Geopolitics Human Rights Pakistan Security Terrorism

Enforced Disappearances, Human Rights and BLA’s Independence Call

By N. C. Bipindra Balochistan has yet again entered a dangerous phase of political and humanitarian uncertainty. Recent declaration by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) to form an independent army and seek international recognition as a sovereign nation has brought decades-long freedom struggle against Pakistan’s reported occupation into sharp focus. While BLA’s statement marks a new and more assertive phase in the struggle to take governance into their own hands, it also threatens to worsen an already grim human rights landscape. For years, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and suppression of dissent have scarred the province. Now, with renewed calls for being recognized as a separate nation, Balochistan risks sliding deeper into vortex of violence and repression that shows little sign of abating. Pakistan’s army and security establishment has come down heavily on Baloch people seeking their basic rights to live peacefully and honourably. Islamabad’s new found friend in US President Donald Trump may be oblivious to this grim situation and only interested in excavating the high value rare earth metals and specialized molecules with high precision application across industries in America. A Province in Perpetual Conflict Balochistan, rich in natural resources but poor in development and representation has long been a theatre of conflict between Pakistani state and various Baloch nationalist groups. The grievances are old and deep, rooted in reported political marginalization, economic exploitation and cultural erasure. BLA’s recent announcement seeking international recognition and establishment of diplomatic missions represents a bold political escalation. It reframes the struggle from one of autonomy within Pakistan to outright independence. Predictably, such a declaration is being treated in Islamabad not as political dissent but as a direct challenge to national sovereignty, setting the stage for intensified military operations. Beneath the political grandstanding lies a darker humanitarian crisis that predates this declaration: persistent phenomenon of unexplained disappearances and human rights abuses that have come to define life in Balochistan. Missing People of Balochistan For families in Balochistan, the phrase “missing persons” has become an everyday horror. Thousands of Baloch men — students, teachers, activists, and ordinary civilians — have disappeared over the years, allegedly picked up by security forces or intelligence agencies. Many are never seen again; others turn up dead, often bearing signs of torture. According to the Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB), 123 enforced disappearances and 26 killings were recorded in just August 2025. Earlier in March that year, the group documented 151 disappearances and 80 killings. Such numbers are staggering for a single province, and they are likely underestimates, given the difficulty of reporting in militarised areas. The Pakistan Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) has received over 10,000 cases nationwide, with a disproportionate number from Balochistan. Yet, rights groups say that official mechanisms lack independence and transparency. Investigations rarely lead to prosecutions, and security agencies operate with near-total impunity. The HRCB and other local NGOs have documented a recurring pattern: night-time raids, arrests without warrants, and bodies discovered days or weeks later in desolate areas. Families often face intimidation when they speak out or join protests demanding the return of their loved ones. Many have spent years camped outside press clubs or government offices, holding faded photographs and placards that ask a simple question: “Where is my son?” Fear and Silence: A Society Under Siege The psychological toll on the province is immense. Entire communities live under a shadow of fear. In cities like Turbat, Kech, Awaran, and Gwadar, once bustling trade hubs, silence has replaced debate. Even student activism is seen as a potential act of rebellion. Students have been frequent victims of disappearances, especially those affiliated with Baloch student organisations. Human rights defender Dr. Mahrang Baloch, who spearheaded a peaceful movement for missing persons, was herself detained in 2024, a move widely condemned internationally as an attempt to crush dissent. Journalists, too, face censorship and threats. Many have been warned against reporting on disappearances or military operations. The result is a near-total blackout on independent information from much of Balochistan, leaving only official narratives and sporadic social media updates from activists who risk their lives to post them. Extrajudicial Killings and the “Kill-and-Dump” Policy One of the most disturbing aspects of the crisis is what local activists describe as the “kill-and-dump” policy. Individuals who disappear are later found dead, their bodies dumped on roadsides or in remote deserts. These victims are often presented by authorities as “terrorists” killed in encounters, but human rights groups say many of these encounters are staged. The state’s security establishment insists its operations target armed insurgents, not civilians. Yet the blurred line between militant and civilian in such operations has made accountability nearly impossible. In some cases, the victims had no political affiliation at all. Families are left with bodies to bury and no answers about why their loved ones were taken or killed. Legal and Institutional Failures Pakistan is a signatory to major international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention Against Enforced Disappearances. Yet, in practice, these obligations remain largely unfulfilled. The COIED, established to investigate missing persons cases, has been criticised as toothless. It lacks the authority to compel powerful agencies like the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the Frontier Corps (FC) to produce detainees or disclose information. Its reports are rarely made public, and few cases have led to convictions. In the absence of credible accountability, enforced disappearances have become normalised as a tool of control. Human rights lawyers describe it as a deliberate policy, a way to silence opposition without legal consequence. BLA’s Declaration and Its Fallout The BLA’s move to declare a separate “army” and seek global recognition adds a dangerous new layer to this human rights tragedy. The Pakistani state, already hypersensitive to any challenge in Balochistan, is likely to respond with harsher counter-insurgency measures, which could lead to more disappearances, arrests, and extrajudicial killings under the banner of fighting terrorism. Civilians will, as always, bear the brunt. In areas where the BLA has

Beyond “Iron Brothers” - The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

China Cyber Security Defence Geopolitics Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

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Beyond “Iron Brothers”: The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

