CIHS – Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies

Date/Time:

Hypocrisy Mars Press Freedom Index

Hypocrisy Mars Press Freedom Index

Enhanced transparency, fairness, inclusivity and addressing structural issues will make Reporters Without Borders report more credible. Madhu Hebbar World Press Freedom Day is observed annually on May 3 by United Nations General Assembly beginning 1993 to champion fundamental role of free press in free democratic societies. It promotes press freedom, evaluates its global state, defends media independence and honours journalists who face persecution or death for their work (United Nations, www.un.org). In 2025, the focus is impact of artificial intelligence on journalism, addressing both its potential to enhance reporting and its risks, such as misinformation and surveillance. The day calls for governments to protect journalists and encourages media professionals to reflect on ethical challenges, emphasizing the press as cornerstone of democracy. World Press Freedom Index, published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), ranks 180 countries based on press freedom across five indicators: political context, legal framework, economic context, socio-cultural context and safety (RSF, rsf.org). In 2024, rankings for United States, United Kingdom, France and India reveal varied challenges, while criticisms of the index’s methodology and perceived biases spark debates about its objectivity. United States (Rank: 55th, Score: 66.59) As per the index, US dropped 10 places from 45th in 2023 with press freedom score of 66.59, the lowest in recent years (Statista, www.statista.com). RSF cites growing public distrust in media, fueled by political antagonism, as a key factor. Limited government interference notwithstanding, media ownership concentration, decline of local newsrooms, and layoffs—thousands of journalists lost jobs in 2023–2024—have weakened media landscape (RSF, rsf.org). Biden administration’s rhetoric such as calling journalism “not a crime,” contrasts with its pursuit of WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange and failure to press allies like Israel on press freedom violations (RSF, rsf.org). Critics argue US ranking reflects domestic political polarization rather than overt censorship, yet its mid-tier position highlights structural vulnerabilities in a supposed bastion of free speech (ICIJ, www.icij.org). United Kingdom (Rank: 23rd, Score: 78.29) UK improved slightly to 23rd in 2024 from 26th in 2023 with a score of 78.29 reflecting a relatively strong press freedom environment within Europe (RSF, rsf.org). However, challenges persist, including threats to public media funding and legal harassment of journalists through Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). UK’s score benefits from a robust legal framework and media pluralism but RSF notes concerns over surveillance laws and detention of Assange which raise questions about government commitment to press freedom (RSF, rsf.org). Critics argue the UK’s high ranking may downplay these issues, especially when compared to lower-ranked nations with more overt censorship, suggesting a possible Western bias in the index’s weightage for subtle versus explicit threats. France (Rank: 21st, Score: 78.53) France rose to 21st in 2024 from 24th in 2023, with a score of 78.53, bolstered by strong legislative framework and European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) which protects journalists from political interference (Vajiram & Ravi, vajiramandravi.com). Yet, RSF highlights issues like police violence against journalists during protests and increasing online harassment particularly targeting female reporters. France ranking reflects Europe’s generally favourable press environment but its score masks domestic challenges such as media ownership concentration and occasional government pressure on public broadcasters (RSF, rsf.org). Critics question whether France’s high ranking overstates its press freedom given these issues compared to lower-ranked nations facing more severe restrictions. India (Rank: 159th, Score: 31.28) India improved slightly from 161st in 2023 to 159th in 2024, but its score dropped from 36.62 to 31.28 with gains only in security indicator (Vajiram & Ravi, vajiramandravi.com). RSF reports that nine journalists and one media worker were detained in 2024 and new laws like the Telecommunications Act 2023 and Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 grant government sweeping powers to censor media (Drishti IAS, www.drishtiias.com). Modi government’s ties with media conglomerates such as Reliance, which owns over 70 outlets reaching 800 million people, exacerbate concerns about media independence. India’s government has dismissed the index as “propaganda,” arguing it overlooks democratic vibrancy and uses a flawed methodology with small sample size (Hindustan Times, www.hindustantimes.com). India’s low ranking behind relatively unstable nations like Pakistan (152nd) fuels accusations of bias, as critics claim the index penalizes non-Western democracies disproportionately. Hypocrisy in Rankings RSF index faces accusations of hypocrisy, particularly in its treatment of Western versus non-Western nations. US, UK, and France despite domestic issues like media concentration and legal harassment, consistently rank higher than India, where overt censorship and journalist detentions are more prevalent. Critics argue that RSF’s methodology, reliant on expert questionnaires and Western funding, may prioritize subtle threats in democracies (e.g., distrust in the US) over systemic repression elsewhere (Global Investigative Journalism Network, gijn.org). For instance, India’s ranking near conflict zones like Palestine (157th) seems harsh to its defenders, given its democratic elections, while the UK’s high ranking despite Assange’s detention raises questions of consistency. RSF’s focus on political indicators, which fell globally by 7.6 points in 2024 may amplify perceptions of bias when Western allies face lighter scrutiny than adversaries like China (172nd) or Russia (162nd) (RSF, rsf.org). The index’s credibility is further questioned due to its funding from Western governments and NGOs which some argue aligns rankings with geopolitical interests. For example, Qatar (89th) ranks surprisingly high despite media restrictions, possibly reflecting strategic alliances (RSF, rsf.org). India’s stagnation at 159th despite its democratic framework, suggests a potential Western-centric lens that undervalues non-Western contexts. To address these criticisms, RSF could enhance methodological transparency and diversify its expert pool to better reflect global realities. Conclusion World Press Freedom Day underscores vital role of a free press but RSF index’s rankings for US, UK, France and India highlight both unique national challenges and broader questions about the index’s fairness. While US grapples with distrust, UK and France face legal and structural issues and India contends with overt censorship, index’s perceived biases undermine its credibility. A more transparent and inclusive approach could strengthen its role as a global advocate for press freedom. (Author is an IIT Graduate Engineer, living in the greater Los Angeles area. He is engaged in coaching youngsters interested in Hindu civilizational

