Bharat Canada Disinformation Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security

Did SOAS Institutionalise Hinduphobia on behalf of George Soros?

The Leicester unrest of 2022 generated a crowded and contested reporting ecosystem. By the time the SOAS commission published Better Together: Understanding the 2022 Violence in Leicester in February 2026, the evidential field already included rapid-response briefs, computational forensic analysis, fact-finding reports, media investigations, and an ongoing UK government-commissioned review. The key analytic question, therefore, is not whether the SOAS report entered a vacuum. It did not. The real question is whether it fairly integrated the prior evidential landscape, or whether it reorganised that landscape through a pre-set ideological frame. Across the pre-2026 reporting ecosystem, a striking convergence is visible. Reports issued by CIHS, NCRI, CRT/Charlotte Littlewood, and CDPHR differ in method, tone, and institutional location, yet they repeatedly arrive at two common findings. First, disinformation and influencer amplification were not incidental features of the Leicester violence; they were causal drivers in escalating tensions, shaping perceptions, and mobilising individuals towards real-world confrontation. Secondly, Hindus were not merely one community among many caught in a diffuse breakdown of cohesion. They were, in significant respects, targets of online incitement, doxxing, false attribution, intimidation, and attacks on property and religious symbols, much of which these reports attribute to Islamist factions and allied misinformation ecosystems operating in and around Leicester. This matters because media gatekeeping failed at a critical moment. The prior reports, especially NCRI, CIHS, and CRT, converge on the claim that unverified influencer narratives were elevated into mainstream discourse without sufficient due diligence. In that environment, misinformation ceased to be rhetorical noise and became operationally consequential. False claims about “RSS terrorists”, “Hindutva thugs”, or organised Hindu extremism were not simply descriptive errors; they shaped how violence was interpreted, whom authorities and media treated with suspicion, and which communities were left exposed. The result was not neutral confusion, but a reputational inversion in which Hindu victims could be reframed as presumptive aggressors. It is against that background that the SOAS commission report must be read. The report adopts the formal language of inquiry, relies on mixed methods, and includes an express statement that Open Society Foundations had no influence over its methods or findings. Yet the report was privately funded, publicly linked to a reported £620,000 OSF grant, and conducted in parallel with an already existing UK government review. In a politically charged communal context, that institutional configuration was always likely to attract scrutiny. Even if one accepts the non-interference disclaimer at face value, such statements do not settle the deeper question of whether funding relationships, institutional culture, or ideological priors shaped the report’s framing, priorities, and recommendations. The central criticism advanced in this paper is not that the SOAS report contains no useful material. On the contrary, its own descriptive sections document anti-Hindu harm in serious terms, including intimidation, attacks in Hindu neighbourhoods, and the Shivalaya Mandir incident. The problem lies elsewhere: in the report’s interpretive and policy architecture. While acknowledging anti-Hindu targeting and admitting verification limits around some claims concerning alleged Hindutva-linked organisational involvement, the report nonetheless elevates “Hindutva extremism” into the principal prescriptive concern. In doing so, it produces a structure in which Hindus are descriptively recognised as having suffered harm, yet prescriptively positioned as the primary object of suspicion and institutional management. That asymmetry is the report’s most serious flaw. A report can document harm accurately and still institutionalise bias through the categories it privileges and the remedies it recommends. In the Leicester case, the cumulative evidential landscape pointed first towards protection: countering disinformation, recognising anti-Hindu prejudice, scrutinising Islamist mobilisation, and repairing failures of media and civic response. The SOAS commission instead shifts the centre of gravity toward the ideological containment of “Hindutva”. That is not a neutral synthesis of the evidence. It is a policy reorientation with downstream consequences for safeguarding, public discourse, community recognition, and the equal treatment of Hindus in Britain. This report therefore proceeds from a narrow but important contention: the SOAS commission should not be assessed only by what it says, but by what it does institutionally. Read against the wider evidential record, it raises a serious question as to whether a privately funded, politically salient inquiry helped recast a pattern of anti-Hindu victimisation into an official-sounding framework of Hindu suspicion. If so, the issue is larger than one report. It is whether elite institutions, media ecosystems, and donor-linked inquiry structures together contributed to the normalisation of a one-sided narrative of Leicester—one with damaging implications for public trust, social cohesion, and the recognition of Hinduphobia in the United Kingdom. Prior reports and what they establish The pre-2026 report ecosystem is largely overlapping. It contains briefs, computational forensics, and fact-finding studies. The correct analytic method is to compare what each report credibly establishes, given its methods, and then evaluate whether the SOAS commission report fairly integrates that evidential landscape or reorganises it into a pre-set ideological frame. The Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS), an independent Delhi-based think tank issued rapid-response briefs in September 2022. Its Leicester briefs highlights that organised Islamist entities and individuals targeted Leicester’s Hindu population and that over fifty Hindu properties and vehicles were damaged in targeted attacks; it further records that Leicester police refuted the kidnapping narrative, and it names Majid Freeman as a prominent misinformation disseminator. CIHS reports there after have been tested against the computational and police-referenced work in NCRI and CDPHR. The Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) report is the most technologically explicit computational study. It describes multi-platform data collection and applies machine learning, natural language processing, network analysis and OSINT to build a timeline of malicious narratives and mobilisation patterns. Its headline figures include that AI models detected calls for violent action on Twitter during the Leicester events, with 70% of those calls directed against Hindus and 30% against Muslims. Crucially, NCRI also states that disinformation about Hindus as “bloodthirsty and genocidal” motivated attacks by recruiting online reinforcements to real-world engagements, and it explicitly criticises mainstream outlets for failing due diligence and amplifying Majid Freeman as a “central agitator”. This is not an aesthetic