N. C. Bipindra Pakistan’s engagement with both Washington and Beijing raises concerns about its relationship with China. Despite claims of trust and shared interests, Pakistan’s foreign policy history reveals a consistent pattern of duplicity. This poses risks for China, affecting its security and technological dominance. Let us analyse Pakistan’s dual alignments, urging caution from Beijing regarding military technology transfers to Islamabad. Pakistan’s foreign policy traits, transactionalism, opportunism, and dependence on external allies, suggest a potential shift in technology flow from the U.S. to China in a new geopolitical landscape. Historical Patterns of Technology Transfers Pakistan has long capitalised on its geostrategic location to obtain military and economic concessions from major powers. During the Cold War, it accommodated CIA operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan and received sophisticated U.S. armaments; however, not all of it remained in Pakistani possession. Two instances are particularly noteworthy. In the 1990s, U.S. intelligence asserted that Pakistan transferred American-supplied Stinger missiles to China, a claim that Islamabad refuted. After the 2011 Abbottabad raid, The New York Times disclosed that Chinese engineers were permitted to examine the remnants of a downed U.S. stealth-modified Black Hawk helicopter. Although definitive evidence was lacking, U.S. officials referenced intercepted communications to substantiate the allegation. These occurrences, notwithstanding Pakistani refutations, solidified perceptions of duplicity. For Beijing, the implication is unequivocal: if Pakistan was unable to protect U.S. technologies, it cannot be entirely relied upon to safeguard Chinese ones. Pakistan’s Contemporary Balancing Act Today, Pakistan faces a transformed strategic environment. Following Operation Bunyaan-un-Marsoos and subsequent outreach efforts, Islamabad has sought to re-engage Washington, particularly to secure tariff concessions and financial relief amid severe economic strain. Simultaneously, it remains dependent on Beijing for military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons and sensors to drones. The private lunch hosted for Asim Munir at the White House on June 18, 2025, is not merely a ceremonial bonhomie. It is a fact that such courtesies are rarely extended without an eye on strategic dividends. It appears that, in an era where China has surged ahead of the U.S. in technologies like AI, 5G, and advanced manufacturing, Washington views Pakistan not merely as an old battlefield ally but as a potential conduit for intelligence, leverage, and Chinese tech transfer. Perhaps, for Washington, cultivating ties with Pakistan’s generals is about far more than courtesy. It offers a discreet channel for access, legitimacy, and potentially even Chinese technology. However, this balancing act carries profound risks for China. Sensitive Chinese systems, long assumed to be secure within the framework of an “all-weather” partnership, may become vulnerable to American scrutiny as Pakistan attempts to cultivate favor in Washington. What was once an unshakable partnership is beginning to look increasingly fragile, as Pakistan’s loyalties are often dictated not by long-term commitments but by immediate strategic and financial incentives. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel has long observed, “Pakistani generals can be bought any time,” a reminder of how transactional and compromised the country’s military elite remain. Compounding this vulnerability is the conduct of Pakistan’s civil–military elite. Many former army chiefs, including Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa, have relocated abroad or maintained significant overseas assets after retirement. Such behavior underscores an entrenched pattern of ethical and moral corruption: leaders prioritise personal enrichment and external safe havens over national development, leaving the public to suffer under chronic instability and economic decline. Case of the J-35 Stealth Fighter Pakistan’s reported withdrawal from a planned deal for 40 J-35 stealth fighters highlights these dynamics. Once poised to be the jet’s first foreign buyer, Islamabad later dismissed the reports, despite earlier claims of pilot training in China. Battlefield lessons from Operation Sindoor — where Chinese systems underperformed against India’s BrahMos and S-400 — fueled doubts about the untested J-35. Economic pressures, including IMF austerity and a stretched defence budget, further undermined the $5 billion deal. For Beijing, Pakistan’s reversal exposed the fragility of trust: a flagship transfer was abandoned in favor of renewed U.S. outreach, underscoring China’s vulnerability to Islamabad’s hedging. Hypersonic Missiles: China Draws a Line Another case highlighting Beijing’s caution is its reported rejection of Pakistan’s request for hypersonic missiles and related technology. Media reports suggest China refused both sales and tech transfers, fearing Islamabad’s growing outreach to the U.S. could expose sensitive systems. Unlike fighter jets or conventional missiles, hypersonic platforms like the DF-17 are central to China’s strategic deterrence and lack downgraded export versions, reflecting their sensitivity and immaturity. The denial underscores a key reality: even in an “all-weather” partnership, Beijing does not fully trust Pakistan with its most advanced technologies. Strategic Implications for China The implications of this dynamic for China are far-reaching. First, Pakistan represents both an asset and a liability for Beijing. It provides strategic depth in South Asia, a reliable arms market, and political support in international forums. Yet these benefits come at the cost of significant vulnerability: advanced Chinese systems risk exposure through Pakistani networks, intentionally or inadvertently, to Western intelligence. Second, the problem is structural rather than episodic. Pakistan’s foreign policy has long been characterised by transactionalism, with loyalty subordinated to immediate material gains. As Islamabad draws closer to Washington, Beijing must anticipate that Pakistan’s defence partnership could once again become a conduit for technological leakage, this time at China’s expense. Third, the nature of emerging technologies magnifies the risk. Whereas conventional hardware could be downgraded for export, dual-use and software-driven systems cannot be so easily restricted. For Beijing, the possibility of losing control over AI, cyber, or hypersonic technologies through Pakistan would represent a strategic disaster, undermining years of investment and eroding its position vis-à-vis the United States. In this sense, Pakistan’s growing closeness with Washington is about far more than counterterrorism cooperation or financial bailouts. It is “more than what meets the eye”: for the West, Pakistan provides a potential backdoor to scrutinize and even reverse-engineer Chinese technologies in domains like AI, quantum, and stealth areas where Beijing has made significant advances over the United States. Washington now views Beijing not merely as a rising