Read More
Report: Conversion Cartels, Silent War on Bharat’s Soul

Report: Conversion Cartels, Silent War on Bharat’s Soul

India’s dharmic landscape is witnessing significant alteration with patterns emerging that raise concerns about national security, social cohesion and sovereignty. These patterns include proliferation of churches, legal actions related to religious conversions, children rescued from missionary organizations and increased scrutiny of missionary bodies under Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA).​

Read More
Vision That Works for Bengal Region

Vision That Works for Bengal Region

India’s 21-point Action Plan operationalizes cooperation through commerce, climate, connectivity and culture anchored in grounded capabilities. Rohan Giri For regional groups like BIMSTEC comprising seven nations straddling South and Southeast Asia there’s hardly a big need for grand declarations. Instead, practical architecture is need of the hour. The 21-point action plan discussed at the recent BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok, Thailand may provide a window of opportunity. The plan mooted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi may provide the template for sustainable relations between member-countries to navigate complexity of inter-dependence, climate risk and digital transition. The proposal has gained significance due to the timing and not ambitious objectives it seeks to achieve. Given that it is under-networked, Bay of Bengal region finds a key role that it can play in supply chain resilience, energy connection and climate vulnerability. A structured cooperation to deal with key issues is essential for sustaining the relationship for shared prosperity of people in the region. For instance, setting up Bay of Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the decision to hold an annual business summit will work wonders for the region. Emphasis on business and trade recognizes that economic integration is not only a desired goal but a necessity to further regional integration and ward off global disruptions. The move to explore possibility of undertaking trade in local currencies would help mitigate vulnerability to external financial disturbances. Deliberations on shift to digital infrastructure are equally well-founded. Recognizing uneven digital capacities in the region, the idea of conducting pilot research on applicability of India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) is prudent. Without pushing for adoption of digital infrastructure put together by Bharat, the proposal gains importance as it provides a clear path to digitizing economies in the region. The recommendation to look at possibility of interlinking India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) with regional payment systems reflects the urgent need for smoother cross-border financial flows that can positively impact tourism, small businesses and migrant remittances in segments often neglected. On physical infrastructure, it is still a long way to traverse while digital and financial corridors provide instant mobility. Reducing friction in transactions is inevitable if formal trade between countries were to flourish over long run and phase-out unofficial trade. The design of the plan seems to respect this peaceful realism. The action plan’s emphasis on disaster management and climate readiness shows where it exhibits greater insight. Along with cooperation between national disaster response authorities, the idea of creating a BIMSTEC Centre of Excellence for Disaster Management addresses a particularly acute regional vulnerability. Countries in Bay of Bengal region experience regular earthquakes, floods, and cyclones. Hence, the idea of a regional centre for excellence to manage disasters is more of shared insurance against environmental volatility. Similarly, space technology cooperation is important not to further geopolitical ambition but rather as an appreciation of vital involvement in remote sensing and satellite data. This will help in agricultural planning, weather forecasting and coastal surveillance. The idea of constructing ground training centers and cooperate on nano-satellites answers the quiet revolution in space democratisation. Access to space-based data can significantly impact small and mid-sized countries in BIMSTEC determining the difference between informed governance and ongoing vulnerability. The projects to train 300 young people each year; grant scholarships in forestry and traditional medicine and organize capacity-building programmes for diplomats and healthcare professionals highlight the commitment to regional prosperity. Collaborative efforts and sharing resources is an important component of this cooperation. Recommendations do not advocate depending just on institutions of any one nation. Rather, they advise utilizing existing resources and capabilities to help people in the area. For example, public health where the support for traditional medicine research and cancer care training program through Tata Memorial Centre answers both epidemiological trends and cultural settings. These are not meant to be soft-power weapons. These are responses to address gaps in healthcare impacting millions of people. Calls for security cooperation without securitisation and proposed ministerial level conclave to solve shared issues like cybercrime, terrorism, and trafficking are bang on the dot. Soft security threats which often undermine governance in post-pandemic global order pose a greater challenge than traditional military hazards. Energy integration is one area that can be fast tracked with a regional electric grid link. With Energy Centre now operational in Bengaluru, the plan aims to go beyond statements to technological harmony. Dynamic load balancing, made possible by shared grid infrastructure, lowers storage needs, fits with climate targets, and helps balance loads. These are required for sustaining economic growth in medium to long term. Youth involvement and cultural interaction, regional athletics meet and Hackathon presents a gentler but not softer approach to regionalism. These are areas that enable development of shared generational identity Many times, multilateral organizations fail not because of bad policies but loss of public credibility. Sporting and cultural interactions act as slow-burning engines to create relationships that legislation by itself cannot support. A long-standing focus for BIMSTEC is maritime connectivity which is sought to be furthered by the plan to set up Sustainable Maritime Transport Centre. The plan emphasises not only shipping routes but research, creativity and capacity-building. Given the Bay of Bengal’s growing strategic relevance for world supply chains and the environmental hazards of overuse, this emphasis provides a relevant junction between economic value and environmental sensibility. Collectively, the 21 ideas do not suggest that a new pole in world affairs is emerging. They do not assert extraordinary uniqueness. Rather, they capture demands of modern regionalism. They respond to pragmatic questions that legislators all through Global South face: How might regional cooperation be less vulnerable? How can one build without overreaching? How can one integrate without imposing control? India’s approach is conditional upon regional needs and not grandiose or minimalist. It understands that leadership in multilateral environments, especially among close neighbours is something to be operationalised through credibility, patience and alignment rather than declarations. The recommendations stay anchored in viability by providing existing institutional capability instead of building whole new systems. (Author is a doctoral

Read More
Ambedkar Weaponised!

Ambedkar Weaponised!

