Bangladesh’s self-goal: tilt to Pakistan

Jamat e Islami and Muhammed Yunus seek to shape Bangladesh into politically radical Islamic nation and threaten its Bengali Identity N. C. Bipindra During a 1955 debate in Pakistan’s Second Constituent Assembly on whether the eastern province should be called East Bengal or East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said, “We have demanded so many times that you should use East Bengal instead of East Pakistan. The word Bengal has a history and a tradition of its own.” Today, Bangladeshis share Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s sentiments: Bengali is their ethnicity and Bangladesh is their nation. In fact, Bangladesh’s formation in 1971 was built on Bengali nationalism spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Father of Bangladesh. In August 2024, during uprising that led to ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, radical Islamic groups with an affinity to Pakistan were unleashed under the garb of student protests who attempted to vandalise the legacy of true hero of Bangla identity Sheikh Mujibur. The same Sheikh Mujiibur who was hailed as greatest Bengali of all time ahead of Rabindranath Tagore by BBC Bengali Language Service Survey, about whom Cuban leader Fidel Castro once said, “I have not seen the Himalayas. But I have seen Sheikh Mujib.” Pakistan has historically rejoiced vandalism of Bengali identity (in fact, any identity other than their own). Urdu-speaking Pakistanis, who hate local languages including Punjabi or Sindhi, have neither sympathy nor commonality with Bengali culture, language, or societal beliefs. Since partition in 1947, the policies and outlook of Pakistan have been indifferent, irrational and mired in hatred for Bengali identity of Bangladesh. The entire world took note of utter neglect and callous treatment meted out to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in aftermath of cyclone Bhola in 1970 by the Pakistani central government. To date, the aid that was promised by Pakistan to East Pakistan has not been transferred. Rather than offering a nursing hand, a year later, Pakistan launched terror on the streets of Bangladesh under Operation Searchlight. The horror of ‘Operation Searchlight’ undertaken by Pakistani military on March 25, 1971, to crush Bengali nationalist movement after Awami League won a majority in the general elections is still fresh and painful for the conscience of Bengali people. The stark and ignoble truth about Pakistan’s genocide in Bangladesh is that it was a conscious military policy steered at the government level to undermine Bengali society and in some cases attempt to change Bengali gene pool. For over 52 years, Pakistan has neither established nor attempted open, direct, people-to-people connections with those inside Bangladesh who support Bangla nationalism. Of the hundreds of cuts inflicted by Pakistan on Bangladesh, the most noticeable is an ongoing attempt at systemic erosion of Bangla identity and its replacement with the ideology of political Islam, which is the basis of governance in Pakistan. The underlying role of Jamat e Islami, a radical organisation which was banned in 2013 (and such other organisations), is hard to miss in the ouster of a democratically elected government in 2024. No wonder Jamat e Islami has found favour with Bangladesh’s current interim administration under Muhammed Yunus, who lifted the ban on the radical organisation. While other Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh do have connections with Pakistan, since 1971, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh has been Pakistan’s true friend and partner. These radical Islamic groups have left no stone unturned to shred the fabric of Bangla identity and colour the whole of Bangladesh in politically radicalised Islam. Therefore, people of Bangladesh need to view Pakistan’s recent warming to Bangladesh through a historic and nationalistic lens. The recent developments coincide with an unusual wave of military and diplomatic engagement between Bangladesh and Pakistan, marked by the visit of Pakistan’s Navy Chief to Dhaka and the first docking of a Pakistani naval vessel at Chattogram port since 1971. Bangladesh, at this stage, must remember and side with friends who were steadfast with them through their biggest economic transformation and offered a helping hand in times of crisis. The more Bangladesh leans towards becoming Pakistan-like in text and tenor, its economy will further tank. Radicalism and a healthy economy simply cannot coexist. Over the past year alone, Bangladesh’s GDP growth has fallen from a flying 6.1% to crawling 3.76%. A year ago, Bangladesh’s growth was comparable to India’s and China’s and was considered one of the enterprising economies in Asia. Bangladesh must understand that Pakistan, which is mired with deep corruption, radicalism, a struggling economy, and is often part of the FATF ‘grey list’ and is home to most of the recognised terrorist organisations in the world, and works as a puppet state to China, cannot assist Bangladesh in any meaningful way. On the contrary, Bangladesh must seek a rational division of the pre-1971 assets of the state of Pakistan, and the aid that was promised in the aftermath of Cyclone Bhola. The evidence conclusively indicates that the recent shift in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations would further push political instability in Bangladesh, foster political Islam, provoke conflicts along shared borders, and, most importantly, pose a threat to the Bangla identity, which is the basis of the foundation of Bangladesh. Additionally, fondness towards Pakistan would dent Bangladesh’s image at world forums. Friendship with a failing (failed) state like Pakistan cannot bring more than this. The world has faith in Bangladesh; that Bangladesh would learn its lessons from history, as exact events of 1971 may not repeat themselves, but they may rhyme. Georg Hegel, a German philosopher, once said, “What experience and history teach is that nations and governments have never learned anything from history or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it.” This now sounds true and apt for Bangladesh’s recent shift towards Pakistan. (Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS)

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Bondi Terror Massacre and States That Enable Jihad