Is Islamic Alliance in offing, With Ambiguities

Defence Geopolitics International Pakistan Policy Security Trade

176

Is Islamic Alliance in Offing, With Ambiguities

Only a true test, a moment of crisis, will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. Rahul Pawa When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a sweeping mutual defense agreement in Riyadh this month, it marked a strategic pivot. The agreement, termed a “Strategic Mutual Defence” agreement declares that an attack on one is an attack on both, echoing NATO’s famous Article 5 commitment. It’s an unprecedented pledge between the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the only Muslim nation armed with nuclear weapons. Yet behind the celebratory rhetoric, the agreement’s true scope and weight remain uncertain. A NATO-Style on paper, the agreement’s collective defense vow is explicit: “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” Pakistan’s government said. In practice, much is left vague. Notably, the agreement is silent on whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Islamic world’s only nukes is now at Saudi Arabia’s disposal. Pressed about a potential Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Riyadh, a senior Saudi official would only say the agreement “encompasses all military means”. This careful ambiguity hints at a broad commitment while stopping short of any explicit nuclear guarantee. Another grey area is the agreement’s status. Riyadh and Islamabad pointedly call it an “agreement” and not a treaty. By definition, though, any written inter-state accord intended to bind is a treaty under international law, regardless of its label. The absence of a published text and the flexible wording suggest the parties prefer some wiggle room. Saudi Arabia has pursued grand defense coalitions before like a 2015 pan-Islamic military alliance against terrorism that proved “more symbolic than operational”. This time, the language of collective defense is tied to plans for concrete cooperation (joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, arms training). Whether it matures into a robust alliance or remains largely aspirational will only be clear with time. The agreement’s timing is telling. It came days after a surprise Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar that killed Hamas figures and stunned the Gulf States. Qatar hosts a major US airbase, yet Washington did not prevent the strike, a jolt to regional confidence in American protection. Saudi Arabia, already uneasy about U.S. reliability, seized the moment to bolster its own security. Officially, Riyadh says the deal “institutionalises” long-standing cooperation rather than targeting any specific incident. Still, it unmistakably signals that the kingdom can seek safeguards beyond the U.S. umbrella. The agreement even revived talk of an “Islamic NATO.” Saudi Arabia binding itself to Pakistan, Islam’s spiritual heart partnering with its only nuclear-armed state is a powerful image. Observers speculate that other Muslim countries might one day align under a similar framework. Yet longstanding sectarian and political rifts (Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab) have doomed past unity efforts. For now, the Riyadh-Islamabad agreement is as much a message to big powers as a foundation for any broader alliance. Perhaps the toughest diplomatic test for Riyadh is managing the agreement’s fallout in New Delhi. India has spent years cultivating Saudi Arabia as a partner, a top source of oil, investment and Islamic-world backing on contentious issues. A formal Saudi-Pakistani security link is exactly what India hoped to avoid. New Delhi “would not welcome an explicit security tether between its principal energy supplier and its strategic rival,” one analysis noted. In effect, the agreement edges Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan, risking awkward strain in Saudi-India ties. Indian government reacted in measured tones, acknowledging the agreement and saying it would “study the implications” for her security. The real worry in New Delhi is not that Saudi forces would fight on Pakistan’s side which remains far-fetched but that Pakistan will feel politically bolstered by Riyadh’s backing. Pakistani hardliners may adopt a tougher posture in future confrontations, believing a wealthy Arab power has their back. There’s also concern that Saudi aid or arms could flow to Pakistan over time, indirectly strengthening India’s longtime foe. Aware of these optics, Saudi officials have been quick to reassure India. One senior official stressed that Saudi’s relationship with India “is more robust than it has ever been” and vowed to keep deepening it. Riyadh clearly wants to show it can defend its interests with Pakistan without abandoning its friendship with India. Even so, the balancing act is delicate. New Delhi will likely respond by tightening its own strategic bonds, for instance, with Israel, a close defense partner – and by quietly urging Riyadh to stay neutral in South Asian issues. Much progress in India-Saudi relations has come in recent years, and both sides have incentives to prevent this new alignment from derailing that momentum. As the dust settles, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement stands as a bold statement, but one not yet tested by crisis. Its ripple effects are already evident. Israel, which had been inching toward a historic normalisation with Riyadh, now sees that prospect put on hold Washington, too, must grapple with a Gulf ally hedging its bets on security. Ultimately, the agreement’s significance will hinge on how seriously Riyadh and Islamabad implement it. Regular joint drills coordinated planning or clear mutual defense protocols could turn the promise into genuine deterrence. Absent that, skeptics may view it as more posturing than substance. History offers caution: Pakistan’s past defense agreement s (such as Cold War alliances with the U.S.) often fell short when real wars loomed, and Gulf unity schemes have tended to fragment under pressure. For now, Saudi Arabia has made a dramatic bid to diversify its security options, a gamble on Pakistan’s reliability and on charting a more independent course without alienating old partners. If the gamble succeeds, it could redraw the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia. If it falters, it will remind everyone that even grand agreements can carry unspoken caveats. Only a true test, a moment of crisis will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi

Defence Hindus Kashmir Pakistan Policy Politics Security

456

Heritage, Ethos, Not Saffronisation

Selective amnesia and deliberate attempt to communalise the army on naming of operation Sindoor is gross and unacceptable. Brig Brijesh Pandey Frontline column “Hindu Names for Military Operations: Treading a Dangerous Line” by Mani Shankar Aiyar published on 09, September 2025 argues that naming of military operations by the present government – most recently Operation Sindoor reflects a deliberate “saffronisation of Indian Army.” The argument is provocative, selective and highly misleading. Having served for 35 years in Indian Army, I never felt that I’m a Hindu or so to say only a Hindu. Being from a pure Sikh Regiment, felt more like a SIKH, behaved like a Sikh and whenever there was a chance to name an institution, exercise or force, the first name that would come to the mind was one that related to Sikh traditions of valour. Yet no one, including my parents, questioned my secular or Hindu credentials. This is so, because anyone who understands armed forces – the history, military tradition and institutional structure – knows that operation or force names are cultural symbols, not ideological manifestos. The culture of naming operations and exercises is older than modern warfare and militaries across the globe use evocative names for operations and exercises – sometimes as a code for secrecy, motivation and more often for messaging deterrence to the adversary as much as public consumption. From earliest days of independent India, armed forces have drawn names from mythology, Sanskrit, geography and abstract concepts. This practice cuts across political regimes led by Congress, BJP or coalitions. In 1984, almost four decades prior to the debate, Indian Army launched Operation Meghdoot to secure Siachen Glacier. The name comes from Kalidasa’s Sanskrit classic Meghaduta (Cloud Messenger from Hindu Cosmology) where an exiled Yaksha asks a cloud to carry a message to his beloved in the Himalayas. Name was chosen, as it was apt reflection of the nature of operation wherein Indian troops were airlifted like clouds into Himalayan heights. It was nothing but a cultural resonance. The name of recently concluded operation Sindoor has been used as evidence to create a discourse that Army is getting communalized or saffronised. Rationale for the name is very clear. Terrorists in Pahalgam targeted married Hindu men, widowing women overnight. Sindoor (vermilion) symbolizes marital bond in Indian culture. Naming the operation which was primarily a retaliatory action against such a heinous crime selectively inflicted on the majority community of the country was meant to be a tribute to victims and their families, not as a religious decree. Branding it as ideologically motivated reflects ignorance as well as crafty effort to question secular credentials of the armed forces. The act of symbolism and resolve when questioned post-operation Sindoor, a defense ministry official had said, “There is no single written policy on naming. Choices are pragmatic, contextual and meant to evoke resolve.” More often than not, the ideas get generated at very junior level and accepted as such to keep the initiative alive. The writer of “Hindu Names for Military Operations: Treading a Dangerous Line” has been selective about names in recent times, without considering full spectrum since evolution of Indian Armed Forces. When names like Operation Trident (1971), Operation Shakti (1998) or Exercise Ashvamedha (2007) were chosen, no one accused the government of the day – the Congress-led in each case – of religious indoctrination. In the name “Operation Trident”, famous naval strike on Karachi in 1971, “trident” is nothing else than “Trishul”, the weapon of Lord Shiva. Operation Shakti, India’s nuclear test in 1998 drew the name from Goddess power in the Hindu philosophy. But then, these names were accepted as civilizational, not sectarian. When no questions were Congress raised then, why do it now? To illustrate that there is neither any disruption in naming the operations nor is any correlation with appointment of CDS, it is important to analyze few names that relate to the pre and post-2014 era. Era Operation/Exercise Name Year Origin/Meaning Mythological/ Cultural link Pre-2014 Operation Meghdoot 1984 Kalidasa’s Meghadoota Yaksha sends clouds to Himalayas Operation Trident 1971 Trident (Trishul) Weapon of Lord Shiva Operation Pawan 1987 Pawan = Wind Vedic Deity Operation Shakti 1998 Shakti = Power Goddess Power Exercise Ashvamedha 2007 Royal Horse sacrifice Ancient Hindu Ritual Exercise Sudarshan Shakti 2011 Sudarshan Chakra Vishnu’s discus Missiles Prithvi, Agni, Akash, Nag Ongoing Fire, Earth, Sky, Serpent Vedic / Hindu roots Exercise Indra Ongoing Indra = God of rain Vedic deity Post 2014 Operation Maitri 2015 Maitree = Friendship Sanskrit, Budhist ethos Exercise Shatrujeet 2016 Shatrujeet = Enemy Conqueror Sanskrit motivational If Armed Forces were being transformed to suit a particular religion, their names and demography would also have started changing. Instead, the regimental system remains plural – Sikh Regiment, Rajputana Rifles, Maratha Light Infantry, Punjab Regiment, Assam Regiment, Madras regiment, Gorkha Regiment, Brigade of Guards, and so on – each maintaining regional, caste or faith-based traditions. The very regimentation of Indian Armed Forces is proof of pluralism. If the army was being saffronised as claimed by Aiyar, there would be a written directive mandating Hindu names. Whether it is regiments, exercises or operations, they would all start assuming names relating to Hindu religion only. Unlike compulsory recruitment of persons of religions based on which regiments exist only Hindus will get recruited. Likewise, promotion criteria will change. There would be no non-Hindu tenanting critical appointments such as Chief of Army / Navy / Air Force. Contrary to this, what we see is continuity: a mixture of neutral, mythological and cultural names chosen for operational and symbolic value. Seen through Cognitive Warfare lens, such narratives follow a familiar toolkit: disinformation (casting doubts on facts by portraying cultural symbolism as ideological capture), amplification (mainstreaming selective examples while ignoring historical continuity) and de-legitimization (eroding trust in one of the most patriotic institutions). We saw a similar pattern when opposition leaders questioned authenticity of 2016 Surgical Strikes and 2019 Balakot airstrike. In each case, rumour and

Artificial Intelligence Cyber Security Defence Pakistan Terrorism

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A Terrorist Tech Review in Khorasan

