Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security Terrorism

Bangladesh: A Nobel Halo, an Islamist State,Terror Networks and Radicalisation as State Policy

Rahul PAWA | @imrahulpawa (X) Global jihadists see an opening: a chance to reconnect their Pakistani networks with Bangladeshi extremists, reversing years of counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation gains. On a mid-December night in Bangladesh, 25-year-old Dipu Chandra Das, a Hindu garment factory worker was beaten by a frenzy of Islamists, hung from a tree, and set ablaze on a highway. His alleged “crime”? A rumor that he insulted Islam. Yet investigators have since confirmed there is zero evidence that Dipu ever blasphemed at all. Not one can point to a single derogatory remark he made; “no one saw or heard” anything offensive, a Rapid Action Battalion officer admitted. In other words, an innocent Hindu man was lynched and immolated over a lie. One would expect such a medieval atrocity, captured on video and circulated worldwide, to provoke an outpouring of shock from international human rights watchdogs. Imagine if the roles were reversed: a Muslim man lynched and burned by a mob in a Hindu-majority country. The global indignation would be instantaneous and deafening. But in Dipu’s case, the outrage has been oddly muted. Major human rights organizations and Western governments that normally champion minority rights barely mustered a whisper of protest. The deafening silence of these supposed watchdogs is as harrowing as the crime itself, and it exposes a disturbing double standard. Bangladesh’s own minority rights groups vehemently condemned the lynching, the Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council decried the “so-called blasphemy” killing as an assault on communal harmony. But where were the urgent press releases from Geneva, the high-profile tweets from Human Rights Watch, the emergency sessions at the UN? Their voices have been either absent or astonishingly subdued. Such restraint stands in stark contrast to their usual activism when religious persecution occurs elsewhere. The message implicit in this silence is chilling: that the lynching of a poor Hindu man in Bangladesh is somehow a lesser transgression on the global human rights ledger. The hypocrisy extends to Bangladesh’s interim rulers. The current government, led by Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus, swept to power in August 2024 after a Islamist-led “Monsoon Revolution” toppled Sheikh Hasina’s democratically elected administration. Internationally, Yunus is venerated for championing human rights and equality. Domestically, his regime’s actions tell a darker story. Chief Adviser Yunus was quick to issue a condemnation of Dipu’s lynching, vowing the perpetrators “will not be spared”. However, such words ring hollow against the regime’s track record: while it denounces one mob killing, it has concurrently overseen the release or escape of hundreds of criminals and Islamist extremists since taking power. At Hadi’s funeral, Yunus himself delivered a eulogy that should have set off international alarm bells. In front of tens of thousands, Yunus heaped praise on Hadi’s “mantra” and vowed to fulfill Hadi’s vision “generation after generation”. Let’s be clear: Hadi was explicitly known for his anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric and polarising, Islamist-tinged politics. By publicly sanctifying Hadi’s ideals, Yunus sent a