CCP inability and intolerance to resolve people’s grievances, economic woes, joblessness led to rise in number of “Zhang Xianzhong” attacks.
Rahul Pawa
China in 2024 has seen a startling surge in violent attacks on civilians, with over 20 incidents leaving more than 90 people dead and scores injured. These incidents, often described as “Zhang Xianzhong” attacks or “revenge on society” attacks expose deep societal fractures and challenging the image of stability and control that Xi Jinping’s leadership has meticulously cultivated.
The attacks which included car-ramming and mass stabbings reflect a dangerous cocktail of economic despair, social grievances and a government increasingly out of touch with people’s issues.
Last month, a 62-year-old man drove an SUV into crowds in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province that led to killing 35 and injuring 43. His motive, reportedly rooted in bitterness over a divorce settlement was a stark reminder of how personal grievances in today’s China are escalating into public tragedies.
President Xi, in an uncharacteristically direct response, urged local authorities to “draw lessons” from the case and strengthen prevention measures. Yet, this rare acknowledgment of failure only highlighted limits of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to control a society increasingly defined by tensions and resentment.
These attacks are not anomalies. In 2024 alone, incidents like a stabbing spree in Wuxi that left eight dead, a car-ramming attack in Changsha that killed eight and at least ten school attacks have painted grim picture of a nation under siege from within.
While Beijing’s strict censorship obscures much of the data, social media tallies and local reports suggest that the frequency and lethality of these events are on rise. Schools, once considered safe havens, have become frequent targets with attacks mirroring a wave of school violence last seen in 2010. Then, six schools were attacked in quick succession, killing over 15 children. Today’s resurgence of similar violence points to unresolved structural issues that have only deepened under Xi’s rule.
Chinese netizens navigating state’s ever-present censorship have adopted the term “Zhang Xianzhong” to describe these attacks. The phrase refers to 17th-century rebel whose campaigns of mass killing were seen as acts of revenge on society. While officials quickly scrub mentions of the term online, its persistence reflects an undercurrent of fear and frustration among citizens.
The attackers largely armed with knives or vehicles due to strict gun control laws often cite grievances ranging from economic hardships to personal injustices. Analysts believe these attacks are symptomatic of an eroding social contract in China where economic slowdown, unemployment and widening inequalities have left millions disillusioned.
Economic despair is perhaps the most potent driver of this unrest. China’s post-COVID recovery has been sluggish with youth unemployment exceeding 20 per cent and small businesses closing at an alarming rate. The once-thriving property market has collapsed, household debt is mounting and local governments are grappling with financial insolvency.
These pressures are not limited to economic woes; they are deeply personal, affecting livelihoods, aspirations and social cohesion. Promise of prosperity that once underpinned CCP’s legitimacy is faltering and with it, the trust of a society that had largely bought into Xi’s vision of a “Chinese Dream.”
Making matters worse is CCP’s shrinking tolerance for dissent. The longstanding system of petitioning where citizens could formally lodge grievances with government has been effectively gutted. Local officials, fearing repercussions for their regions’ perceived instability, now block petitioners from reaching Beijing or dismiss complaints altogether.
A 2022 regulatory revision further centralized complaint resolution at the local level, creating a perverse incentive for officials to suppress grievances rather than resolve them. For many citizens, this has closed one of the last remaining avenues for seeking justice in an increasingly opaque and authoritarian state.
In such a climate, acts of violence become not just crimes but desperate expressions of discontent. They are, as one netizen put it before their post was censored, “the sound of a society breaking apart.” The CCP, ever wary of its image, has responded by doubling down on surveillance and control. Local governments are now tasked with identifying “high-risk” individuals—those categorized under what the state calls the “four nothings” (no spouse, no children, no income, no assets) and the “five losses” (financial, relational, social, mental or other critical stressors). In Zhuhai, this framework was deployed following the deadly vehicle attack, with authorities instructed to proactively monitor and intervene in lives of these vulnerable groups.
While these measures may offer short-term reductions in violence, they do little to address root causes of societal discontent. Instead, they risk further alienating a population already weary of state overreach. Critics warn that treating citizens as potential threats rather than partners in governance will only deepen the divide between people and state. Moreover, China’s increasingly invasive surveillance apparatus, though technologically sophisticated, is ill-equipped to tackle complex, deeply human factors driving these attacks.
Xi Jinping’s leadership is at a precarious crossroads. For years, he has positioned himself as China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, centralizing authority and eliminating dissent within the party. But the events of 2024 have exposed vulnerabilities in his governance model. The rise in violent attacks, coupled with economic stagnation and growing public frustration is eroding the very foundation of his rule. Internationally, these issues are undermining Xi’s efforts to portray China as a stable and orderly superpower.
The targeting of foreigners in some attacks has added another layer of complexity. In September, a ten year old Japanese boy was fatally stabbed near a school in Shenzhen, an incident followed by similar attacks on Japanese nationals in other cities. While Beijing has labeled these as isolated acts, they point to a growing strain of xenophobia and anti-foreigner sentiment under Xi’s rule.
This ethno-nationalism, once a tool for consolidating domestic support, is now proving to be a double-edged sword, damaging China’s global reputation and risking diplomatic fallout.
As 2024 draws to a close, CCP is scrambling to project an image of control. Xi’s speeches emphasize stability, his officials announce plans to address grievances and state media highlight the supposed effectiveness of new security measures. But beneath the surface, cracks in China’s societal fabric are widening.
CCP’s traditional tools of censorship and propaganda are proving inadequate in the face of mounting public anger. Even as Xi tightens his grip on power, the question lingers on: how long can he suppress the forces of discontent bubbling beneath the surface?
The coming months will be critical. Chinese New Year, traditionally a time of celebration, also brings with it the stress of debt repayments and family expectations. For a nation already on edge, this period could trigger further violence.
In a country where control has always been synonymous with stability, events of 2024 serve as a stark reminder that even the most tightly managed systems are vulnerable to collapse from within. For Xi Jingping, the stakes could not be higher. His ability to navigate this crisis will define not only his legacy but also trajectory of a nation increasingly at odds with itself. The fortress of Xi’s China is cracking—and the world is watching to see what happens next.
(Author is Research Director at Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies, New Delhi based non-partisan think-tank)Cracks in Xi’s Fortress
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