Broader implication is that counterterrorism efforts must adapt to an era of synthetic propaganda and AI-assisted operations. This means investing in new detection technologies, updating regulations for AI platforms, and perhaps rethinking how we monitor online terrorist communities without infringing on common people’s privacy. Rahul Pawa In June 2025, an unlikely tech column appeared in Voice of Khorasan, the English-language web terrorist propaganda magazine of ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province). Amid usual disillusions, Issue 46 featured a detailed comparison of popular AI chatbots; from OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Microsoft’s Bing AI to the privacy-focused Brave Leo and the Chinese bot dubbed “DeepSeek.” The tone resembled a consumer tech review, but the intent was deadly serious. The authors warned fellow jihadists about the risks of these tools, raising alarms about data privacy and surveillance. ChatGPT and Bing, they noted, might log user data or even expose a terrorist’s IP address, a potential death sentence for an terrorist on the run. They cautioned that generative AI could churn out false information or even mimic someone’s writing or speaking style, making it a double-edged sword for propaganda. After weighing the platforms, the magazine gave its endorsement: Brave’s Leo AI, integrated into a private web browser and requiring no login, was deemed the safest option for terrorists seeking anonymity. In essence, ISIS-K selected the chatbot that asks for the fewest questions in return, a chilling reminder that even terrorists prize privacy features. This surreal scene, a terrorist group rating AI assistants illustrates how terrorist organisations are eagerly probing the latest technology for their own ends. If Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate is producing in-house reviews of chatbots, it is because they see potential tools for propaganda, recruitment, and even operational support. And ISIS-K is not alone. Across the ideological spectrum, violent terrorists are experimenting with generative AI, ushering in a new chapter in the long history of terrorists exploiting digital media. From jihadists in remote safe houses to far left extremist cells in Western suburbs, terrorists are testing how AI can amplify their hateful messaging and help them evade detection. It’s a development that has counterterrorism officials on high alert, and for good reason. For decades, terrorist groups have been early adopters of new media. In the late 1990s, Al-Qaeda circulated grainy VHS tapes and CD-ROMs with lectures by Osama bin Laden. By the mid-2010s, ISIS perfected the art of online propaganda: slickly edited videos, encrypted chat channels, and multilingual web magazines reached recruits worldwide at the click of a button. The Islamic State’s media operatives earned a dark reputation as “innovators” in digital terror, leveraging YouTube, Twitter, and Telegram in ways governments struggled to counter. Now, generative AI is the latest technology wave and once again, terrorists are riding it. What’s different today is the power and accessibility of these AI tools. Modern generative AI can produce content that is startlingly realistic and tailored to an audience’s biases or emotions. This opens troubling possibilities for propaganda. Terrorist groups can now generate fake images, videos, and even interactive dialogues at scale, with minimal resources. In recent months, terrorists have used AI-created images and videos to stoke sectarian hatred and amplify conflicts. During the Israel counter strike on Hamas in 2023, for example, Hamas-linked propagandists circulated doctored visuals, including fabricated pictures of injured children and fake photos of Israeli soldiers in humiliating situations to inflame public emotion and spread disinformation. These AI-manipulated images blended seamlessly into the online information ecosystem, making it harder to separate truth from fabrication in the fog of war. ISIS and its offshoots have likewise ventured into deepfakes. Islamic State’s media affiliates reportedly published a “tech support guide” in mid-2023 instructing followers how to securely use generative AI tools while avoiding detection. Not long after, ISIS-K began unveiling AI-generated propaganda videos. Following a 2024 attack in Afghanistan, ISIS-K released a video bulletin featuring a fictitious news anchor, generated by deepfake technology calmly reading the group’s claims of responsibility. The video looked like a normal news broadcast, complete with a professional-looking anchor, except it was entirely fabricated by AI. In another case, after an assault in Kandahar, an ISIS-K propagandist created a second deepfake “Khurasan TV” clip, this time with a Western-accented avatar as the presenter. The goal is clear: lend terrorist propaganda a veneer of credibility and polish that previously required a studio and camera crew. Instead of grainy cellphone martyr videos, we now see digital avatars delivering the jihadists message in high definition, potentially fooling viewers (and automated content filters) that would dismiss overtly violent footage. As one security analyst observed, this marks a stark upgrade from the early 2000s when terrorist videos were rudimentary and “prioritised the message over higher production values” , today’s AI-crafted terror content can closely resemble legitimate media broadcasts. Why are terrorist groups so keen on generative AI? The answer lies in what these tools promise: speed, scale, personalisation, and a degree of deniability. A large language model can produce terrorist propaganda texts in multiple languages almost instantaneously, allowing a group like ISIS-K or al-Qaeda to tailor messages to different ethnic or national audiences without a large translation team. AI image generators can churn out endless visuals for memes, posters, or fake “news” proof, enabling agitators to flood social media with content that algorithmic moderation hasn’t seen before, thereby evading detection by hash-based filters that flag known terrorist photos. As Adam Hadley of Tech Against Terrorism warned, if terrorists manipulate imagery at scale with AI, it could undermine the hash-sharing databases that platforms use to automatically block violent content . In effect, generative AI offers terrorists a way to boost volume and variety in their online output, potentially staying one step ahead of content moderation efforts. Just as importantly, AI lowers the barriers for creating sophisticated lies. Misinformation and conspiracy theories can be mass-produced with ChatGPT-like models, which excel at mimicking authoritative tone or even an individual’s speech patterns. ISIS-K’s magazine explicitly noted this danger that AI can “create false information or mimic specific speech patterns”