Neo-Ambedkarite groups in US, Europe invoke him to promote the very causes he opposed: religious dogma, separatism and ideological violence. This isn’t social justice; it’s soft warfare against Bharatiya unity in the guise of activism. Dr. Shailendra Kumar Pathak Dr. B.R. Ambedkar remains one of Bharat’s most influential and tallest intellectuals, a fierce advocate for rights of the downtrodden and architect of Bharat’s Constitution. His political, religious and philosophical views were grounded in rationalism, human dignity, national integrity, and democratic values. In recent times, however, self-proclaimed Ambedkarite groups operating from UK and US have fundamentally deviated from his original principles. These organizations that actively engage with global radical Islamist networks and evangelical Christian lobbies promote agendas that are anti-Hindu, anti-Bharat and in many cases subversive. A detailed examination of Dr Ambedkar’s original works including “Pakistan or the Partition of India,” “Buddha or Karl Marx,” the “Constituent Assembly Debates” and speeches such as “Annihilation of Caste,” reveals a clear misappropriation of his legacy by the present day outfits. To begin with, Ambedkar was never a critic of Hinduness. His sharp critique was specifically aimed at caste system and its dehumanizing effects but he never spared Islam, Christianity, or communism from scrutiny either. In “Pakistan or the Partition of India,” Ambedkar expressed grave concern about Islamic worldview. He argued that Islam fostered a brotherhood limited only to Muslims and viewed others with contempt. He wrote, “The brotherhood of Islam is not the universal brotherhood of man. It is brotherhood of Muslims for Muslims only.” Furthermore, he warned that Islamic law, which prioritizes religious allegiance over national loyalty, posed a significant challenge to Bharatiya nationalism. As per Ambedkar, Islam’s insistence on Sharia supremacy over civil laws, integration into a secular and democratic Bharat was difficult. He highlighted historical destruction of Hindu temples by Islamic rulers as proof of Islam’s violent legacy in Bharat. Ambedkar’s views on Christianity were equally candid. He noted that Christianity, while preaching equality, had historically supported slavery and racial segregation. In his view, both Islam and Christianity were unsuitable for addressing Bharat’s social issues. Their ‘universalist’ rhetoric notwithstanding, both religions, according to Ambedkar, were more interested in expanding their spheres of influence than genuinely uplifting the oppressed. This led to him embracing Buddhism and not these two faiths. Buddhism, on the other hand, he considered an indigenous, ethical, and rational path grounded in compassion and equality. In his essay “Buddha or Karl Marx,” Ambedkar contrasts moral, non-violent methods of Buddha with violent revolutionary approach of Marx. He praises Buddha for seeking to transform through inner change, rather than coercion or armed struggle. Ambedkar was also a consistent critic of communism. He saw its violent methods and contempt for individual liberty as deeply flawed. He argued that communism’s promise of a withering state and classless society masked the reality of permanent dictatorship and suppression of dissent. In his writings, he asked pointedly whether any economic end justified mass killing and loss of human values seen in communist regimes. He blamed communist labour leaders for exploiting workers to nourish their political gains and general failure of Bharat’s labour unions. Ambedkar’s political positions were deeply nationalist. He emphasized Bharat’s territorial integrity and democratic unity above sectarian or ideological interests. He criticized the Indian National Congress not because he was against the idea of Bharatiya self-rule but because Congress exploited caste and communal identities for electoral gain. He accused Congress of selecting candidates from dominant castes, thereby marginalizing truly oppressed communities. He flagged the  issue with Congress’s approach to Hindu-Muslim unity, accusing them of appeasement rather than principled negotiation. He found the Hindu Mahasabha more forthright in its communal positions than the Congress, which he believed played double games. Regarding Gandhi, Ambedkar was blunt. He criticized Gandhi’s role at the Round Table Conference, calling him petty-minded and poorly equipped to deal with complexities of communal negotiations. He accused Gandhi of widening social rifts rather than healing them. While he acknowledged Gandhi’s early concern for untouchability, he ultimately found Congress efforts tokenistic and ineffective. Funds meant for Dalit upliftment, according to Ambedkar, were misused or wasted with little real impact on the ground. Against this backdrop of rational critique and democratic commitment, neo-Ambedkarite movements emerging in West appear not only disconnected from his philosophy but actively working against it. In United States, outfits such as Equality Labs, Ambedkar International Center (AIC), Ambedkar King Study Circle (AKSC), South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT) and Dalit Solidarity Forum have established close working ties with global Islamist fronts and Christian evangelical networks. Their participation in “Dismantling Global Hindutva” campaign a platform notorious for anti-Hindu, anti-Bharat propaganda—exposes their alignment with ideological forces that Ambedkar explicitly rejected. Similarly, in United Kingdom, organizations like Caste Watch UK, Anti-Caste Discrimination Alliance (ACDA), Voice of Dalit International (VODI) and Europe-based International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) have increasingly become vehicles for lobbying against Bharat on international forums. Rather than focusing on constructive social change or building solidarity through inclusive reforms, many of these groups engage in litigation-driven activism and diplomatic lobbying, often backed by church-linked NGOs and hardline Islamist organizations. Their rhetoric disproportionately targets Hindu identity and Bharatiya sovereignty, mirroring talking points of those who have long sought to destabilize Bharat’s national unity. Their agenda is not centered on social upliftment through moral and constitutional reform as Ambedkar envisioned but on creating a permanent atmosphere of victimhood and communal division. These groups exploit caste-based grievances to create unrest within Hindu society and push vulnerable sections toward religious conversion and even radicalization. They also romanticize violent ideologies like Naxalism which Ambedkar would have unequivocally opposed given his commitment to constitutional democracy. Ambedkar’s shift from forming Scheduled Castes Federation to proposing Republican Party of India reflects his political evolution he moved from a caste-specific platform to a more inclusive political identity aimed at uniting all marginalized groups. His emphasis was always on national unity, moral reform and social harmony. In fact, there are strong philosophical parallels between his vision and RSS concept of “Samrasta”