Afghanistan Geopolitics Pakistan Security Terrorism United States War

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Pakistan’s War of Its Own Making: Durand Line, Pashtun Identity, and Terrorist Blowback

How a colonial boundary drawn in 1893 planted the seeds of war that now threatens to engulf the entire region and why Pakistan is its own worst enemy. Rahul PAWA | x – iamrahulpawa On February 26, 2026, Pakistani jets struck targets in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost provinces. Kabul retaliated. Islamabad declared open war. The international community scrambled for its talking points. But for anyone who has studied the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship with any intellectual honesty, there was nothing surprising about this moment. It was, in every sense, inevitable, the product of a colonial wound never properly healed, an ethnic identity never properly reconciled, and a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions that Pakistan inflicted upon itself In November 1893, British civil servant Sir Mortimer Durand sat across a table from Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and drew a line across a map. That line, 2,670 kilometres of mountain, desert, and river became the Durand Line, and it bisected the Pashtun tribal homeland with surgical indifference to the people who lived there. It was a colonial instrument of administrative convenience, not a meaningful border between two nations. When Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947, it inherited the Durand Line as its western frontier. Afghanistan refused to accept it. Kabul was, in fact, the only country in the world to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations that year, a remarkable act of diplomatic hostility toward a nation barely days old, driven entirely by the conviction that Pakistan had absorbed Pashtun lands that had no business being part of a new Muslim state in the subcontinent. Every Afghan government since; monarchy, communist, mujahideen, the first Taliban, the Western-backed republic, and now the second Taliban has refused to formally recognise the Durand Line as an international border. Pakistan has spent 75 years insisting the matter is settled. It is not settled. It has never been settled. And that unresolved dispute is the tectonic fault line beneath everything that has erupted in 2026. Fifty Million People Who Refuse to Be a Border Roughly 50 million Pashtuns live across both sides of the Durand Line. They share language, tribe, genealogy, and code, the ancient honour system of Pashtunwali that governs loyalty, hospitality, and revenge in equal measure. To a Pashtun tribesman in Waziristan, the line on Pakistan’s map means little when his cousin lives in Khost. Cross-border movement, cross-border marriage, and cross-border allegiance are not insurgent behaviour. They are culture. Pakistan’s military establishment has never fully grasped or chosen to accept this reality. Its periodic attempts to fence and fortify the border, most aggressively from 2017 onward, have been met with fierce resistance from tribal communities that view the fence not as a security measure but as a colonial imposition. Skirmishes between Pakistani border forces and Afghan fighters over the fence are practically routine. The current war did not materialise from a vacuum; it escalated from a slow-burning conflict that has been claiming lives along the Durand Line for years. The Monster Pakistan Built To understand how Pakistan arrived at this catastrophic juncture, one must understand the doctrine of “strategic depth.” Pakistan’s generals, perpetually preoccupied with the Indian infatuation on their eastern border, became obsessed with ensuring that Afghanistan would never side with India, or worse, open a second front. The solution, as conceived by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) through the 1970s and 1980s, was to cultivate a network of jihadist proxies in Afghanistan that Islamabad could control and deploy. The Afghan mujahideen. The Taliban. Assorted terrorist networks that moved through Pakistan’s tribal areas with impunity. The Taliban of 1994 were, in significant measure, a Pakistani creation. The ISI funded them, armed them, and provided the political scaffolding that allowed them to sweep to power in Kabul in 1996. For five years, Pakistan had the compliant Afghan government it had always wanted. Then came 11 September. Under intense American pressure, and out of greed for US dollars, Islamabad was forced to publicly disavow the very asset it had spent two decades cultivating. What followed was perhaps the most cynical double game in modern geopolitical history. Pakistan publicly cooperated with the American-led war on terror while elements of its intelligence apparatus continued to shelter, fund, and facilitate the Taliban through two decades of conflict. Safe houses in Quetta. Sanctuaries in Baluchistan. The Haqqani network operating from Pakistani soil. American generals and CIA directors said it in public, in congressional testimony, with barely concealed rage. Pakistan denied everything, pocketed billions in American aid, and continued. Blowback: The Reckoning When the Americans abandoned Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban swept back into Kabul, General Faiz Hameed, Pakistan’s former ISI chief, was famously photographed sipping tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel. But Pakistan had not fully reckoned with what came next: the Afghan Taliban, now rulers rather than stateless militias, showed little appetite for serving as Pakistan’s instrument. They had decided long ago to govern as Afghans and think as Pashtuns. And they have shown no meaningful inclination to police their eastern border on Islamabad’s behalf particularly not against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban known as TTP. The TTP is, in ideological and genealogical terms, indistinguishable from the Afghan Taliban. They share theology, ethnic identity, and in many cases, blood. The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to launch operations against TTP is not weakness or negligence, it is a deliberate choice rooted in Pashtun solidarity. Pakistan created the militant infrastructure that spawned the TTP. It nurtured the ideology that animates them. It is now being consumed by the very forces it engineered, and it wants the Taliban to solve a problem that Pakistan itself created. That is blowback in its purest form. TTP has killed thousands of Pakistani soldiers since 2007. It has Pakistani military installations. Pakistan has responded by demanding the Afghan Taliban act, and when they don’t, by launching airstrikes into Afghan territory. Those airstrikes kill civilians. They inflame Pashtun sentiment on both sides of the Durand Line. They validate every Afghan suspicion

Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security Sikh Terrorism

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Debt Bondage: Pakistan’s way of exploiting its minorities

Forced labour, servile marriages, bonded inhuman labour, physical torture and abuses against women, children and the elderly have threatened Sindh’s minorities. I. Executive Summary Debt bondage in Sindh is systemic, inter-generational and structurally embedded. Legal prohibitions and international commitments notwithstanding, serious gaps in enforcement and socioeconomic inequalities sustain a cycle of exploitation. Without coordinated, evidence-based and politically accountable reform, millions of minorities, women and children remain at risk of continued slavery. Scale of Crisis Debt Bondage in Sindh High-Risk Districts & Sectors Impact on Minorities Child Labour Dimension Legal and Policy Gaps Structural Drivers Challenges in Rehabilitation & Reintegration Human Rights Relevance II. Context Debt bondage, a contemporary type of slavery wherein employees are obligated to their employers against unpaid advances and structural pressure, remains deeply ingrained in Sindh’s rural economy. It continues to be one of the most pervasive yet under-addressed human rights issues. Statutory prohibitions notwithstanding, international commitments and constitutional protections, exploitative practices continue unhindered due to systemic socioeconomic and governance failures, trapping millions of people in debt bondage, forced labour and coercive exploitation across important economic sectors. Minorities, especially low-caste Hindus, are disproportionately affected by cycles of inequality and exploitation perpetuated. Millions of people are still working in bonded labour in agricultural, brick kiln and informal sectors, according to extensive data and field reports. Minorities are disproportionately affected due to socio-cultural marginalisation. III. Background: Sindh, one of the world’s oldest centres of civilisation, is home to the Indus Valley and has historically served as a hub for ideas, trade and cultural development. The region’s multi-layered history, which includes Persian, Afghan, Mughal and eventually British colonial dominance, illustrates both cultural richness and repeated conquest from Mauryan, Kushan and Gupta rule to its significance as a centre of Islamic study and trade under Arab and Turkic rulers. Sindh has struggled with persistent concerns about political centralisation, unequal resource distribution and influences on its linguistic and cultural identity ever since it joined Pakistan in 1947.Discussion about representation, economic justice and provincial autonomy is still essential for understanding current conflicts and the Sindhi movement’s desire for increased involvement in choices affecting the future of the area. Owing to mistreatment and mismanagement, there have been persistent demands for complete independence as a sovereign Sindh nation. As of 2023, Sindh, one of Pakistan’s four provinces, is home to an estimated 55 million people and occupies 140,914 square kilometres. In addition to serving as the provincial capital, Karachi is the biggest metropolis and centre of Pakistan’s economy. English is commonly used in government, administration and education, whereas Sindhi is the official provincial language and Urdu is the national language. Due to Sindh’s historically complex social fabric, majority of the province is Muslims (around 91 per cent) with Hindus making up the largest religious minority (about eight per cent). World Sindhi Congress (WSC), which represents Sindh abroad at Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), promotes Sindhi political, cultural and human rights concerns on a global platform. Sindh has a long history of civilisation that dates back to ancient times. The ancient homeland of the Sindhu (Indus) River is known as Sindhudesh or Sindhu Kingdom