyahu and US President Trump’s ego of sizing up Iran may well be massaged while duo sport victory signs, offer interviews during and after the bloody conflict followed by jostle to win billions of dollars contracts to resurrect the American aligned assets of consequence. At least till now, the war has not achieved its primary objective of forcing current Shia leadership in Iran headed by Mojtaba Khamenei into submission and object surrender. While President Trump claims a ‘victorious end’ to the war, Iran’s leadership has been defiant and vows to bring the conflict to a close on its terms, timing and the way it deems fit. The rant that ‘there’s hardly anything left in Iran’ may be to mollify American oil lobby, GCC allies and calm down European Union partners that fear complete disruption of oil and gas supplies into their homes. Second objective was to install a new regime and completely dismantle the Shias’ religious rule. The stated position was to ring in a more democratic, open, flexible and American friendly regime in Tehran. But, that seems to be eons away. Most interesting is that youngsters’ hitherto opposed to religious leadership and revolutionary guards are not seen on streets of Iran rejoicing anymore. Instead, the overwhelming sentiment is that ‘Iran be ruled by Iranians’ and not outsiders. This nationalistic outburst amongst ordinary Iranians is something that President Trump and his key advisors did not foresee. Hence, there may not be another Trump-triggered Board of Governance for Iran like Gaza that will take reins in Tehran. Thirdly, President Trump’s war seems to have the potential to turn tide and bring both Shias as well as Sunnis apart from minority groups in Tehran on one platform as part of a rainbow alliance to take charge of Iranian affairs post-war. Differences notwithstanding, minorities like Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Lurs, Balochs, Arabs and Turkmens may consider joining this rainbow coalition. Till now, these minorities have not warmed up to Trump’s idea of taking charge in Tehran without participation of Shias. Fourthly, there’s a possibility that the rainbow coalition may not run as a puppet government in the hands of European powers and the US, assert itself and chart its own path. Fifthly, complete isolation of Iran in West Asia from its dozen neighbouring countries in West Asia also may not happen. Bombing of US assets in these countries may not lead to an anti-Iran campaign in the Muslim world. Instead, Islamist narrative may go the other way with Iran seen standing up alone against US and its allies. Will other West Asian countries rally behind Iran to resist takeover by US is a billion dollar question? Sixthly, anti-American sentiment may trigger larger participation of China, Russia and others in West Asian affairs going forward. Even in reconstruction of Iran, these powers may play a vital role with resources, investments given the strategic importance of pursuing an anti-US line. Seventhly, in post-war scenario, biggest issue would be exercising control over Iran’s enormous oil and gas assets and Gulf of Hormuz thereby key shipping lines, movement of energy supplies, cargo etc. Eighthly, post-war, 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) that positioned itself as united progressive voice of Muslim world may undergo big change to reflect new realities in West Asia. Rupture in this mega conglomeration is bound to deepen in case the member-countries adopted a radical Islamist agenda, promoted terror and created infrastructure to further such forces of disruption. Ninthly, reforming banks and financial institutions hitherto run on Sharia principles, neck deep in ‘islamizing the world’ would make Muslims more acceptable as a religious group especially in Western framework. For countries like Bharat that have not jumped blindly into war hysteria has an opportunity and equivalent challenges in West Asia engagement. About 10-million plus diaspora that are mostly employed with services industry, corporates, financial sector and elsewhere would play a larger role in post-war Iran and other West Asian capitals. As a peacenik opposed to violence and war, Bharat maintained ‘strategic autonomy’, kept equidistant in the conflict and attempted at bringing warring parties on to one table. When the war ends, Bharat would be most acceptable to play the role of ‘a big balancing power’ in Gulf’s renewed engagement with US and European Union. On economic and development front, Bharat can partner with Tehran sans hesitation. It’s in the interest of both West Asian economies and India that stability quickly returns to the region and start afresh in Iran’s engagement internationally. (Author is a veteran journalist, Director & Chief Executive of non-partisan think-tank based in New Delhi, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

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