Read More
India's Defence Doctrine: Missiles, Markets, and Momentum

India’s Defence Doctrine: Missiles, Markets, and Momentum

India’s defence sector is undergoing a strategic renaissance evolving from self-reliance to global leadership as an exporter of cutting-edge, indigenous military technologies and a trusted partner in the international security architecture. Akshay Raina When it comes to national security, a country’s ability to rely on its own resources in times of conflict is crucial. For India, a rapidly growing global power with diverse security concerns, achieving self-reliance in defence production has become a top priority. This shift from dependency to self-sufficiency is no longer just a strategic aim; it’s a vital step toward safeguarding India’s defence needs while simultaneously strengthening its position in the global defence market. The country’s focus on enhancing indigenous defence production, through initiatives like Make in India, has completely transformed the landscape of defence manufacturing. In recent years, India has dramatically reduced its dependence on foreign imports, thanks to forward-thinking policies, increased collaboration between government agencies and private industries, and a strong emphasis on developing homegrown defence technologies. These efforts have also contributed to a significant rise in defence exports, signalling India’s emerging role as a major global defence producer and exporter. From Import Dependency to Self-Reliance India has historically been one of the world’s largest importers of defence equipment. However, this trend is rapidly changing. The introduction of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 by the Ministry of Defence was a pivotal move in this transformation. The DAP focuses on promoting the indigenization of defence production, strengthening India’s military capabilities and reducing the country’s reliance on foreign suppliers for key military hardware. A key aspect of this procedure has been the development of indigenization lists, alongside fostering innovation from domestic startups and MSMEs (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises), which are now integral to India’s defence ecosystem. The government’s investment in defence corridors and its efforts to promote collaboration between public sector undertakings (PSUs) and private entities have further accelerated this progress. Moreover, the relaxation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) limits in defence has encouraged global defence companies to establish manufacturing hubs in India, helping to fuel the growth of the domestic defence industry. Milestones in Indigenous Defence Production India’s move toward self-sufficiency in defence is marked by significant technological advancements and strategic achievements. India’s capabilities in defence manufacturing are no longer limited to just assembling products; the country is now designing and producing world-class technologies for its defence needs. Some of India’s notable indigenous defence products include: These products, alongside ongoing advancements in electronic warfare, radar technologies, and advanced fighter jets, exemplify India’s growing capability to design, develop and produce defence technologies to meet its strategic needs. With sustained investments in research and development, India is poised to reduce its dependence on foreign defence imports even further. India’s Expanding Defence Export Market India’s increasing self-reliance in defence is not only reducing the country’s dependence on imports but is also positioning India as a significant player in the global defence export market. Over 100 countries now purchase defence products from India, including helicopters, naval vessels, missiles, armored vehicles and aircraft. The rise in defence exports is largely attributed to the government’s focus on high-quality manufacturing, innovative technologies and streamlining the defence procurement process. Key achievements in India’s defence exports include: For instance, as per recent reports, India supplied over $250 million worth of Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank munitions and other ammunition to Armenia in 2022. India has also exported naval platforms and torpedoes to Mauritius, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam and military trucks to Thailand. Additionally, Tata 8×8 LPTA trucks, based on the Tata 1623 platform, are being exported to the Royal Moroccan Army, marking another achievement in India’s defence exports. Future of India’s Defence Exports India’s defence exports are on an upward trajectory. As the country enhances its defence production capabilities, its growing export footprint positions India as a trusted supplier of affordable, high-quality defence products. The government’s ambitious target of reaching ₹50,000 crore in defence exports by 2029 reflects India’s determination to become a global leader in defence manufacturing. This rise in exports is not just about economics—it’s also about strengthening India’s strategic alliances globally. Deals with countries like the UAE, Armenia and Myanmar reflect India’s growing influence and the trust placed in its defence capabilities. By providing cutting-edge defence solutions at competitive prices, India is offering an alternative to traditional Western and Russian defence suppliers, which only further solidifies the country’s position in the global defence market. India’s Strategic Vision for Global Defence Leadership India’s defence sector has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past decade. Once one of the world’s largest importers of defence equipment, India is now rapidly becoming a top producer and exporter of world-class defence technologies. The government’s support for indigenous defence production, increased foreign investments and strategic initiatives like the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 have paved the way for India to become self-reliant in defence production. India’s defence exports have surged significantly, from ₹686 crore in 2014-15 to ₹21,083 crore in 2023-24. With cutting-edge products like BrahMos, Pinaka and Tata 8×8 trucks, India is providing high-quality, reliable, and affordable defence solutions to the world. The country’s goal of achieving ₹50,000 crore in defence exports by 2029 is a clear indicator of India’s growing influence on the global defence stage. As the geopolitical landscape evolves, India’s role as a trusted defence partner and manufacturing leader will continue to grow, securing both its own defence needs and its position as a global strategic power. By prioritizing self-reliance, innovation and global partnerships, India is not just preparing for its future defence requirements but is also positioning itself as a leader in the global defence market. (Author is a seasoned media professional, content strategist and news analyst)