in Mahabharata. Sindh’s longstanding status as a unique cultural and political entity in early South Asian history is reflected in the name. Sindhi people face increasing environmental, socioeconomic and human rights challenges that require immediate international attention. The targeting of ethnic Sindhis and religious minorities, together with reports of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and dissent repression, highlights a very alarming accountability vacuum. Religious prejudice has escalated, making minority groups, especially Hindu girls, more susceptible to kidnapping and coerced conversion. Simultaneously, Sindh’s agrarian economy has been severely damaged by climate vulnerability, rising sea levels, soil salinity and frequent flooding. Economic Corridor (CPEC) have accelerated ecological degradation, industrial pollution and displacement without sufficient local consultation. Sindh’s socioeconomic stability and cultural security have been undermined by these intertwined crises that have strengthened calls for greater political representation, minority rights protection, environmental protection and meaningful involvement in decisions that impact the region’s resources and future development. IV. Debt Bondage: A Silent Killer Debt bondage also known as bonded labour is contemporary form of slavery. It happens when someone is forced to pay back debt or advance payments (commonly referred to as peshgi) on terms that make it nearly difficult to comply due to exorbitant interest rates and pitifully low salaries. They are unable to refuse or flee exploitative labour which traps workers and their families. Forced labour, human trafficking, servile marriage and bonded labour are all considered forms of modern slavery and are included in the Global Slavery Index framework. On paper, millions of Sindhis in Pakistan enjoy freedom, but in practice, bondage rules their lives. Debt is a multigenerational trap designed to keep an indigenous community economically reliant, socially immobile, and politically silent in rural Sindh. It is not a short-term misery. Poverty is not the cause of this. It is a social order that was created. Districts where agriculture and kiln-based labour dominate local economies, such as Tharparkar, Umerkot, Sanghar, Mirpurkhas, Badin, Thatta and portions of Hyderabad division, are regularly designated as high-risk. V. Signature Patterns in Sindh In Sindh, bonded labour is still widely used, especially in brick kilns and agriculture, where unskilled labourers and landless peasants (haris) take advance loans from kiln owners or landowners and get caught in never-ending debt cycles that last for generations. Farmers are frequently forced to give up a disproportionate amount of their produce due to informal and opaque sharecropping arrangements, which increase their financial dependence and restrict any feasible route to repayment. Importantly, bonded labour is not limited to adult male workers; women and children are also ensnared in household debt commitments, making them more susceptible to abuse, exploitation and systematic denial of their basic rights. These obligations are: A Sindhi child is often born with debts that will never be paid off, including money the child never borrowed and working land he/she will never own. This isn’t labour but ‘hereditary imprisonment’. VI.

Bharat Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

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Seven Years after Pulwama Terrorist Attack: Global Responses

On the 7th anniversary of #Pulwama terrorist attack, we release our new brief on Jaish-e-Mohammed (#JeM): major attacks, India’s counter-terror response, and global actions; UN listings, bans, sanctions, and FATF-linked pressure. It also tracks Pakistan’s retrospective denial and optics, even as JeM’s infrastructure persists. A seven-year audit of accountability, impunity, and what constrains terror.