dangerous signal that anti-India and anti-Hindu dictate is now quasi-official ideology in Dhaka. Unsurprisingly, the fallout was swift. Days after Hadi’s death, Bangladesh erupted in fury, not just against alleged conspirators in his killing, but against perceived Indian influence. Mobs attacked the Indian Assistant High Commission in Chittagong, and hundreds of protesters marched on the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, chanting anti-India slogans and even hurling stones at diplomatic compounds. Bangladesh’s police hinted (without evidence) that Hadi’s assassins might have fled to India – where ex-PM Hasina has taken refuge – a claim that only inflamed public paranoia. In the frenzy, fact and fiction mattered little: ‘anti-India and anti-Hindu agenda’ was the rallying cry. Caught in the crossfire were Bangladesh’s Hindu minorities, now doubly scapegoated as both “blasphemers” at home and perceived fifth-columnists for India. Attacks on Hindu homes, temples and community leaders have spiked over the past year and a half. Even before Dipu Das’s lynching, minority groups warned that the post-Hasina political climate had emboldened extremists to settle scores with Hindus, Buddhists and Christians. Tragically, those warnings proved prescient in Bhaluka, Mymensingh, when Dipu’s killers exploited a religious rumor to unleash lethal mob “justice.” Police and RAB have detained ten suspects, Mohammad Limon Sarkar, Mohammad Tarek Hossain, Mohammad Manik Mia, Ershad Ali, Nijum Uddin, Alomgir Hossain, Mohammad Miraj Hossain Akon, Mohammad Azmol Hasan Sagir, Mohammad Shahin Mia, and Mohammad Nazmul, aged 19 to 46. The interim regime’s, especially Mohammad Yunis’s own actions, from baiting an anti-Indian agitator to allowing Islamist hardliners back into public life, have fertilised the soil in which Islamist extremism and radicalisation grows. Perhaps most cynical of all has been the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry’s complicity and the atrocious attempt to downplay these horrors. When India officially protested the mob killing of a Hindu Bangladeshi (and even a small peoples demonstration in New Delhi decrying it), Dhaka’s response was dismissive. Foreign Affairs Adviser Mohammad Touhid Hossain bristled at the notion that Dipu Das’s lynching had anything to do with minority targeting. He then lectured that “such incidents occur across the region” and every country has a responsibility to address themas if mob lynching and immolation of religious minorities is just business as usual in South Asia, nothing special. This whataboutist shrug is nothing short of an attempt to normalise hate crimes. By equating a communal lynching with generic law-and-order problems everywhere, Bangladesh’s officials signal that the brutal murder of a Hindu for an unproven slur is not a national emergency but a routine matter that merits no extra soul-searching. This attitude is profoundly dangerous. Bangladesh was founded on principles of secularism and communal harmony in 1971, a legacy now under siege. To shrug off anti-Hindu violence as “common in the region” is to abandon the very idea of a pluralistic Bangladesh. It emboldens extremists and tells persecuted minorities that they are essentially on their own. Indeed, Islamist radicals have heard the message loud and clear. With the new regime’s indulgence, dormant terrorist networks are roaring back to life. Key jihadist leaders have re-entered the fray, for example,