Read More
USCIRF 2025 - Distorting India’s Reality

USCIRF 2025: Distorting India’s Reality

The USCIRF time and again spins a one-sided tale cherry-picking facts, sidelining India’s constitutional pluralism, and pushing a loaded narrative that fits their playbook more than ground realities. Pummy M. Pandita The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) 2025 India report has once again revealed the commission’s fundamentally flawed methodology, dependence on biased data sources & selection, lack of transparency in evaluating religious freedom, and a one-sided narrative that misrepresents India’s thriving democracy and plural society. By selectively choosing incidents, depending on questionable sources, and willfully avoiding India’s constitutional framework, USCIRF has created a report that is neither objective nor credible. In selectively pointing out incidents in a vacuum and ignoring the broader framework of India’s constitutional protections for all religions, USCIRF goes against its own credibility. Not only does this report misrepresent the situation on the ground, but it also unfairly defames a nation that enshrines the rights of all its citizens. USCIRF has repeatedly refused to provide its sources of data in a manner that meets rigorous journalistic or academic transparency standards. Much of the incidents quoted in the report rely on politically driven NGOs,  lobby groups, and reports from organisations that have a recorded history of ideological bias against India. Reports tend to be based on media reports instead of official government statistics, police records, or independent judicial evaluations. This selective information distorts the actual picture of religious freedom in India. Most of these sources have already been identified as previously misreporting or manipulating facts to fit a specific agenda. The lack of primary research, government interaction, or varied local opinions in the report questions its credibility. India is targeted for scrutiny, yet the USCIRF overlooks or disparages such incidents or worse in other democracies, showing a distinct double standard. The report ignores the emergence of religious extremism among some minority communities, such as instances where religious radicalization put national security at risk or affected communal harmony. It disregards the constitutional protection afforded to minorities in countries like India’s strong judicial protections, affirmative action measures, and full participation of minorities in public life. USCIRF selectively reports on local incidents without context, repeatedly leaving out legal proceedings, counter-reports, and government action taken to respond to grievances. USCIRF consistently misinterprets India’s legal structure, labeling good governance actions like anti-conversion laws and policies regarding citizenship as discriminatory, although they are founded on constitutional provisions. The report also underplays violent extremism, secessionist forces, and foreign interference in Indian internal affairs, selectively labeling state reactions as “persecution” without drawing attention to threats to national security. USCIRF’s record of going after India has followed a general geopolitics design wherein reports have been used to lever diplomatic engagements. The USCIRF has specifically targeted the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (“2019 CAA”) passed by the Indian Parliament in 2019 and its continued criticism since then reveals an inaccurate understanding of the genesis of the law and the disrespect towards sovereign Indian democratic institutions. CAA is designed to offer refuge to persecuted religious minorities—Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians—from neighboring Islamic states like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. These minorities have long faced systemic oppression in their home countries. CAA does not affect Indian Muslims, who are in no way disadvantaged by the law. Yet USCIRF frames it as a discriminatory tool, conveniently ignoring that it aims to address religious persecution in neighboring Islamic nations. For good order sake, United States too has a similar Citizenship Act in the form of the Lautenberg Amendment, led by US Senator Frank Lautenberg in 1989-90, which facilitates citizenship to recognized persecuted religious minorities in the former Soviet Union. Iran was added subsequently through the Specter Amendment, that provided refugee status and ultimately citizenship to a group of minorities from three nations.  Why is USCIRF silent on that and not condemned this act also? The commission has also been accused of disproportionately targeting on some nations and ignoring serious religious freedom abuses in many other nations, which puts its motives and geopolitical agendas in question. Its inability to speak out against growing cases of persecution of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and other minority groups in the neighboring countries where blasphemy laws and institutional discrimination are prevalent. This inconsistency erodes the credibility of the USCIRF and raises questions about whether its reports are motivated by facts or political goals. Suggesting India as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) is not only factually wrong but also smells of a conscious effort to mislead about India’s religious scenario. India is still one of the most religiously plural and diverse countries, where individuals from all religions are involved in government, business, and public life. However, USCIRF’s failure to recognize this diversity and continued legal protections for religious communities reveals its biased agenda. The report also criticises India’s anti-conversion laws, which are in place to prevent coerced religious conversions, often under the guise of marriage or social coercion. These laws, intended to protect vulnerable individuals from exploitation, have become a focal point of controversy. USCIRF dismisses this as Hindu nationalist propaganda, sidestepping the genuine concerns that prompted these laws. By recommending punitive measures like sanctions and diplomatic pressure against India, USCIRF has gone beyond its mandate and attempts to intrude into the sovereign decisions of a democratic country. These suggestions are not only counterproductive but also demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of India’s democracy and devotion to pluralism. USCIRF Report 2025 is an extremely defective, ideologically charged document that fails objective scrutiny. Its selective ire, methodological shortcomings, and transparency deficiencies make it unsuitable for serious policy discussion. It is an instrument of geopolitical politics, not an objective evaluation of religious freedom. India’s commitment to religious freedom is classified in its Constitution and defended by its democratic institutions. It is essential that any honest evaluation of India is provided based on verifiable data, integrated analysis, and a recognition of India’s pluralistic fabric USCIRF 2025: Distorting India’s Realitysomething the USCIRF report utterly fails to accomplish. USCIRF’s biased reports are not an isolated phenomenon. They fit into a larger pattern