Time and again, investigations into jihadist violence have pointed to enabling ecosystems that stretch across borders, with recurrent nodes linked to Pakistan based terrorist infrastructure and diaspora level recruitment networks that sustain extremist causes. Rahul PAWA | @imrahulpawa Sydney’s Bondi Beach was the scene of a chilling mass shooting during a public Hanukkah celebration. Witnesses say two masked gunmen opened fire on dozens of peaceful Jewish worshippers lighting the first candle of Chanukah on the beach. Authorities now report at least 15 people killed (including a 10-year-old girl) and dozens wounded. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned it and has advocated for tougher gun laws. UK Chief Rabbi noting the attackers deliberately targeted Jews merely for gathering “visibly and peacefully as Jews”. It is Australia’s deadliest terrorist assault in years, and it once again shows how safe spaces for Jewish life are being converted into active crime scenes. Investigators say the terrorists were a father-and-son team of Islamist extremists. Both were armed with long-barrelled rifles and dressed in black tactical gear. Police identified them as 50-year-old Sajid Akram and his 24-year-old son Naveed Akram, Pakistani-origin nationals. Sajid was shot dead by officers at the scene, and Naveed remains in custody in critical condition. Officials found two ISIS flags in their getaway vehicle and believe both men had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Remarkably, Australian intelligence had even interviewed Naveed six years ago about ties to a local IS cell. The father legally owned multiple firearms and reportedly stockpiled explosive materials, indicating this was a premeditated terror operation. Clearly, this was not a random rampage by troubled loners but a coordinated attack by Islamist jihadists emboldened by extremist networks. This massacre comes amid a disturbing surge of antisemitic violence and Islamist radicalism across the West. In the United States last year, FBI crime statistics show Jews, just 2% of Americans were the target in 69% of all religion-based hate crimes along with Hindus, crimes against whom have doubled in recent years. This unprecedented spike of 1,938 incidents of anti-Jewish hate became particularly evident on US campuses during protests following Israel’s military response to the October 7 Hamas attack. Jewish communities report unprecedented fear and harassment. Europe has seen similar trends, a recent EU survey found 80% of Jews across member states feel antisemitism has grown in recent years and many now conceal their identity in public. Analysts warn this trend is aided by on-line radicalisation and echo chambers: there are “no lone wolves”, only networks of extremists linking movements from North America to Europe. Indeed, authorities have foiled multiple Islamist-inspired plots just this year, from individual attackers to organized cells and intelligence agencies caution that democratic societies remain prime targets. To counter these threats, public venues have adopted stringent new security. Across Germany and other countries, Christmas markets (symbolic of Western holiday culture) now open behind concrete barriers, metal detectors and armed guards. For example, Berlin’s famed Gendarmenmarkt Christmas village has raised concrete barricades and expanded CCTV and police patrols. Security budgets are soaring, in fact, German city authorities report a 44% increase in spending on public-event security over the past three years. These measures recall last winter’s deadly car-ramming in Magdeburg killing six and injuring hundreds. This year’s images of heavily-armed officers at a Munich market highlight how normal life is now treated as a potential target. Even routine outings are screened: just weeks ago police arrested five suspected Islamist extremists plotting a vehicle-ramming at a Bavarian market. New bans on large knives in crowds, random security checks and surging police presence at synagogues and malls have become the norm. Paris, once synonymous with joie de vivre (cheerful enjoyment of life), has officially cancelled its New Year’s Eve midnight concert, citing concerns over “unpredictable crowd movements”, in a break with a tradition that has run for more than six decades. The attack has also deepened global tensions over Islamist terrorism, especially in South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was swift to condemn the Bondi massacre on “first day of the Jewish festival of Hanukkah” and offered India’s “deepest condolences and full support” to Australia. His post declared that “India stands in solidarity” with the victims and reiterated that India has “zero tolerance towards terrorism”. Those words resonated most in India, a country long been a victim of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism practiced by Pakistan against it as a part of its state policy. Earlier this year, India had itself been struck by terror on April 22, when Pakistani backed terrorists massacred 24 Hindu tourists in Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi immediately tracked Pakistan Army-backed jihadists for the Pahalgam terror attack and retaliated with force launching “Operation Sindoor.” During the initial three-day period of operation, India obliterated nine globally acknowledged terrorist camps and infrastructure inside Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir hitting training and indoctrination sites of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (globally proscribed Pakistan-based terror groups) to “dismantle” infrastructure for further attacks. Later the country foiled an extraordinary scale Bio-terror plot and accidental blast in Delhi following the country’s crackdown on terrorism. From Sydney’s Bondi Beach Hanukkah massacre to Britain’s 7/7 bombings and the 2006 transatlantic “liquid bomb” plot, to the Denmark recce by David Headley and to India’s own horrors in Mumbai in 2008, Pahalgam in 2025 and Delhi 2025 counter-terror case files keep converging on the same connective tissue of facilitation, training and operational enabling that investigators have repeatedly traced to Pakistan based and Pakistani Army backed jihadist networks, even when the attackers themselves hold Western passports, much as the 9/11 Commission identified Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the principal architect of 9/11 and he was later captured in Pakistan. The Bondi Beach shooting tragically reaffirmed this harsh reality. In today’s world, no place is immune from Islamist violence, not sunny Sydney, not a festive holiday market in Europe and not the high Himalayas in India. Defending free societies therefore requires more than platitudes. It demands relentless pressure on the entire pipeline of radicalisation,

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2001 INDIAN PARLIAMENT ATTACK

Pummy Mattoo Pandita 13 December 2001 is remembered as a turning point in Bharat’s democratic history, when democracy was not merely challenged but violently attacked by Jaish-e-Mohammed, targeting not just lives, but the very sovereignty, constitutional stability and civic trust on which the nation stands.