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Beyond Binaries!

Four labour codes balance economic prosperity spread with workers’ social protection, minimum wages, social security, industrial safety. Ayadoure Stalin India’s reforms in labour sector represent one of the most consequential policy transformations of modern times. Public debate has largely framed consolidation of 29 central labour laws into four codes as an exercise in administrative simplification or investor-friendly deregulation. What’s unfolding is not merely statutory restructuring but reorientation of India’s labour philosophy that seeks to reconcile economic growth with social dignity, flexibility with security and national competitiveness with ethical responsibility. India’s labour reforms must be situated within a deeper intellectual lineage articulated decades ago byDattopant Bapurao Thengadi, founder of the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, India’s most original labour thinkers. Thengadi’s vision of “Third Way” rejected binaries that have long dominated labour discourse: capitalism versus socialism, employer versus worker, market versus state. Instead, he proposed a distinctly Bharatiya framework rooted in civilisational values, social harmony and national interest. Viewed from this prism, India’s four Labour Codes are not an imitation of western neo-liberalism nor a retreat from worker protection but an evolving attempt to institutionalize labour order that Thengadi imagined. Pro-worker without being anti-industry, pro-growth without being socially extractive and modern without being alien to India’s socio-economic realities was what Thengadi professed. Failure of Imported Models Since Independence, colonial legacies and imported ideologies have had predominant say in shaping India’s labour regime. British-era labour laws were designed to regulate industrial unrest, not to empower a young nation’s workforce. Following independence, many of these laws were retained and expanded under influence of socialist and marxist frameworks that essentially viewed labour from class struggle lens. This approach produced paradoxical outcomes. On paper, India had one of the most protective labour regimes. In practice, over 90 per cent of workers remained outside protective cover of the state. A miniscule, organized and vocal workforce cornered all the benefits with strong safeguards, while vast majority—informal, contractual, agricultural, and migrant workers—were denied social security, safety and wage stability. Thengadi was among earliest critics of this diabolic contradiction. Excessive legalism without universality weakens the entire labour force, he had argued. Laws that protect only a minority foster informality, discourage enterprise growth and ultimately undermine workers’ dignity. He rejected capitalist view that labour protections are obstacles to efficiency and growth. For Thengadi, labour was neither a commodity nor a revolutionary instrument but a key stakeholder in national development and spreading prosperity.India’s labour reforms must be read as an effort to escape this historical trap. Consolidation & Philosophical Reorientation Consolidation of 29 central labour laws into four Codes: Wages, Industrial Relations, Social Security and Occupational Safety, Health, and Working Conditions, addresses not only administrative fragmentation but ideological incoherence. For decades, employers navigated overlapping definitions, contradictory compliance requirements and inspector-driven enforcement. Workers, meanwhile, faced confusion over entitlements and limited security coverage and wages. The result was regulatory fatigue without universal justice. Four Codes establish a single, coherent legal architecture that replaces multiplicity with clarity. This rationalisation is not abandonment of labour welfare but a prerequisite for its expansion. Thengadi consistently emphasized that justice must be practical, accessible and enforceable. A legal framework that is too complex to comply with is ultimately unjust. Simplification is not a concession to capital, it is a tool to widen protection. Social Security & Inclusion Most transformative aspect of India’s labour reforms is Code on Social Security, 2020 that formally brings gig workers, platform workers and unorganised labour within the ambit of statutory social security. Globally, the rise of platform-based work has exposed inadequacy of traditional labour categories. Many advanced economies remain mired in binary debates: are gig workers employees or independent contractors? India’s approach is notably different. Rather than forcing rigid classifications, Indian framework prioritises coverage over categorisation. This reflects Thengadi’s ethical orientation. In The Third Way, he argued that social security is not by-product of industrial employment but a societal obligation. The dignity of labour does not depend on contract but work contribution to national economy. By recognizing gig and platform workers as beneficiaries of social security, they can now avail pension, insurance and health benefits. India signals a global normative shift. In an era where technological change often erodes worker protection, India is asserting that modernity need not mean precarity. Wage Rationalization & Economy Code on Wages, 2019 replaces a fragmented system of wage laws with unified framework governing minimum wages, timely payment and bonuses. Historically, India’s wage regulation suffered from sectoral silos and definitional ambiguities that enabled wage suppression and delayed payments. The new Code establishes a national floor wage while allowing contextual variation in states and sectors. This balance is critical. Thengadi opposed both exploitative wage competition and rigid uniformity. He believed that wages must reflect economic realities while meeting ethical threshold of ensuring livelihood security. Wages Code advances this moral economy. By ensuring timely payment and transparent definitions, it strengthens the workers’ position without undermining enterprise viability. It reflects a belief that fair wages are not anti-growth but foundational to sustainable growth. Industrial Relations & Adversaries Industrial Relations Code, 2020 has been most contested of the four reforms. Critics argue that raising thresholds for government approval in layoffs and closures weakens labour protection. Such critiques, however, often overlook India’s empirical employment landscape. Rigid exit regulations discouraged firms from scaling sizes, incentivizing contracts and informality. Consequence was not workers’ security but job insecurity for millions outside formal employment. Thengadi rejected the idea of labour being constantly adversarial with companies’ managements. He opposed both managerial authoritarianism and perpetual militancy. For him, industrial harmony and growth were a shared national responsibility grounded in dialogue, discipline and mutual respect. Industrial Relations Code aims to strike a balance between flexibility and protection. By promoting collective bargaining, streamlining dispute resolution and reducing incentives for informality, it aims to create stable workplaces rather than fragile jobs. Stability, not rigidity is the foundation of workers’ welfare. Occupational Safety & Trust OSHWC Code, 2020 modernizes safety standards while introducing risk-based inspections. This marks a shift from inspector-driven control to

A Nation at Risk While the World Watches

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

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A Nation at Risk While the World Watches