Read More
Inside China's Grey Zone Strategy

Inside China’s Grey Zone Strategy

Rahul Pawa In South China Sea, grey zone tactics unfold with laser-focused intent. Watching the PLA Navy’s manoeuvres or the maritime militia’s presence can, at times, feel like staring at a chessboard whose pieces inch forward one measured square at a time. The sight of special barges looming by the docks in Zhanjiang, China, went unnoticed by many who passed them on their daily commutes. To casual observers, these hulking platforms seemed little more than routine maritime fixtures. But for those with their eyes fixed on the shadows of international geopolitics, these barges signalled something far more ominous: a finely tuned exercise by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in what appeared to be over-the-shore logistics drills for a future military landing. In hushed circles in Taipei, Washington, Delhi and capitals across Asia, the question was no longer if China was meticulously preparing itself for conflict, but rather how it used the blurred space between war and peace to move closer to its global aspirations. In recent years, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has demonstrated a distinct flair for “grey zone” strategies—actions that straddle the threshold between open conflict and the calm of peacetime. This approach is not entirely new; historical powers have long tested their adversaries with salami-slicing tactics, never crossing the bright red line that might spark a full-scale clash. Yet what sets the CCP apart is its calculated synchrony of economic, diplomatic, maritime, and cyber manoeuvres, pushing its objectives in precise increments. In effect, Beijing has mastered the subtlety of wrestling advantage while making it appear that the match has barely begun. In South China Sea, these grey zone tactics unfold with laser-focused intent. Watching the PLA Navy’s manoeuvres or the maritime militia’s presence can, at times, feel like staring at a chessboard whose pieces inch forward one measured square at a time. When disputes arise, the CCP often deploys fishing fleets that function like unofficial patrols, creating friction against neighbours like Vietnam or the Philippines. Although these fishing vessels seem harmless at a glance, their real purpose is to project CCP influence and thwart regional rivals from fully exercising their own sovereignty. Beijing’s “nine-dash line” claims—rejected as baseless by a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitration panel—illustrate its sweeping claim over nearly the entire South China Sea. Yet China treats that ruling as little more than background noise. It has advanced its position through repeated harassment of Philippine resupply missions, demonstrating how a large naval fleet is not always necessary to assert dominance. Last year, when Philippine efforts to resupply the rusted BRP Sierra Madre near the Second Thomas Shoal were impeded by China’s Coast Guard and maritime militia. An agreement to ease tensions was eventually reached, but China then turned its gaze toward the Scarborough and Sabina Shoals, employing a range of coercive tactics that skirted just below the threshold of outright military force. This is precisely the effectiveness of Beijing’s grey zone philosophy: the CCP can repeatedly test the resolve of its neighbours and the broader international community without triggering a major conflagration. Unchallenged, those incremental gains morph into accepted realities—often reinforced by a parallel campaign of disinformation and cyberattacks that sow confusion and shape public perception. Indeed, the hallmark of the CCP’s grey zone strategy is its convergence with information operations. As the world has become more interconnected, data and narrative management have become invaluable pieces on the geopolitical chessboard. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported that Chinese agents circulated 60 percent more false or biased information in 2024 than in the previous year, an alarming trend that hints at a steady intensification of disinformation campaigns. It is, in effect, the other side of the same grey zone coin: while the PLA’s warships push deeper into contested waters, Beijing’s narratives undermine trust in democratic processes, making it that much harder for adversaries to mount a united response. Another front where Beijing flexes its grey zone muscles lies in the economic realm—a domain where “carrots and sticks” often speak louder than gunboats. CCP’s massive market provides an enticing lure for many nations, encouraging them to tread lightly on issues Beijing holds dear. At the same time, the CCP is quick to punish countries that challenge its aims. Witness how trade restrictions, investment blacklists, and targeted boycotts are deployed whenever a state brushes too close to opposing CCP’s territorial ambitions or welcoming dissidents. Even patrolling maritime areas in dispute can shut down foreign economic opportunities: by swarming neighbourly waters with large fishing fleets, CCP can intimidate local companies into abandoning lucrative projects such as oil and gas extraction. However, nowhere is the CCP’s grey zone approach more fraught with global tension than around Taiwan. For decades, Beijing has asserted that the island is a “breakaway province”, destined, eventually, for reunification—by force if necessary. Yet mounting a full-scale invasion comes with tremendous risk, both militarily and politically. Thus, CPC’s cross-strait strategy frequently focuses on intimidation and incremental pressure. Having declared its own Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over much of the East China Sea, the PLA has probed Taiwanese airspace with persistent sorties, testing and teasing the boundaries. Over the course of 2024, the PLA Navy stationed warships near Taiwan’s ADIZ, and by December that year, it conducted large-scale exercises with aviation and naval forces in an elaborate show of force. All of it served dual purposes: normalising frequent PLA military appearances in the region, and demonstrating that Taipei’s backers—chief among them the United States—may not muster the political will to intervene every time. For the United States and its allies, especially Japan, the grey zone creates a double bind. Acting too robustly against each provocation risks an escalation that no one wants, while complacency allows Beijing’s inroads to solidify into indisputable facts on the ground—or, in this case, at sea. The art of Beijing’s game lies in how it calibrates pressure just below that flashpoint. By the time foreign powers muster the will to intervene, the CCP has typically moved on to

Read More
Demolishing the Dawn’s Deception

Demolishing Dawn’s Deception

Rohan Giri Dawn.com, the Pakistani news outlet that hosts Naqvi’s fabrications, has a long history of anti-Indian prejudice, regularly publishing articles that undermine Indian sovereignty and national interests. While it claims to support democracy, it rarely, if ever, scrutinizes Pakistan’s establishment with the same zeal as it does India. The hypocrisy is apparent. It is a journal that thrives on manufactured frustration with India while deliberately avoiding the dictatorial reality of its country. Jawed Naqvi’s most recent piece in The Dawn, “India’s left-right centenary,” is another example of selective indignation and intellectual dishonesty. It is deliberately written to support the myth that Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is the face of fascism in India. In his distinctive manner, Naqvi weaves together hypocritical historical allusions, ideological prejudices, and plain lies to create a story that has been disproven time and time again but is still promoted by those who are unwilling to confront except facts. In addition to criticizing RSS, his piece highlights the larger intellectual squalor that plagues segments of the Indian left and its supporters abroad. Exposing his distortions is not only necessary but also morally required since, if allowed unchecked, lying takes on the appearance of reality. Naqvi’s argument’s basic tenet is a sloppy and false analogy between RSS and European fascism. It reveals a basic misinterpretation—possibly deliberate—of fascism as well as the intellectual and historical foundations of RSS. RSS has never aspired to be an authoritarian entity, in contrast to Hitler’s racial superiority or Mussolini’s corporatist state. It continued to be a sociocultural movement dedicated to self-reliance, national cohesion, and a continuation of civilization. The alleged similarities to European fascism are merely rhetorical instruments employed by people who wish to discredit the movement without actually participating in its activities. The irrationality of this accusation is further demonstrated by the fact that RSS has never supported racial supremacy, a one-party system, or a dictatorship—all of which are fundamental elements of fascism. Decentralization of authority, community-driven governance, and cultural revival—values that are directly in conflict with the core of fascist ideology—have, if anything, always been at the heart of RSS’s priorities. Naqvi’s assertion that Hitler and Mussolini were the inspiration for RSS is a well-worn fallacy that has been repeatedly disproved but is still brought up by individuals with political frustrations. The accusations are the result of selectively misinterpreting words made by specific people while disregarding the broader context. Distorting historical facts to suit a convenient political narrative is the height of intellectual dishonesty. Unlike the Communist parties, which notoriously followed the Soviet line even at the expense of national interests, the RSS has no history of working with colonial or imperialist regimes. In 1942, the Communists fiercely opposed the Quit India Movement, calling it “subversive,” at the direction of their bosses in Beijing and Moscow. They weakened the quest for independence, whereas RSS struggled diligently at the grassroots level to foster cultural awareness and a sense of pride in the country. If the study of treachery is the goal, then the Communist parties—not RSS—need to be examined. Communists teaching about nationalism is blatantly ironic. Communists were involved in violent uprisings, such as the Telangana Rebellion, which aimed to impose a Soviet-style revolution in India, while the RSS was working to unite the nation. Naqvi romanticizes this uprising as a noble peasant battle, but in reality, it was a violent and terrifying war. Under the guise of “revolution,” the Communist objective has always been to sow disarray, erode democratic institutions, and open the door for authoritarian control. It should come as no surprise that democracy has always suffered the most when Communists have taken control, whether in North Korea, the USSR, or Maoist China. The people’s rejection of their outdated, foreign-imposed ideology is what is causing their electoral downfall in India, not any alleged “fascist” repression. Naqvi’s attempts to demonize the RSS and cover up the wrongdoings of Indian Communists are blatant examples of selective amnesia. The CPI’s record is marked by obvious blemishes, including its ideological subservience to foreign powers, its unwillingness to support the 1962 war effort against China, and its vacillations on important national challenges. On the other hand, RSS has supported Indian army in needs, increased disaster relief, and supported national defense. These are not theoretical claims; they are demonstrable realities. Naqvi, however, avoids them out of convenience since they contradict his rhetoric. It is a flagrant fabrication to say that RSS and its inspired individuals were “apologists for colonialism.” The Communist leadership frequently undermined nationalist initiatives and remained ambivalent about India’s independence. While RSS karyakartas were actively involved in opposing British rule. The goal of the RSS was to create a robust, independent society that could fend off colonial domination on all fronts—politically, culturally, and economically. The Communist concern with quick and frequently violent upheavals was always in conflict with these long-term objectives. If we look at Jawed Naqvi explicitly, his history of anti-Hindu and anti-Indian hatred is well known. His publications frequently echo the talking points of Pakistan’s official narratives, raising doubts about his integrity, ethics and journalism. His previous pieces, such as “Hindutva Terrorism: Another View” and “The Crooked Timber of Modi’s India,” all follow the same formula: they show Muslims as unforgiving victims, Hindus as aggressors, and India as a country on the verge of collapse. The outrage is blatantly selective. He highlights every perceived or actual weakness in India’s democracy, but he says nothing about Pakistan’s deep state, its persecution of minorities, or its decline into political and economic catastrophe. Naqvi’s most recent article is not a rare occurrence; rather, it is a component of a larger trend—a network of authors and journals that want to discredit India’s revival of civilization by calling it “fascist.” A typical example of projection is this one. Extremist Islamism and Communism, I call that Islamo-leftist, the exact ideologies Naqvi espouses, have committed some of the most horrific crimes in recorded history. More than 100 million people have died as a result of communism worldwide, and extremist Islamist beliefs have sunk entire