Bharat Human Rights Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

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Pulwama@Seven: No Room for Complacency

Brig Brijesh Pandey Seven years after the Pulwama suicide bombing claimed the lives of 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel, India’s security strategy still carries the imprints of that national tragedy. The body bags wrapped in the National Flag catalysed the strategic shift. This terrorist attack by Pakistan-based and backed terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), from the Pakistan-occupied territories of Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK), was not merely an act of terrorism; it marked a geopolitical turning point that permanently reshaped India’s approach to deterrence. This incident also signaled a strategic shift toward Pakistan, emphasising the development of asymmetric capabilities and consequently, reshaping the balance of power in South Asia. The anniversary, however, should not turn out to be just a solemn remembrance; it should impel us to ponder over more serious questions, such as what changed after the Pulwama terror strike? What was the overall spectrum of India’s response? Have the risks been resolved? The Shock and Aftershock Pulwama suicide bombing was one of the most heinous attacks in over a decade. Within 12 days of the incident, India responded with a Trans-Line of Control (LoC) air strike at Balakot, deep inside PoJK. Trans LoC action, employing conventional forces, had thus far been defined as an “act of war.” Consequently, Pakistan was expected to respond with conventional kinetic action inside Indian territory. Perhaps the shock of the air strike was so great that it shook the military planners in Pakistan. They not only preferred to give it a pass, but also quickly returned the Indian pilot, the then Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who was taken as a prisoner after his aircraft crashed inside PoJK. In the pre-2019 era, India’s response to terrorist initiated incidents (TIIs) was characterised by restraint. It oscillated between diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, ceasefire violations across the LoC, limited covert operations and return to normalcy. What changed with Pulwama was India’s definition of “terror acts” and the unwarranted restraint caused by the term “act of war.” The most remarkable part was India smashing the glass ceiling of nuclear overhang, making a statement that Proxy War will no longer be cost- free. So what was the significance of the Balakot air strike? Firstly, it brought about a paradigm shift in the security policy from strategic restraint to calibrated punishment. Secondly, India dislodged Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and reinforced the deterrence established through the Uri Surgical strikes of 2016. Thirdly, at the global level, India suddenly altered the threshold levels of tolerance towards conflict between two nuclear-armed states. End of Strategic Restraint Balakot air strikes were domestically followed with a decisive mandate in favour of the ruling dispensation in India. This served not only as the public endorsement of India’s punitive action against Pakistan but also as the National consensus on “zero tolerance” towards any form of attack, conventional or sub-conventional. What followed was silent yet substantive: – There is no ambiguity about the dismantling of terror infrastructure post abrogation of Article 370 substantively. There has also been a remarkable improvement in most of the parameters of terrorism, such as recruitment, infiltration by foreign terrorists, number of TIIs and the resultant loss of lives. However, to assume that the entire framework of Proxy War encompassing ideological radicalisation, nexus networks and terror infrastructures will get dismantled so easily, will be a fallacy. So long as the “idea of terrorism” is alive, peace will remain elusive and the trajectory of stability can be altered in the blink of an eye. Deterrence in South Asia In the immediate aftermath of the Balakot air strikes, it was believed that deterrence had been restored and would dissuade Pakistan from orchestrating a major terror strike against India. This belief was shattered by the terror attacks at Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, killing 26 tourists after segregating them in the name of religion. Given the nature of the attacks and manner of execution, it can well be called a step higher than the Pulwama suicide bombing. Consequently, this led the Indian security planners once again to redefine the boundaries of deterrence through Operation Sindoor. For Pakistan, the costs were multiplied manifold, and the spectrum of punishment was enhanced to encompass the entire length and breadth of Pakistan. Even foreign assets stationed in Pakistan were not spared, and the attacks signalled a “conventional anti-dote” to the strategic comfort Pakistan derived from India’s “no first use” nuclear doctrine. Despite such a decisive action, compelling Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations to rush to seek a ceasefire, the Delhi Car Bombing of 10 November 2025 at Red Fort Metro Station occurred. This time too, the trail pointed towards Pakistan, though the network differed in character and the arc of orchestration extended as far as Türkiye. Recurrence of terror attacks underscores a basic reality that deterrence in South Asia is neither static nor absolute. It is a dynamic contest shaped by big power alignments, multiple regional actors (often working in concert), proxy players embedded within the society, internal political machinations, and ideological currents. The challenge is further compounded by the constant mutation of terrorist organisations, evolving new methods, funding patterns and operational space. This helps them to evade the conventional operational responses. Consequently, even decisive actions such as Balakot or sophisticated, high-precision operations such as Operation Sindoor cannot be expected to create permanent deterrence. Pakistan Army, whose relevance has long been based on perpetual hostility with India, will continue to innovate and rewire its Proxy Warfare. Moreover, the regional and global players whose geostrategic interests are served by constraining India’s rise or drawing India into asymmetric dependencies that undermine India’s strategic autonomy will keep discovering new ways of supporting Pakistan’s disruptive designs. Internal Security Question Beyond the realm of geopolitics and external dimensions lies an uncomfortable yet fundamental question: could Pulwama have been prevented through an anticipatory mechanism? Investigations into major TIIs have constantly indicated the gaps in intelligence, inter-agency coordination, integrated threat assessment, and the last-mile operational preparedness of forces operating in various conflict zones. While procedural and structural measures