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Analysis: From Siege to Staccato Strikes: 26/11 Mumbai Attack to 10/11 Red Fort Blast

From foreign-directed, 26/11-style mega-operations to low-signature, micro-cell, digitally inspired strikes like 10/11 and the foiled ricin plot, India’s terror landscape has changed. Through community monitoring, hardened cities, quick forensics and sharper intelligence India has reduced incidences significantly. In order to combat terror ecosystems at their root, world must now embrace India’s zero-tolerance policy and modernise international counter-terrorism frameworks.

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India Stopped an ISIS-K Bio-Terror Plot the World Needs to Talk About

An ISIS-K bio-terror attack that could have killed over a hundred thousand people was just stopped in India. Why isn’t the world talking about it? Rahul PAWA In a world saturated with headlines of conflict and calamity, an extraordinary victory against terrorism has gone almost unnoticed beyond specialist circles. Indian authorities quietly dismantled a bio-terror plot so chilling in ambition that its success would have rewritten the story of global security. Just days ago, India’s Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) dismantled an Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) cell, the South Asian affiliate of the Islamic State preparing to unleash a mass biological terrorist attack. At its core lay ricin, a toxin so lethally efficient, one of the deadliest known toxins, derived from something as ordinary as the castor bean. It was a scheme as simple as it was monstrous, poisoning the essentials of life itself, and it was stopped just in time. Its story came to light with an arrest that barely drew notice. Acting on specific intelligence, Gujarat ATS arrested Dr Ahmed Mohiyuddin Saiyed, a China-educated MBBS graduate, in Ahmedabad for his links to ISIS-K. Investigators say he had been extracting ricin from castor oil, four litres of which were recovered from his possession and had already procured laboratory equipment and begun initial chemical processing when officers arrested him. According to police sources, his plan was as insidious as it was horrific: to poison public drinking water supplies and even food (prasad) at Hindu temples, thereby silently killing masses of civilians. Officials estimate the plotters intended to kill “scores of people” and were aiming for catastrophic casualties. In worst-case scenarios, analysts have speculated that hundreds of thousands of lives might have been at risk, had a major water reservoir or a large temple gathering been successfully poisoned. The ambitious reach of this foiled plot underlines why it deserves far more international attention. This was not a lone wolf or a fringe fanatic acting in isolation; it appears to have been coordinated by ISIS-K, working through educated operatives. Dr. Saiyed’s handler, Abu Khadija, was an Afghanistan-based terrorist associated with ISIS-Khorasan, and he potentially arranged arms deliveries for the cell via drones crossing the Pakistan border. Saiyed did not act alone. Two other accomplices, 20-year-old Azad Suleman Sheikh and 23-year-old Mohammad Suhail from Uttar Pradesh, India’s northern state were arrested alongside him. These men had spent the last year conducting reconnaissance on potential targets across India, scoping out crowded public places where a poison attack could yield maximum chaos. Among the locations they surveilled were Asia’s largest wholesale produce market in Delhi (Azadpur Mandi), a bustling fruit market in Ahmedabad, and even the headquarters of RSS, a prominent social organisation in Lucknow. The chosen targets, places of food, water, community life, speak volumes about the terrorist’s cruel intent to strike at the very heart of ordinary society. By targeting temple prasad (food offered to Hindu devotees) and municipal water, they aimed to turn sustenance into a weapon. The depravity is chilling. Ricin itself is a nightmare agent. Tasteless and deadly, it is classified as a Category B bioterrorism agent under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A dose of a few milligrams can kill an adult if delivered effectively, and there is no antidote. Notably, ricin is not a typical weapon in the terrorist arsenal. it has surfaced mostly in fringe plots and isolated incidents (such as poisoned letters addressed to U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump in past years), but never before at this scale. The rarity of ricin attacks is partly why this plot is so alarming: intelligence agencies warn that ISIS and its affiliates have been actively discussing bio-terror tactics in encrypted chats, marking a strategic shift towards unconventional methods. In other words, the very fact that jihadist groups are exploring bioweapons is a worrisome evolution of terror. Unlike bombs or guns, a biological or chemical attack can sow panic far beyond the immediate victims. It contaminates the basic trust we place in our communal resources. As one counter-terror official noted, poisoning a city’s water or food supply would not only kill people but “wreak havoc in the minds of the people”, inflicting psychological trauma on society at large. Had the ricin plot succeeded, it could have easily been one of the deadliest terror attacks in modern history, a silent mass murder stretching over days or weeks as poisoning victims fell ill, and an entire populace plunged into fear. Thankfully, that nightmare never came to pass. Indian security forces acted on a tip and caught the plotters red-handed, seizing their cache of castor oil, weapons (including imported semi-automatic pistols), and digital evidence of their plans. The swift operation, coordinated by Gujarat ATS with central intelligence support, likely saved countless lives. It was, in effect, a major victory in the global fight against terrorism. Yet outside of India, this triumph registered barely a blip. Global media outlets that routinely headline terror incidents offered only cursory reports, if any, on India’s ricin plot bust. Why? One reason may be that success stories simply garner less attention, when disaster is prevented, there are no dramatic visuals of carnage to propel 24/7 news coverage. A bomb that didn’t go off is often a footnote, while a bomb that explodes is breaking news. This asymmetry in coverage creates a perverse situation where we pay more heed to terrorist violence than to vigilance that averts violence. There is also an uncomfortable truth about geographic bias. Had a quarter-million people in a Western city been in danger from a foiled bio-attack, one suspects it would dominate international headlines and talk shows. But when such a plot is foiled in India, it struggles to capture the world’s imagination. This is despite the fact that ISIS’s operations in South Asia are very much a global concern, the ISIS-K module behind the ricin plot has ties spanning Afghanistan and Pakistan, and reflects the same menace that threatens cities from London to New York. Indeed, an Indian investigation report recently

