United Kingdom’s counter-extremism policy botches up by intent. It’s a political weapon against Hindus and offers shield for islamists. Dr. Shailendra Kumar Pathak United Kingdom’s government’s proposed new counter-extremism policy may not be well intentioned. It’s being perhaps calculative and an ideological weapon designed to shield Islamists while turning Hindus scapegoats. UK’s Home Ministry document, ‘Extremely Confused: The government’s new counter-extremism review revealed’, authored by Andrew Gilligan and Dr. Paul Stott for Policy Exchange think tank throws insights into anti-Hindu thinking of Keir Starmer government in London. This policy manipulates language, distorts extremism definitions and provide protective shield to most dangerous groups while targeting those who seek to challenge Islamist and leftist orthodoxy. The report is in itself a response to UK Home Ministry counter-extremism document prepared under the influence of left-wing and Islamist-aligned bureaucrats. Figures such as Sara Khan, Iman Atta and Robin Simcox, known for their self-proclaimed progressive and Islamist-leaning advocacy, have had significant impact on shaping this policy direction. These figures have past associations with organizations that downplay role of Islamist ideology in terrorism and instead push for a “decolonial” or “grievance-based” framework that excuses extremist behaviour. By shifting from an ideology-based to a behaviour-based approach, UK government has removed Islamism from scrutiny, despite its overwhelming role in extremism while falsely constructing a “Hindu nationalist threat” to create moral equivalence where none exists. The report highlights how Islamist terror has been responsible for 94 per cent of terrorism-related deaths in UK since 1999. Yet, the policy assigns vague, neutral labels like “grievance-based extremism” or “online radicalization” to Islamist violence. Instead of acknowledging well-documented role of Islamist ideology in grooming gangs, blasphemy violence and jihadist attacks, the policy frames these acts as “problematic behaviours” detached from ideology. “The Sprint de-centres and downplays ideology in general and Islamism in particular,” the report states, making it clear that the government is deliberately avoiding naming the most pressing extremist threat. This ensures that counter-terror resources are wasted monitoring low-level social grievances while radical mosques and Islamist networks continue operating freely. At the same time, Hindutva and Hindu nationalism are explicitly named as threats—despite no Hindu terror cases in UK. This is a deliberate effort to demonize Hindus, forcing them into a defensive position where any resistance to Islamist aggression is framed as extremism. This distortion is not accidental; it is a product of Left-Islamist alliance. The leftist establishment sees Islamist groups as allies against nationalism, traditional values, and Western identity. By falsely portraying Hindus as aggressors, they create a justification to police and silence Hindu voices. The Leicester riots of 2022 epitomized this dynamic—Islamist mobs attacked Hindu homes, temples and businesses, yet the media and government falsely framed Hindus as the perpetrators. The Policy Exchange report specifically identifies Islamist groups such as Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) and CAGE as key influencers in shaping this policy direction. Both organizations have a history of defending Islamist extremism, with MEND previously accused of enabling hate speech and CAGE notorious for its support of jihadist figures, including defending ISIS executioner Mohammed Emwazi (“Jihadi John”). CAGE’s leadership has been linked to figures such as Moazzam Begg, who has defended convicted terrorists and consistently opposed counter-terrorism measures aimed at dismantling jihadist networks. New counter-extremism policy ensures that future anti-Hindu violence will be ignored or worse, justified under guise of fighting “Hindutva extremism.” The Policy Exchange report warns, “Expansionary definitions also risk triggering even greater and more distracting political controversy than now, from both right and left,” demonstrating that this shift will not only harm Hindus but weaken counter-extremism efforts altogether. Similarly, Khalistani separatist figures like Avtar Singh Khanda—who played a significant role in radicalizing Sikh youth—are downplayed as mere “diaspora activists.” The policy’s refusal to acknowledge Khalistani terror confirms its politically motivated agenda. How UK’s Counter-Extremism Policy Manipulates Language to Protect Islamists and Target Hindus Group Government Label Real-World Impact Islamists and Jihadists “Grievance-based extremism,” “youth violence,” “online radicalization,” “extreme views” De-ideologizes Islamist violence, making it appear as personal problem rather than a systemic movement Islamic Grooming Gangs “Organized exploitation,” “group-based sexual abuse” Avoids acknowledging religious, ethnic patterns behind these crimes Islamic Blasphemy Extremists (e.g., Batley Grammar incident) “Marginalized voices reacting to offense” Shields Islamic radicalism from accountability, while punishing those who ‘provoke’ them Hindus who defend themselves “Hindu nationalist extremism,” “Hindutva radicalization” Creates false equivalence between Hindu self-defense and Islamist violence Khalistani Extremists “Sikh activism,” “diaspora advocacy” Downplays their links to terrorism, separatist violence Broader objective behind this policy seems to create a permanent mechanism for ideological suppression. By expanding extremism to include vague categories like “misogyny,” “conspiracy theories,” and “online subcultures,” the government has provided itself with a sweeping tool to criminalize dissent. The Policy Exchange report specifically criticizes this shift, saying that “including a range of other crimes and social ills in the remit risks swamping already stretched interveners and counter-terror police with tens, if not hundreds, or thousands of new cases.” This ensures that anyone critical of Islamism, mass immigration or leftist policies can be surveilled and targeted. The reversal of protections against recording “non-crime hate incidents” further exacerbates this problem, allowing police to build unofficial records against individuals who express politically inconvenient views. Meanwhile, Islamists benefit immensely from this shift. By removing ideology from counter-extremism, the government ensures that radical preachers, jihadist recruiters and extremist organizations are treated as victims of social grievances rather than as threats to national security. This will make it even harder for law enforcement to track and dismantle jihadist networks. The rebranding of Islamist extremism as “behavioural concerns” allows Islamists to operate with near impunity while those who challenge them face legal persecution. “The Sprint may have been influenced by the events of Southport,” the report notes, warning that using lone incidents of violence as justification for broad policy shifts risks erasing the real threats posed by ideological extremism. This is not counter-extremism—it is state-sponsored assault on Hindus and a deliberate act of political repression. Instead of drawing comparison to Jewish experience, it is more