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security

366

Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh

Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.

Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Hindus Bangladesh Bharat Human Rights Khalistan

359

Situational Analysis: Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Khalistani support for Islamist-linked violence and minority killings in Bangladesh, and the appearance of anti-Hindu and anti-India sloganeering outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, reiterate that this is not simply a local Western “public order” problem. It is foreign territory being utilised as an outward-facing theatre for a Pakistan-rooted, anti-India orientation, where street spectacle and digital amplification do the work of deniable pressure.

Bangladesh’s Political Alliances Ahead of the 2026 Elections: Domestic Shifts and Geopolitical Alignments

Bangladesh Bharat Election Hindus Human Rights Leadership Pakistan Policy Politics

488

Bangladesh’s Political Alliances Ahead of the 2026 Elections: Domestic Shifts and Geopolitical Alignments

By N. C. Bipindra As Bangladesh moves toward the general elections scheduled for February 2026, the country is experiencing its most far-reaching political realignment in decades. The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s long-entrenched Awami League dominance following the 2024 mass uprising has dismantled the familiar two-party framework and given rise to a fragmented, competitive political arena. New coalitions, revived Islamist forces and youth-driven political platforms are all vying for space, and their manoeuvring is unfolding amid intensifying regional and global interest. For India, China, the United States and Pakistan, the choices Bangladeshi voters and parties make in 2026 will shape not only domestic governance but also Dhaka’s strategic orientation in South Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. From Awami League Dominance to Political Fragmentation For more than a decade, Bangladesh’s political and foreign policy trajectory was closely associated with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League. Domestically, the party presided over a strong centralised system that delivered economic growth while constricting political competition. Internationally, it cultivated a close strategic partnership with India, maintained extensive economic and infrastructure engagement with China and managed an increasingly strained relationship with the United States over issues of democracy, elections and human rights. The upheaval of 2024 abruptly ended this equilibrium. The interim administration under Muhammad Yunus pledged institutional reform and credible elections, but it also left the Awami League politically marginalised, creating a vacuum that rival forces are now racing to fill. BNP: Strategic Balancer with a Nationalist Tilt In this transformed landscape, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has emerged as the most significant electoral contender. Long the principal opposition to the Awami League, BNP now sees itself as the natural governing alternative in a post-Hasina order. Its campaign narrative centres on restoring democratic norms, recalibrating economic policy, and reasserting civilian political authority. The death of party chairperson Khaleda Zia in December 2025 has accelerated a generational shift within the BNP, with her son Tarique Rahman assuming a central leadership role and directing alliance-building efforts ahead of the polls. This transition has infused the party with renewed urgency but also heightened scrutiny of its internal cohesion and strategic direction. Geopolitically, a BNP-led government would likely pursue a more balanced and less India-centric foreign policy than the Awami League. While ties with New Delhi would remain important, BNP has historically been more cautious, sometimes sceptical, of India’s influence and would seek a relationship framed more explicitly around reciprocity and sovereignty. At the same time, BNP is open to deepening economic engagement with China, viewing Beijing primarily as a source of investment and infrastructure rather than an ideological partner. Relations with the United States are expected to improve relative to the