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Enforced Disappearances, Human Rights and BLA’s Independence Call

By N. C. Bipindra Balochistan has yet again entered a dangerous phase of political and humanitarian uncertainty. Recent declaration by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) to form an independent army and seek international recognition as a sovereign nation has brought decades-long freedom struggle against Pakistan’s reported occupation into sharp focus. While BLA’s statement marks a new and more assertive phase in the struggle to take governance into their own hands, it also threatens to worsen an already grim human rights landscape. For years, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and suppression of dissent have scarred the province. Now, with renewed calls for being recognized as a separate nation, Balochistan risks sliding deeper into vortex of violence and repression that shows little sign of abating. Pakistan’s army and security establishment has come down heavily on Baloch people seeking their basic rights to live peacefully and honourably. Islamabad’s new found friend in US President Donald Trump may be oblivious to this grim situation and only interested in excavating the high value rare earth metals and specialized molecules with high precision application across industries in America. A Province in Perpetual Conflict Balochistan, rich in natural resources but poor in development and representation has long been a theatre of conflict between Pakistani state and various Baloch nationalist groups. The grievances are old and deep, rooted in reported political marginalization, economic exploitation and cultural erasure. BLA’s recent announcement seeking international recognition and establishment of diplomatic missions represents a bold political escalation. It reframes the struggle from one of autonomy within Pakistan to outright independence. Predictably, such a declaration is being treated in Islamabad not as political dissent but as a direct challenge to national sovereignty, setting the stage for intensified military operations. Beneath the political grandstanding lies a darker humanitarian crisis that predates this declaration: persistent phenomenon of unexplained disappearances and human rights abuses that have come to define life in Balochistan. Missing People of Balochistan For families in Balochistan, the phrase “missing persons” has become an everyday horror. Thousands of Baloch men — students, teachers, activists, and ordinary civilians — have disappeared over the years, allegedly picked up by security forces or intelligence agencies. Many are never seen again; others turn up dead, often bearing signs of torture. According to the Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB), 123 enforced disappearances and 26 killings were recorded in just August 2025. Earlier in March that year, the group documented 151 disappearances and 80 killings. Such numbers are staggering for a single province, and they are likely underestimates, given the difficulty of reporting in militarised areas. The Pakistan Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) has received over 10,000 cases nationwide, with a disproportionate number from Balochistan. Yet, rights groups say that official mechanisms lack independence and transparency. Investigations rarely lead to prosecutions, and security agencies operate with near-total impunity. The HRCB and other local NGOs have documented a recurring pattern: night-time raids, arrests without warrants, and bodies discovered days or weeks later in desolate areas. Families often face intimidation when they speak out or join protests demanding the return of their loved ones. Many have spent years camped outside press clubs or government offices, holding faded photographs and placards that ask a simple question: “Where is my son?” Fear and Silence: A Society Under Siege The psychological toll on the province is immense. Entire communities live under a shadow of fear. In cities like Turbat, Kech, Awaran, and Gwadar, once bustling trade hubs, silence has replaced debate. Even student activism is seen as a potential act of rebellion. Students have been frequent victims of disappearances, especially those affiliated with Baloch student organisations. Human rights defender Dr. Mahrang Baloch, who spearheaded a peaceful movement for missing persons, was herself detained in 2024, a move widely condemned internationally as an attempt to crush dissent. Journalists, too, face censorship and threats. Many have been warned against reporting on disappearances or military operations. The result is a near-total blackout on independent information from much of Balochistan, leaving only official narratives and sporadic social media updates from activists who risk their lives to post them. Extrajudicial Killings and the “Kill-and-Dump” Policy One of the most disturbing aspects of the crisis is what local activists describe as the “kill-and-dump” policy. Individuals who disappear are later found dead, their bodies dumped on roadsides or in remote deserts. These victims are often presented by authorities as “terrorists” killed in encounters, but human rights groups say many of these encounters are staged. The state’s security establishment insists its operations target armed insurgents, not civilians. Yet the blurred line between militant and civilian in such operations has made accountability nearly impossible. In some cases, the victims had no political affiliation at all. Families are left with bodies to bury and no answers about why their loved ones were taken or killed. Legal and Institutional Failures Pakistan is a signatory to major international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention Against Enforced Disappearances. Yet, in practice, these obligations remain largely unfulfilled. The COIED, established to investigate missing persons cases, has been criticised as toothless. It lacks the authority to compel powerful agencies like the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the Frontier Corps (FC) to produce detainees or disclose information. Its reports are rarely made public, and few cases have led to convictions. In the absence of credible accountability, enforced disappearances have become normalised as a tool of control. Human rights lawyers describe it as a deliberate policy, a way to silence opposition without legal consequence. BLA’s Declaration and Its Fallout The BLA’s move to declare a separate “army” and seek global recognition adds a dangerous new layer to this human rights tragedy. The Pakistani state, already hypersensitive to any challenge in Balochistan, is likely to respond with harsher counter-insurgency measures, which could lead to more disappearances, arrests, and extrajudicial killings under the banner of fighting terrorism. Civilians will, as always, bear the brunt. In areas where the BLA has

Beyond “Iron Brothers” - The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

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Beyond “Iron Brothers”: The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