Radicalised Khalistanis, a Canadian Problem

Canada Khalistan Pakistan Security Sikh

369

Radicalised Khalistanis, a Canadian Problem

For years Canada’s mainstream parties have courted Sikh immigrants to win votes. Now, they pander to Khalistani extremists for political gains. Rahul Pawa As Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Canada for the G7 summit, an unsettling scene greeted international media: young children brandished “Khalistan” flags and even defaced a Hindu temple in Surrey with secessionist graffiti. These images of toddlers taught to chant separatist slogans sparked outrage in India and around the world. Spokesman Sudeep Singh of the revered Patna Sahib Gurudwara, the birthplace of the tenth Sikh Guru, Guru Gobind Singh Ji warned that “the way children were used in the protests is highly condemnable”. Similarly, Sikh seminary leader Sarchand Singh Khyala condemned the videos as “spreading hatred by brainwashing children”. Dressed-up flags and violent symbols at public parades horrify many Sikhs abroad who see these stunts as political theatre, not Sikhism. Mainstream Sikh leaders make the same point: Khalistanis in Canada are a tiny fringe, not the Sikh community. In late realization of sorts, former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has emphasized, “many supporters of Khalistan in Canada… do not represent the Sikh community as a whole.” Leading Sikh voices echo this. Jasdip Singh Jassee of Sikhs of America reminds Americans that “the vast majority of Sikhs globally, including in the US and Canada, do not support separatist agendas.” In India, religious seats like Takht Patna Sahib and Damdami Taksal have publicly denounced the protests. Their message is unequivocal: the Khalistan protesters are not Sikh martyrs. Patna Sahib’s spokesman notes that all of Sikhism’s pending issues are being resolved in India, so “there should not be such protests” against PM Modi “no Sikh can tolerate this.” In fact, these Khalistani stunts run directly counter to Sikh teachings. Sikhism emphasises service and harmony not hate or violence. Provincial Sikh leaders emphasise, “Sikhs have protected mandirs (Hindu temples)” as their sacred Dharmic duty. Yet last April in Surrey, vandals scrawled “Khalistan” on the pillars of Shree Lakshmi Narayana Mandir. This hate-crime – denounced by the temple as “an attack on a sacred space” would deeply sadden ordinary Sikhs. Jasdip Jassee said it was “disgusting” that extremists chose Diwali (a Sikh-protected festival) to vandalise a mandir, calling it “shameful” and against Sikh values. Similarly, Damdami Taksal (a mainstream Sikh seminary) has openly criticised Canadians who use children to insult India’s PM, saying these pro-Khalistan people “are spewing venom against India”. These Sikh authorities unanimously emphasise that Khalistan is not a Sikh cause and certainly not one worth teaching to children. On the contrary, Sikhism is deeply Dharmic and Indian. From the Punjabi heartland to global diaspora Sikhs celebrate their faith’s founder Guru Nanak and their tenets of service (seva) and protection. India’s own armed forces and civil institutions reflect Sikh contributions: for example, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh (a Sikh) was made India’s first Air Force Field Marshal, and Sikh generals have led the Army in multiple wars. Sikh entrepreneurs, scholars and saints likewise uplifted Indian society. For modern Sikhs, the idea of carving out a separate nation feels alien only a “microscopic” minority even entertains it. A former Punjab Chief Secretary notes that hardcore Khalistani ideologues are “not even one per cent” of Sikh population while many others view Khalistan more as a business or polarising narrative. Polls agree Punjab elections show pro-Khalistan candidates picking up well under 1 – 2 per cent of votes in Sikh-majority districts. In short, the Khalistan idea has virtually no grassroots support back in India; it lives on only in select pockets abroad. So why does the Khalistan fringe loom so large in Canada? The answer lies in Canadian diaspora politics and foreign meddling. For years Canada’s mainstream parties have courted Sikh immigrants to win votes, often ignoring their excesses. Observers note a growing consensus among all Canadian parties to pander to Khalistan sympathies for electoral gain. Minister S. Jaishankar put it bluntly: by giving radical Sikhs impunity, “the Canadian government… is repeatedly showing that its vote bank is more powerful than its rule of law.” Veteran broadcaster Terry Milewski described it as a dirty deal: Canadian MPs attend Sikh parades and “look the other way” at posters of terrorists, in exchange for “10,000 votes… because the people of the gurdwaras will vote as we tell them”. In such a climate, small separatist groups found refuge on Canadian soil under the banner of free speech. Worse, intelligence services have cynically empowered them. Indian officials repeatedly assert that Pakistan’s ISI funds the Khalistani network in Canada. Union Minister Hardeep Puri openly called protestors “kiraye ke tattu” (mercenaries on hire) whose demonstrations were staged “from the neighbouring country [Pakistan] where they get funding.” Security analysts back this up, several top analysts observe that these activists have their own underworld and are often involved in deadly gang rivalries and are essentially “helping Pakistanis spend whatever remains of their money”. Indeed, he warns that Sikh extremists in Canada “will continue to be funded and fuelled by the ISI”. Put bluntly, this looks less like a grass-roots Sikh movement than a criminal-intelligence network. It is a problem imported into Canada by a hostile state, not spawned by Sikh communities. The political consequences in Canada have been dramatic. In the 2025 federal elections, Jagmeet Singh, NDP leader who long voiced support for Sikh protesters, saw his party collapse. Singh lost his own seat and announced he would step down as leader. Earlier, in September 2024, Singh had even “ripped up” his confidence-and-supply deal with Trudeau’s “Liberals”, erasing the government majority he once helped engineer. Meanwhile Trudeau’s gamble backfired. As Sikh ally Singh turned on him, Trudeau’s Liberals barely clung to power under newcomer Mark Carney. By early 2025 Trudeau himself resigned as a result of his Khalistan miscalculation. In short, Ottawa’s flirtation with diaspora extremism not only frayed Canada-India ties, it torpedoed the careers of Western politicians. Against this turmoil, Sikhs have reaffirmed their core values. Sikh institutions wasted no time republishing lessons of unity. Damdami Taksal’s Sarchand

India Emerges Global Power Through Sindoor

Pakistan Terrorism

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India Emerges Global Power Through Sindoor