Read More
The Polis Project Exposed - A Web of Bias, Misinformation, and Deception

The Polis Project Exposed: A Web of Bias, Misinformation, and Deception

Rohan Giri The Polis Project bills itself as a journalism and research group, but its activities betray a much darker purpose. Instead of being an impartial organisation dedicated to the truth, it routinely targets Hindu organisations and India, spreading misleading information while omitting the realities of religious persecution and intricate geopolitics. Under its cover of human rights, it serves as a platform for anti-India propaganda, twisting the truth and influencing opinions around the world to support its political agenda. Another illustration of The Polis Project’s continuous effort to discredit Hindu organisations and harm India’s reputation abroad is the recent propaganda report it released titled “Transnational Funding in Hindu Supremacist Movements”. This purported report is a politically driven attempt to paint Hindu institutions as extremist fronts rather than an unbiased analysis of financial networks.  With an aim to provide the impression that there is an organised supremacist movement, where none actually exists, the paper has selectively omitted important information, using inflammatory language, and cherry-picking statistics. It vilifies organisations involved in humanitarian, educational, and cultural preservation efforts while willfully ignoring the actual threats posed by radical groups operating in South Asia and abroad. There is a certain pattern to the Polis Project’s operations. While ignoring grave human rights abuses in other regions of the world, it unfairly criticises India. Its obsession to depict the current Indian government as authoritarian, using hyperbolic phrases like “genocide” and “fascism”, is to stir up indignation and sway global opinion. By creating a biased narrative that ignores the complexity of religious conflicts and communal tensions in India, their reporting on sociopolitical events distorts reality. While ignoring the persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Kashmir, it creates the impression that India is an oppressive state by publicising certain occurrences and interpreting them with a preconceived ideological framework. Deep state funding, particularly those supported by George Soros, is the source of the Polis Project rather than an independent organisation. Its creator, Suchitra Vijayan, has a history of endorsing radical groups while posing as an activist. A cursory glance at her social media activity shows that she publicly supports people who have been charged with inciting violence, such as Umar Khalid, who was detained for his role in the Delhi riots. She also offered assistance to Irfan Mehraj, a “journalist,” who was detained in connection with a terror financing investigation in 2023. Mehraj was identified by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) as a close associate of Khurram Parvez, a well-known anti-Indian activist and a prominent member of the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Societies (JKCCS), a group connected to dubious financial dealings that aid separatist elements. The Polis Project’s operating structure further demonstrates foreign influence over it. As per Disinfo Lab’s claim, the administrator of its Facebook page is headquartered in Pakistan, which raises severe questions regarding its legitimacy and motivation. Although its propaganda efforts are focused on India, its digital presence indicates external management, raising the prospect of planned influence tactics aimed against India’s stability. This aligns with broader international efforts to amplify divisive narratives against the country. Even outside of its digital activities, The Polis Project has close connections to groups that have openly supported separatist and Islamist causes. The Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC), an organisation well-known for advocating against India on global forums, regularly features in its events. Despite IAMC’s acknowledged affiliations with extremist organisations, The Polis Project finds common ground with them, confirming that it is far from being an unbiased research organisation. Its unclear funding structure is another issue. The Polis Project says it is transparent, although it hasn’t given a detailed account of where its funding comes from. Its closed financial sources raise serious concerns, and as a nonprofit organisation with headquarters in the United States, it is nevertheless vulnerable to outside interference. Who provides the funding for it? What outside parties gain from its persistent anti-Indian propaganda campaign? The ambiguity surrounding these issues suggests a conscious attempt to hide the foreign entities that might be controlling its operations. Besides targeting Hindus in India, The Polis Project has also reached out to the Hindu diaspora around the world. It attempts to damage the standing of charitable endeavours carried out by Hindu communities around the world by unjustly associating Hindu cultural organisations and charities with a purported supremacist purpose. Claims that organisations like Sewa International, Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation, and Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh are political fronts are unfounded, despite the fact that they have played important roles in social service, education, and disaster relief. Discrediting the Hindu diaspora and stifling its contributions to social advancement are deliberate goals. The Polis Project’s utter silence over the religious persecution of Hindus is another example of its duplicity. It vigorously promotes stories of state-led persecution of minorities in India, but it ignores the violent attacks on Hindu communities around the world, the systematic discrimination and persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and ethnic cleansing in Kashmir. Its selective activism reveals its lack of sincere support for human rights and demonstrates that its goals are not to promote justice but to pursue a political agenda. India’s sovereignty is being undermined globally by The Polis Project, who continuously depicts India as an authoritarian state. It is in line with larger efforts to destabilise India as it presents internal policies as dictatorial, supports separatist language, and purposefully leaves out important background information. This cannot merely be the result of a journalistic error, but a well calculated move to damage India’s reputation internationally. In an effort to undermine India’s position as a rising global force and sow internal strife, it manipulates narratives for the benefit of outside interests. With a blatant ideological agenda, the Polis Project is not an impartial monitor. Its biased narratives, foreign affiliations, selective activism, and untransparent funding make it clear that it is an anti-India propaganda tool. It is crucial to refute its misinformation with factual arguments and stop its lies from becoming widely accepted in global discourse. Organisations with a stake in dividing