N. C. Bipindra Pakistan’s engagement with both Washington and Beijing raises concerns about its relationship with China. Despite claims of trust and shared interests, Pakistan’s foreign policy history reveals a consistent pattern of duplicity. This poses risks for China, affecting its security and technological dominance. Let us analyse Pakistan’s dual alignments, urging caution from Beijing regarding military technology transfers to Islamabad. Pakistan’s foreign policy traits, transactionalism, opportunism, and dependence on external allies, suggest a potential shift in technology flow from the U.S. to China in a new geopolitical landscape. Historical Patterns of Technology Transfers Pakistan has long capitalised on its geostrategic location to obtain military and economic concessions from major powers. During the Cold War, it accommodated CIA operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan and received sophisticated U.S. armaments; however, not all of it remained in Pakistani possession. Two instances are particularly noteworthy. In the 1990s, U.S. intelligence asserted that Pakistan transferred American-supplied Stinger missiles to China, a claim that Islamabad refuted. After the 2011 Abbottabad raid, The New York Times disclosed that Chinese engineers were permitted to examine the remnants of a downed U.S. stealth-modified Black Hawk helicopter. Although definitive evidence was lacking, U.S. officials referenced intercepted communications to substantiate the allegation. These occurrences, notwithstanding Pakistani refutations, solidified perceptions of duplicity. For Beijing, the implication is unequivocal: if Pakistan was unable to protect U.S. technologies, it cannot be entirely relied upon to safeguard Chinese ones. Pakistan’s Contemporary Balancing Act Today, Pakistan faces a transformed strategic environment. Following Operation Bunyaan-un-Marsoos and subsequent outreach efforts, Islamabad has sought to re-engage Washington, particularly to secure tariff concessions and financial relief amid severe economic strain. Simultaneously, it remains dependent on Beijing for military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons and sensors to drones. The private lunch hosted for Asim Munir at the White House on June 18, 2025, is not merely a ceremonial bonhomie. It is a fact that such courtesies are rarely extended without an eye on strategic dividends. It appears that, in an era where China has surged ahead of the U.S. in technologies like AI, 5G, and advanced manufacturing, Washington views Pakistan not merely as an old battlefield ally but as a potential conduit for intelligence, leverage, and Chinese tech transfer. Perhaps, for Washington, cultivating ties with Pakistan’s generals is about far more than courtesy. It offers a discreet channel for access, legitimacy, and potentially even Chinese technology. However, this balancing act carries profound risks for China. Sensitive Chinese systems, long assumed to be secure within the framework of an “all-weather” partnership, may become vulnerable to American scrutiny as Pakistan attempts to cultivate favor in Washington. What was once an unshakable partnership is beginning to look increasingly fragile, as Pakistan’s loyalties are often dictated not by long-term commitments but by immediate strategic and financial incentives. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel has long observed, “Pakistani generals can be bought any time,” a reminder of how transactional and compromised the country’s military elite remain. Compounding this vulnerability is the conduct of Pakistan’s civil–military elite. Many former army chiefs, including Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa, have relocated abroad or maintained significant overseas assets after retirement. Such behavior underscores an entrenched pattern of ethical and moral corruption: leaders prioritise personal enrichment and external safe havens over national development, leaving the public to suffer under chronic instability and economic decline. Case of the J-35 Stealth Fighter Pakistan’s reported withdrawal from a planned deal for 40 J-35 stealth fighters highlights these dynamics. Once poised to be the jet’s first foreign buyer, Islamabad later dismissed the reports, despite earlier claims of pilot training in China. Battlefield lessons from Operation Sindoor — where Chinese systems underperformed against India’s BrahMos and S-400 — fueled doubts about the untested J-35. Economic pressures, including IMF austerity and a stretched defence budget, further undermined the $5 billion deal. For Beijing, Pakistan’s reversal exposed the fragility of trust: a flagship transfer was abandoned in favor of renewed U.S. outreach, underscoring China’s vulnerability to Islamabad’s hedging. Hypersonic Missiles: China Draws a Line Another case highlighting Beijing’s caution is its reported rejection of Pakistan’s request for hypersonic missiles and related technology. Media reports suggest China refused both sales and tech transfers, fearing Islamabad’s growing outreach to the U.S. could expose sensitive systems. Unlike fighter jets or conventional missiles, hypersonic platforms like the DF-17 are central to China’s strategic deterrence and lack downgraded export versions, reflecting their sensitivity and immaturity. The denial underscores a key reality: even in an “all-weather” partnership, Beijing does not fully trust Pakistan with its most advanced technologies. Strategic Implications for China The implications of this dynamic for China are far-reaching. First, Pakistan represents both an asset and a liability for Beijing. It provides strategic depth in South Asia, a reliable arms market, and political support in international forums. Yet these benefits come at the cost of significant vulnerability: advanced Chinese systems risk exposure through Pakistani networks, intentionally or inadvertently, to Western intelligence. Second, the problem is structural rather than episodic. Pakistan’s foreign policy has long been characterised by transactionalism, with loyalty subordinated to immediate material gains. As Islamabad draws closer to Washington, Beijing must anticipate that Pakistan’s defence partnership could once again become a conduit for technological leakage, this time at China’s expense. Third, the nature of emerging technologies magnifies the risk. Whereas conventional hardware could be downgraded for export, dual-use and software-driven systems cannot be so easily restricted. For Beijing, the possibility of losing control over AI, cyber, or hypersonic technologies through Pakistan would represent a strategic disaster, undermining years of investment and eroding its position vis-à-vis the United States. In this sense, Pakistan’s growing closeness with Washington is about far more than counterterrorism cooperation or financial bailouts. It is “more than what meets the eye”: for the West, Pakistan provides a potential backdoor to scrutinize and even reverse-engineer Chinese technologies in domains like AI, quantum, and stealth areas where Beijing has made significant advances over the United States. Washington now views Beijing not merely as a rising