Biggest losers were Pakistan, Turkey & China that sided with the terror state. Bharat came thumbs up, foreign media cut sorry figure. N. C. Bipindra After India’s Operation Sindoor on Pakistan and its terror hubs to avenge Pahalgam terror victims, the overwhelming assessment of global strategic affairs community, military experts and international media is that New Delhi has had a decisive victory over Islamabad. As India began its precision military strikes on nine terror infrastructure sites inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, initially global media and think-tanks went overboard to declare an Indian defeat. Their claims were based on unverified Pakistan social media handles’ propaganda that Islamabad was successful in shooting down the Indian Air Force fighter jets. But these claims turned out to be untrue as Operation Sindoor progressed over four days during May 7 – 10, 2025. Now, a post-operation diagnosis has placed their trust in the Indian military declarations that India indeed struck specific targets based on undisputable pieces of evidence provided by Indian establishment. Pakistan, on the other hand, has failed miserably to provide any proof – technical data, satellite images, or otherwise – to back its claims. The New York Times had to grudgingly acknowledge the superiority of the Indian military operations in a piece written on May 14, 2025. Many international media outlets have been running interviews with military experts and analysts to back Indian assertions that they struck at precise locations, resulting in over 100 casualties among the Pakistanis. They have also shown satellite images provided by the Indian government and other international space technology firms to back their judgment on Operation Sindoor. India had struck at nine terror sites inside Pakistan and their occupied territories, apart from taking out 11 military infrastructure sites, including air bases, their runways, hangars, ammunition dumps, and air defence assets in the four-day military operations. Pakistan’s major reliance on Chinese military equipment has proved to be a disaster. Pakistan has been unable to back its claims of shooting down five Indian combat aircraft or bombarding Adampur air base, or even taking out Indian military assets such as the S-400 air defence system. This has resulted in the international community and media backing down on their initial claims, most of which was unnamed sources traced back to unverified social media posts. In the fog of war, news is a casualty. The fragmentation of news is a strategic victory. Untruths become the weapon of mass destruction. News becomes an instrument of war itself. As India woke up to the merciless killing of 26 innocent civilians at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir on 22 April 2025, the media world saw an emotionally weak nation unable to bear the loss. There were no words of solace, no newsprint to waste on sympathy. There was an unspoken rejoicing. What a harsh domain the global media had become! As India responded with military strike on 7 May 2025 on nine terror camps deep inside Pakistan and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the Western media was unable to bear the emergence of a New India that had zero tolerance for terror. What followed was the unleashing of untruths and half-truths that beat their misplaced standards of post-truth. Brandon J. Weichert, a so-called national security editor for the American platform National Interest, rushed in on May 8, 2025, to claim that Pakistanis had won the battle with India during the latter’s Operation Sindoor. It hadn’t even been 24 hours since the Indian military operations had begun, and Brandon jumped into deliver his verdict. Operation Sindoor’s military campaign went on for three more days. Post the cessation of military operations by India, Brandon has yet to revise his assessment or claims. So much for his ethics and credibility! His first article was tweeted by Indian-origin Hotmail founder Sabeer Bhatia, who too is unrepentant on peddling Pakistan propaganda. The Pakistani line was followed by Chinese official state media such as the Global Times and China Daily, and their claims were countered by the Indian embassy in Beijing and by the Indian state-run Press Information Bureau’s Fact Check divisions. China’s concerns were real. Its entire arms export market was in line of fire. And probably this was the first time that Chinese arms were being tested in a real battle with an archrival in India. Lest we forget, China was in an eyeball-to-eyeball military confrontation with India till about six months ago in India’s Ladakh region, yet there were no real military battles that took place between them to force the use of heavier weapons. Under Operation Sindoor, India had ramped up on the escalation ladder by first targeting the terror infrastructure inside Pakistan, then shifting its strategic objective to take out Pakistani military assets. India had changed its warfare doctrine vis-à-vis terror groups supported, trained, armed, and funded by Pakistan forever. Indian Prime Minister Modi detailed New India’s approach to terror and their sponsors. India would follow a zero tolerance for terror strikes inside its territory. The nuclear war bogey would not threaten India from going after terror groups and their sponsors, thereby calling the nuclear weapons threshold bluff. And India would consider every terror attack on its citizens as an act of war, meaning Pakistan would face the Indian military might and fury in case another terror strike happened. The nuclear bluff from Pakistan was amplified by the Americans when President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed they had some alarming intelligence to intervene, thereby implying that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan was in the offing. India also indicated through Prime Minister Modi and the Ministry of External Affairs that they were not buying what the Americans were peddling. India also took a strong, long-term view of its qualms with Pakistan and its self-interest, by keeping the 1960 Indus Water Treaty in abeyance even after the cessation of military operations. This, again, is a strategically important position, as India has for years now wanted to renegotiate the treaty to provide its citizens the

Pahalgam to Ops Sindoor: A Case Study in India’s Counter-Terror Doctrine

Pakistan Terrorism

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Pahalgam to Ops Sindoor: A Case Study of India’s Counter-Terror

On the morning of April 22, 2025, in the tranquil and scenic hills of Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, a brutal and premeditated terrorist assault took place—one that fundamentally altered India’s national security posture. Twenty-six civilians, including women and children, were executed at point-blank range by Pakistan-backed terrorists after being identified based on their religious affiliation. Eyewitness accounts confirmed that the attackers interrogated the victims about their Dharma (faith) and segregated them before unleashing gunfire. This atrocity was not merely an act of terror—it was a calculated religious pogrom designed to fracture India’s communal harmony and provoke sectarian unrest. Indian government swiftly classified the attack as a gross violation of international humanitarian norms and an extension of Pakistan’s long-standing policy of proxy warfare with a deeply communal subtext.