later Awami League years, as Washington sees BNP as more receptive to competitive politics, though US support would remain contingent on credible elections and limits on Islamist influence. Any warming of ties with Pakistan under a BNP government would likely be symbolic rather than transformative, constrained by historical sensitivities and limited economic incentives. Islamist Bloc: Ideological Identity, Strategic Ambiguity Alongside BNP’s resurgence, the return of Islamist politics has added a new layer of complexity to the electoral contest. The reinstatement of Jamaat-e-Islami has allowed it to rebuild an Islamist-leaning bloc drawing on conservative rural constituencies and religious networks. Although Jamaat is unlikely to dominate nationally, it is well-positioned to influence outcomes in a fragmented parliament. Its re-entry into mainstream politics has unsettled secular and centrist forces, raising questions about Bangladesh’s ideological trajectory after years of enforced secularism under the Awami League. From a geopolitical perspective, Jamaat’s participation is viewed with unease by both India and the United States. New Delhi associates Islamist political mobilisation with potential risks to border security and counter-extremism cooperation, while Washington remains wary of Jamaat’s ideological orientation and historical baggage. Pakistan, by contrast, sees a degree of ideological affinity in Jamaat’s worldview, though this does not automatically translate into strategic alignment. China has taken a more pragmatic stance, showing little concern for Jamaat’s ideology so long as political stability is maintained and economic engagements remain intact. In this sense, Islamist influence complicates Bangladesh’s external relationships without clearly anchoring the country to any single power. National Citizen Party (NCP): Reformist Politics, Geopolitical Ambiguity Another significant player in the evolving political landscape is the National Citizen Party, a youth-led formation that emerged from the 2024 protest movement. The NCP articulates a reformist agenda centred on institutional accountability, anti-corruption measures and generational change in politics. Its rise reflects widespread public fatigue with dynastic politics and entrenched elites. However, the party’s limited grassroots organisation and inexperience have constrained its electoral prospects, pushing it toward alliance calculations that have sparked internal divisions, particularly over potential cooperation with Islamist groups. Internationally, NCP’s discourse resonates most strongly with Western actors, especially the United States, which views its emphasis on transparency and civic rights as aligned with democratic norms. The party has not articulated a clear or consistent stance toward India or China, reflecting both its novelty and its focus on domestic reform rather than foreign policy. Over the longer term, NCP represents a potential new political elite that could tilt Bangladesh toward stronger engagement with Western institutions, but in the immediate electoral cycle, its influence is likely to be indirect, mediated through alliances. Awami League Remnant: Pro-India, Diminished but Not Irrelevant Although the Awami League has been largely sidelined, its residual networks within the bureaucracy, business community and local governance structures continue to matter. Any partial rehabilitation of the party would be welcomed in New Delhi, which still regards the Awami League as its most reliable partner in Bangladesh. However, strained relations with the United States and deep hostility toward Pakistan would remain defining features of an Awami League foreign policy orientation, limiting its room for manoeuvre even if it regains political relevance. Democracy, Stability, and Strategic Competition For the United States, 2026 election represents a test of process rather than personalities. Washington’s primary concerns revolve around electoral credibility, political pluralism and the containment of violent extremism. A BNP-led or broadly technocratic

Ideology Before Inquiry? A Rejoinder to New York Times RSS Narrative

Bharat Disinformation Geopolitics Hindus

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Ideology Before Inquiry? A Rejoinder to New York Times RSS Narrative