Read More
Don’t Mess Up with Bharat!

Don’t Mess Up with Bharat!

Restructuring US industry to make its products competitive must be President Trump’s primacy and not wage tariff wars with strategic allies. K.A.Badarinath One of the most searched on internet these days is tariffs. After US President Donald J Trump talked round the corner, stakeholders across geographies have begun to make sense of these tariff lines. There’s, however, no reason why Bharat should give in to demands of quixotic President Trump who’s been holding forth with media twenty four by seven. President Trump also seems to be in tearing hurry to make early impact as head of Republican White House. Hence, he set the April 2 deadline to impose massive tariffs on Bharat’s export of products and services. Tariffs is a long story beginning with Donald Trump’s first term four years back when he went ahead and imposed tariffs on steel products, pharmaceuticals etc. There’s definitely an imbalance in trade. Its advantage Bharat as US $ has a deficit of US $ 45.6 billion on bilateral trade worth US $ 191 billion. And, India has reportedly made some proposals to rework the economic, trade and investment relations between the largest and oldest democracies globally. One way could be to enhance defence purchases worth US $ 20 billion by Bharat. Another possibility is to increase energy products including LNG and other hydrocarbon products. But, US may not be able to seize the window of opportunity opened by Bharat during bilateral engagement. Firstly, US defence establishment and deep state may not facilitate sale of F 35 fighter aircraft to Bharat.  A big section of US set up is wary of even floating a joint venture to jointly produce F-35 aircraft with a non-NATO strategic ally like Bharat. This joint venture possibly based out of Bhagyanagar aka Hyderabad need not limit itself to catering to Indian defence forces. It can become hub for exports to other destinations. Stringent protocols and agreement on who gets access to such advanced fighter jets could have been put in the blue print. Story of energy purchases is more or less similar. Would US be able to match or provide equivalent prices offered by Russia on crude, refined or liquefied natural gas products? Either spot or long term contracts, US energy products may not be cost competitive vis-à-vis the middle-east or Russian sources. For an expanding economic force like Bharat, every dollar paid per barrel translates to US $ one billion higher import bill. Insurance and freight differentials are again too huge for Bharat to enter into long term contracts with US. Reciprocal tariffs from April 2 have been proposed by President Trump who thinks that the Bharat is fleecing American people. As per World Trade Organization data, this may not be altogether true. As against an aggregate US tariff of 2,2 per cent, Bharat levies 12 per cent that’s in sync with WTO norms under differential tariff regime. President Trump may have a point relating to individual products like automobiles on which tariffs were brought down by Bharat to 70 per cent from 125 per cent on high end luxury cars. On motor cycles, the applicable tariff line is set at 40 per cent as against 50 per cent earlier. Threat to impose 25 per cent tariff on all Indian goods may not work for US except for addressing political constituency of Donald Trump or for optics. Indian goods constitute just 2.7 per cent of all US imports and do not even figure in top ten exporting countries to America. There’s no reason for mature friends like US and Bharat to haggle over manageable trade imbalance. Instead, working on the big picture like more than doubling the bilateral trade to US $ 500 billion by 2030 and clinching a ‘credible and sustainable’ trade deal in next one year is what’s more significant. Simultaneously, US may have to rework its manufacturing and supply chains to be cost and quality competitive instead of rampaging in over pitched verbal duel with friends and foes alike. Re-inventing  American manufacturing base to align with new age cut throat competition is something that Trump may have to work on beginning with massive restructuring of its industry. US and Trump may not realize this ‘Make America Great Again’ dream unless some hard work is put into it. America may have to expand its bouquet of products and services that can compete in the global market with new forces on the block. Trump’s complaint is that subsidies, non-tariff barriers and VAT system in Bharat hinder American exports. Well, his policy hawks may have conveniently forgotten that Value Added Tax (VAT) regime has come to an end several years back and it’s been subsumed into Goods and Services Tax (GST). On subsidies, US have a very weak case. Can Donald Trump’s advisors prove that America does not subsidise its industry? In Bharat, food, fertilizers and oil products constituted a large part of subsidy bill till a couple of years ago. Retail petroleum products prices have virtually been aligned with market demand and supply chain. There’s no depth in the argument that Bharat subsidises its petroleum products. It’s an emphatic no. Till a couple of years ago, kerosene was the only big subsidized oil product. After having taken piped gas and through cylinders to virtually every household, there’s hardly a big demand for kerosene. Food subsidy or free food grains to the vulnerable sectors is definitely a reality in Bharat. And, its well within its right to fight poverty and hunger through the Prime Minister’s anna yojana. In fertilizers, Bharat is more or less sufficient on urea while DAP and complex fertilizers subsidy is on the slide each year. Minimal subsidy available on a couple fertilizers is support given to farmers for ensuring enough food grains output for 1.4 billion and ward off imports. On non-tariff barriers, US are yet to come up with a list of such restrictions put in place by Bharat. If restricted access to Bharat’s agricultural markets is an issue, US will have

Read More