Operation Sindoor (May 7–10, 2025): India’s Military Response to Pakistan-backed Cross-Border Terrorism

Pakistan Terrorism

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Operation Sindoor (May 7–10, 2025): India’s Military Response to Pakistan-backed Cross-Border Terrorism

India has long accused Pakistan of using terrorism as a tool of state policy. Pakistani-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) are led by cadres who operate with impunity under Pakistani patronage. India routinely notes that these organizations are “Pakistan-based and supported”[1] and that top Pakistani military and civilian authorities tolerate – if not directly aid – their activities. In multiple public statements India has demanded that Pakistan “stop supporting terrorists and terror groups operating from their territory” and dismantle the infrastructure that enables them[2]. This longstanding dispute over Pakistan’s alleged state-sponsored terrorism has erupted in periodic crises over the past two decades.

Defence Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

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India Needs Cognitive Warfare Plan

Fighting enemy on information highway as on ground emerges a big challenge and opportunity for Bharat that’s declared war on terror. Rohan Giri In the wake of Operation Sindoor, India’s precision strike against cross-border terrorist camps in Pakistan, a disturbing counteroffensive has emerged—not on the battlefield, but in the information domain. The recent statement by Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist)—disguised as a call for peace—reveals a deeper, coordinated attempt to delegitimize India’s national security concerns. On the parallel, certain social media influencers and public figures have echoed narratives that align more with Islamabad’s propaganda machinery than with India’s democratic discourse. Convergence of disinformation, ideological proxies and cognitive warfare by deftly manipulating freedom of speech calls for deep dive analysis. Cross-Border Strikes to Cognitive Warzones Operation Sindoor was launched in response to brutal killing of 26 Indian civilians by Pakistan-backed jihadi groups in Pahalgam. Indian Armed Forces counter-terror operation—based on actionable intelligence— neutralised multiple terror hideouts along Line of Control (LoC) and deep into Pakistan. Even before the word was out on the operation, a parallel battlefront opened in the digital sphere. Assorted Left extremists who have lost the plot and support of people re-grouped under CPI(ML) had the gumption to cynically talk about “war mongering,” “mock drills,” and “jingoism” instead of outright condemnation of terrorists, their backers and handlers. Deliberate attempt has been made by CPI-ML to shift focus away from campaign against terror, victims of terror to a narrative of false equivalence placing India’s defensive response and Pakistan’s terrorism on same plane. This is not an isolated political position. It is an ideological posture with global resonance—amplified by social media handlers, YouTubers, and creators whose content is now being routinely picked up by Pakistani media to discredit India’s war against terror. Cultural Expression as Cover for Subversion For instance, Neha Singh Rathore, a content creator and folk performer came under legal scrutiny for provocative posts that allegedly promote communal disharmony. Rathore’s content—strategically laced with satire and emotion—has been widely shared across borders, especially in Pakistani outlets eager to highlight India’s “internal repression.” While art and dissent is at core of democracies like Bharat, Rathore’s content is not organically critical, instead ideologically consistent with Pakistan’s strategic communication goals. The timing, targeting and terminology in such digital content reflect more than personal opinion—they indicate agenda-setting behaviour. CPI(ML) and figures like Rathore are not merely engaging in protest; they are building parallel narratives that erode legitimacy of India’s campaign against terror. When these narratives go viral, they serve the psychological warfare strategies of hostile powers. Beijing in 1962 to Islamabad Today Maoist and marxist gangs have a long history of siding with foreign adversaries. During 1962 Sino-Indian War, segments of CPI openly supported China dismissing Indian territorial claims and branding national mobilization as bourgeois nationalism. Today, the same ideological model has evolved, more sophisticated, digitally native and far more dangerous. By refusing to condemn cross-border terrorism and attacking India’s right to respond, CPI(ML)’s latest statement resurrects this playbook. It leverages democratic tolerance to inject disinformation, exploit communal sensitivities and erode confidence of Indian populace in its institutions. The party’s warning against “war preparations” and “state violence” is couched in humanitarian concern but functionally serves to paralyze India’s right to strategic deterrence. This is not peace activism—it is information sabotage. Legal and Civic Clarity India’s commitment to free speech under Article 19 of Constitution remains robust. This freedom is not absolute. The new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) Section 152 replacing the colonial-era sedition law, rightly targets acts that threaten unity and integrity of nation including narrative warfare. In the digital era, narrative disruptors have become as strategically valuable to the enemy as traditional insurgents. Unlike overt enemies, these actors often present themselves as poets, comedians, journalists or social reformers. Their strength lies in ambiguity, their power in virality. Perception Wars and Legitimacy Battle International opinion is increasingly shaped by perception rather than policy. In this context, India’s counter-terror narratives must compete not only with traditional media but with decentralized content ecosystems that are vulnerable to infiltration, manipulation and illegal funding. When disinformation aligns with an adversary’s diplomatic strategy i.e., portraying India as an aggressor and the region as unstable, it not only undermines counterterrorism efforts but damages India’s geopolitical credibility in multilateral forums. Suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) following Pahalgam Terror attack was a bold diplomatic move, signaling a shift in India’s engagement with Pakistan. But without narrative control, such moves risk being framed globally as escalatory rather than defensive. Strategic Culture of Narrative Resilience India needs more than military readiness; it requires a strategic communication plan that integrates law, policy and narrative discipline. This includes: CPI(ML) statement and online activism that follows it are not expressions of dissent—they are symptoms of a deeper vulnerability: India’s tolerance for internal ideological actors who camouflage sedition as satire. As India rises on the world stage, its battles will increasingly be fought in the cognitive domain. Winning them will require legal, civic, and strategic clarity. (Author is a doctoral fellow at Amity University in Gwalior, content head at Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

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