Dr. Aniket Pingley I am not a journalist by profession. But like any reader who values intellectual honesty, I expect journalism to adhere to its own stated standards of ethics, verification, and fairness. In its article published by NYT titled “From the Shadows to Power: How the Hindu Right Reshaped India,” that expectation is repeatedly taken for a toss. If the NYT is willing to relax on standards when writing about the RSS, readers are entitled to ask whether what is being offered is reporting at all, or merely a predetermined story wearing the language of journalism. This essay examines where and how the article by Mashal and Kumar departs from those standards. My critique does not rest on disagreement with conclusions alone, but on demonstrable violations of widely accepted journalistic ethics, as codified in the IFJ Global Charter of Ethics for Journalists, the Munich Charter, and the Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics. In the sections that follow, I identify specific statements from the article, map them to the standards they violate, and offer rewritten versions showing how the same points could have been presented in a professional manner. 1. Failure: Fact–Opinion Separation Violated Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “The far-right group known as the R.S.S. has spent a century trying to make India a Hindu-first nation.” “The journalist shall make sure to clearly distinguish factual information from commentary and criticism.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 2 Founded in 1925, the RSS has articulated a vision of national identity centered on Hindu cultural/civilizational unity. Critics interpret this vision as seeking a Hindu-first political order, an interpretation the organization has refuted consistently. India, that is Bharat, is a Hindu nation. The word Hindu transcends Hinduism (religion). Hindu is the collective identity of the people of this nation called Bharat. The nationhood of Hindus has evolved over thousands of years independently of the kingdoms in Bharat and their political boundaries. 2. Failure: Loaded Language Used as Factual Description Statement Violated standard How should it have been written Some common sense “The R.S.S. originated as a shadowy cabal for the revival of Hindu pride after a long history of Muslim invasions and colonial rule in India, its early leaders openly drawing inspiration from the nationalist formula of Fascist parties in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” “Avoid stereotyping. Journalists should examine the ways their values and experiences may shape their reporting.” – SPJ Code of Ethics The RSS began as a small, closely organized volunteer movement during the colonial period, operating primarily through local branches, called as shakhas, rather than public political platforms. An honest discussion with the RSS leadership reveals that the founder Dr. Hedgewar was inspired by the vision of Swami Vivekananda, Yogi Aurobindo, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Bal Gangadhar Tilak etc. The RSS was founded in 1925, about half a decade prior to the start fascism in Europe. Why would anyone in the RSS had to go to Europe to learn about martial discipline if they could simply observe the British exercise the same, first-hand and for free? Suggested reading for NYT: Bhawani Mandir pamphlet written by Yogi Aurobindo in 1905. 3. Failure: Suppression of Essential Context Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “It’s philosophy casts India’s Muslims and Christians as descendants of foreign invaders who need to be put in their place.” “The journalist shall not suppress essential information or falsify any document.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 3 Some critics argue that certain Hindutva interpretations frame Indian history through a civilizational lens that emphasizes foreign invasions. RSS leaders, however, state that their definition of national belonging is cultural rather than religious and applies to all citizens. As a matter of fact, Sarasanghachalak Dr. Mohan Bhagwat has stated, on record, umpteen times that everyone in Bharat shares a “common DNA”, irrespective of their faith. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/living-in-harmony-is-our-culture-mohan-bhagwat-says-dna-of-people-in-undivided-india-same-for-40000-years-as-rss-marks-100-years/articleshow/123528212.cms The article itself states: “Their definition is a cultural one, and they consider everyone living in India as Hindu, he (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) said.” 4 & 5. Failure: Causal Claims Without Verification and Prediction Presented as Fact 2 Statements Violated standards How should it have been written “The R.S.S. has infiltrated and co-opted India’s institutions to such a degree …” “that its deep roots will ensure it remains a powerful force long after Mr. Modi is gone.” “Never confuse the work of a journalist with that of a publicist or a propagandist.” – Charter of Munich, Responsibility 9 “The notion of urgency or immediacy in the dissemination of information shall not take precedence over verification.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 5 Individuals associated with organizations that describe ideological affinity with the RSS are present across political parties, civil society groups, and public institutions in India. Scholars and analysts disagree on whether this presence reflects coordinated organizational strategy, informal ideological influence, or the broader political mobilization of Hindu nationalist ideas. However, no judicial findings or investigative agency has proven that the R.S.S exercises institutional control over state bodies or established centralized direction of such influence. 6. Failure: Unfounded Accusations by Association Statement Violated standard Counter question for the NYT “And when you see Hindu vigilantes parading through Muslim neighbourhoods or ransacking churches, you are seeing the R.S.S. affiliates exercising their vision of supremacy.” “Slander, libel, defamation, unfounded accusations are serious professional misconduct.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 10 The article itself states: “He (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) discouraged engaging in hooliganism and incitement of violence”. The basis of this article is a study conducted by Felix Pal that attempts to establish RSS having a tight control over all its affiliates. So does the RSS’s discouragement to incitement of violence and its affiliates’ “exercising their vision of supremacy” through hooliganism logically add up? 7. Failure: Unverified causal theory presented as settled fact Statement Violated standard Counter statement with similar flavour “But the formula has remained central to its success ever since: uniting Hindus around grievances from the past and injecting

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security Terrorism

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Situational Analysis: Global Silence as Bangladesh’s Hindus Are Lynched Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch

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