Is Islamic Alliance in offing, With Ambiguities

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Is Islamic Alliance in Offing, With Ambiguities

Only a true test, a moment of crisis, will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. Rahul Pawa When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a sweeping mutual defense agreement in Riyadh this month, it marked a strategic pivot. The agreement, termed a “Strategic Mutual Defence” agreement declares that an attack on one is an attack on both, echoing NATO’s famous Article 5 commitment. It’s an unprecedented pledge between the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the only Muslim nation armed with nuclear weapons. Yet behind the celebratory rhetoric, the agreement’s true scope and weight remain uncertain. A NATO-Style on paper, the agreement’s collective defense vow is explicit: “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” Pakistan’s government said. In practice, much is left vague. Notably, the agreement is silent on whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Islamic world’s only nukes is now at Saudi Arabia’s disposal. Pressed about a potential Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Riyadh, a senior Saudi official would only say the agreement “encompasses all military means”. This careful ambiguity hints at a broad commitment while stopping short of any explicit nuclear guarantee. Another grey area is the agreement’s status. Riyadh and Islamabad pointedly call it an “agreement” and not a treaty. By definition, though, any written inter-state accord intended to bind is a treaty under international law, regardless of its label. The absence of a published text and the flexible wording suggest the parties prefer some wiggle room. Saudi Arabia has pursued grand defense coalitions before like a 2015 pan-Islamic military alliance against terrorism that proved “more symbolic than operational”. This time, the language of collective defense is tied to plans for concrete cooperation (joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, arms training). Whether it matures into a robust alliance or remains largely aspirational will only be clear with time. The agreement’s timing is telling. It came days after a surprise Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar that killed Hamas figures and stunned the Gulf States. Qatar hosts a major US airbase, yet Washington did not prevent the strike, a jolt to regional confidence in American protection. Saudi Arabia, already uneasy about U.S. reliability, seized the moment to bolster its own security. Officially, Riyadh says the deal “institutionalises” long-standing cooperation rather than targeting any specific incident. Still, it unmistakably signals that the kingdom can seek safeguards beyond the U.S. umbrella. The agreement even revived talk of an “Islamic NATO.” Saudi Arabia binding itself to Pakistan, Islam’s spiritual heart partnering with its only nuclear-armed state is a powerful image. Observers speculate that other Muslim countries might one day align under a similar framework. Yet longstanding sectarian and political rifts (Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab) have doomed past unity efforts. For now, the Riyadh-Islamabad agreement is as much a message to big powers as a foundation for any broader alliance. Perhaps the toughest diplomatic test for Riyadh is managing the agreement’s fallout in New Delhi. India has spent years cultivating Saudi Arabia as a partner, a top source of oil, investment and Islamic-world backing on contentious issues. A formal Saudi-Pakistani security link is exactly what India hoped to avoid. New Delhi “would not welcome an explicit security tether between its principal energy supplier and its strategic rival,” one analysis noted. In effect, the agreement edges Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan, risking awkward strain in Saudi-India ties. Indian government reacted in measured tones, acknowledging the agreement and saying it would “study the implications” for her security. The real worry in New Delhi is not that Saudi forces would fight on Pakistan’s side which remains far-fetched but that Pakistan will feel politically bolstered by Riyadh’s backing. Pakistani hardliners may adopt a tougher posture in future confrontations, believing a wealthy Arab power has their back. There’s also concern that Saudi aid or arms could flow to Pakistan over time, indirectly strengthening India’s longtime foe. Aware of these optics, Saudi officials have been quick to reassure India. One senior official stressed that Saudi’s relationship with India “is more robust than it has ever been” and vowed to keep deepening it. Riyadh clearly wants to show it can defend its interests with Pakistan without abandoning its friendship with India. Even so, the balancing act is delicate. New Delhi will likely respond by tightening its own strategic bonds, for instance, with Israel, a close defense partner – and by quietly urging Riyadh to stay neutral in South Asian issues. Much progress in India-Saudi relations has come in recent years, and both sides have incentives to prevent this new alignment from derailing that momentum. As the dust settles, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement stands as a bold statement, but one not yet tested by crisis. Its ripple effects are already evident. Israel, which had been inching toward a historic normalisation with Riyadh, now sees that prospect put on hold Washington, too, must grapple with a Gulf ally hedging its bets on security. Ultimately, the agreement’s significance will hinge on how seriously Riyadh and Islamabad implement it. Regular joint drills coordinated planning or clear mutual defense protocols could turn the promise into genuine deterrence. Absent that, skeptics may view it as more posturing than substance. History offers caution: Pakistan’s past defense agreement s (such as Cold War alliances with the U.S.) often fell short when real wars loomed, and Gulf unity schemes have tended to fragment under pressure. For now, Saudi Arabia has made a dramatic bid to diversify its security options, a gamble on Pakistan’s reliability and on charting a more independent course without alienating old partners. If the gamble succeeds, it could redraw the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia. If it falters, it will remind everyone that even grand agreements can carry unspoken caveats. Only a true test, a moment of crisis will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi

Defence Hindus Kashmir Pakistan Policy Politics Security

530

Heritage, Ethos, Not Saffronisation

Selective amnesia and deliberate attempt to communalise the army on naming of operation Sindoor is gross and unacceptable. Brig Brijesh Pandey Frontline column “Hindu Names for Military Operations: Treading a Dangerous Line” by Mani Shankar Aiyar published on 09, September 2025 argues that naming of military operations by the present government – most recently Operation Sindoor reflects a deliberate “saffronisation of Indian Army.” The argument is provocative, selective and highly misleading. Having served for 35 years in Indian Army, I never felt that I’m a Hindu or so to say only a Hindu. Being from a pure Sikh Regiment, felt more like a SIKH, behaved like a Sikh and whenever there was a chance to name an institution, exercise or force, the first name that would come to the mind was one that related to Sikh traditions of valour. Yet no one, including my parents, questioned my secular or Hindu credentials. This is so, because anyone who understands armed forces – the history, military tradition and institutional structure – knows that operation or force names are cultural symbols, not ideological manifestos. The culture of naming operations and exercises is older than modern warfare and militaries across the globe use evocative names for operations and exercises – sometimes as a code for secrecy, motivation and more often for messaging deterrence to the adversary as much as public consumption. From earliest days of independent India, armed forces have drawn names from mythology, Sanskrit, geography and abstract concepts. This practice cuts across political regimes led by Congress, BJP or coalitions. In 1984, almost four decades prior to the debate, Indian Army launched Operation Meghdoot to secure Siachen Glacier. The name comes from Kalidasa’s Sanskrit classic Meghaduta (Cloud Messenger from Hindu Cosmology) where an exiled Yaksha asks a cloud to carry a message to his beloved in the Himalayas. Name was chosen, as it was apt reflection of the nature of operation wherein Indian troops were airlifted like clouds into Himalayan heights. It was nothing but a cultural resonance. The name of recently concluded operation Sindoor has been used as evidence to create a discourse that Army is getting communalized or saffronised. Rationale for the name is very clear. Terrorists in Pahalgam targeted married Hindu men, widowing women overnight. Sindoor (vermilion) symbolizes marital bond in Indian culture. Naming the operation which was primarily a retaliatory action against such a heinous crime selectively inflicted on the majority community of the country was meant to be a tribute to victims and their families, not as a religious decree. Branding it as ideologically motivated reflects ignorance as well as crafty effort to question secular credentials of the armed forces. The act of symbolism and resolve when questioned post-operation Sindoor, a defense ministry official had said, “There is no single written policy on naming. Choices are pragmatic, contextual and meant to evoke resolve.” More often than not, the ideas get generated at very junior level and accepted as such to keep the initiative alive. The writer of “Hindu Names for Military Operations: Treading a Dangerous Line” has been selective about names in recent times, without considering full spectrum since evolution of Indian Armed Forces. When names like Operation Trident (1971), Operation Shakti (1998) or Exercise Ashvamedha (2007) were chosen, no one accused the government of the day – the Congress-led in each case – of religious indoctrination. In the name “Operation Trident”, famous naval strike on Karachi in 1971, “trident” is nothing else than “Trishul”, the weapon of Lord Shiva. Operation Shakti, India’s nuclear test in 1998 drew the name from Goddess power in the Hindu philosophy. But then, these names were accepted as civilizational, not sectarian. When no questions were Congress raised then, why do it now? To illustrate that there is neither any disruption in naming the operations nor is any correlation with appointment of CDS, it is important to analyze few names that relate to the pre and post-2014 era. Era Operation/Exercise Name Year Origin/Meaning Mythological/ Cultural link Pre-2014 Operation Meghdoot 1984 Kalidasa’s Meghadoota Yaksha sends clouds to Himalayas Operation Trident 1971 Trident (Trishul) Weapon of Lord Shiva Operation Pawan 1987 Pawan = Wind Vedic Deity Operation Shakti 1998 Shakti = Power Goddess Power Exercise Ashvamedha 2007 Royal Horse sacrifice Ancient Hindu Ritual Exercise Sudarshan Shakti 2011 Sudarshan Chakra Vishnu’s discus Missiles Prithvi, Agni, Akash, Nag Ongoing Fire, Earth, Sky, Serpent Vedic / Hindu roots Exercise Indra Ongoing Indra = God of rain Vedic deity Post 2014 Operation Maitri 2015 Maitree = Friendship Sanskrit, Budhist ethos Exercise Shatrujeet 2016 Shatrujeet = Enemy Conqueror Sanskrit motivational If Armed Forces were being transformed to suit a particular religion, their names and demography would also have started changing. Instead, the regimental system remains plural – Sikh Regiment, Rajputana Rifles, Maratha Light Infantry, Punjab Regiment, Assam Regiment, Madras regiment, Gorkha Regiment, Brigade of Guards, and so on – each maintaining regional, caste or faith-based traditions. The very regimentation of Indian Armed Forces is proof of pluralism. If the army was being saffronised as claimed by Aiyar, there would be a written directive mandating Hindu names. Whether it is regiments, exercises or operations, they would all start assuming names relating to Hindu religion only. Unlike compulsory recruitment of persons of religions based on which regiments exist only Hindus will get recruited. Likewise, promotion criteria will change. There would be no non-Hindu tenanting critical appointments such as Chief of Army / Navy / Air Force. Contrary to this, what we see is continuity: a mixture of neutral, mythological and cultural names chosen for operational and symbolic value. Seen through Cognitive Warfare lens, such narratives follow a familiar toolkit: disinformation (casting doubts on facts by portraying cultural symbolism as ideological capture), amplification (mainstreaming selective examples while ignoring historical continuity) and de-legitimization (eroding trust in one of the most patriotic institutions). We saw a similar pattern when opposition leaders questioned authenticity of 2016 Surgical Strikes and 2019 Balakot airstrike. In each case, rumour and

Artificial Intelligence Cyber Security Defence Pakistan Terrorism

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A Terrorist Tech Review in Khorasan

Broader implication is that counterterrorism efforts must adapt to an era of synthetic propaganda and AI-assisted operations. This means investing in new detection technologies, updating regulations for AI platforms, and perhaps rethinking how we monitor online terrorist communities without infringing on common people’s privacy. Rahul Pawa In June 2025, an unlikely tech column appeared in Voice of Khorasan, the English-language web terrorist propaganda magazine of ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province). Amid usual disillusions, Issue 46 featured a detailed comparison of popular AI chatbots; from OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Microsoft’s Bing AI to the privacy-focused Brave Leo and the Chinese bot dubbed “DeepSeek.” The tone resembled a consumer tech review, but the intent was deadly serious. The authors warned fellow jihadists about the risks of these tools, raising alarms about data privacy and surveillance. ChatGPT and Bing, they noted, might log user data or even expose a terrorist’s IP address, a potential death sentence for an terrorist on the run. They cautioned that generative AI could churn out false information or even mimic someone’s writing or speaking style, making it a double-edged sword for propaganda. After weighing the platforms, the magazine gave its endorsement: Brave’s Leo AI, integrated into a private web browser and requiring no login, was deemed the safest option for terrorists seeking anonymity. In essence, ISIS-K selected the chatbot that asks for the fewest questions in return, a chilling reminder that even terrorists prize privacy features. This surreal scene, a terrorist group rating AI assistants illustrates how terrorist organisations are eagerly probing the latest technology for their own ends. If Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate is producing in-house reviews of chatbots, it is because they see potential tools for propaganda, recruitment, and even operational support. And ISIS-K is not alone. Across the ideological spectrum, violent terrorists are experimenting with generative AI, ushering in a new chapter in the long history of terrorists exploiting digital media. From jihadists in remote safe houses to far left extremist cells in Western suburbs, terrorists are testing how AI can amplify their hateful messaging and help them evade detection. It’s a development that has counterterrorism officials on high alert, and for good reason. For decades, terrorist groups have been early adopters of new media. In the late 1990s, Al-Qaeda circulated grainy VHS tapes and CD-ROMs with lectures by Osama bin Laden. By the mid-2010s, ISIS perfected the art of online propaganda: slickly edited videos, encrypted chat channels, and multilingual web magazines reached recruits worldwide at the click of a button. The Islamic State’s media operatives earned a dark reputation as “innovators” in digital terror, leveraging YouTube, Twitter, and Telegram in ways governments struggled to counter. Now, generative AI is the latest technology wave and once again, terrorists are riding it. What’s different today is the power and accessibility of these AI tools. Modern generative AI can produce content that is startlingly realistic and tailored to an audience’s biases or emotions. This opens troubling possibilities for propaganda. Terrorist groups can now generate fake images, videos, and even interactive dialogues at scale, with minimal resources. In recent months, terrorists have used AI-created images and videos to stoke sectarian hatred and amplify conflicts. During the Israel counter strike on Hamas in 2023, for example, Hamas-linked propagandists circulated doctored visuals, including fabricated pictures of injured children and fake photos of Israeli soldiers in humiliating situations to inflame public emotion and spread disinformation. These AI-manipulated images blended seamlessly into the online information ecosystem, making it harder to separate truth from fabrication in the fog of war. ISIS and its offshoots have likewise ventured into deepfakes. Islamic State’s media affiliates reportedly published a “tech support guide” in mid-2023 instructing followers how to securely use generative AI tools while avoiding detection. Not long after, ISIS-K began unveiling AI-generated propaganda videos. Following a 2024 attack in Afghanistan, ISIS-K released a video bulletin featuring a fictitious news anchor, generated by deepfake technology calmly reading the group’s claims of responsibility. The video looked like a normal news broadcast, complete with a professional-looking anchor, except it was entirely fabricated by AI. In another case, after an assault in Kandahar, an ISIS-K propagandist created a second deepfake “Khurasan TV” clip, this time with a Western-accented avatar as the presenter. The goal is clear: lend terrorist propaganda a veneer of credibility and polish that previously required a studio and camera crew. Instead of grainy cellphone martyr videos, we now see digital avatars delivering the jihadists message in high definition, potentially fooling viewers (and automated content filters) that would dismiss overtly violent footage. As one security analyst observed, this marks a stark upgrade from the early 2000s when terrorist videos were rudimentary and “prioritised the message over higher production values” , today’s AI-crafted terror content can closely resemble legitimate media broadcasts. Why are terrorist groups so keen on generative AI? The answer lies in what these tools promise: speed, scale, personalisation, and a degree of deniability. A large language model can produce terrorist propaganda texts in multiple languages almost instantaneously, allowing a group like ISIS-K or al-Qaeda to tailor messages to different ethnic or national audiences without a large translation team. AI image generators can churn out endless visuals for memes, posters, or fake “news” proof, enabling agitators to flood social media with content that algorithmic moderation hasn’t seen before, thereby evading detection by hash-based filters that flag known terrorist photos. As Adam Hadley of Tech Against Terrorism warned, if terrorists manipulate imagery at scale with AI, it could undermine the hash-sharing databases that platforms use to automatically block violent content . In effect, generative AI offers terrorists a way to boost volume and variety in their online output, potentially staying one step ahead of content moderation efforts. Just as importantly, AI lowers the barriers for creating sophisticated lies. Misinformation and conspiracy theories can be mass-produced with ChatGPT-like models, which excel at mimicking authoritative tone or even an individual’s speech patterns. ISIS-K’s magazine explicitly noted this danger that AI can “create false information or mimic specific speech patterns”

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