By R K Raina The events that unfolded in Dhaka this week should end any remaining illusion that Bangladesh’s current political drift is a contained or internal matter. On Wednesday afternoon, hundreds of protesters marched towards the Indian High Commission under the banner of July Oikya, raising anti-India slogans and issuing open threats against a diplomatic mission. Police restraint prevented immediate escalation, but the message was unmistakable: radical forces now feel emboldened enough to challenge diplomatic norms in broad daylight. The protest was not spontaneous. July Oikya, a front comprising several groups linked to the July mass uprising, had announced its “March to Indian High Commission” in advance. Its leaders warned that they would forcibly enter the High Commission if their demands were not met. These included the return of individuals convicted in the so-called July massacre case, including former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and an end to what they described as “Indian conspiracies” against Bangladesh. Such rhetoric mirrors the familiar language of Islamist mobilisation across the region, where external enemies are invoked to justify internal radicalisation. What makes this incident especially alarming is not merely the hostility directed at India, but the broader political context in which it occurred. Several fundamentalist and extremist figures, previously detained on terrorism-related charges, have been released in recent months under the current interim administration. Many of these elements are now active on the streets, shaping protest narratives and openly threatening foreign missions. This is not accidental. It is the predictable outcome of legitimising radical actors under the pretext of political transition. Threatening a foreign high commission violates the most basic norms of the diplomatic community. When such acts are tolerated, or downplayed as expressions of popular anger, the consequences extend far beyond bilateral relations. They signal a breakdown of state authority and a willingness to allow extremist mobilisation to dictate political space. This moment must be understood within Bangladesh’s longer historical arc. The country was born in 1971 as a rejection of Pakistan’s ideological model. Bengali nationalism asserted that language, culture and democratic choice mattered more than religious uniformity imposed by the state. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman articulated this vision decades earlier, insisting that Bengal’s history and identity could not be erased. That vision guided Bangladesh through its most successful periods of economic growth and social stability. The forces now gaining ground stand in direct opposition to that legacy. Pakistan’s role in this trajectory is being conspicuously ignored. Since 1971, Islamabad has never reconciled itself to the idea of a secular, culturally confident Bangladesh. Its historical hostility to Bengali identity culminated in genocide, and its ideological influence has since flowed through organisations that opposed Bangladesh’s independence. Jamaat-e-Islami, banned for its collaboration with Pakistan during the liberation war and now politically rehabilitated, remains the clearest example. Its ideological alignment with Pakistan is neither incidental nor historical trivia; it is central to the current moment. Yet while these forces resurface, much of the world has chosen silence. Worse, some have framed recent developments as a domestic political correction, urging restraint while avoiding any serious engagement with the ideological direction Bangladesh is being pushed towards. Treating the rise of radical street power, the intimidation of diplomatic missions and the release of extremist figures as internal matters is not neutrality. It is abdication. This selective blindness sets a dangerous precedent. Terrorism, it appears, is being judged differently depending on the target and the geography. Threats against Indian diplomatic property are brushed aside, while the same actors would be condemned instantly if they appeared near other embassies. Such double standards undermine the very international norms. The regional consequences are serious. South Asia is already burdened by fragile borders, unresolved conflicts and ideological fault lines. Allowing Bangladesh to slide towards Pakistan-style politics, marked by street radicalism, ideological hostility and economic uncertainty, risks destabilising an entire neighbourhood. The early economic signals are already troubling. Political instability and radical mobilisation have begun to erode confidence in what was once one of Asia’s most promising growth stories. Equally at stake is Bangladesh’s cultural future. The sustained assault on symbols of the liberation movement, and the replacement of Bengali nationalism with political Islam represent an attempt to rewrite the country’s founding narrative. History shows that such projects do not end with symbolism. They reshape education, law and social norms, often irreversibly. World policymakers should be under no illusion. Pakistan itself is a case study in how tolerating or enabling radical forces for short-term stability leads to long-term dysfunction. Decades of engagement have failed to undo the damage caused by ideological capture of the state. To allow Bangladesh to move down the same path is not a policy error; it is a strategic failure. The warning signs today are far clearer. Threats to diplomatic missions, the release of extremists and the open mobilisation of radical fronts are not normal features of democratic transition. They are indicators of state erosion. If the world continues to look away, it will share responsibility for what follows. The erosion of peace in this region, the empowerment of extremist networks and the slow destruction of Bengali cultural identity will not remain confined within Bangladesh’s borders. Silence, in this case, is not caution. It is complicity. (Author is a former diplomat and policy commentator focused on South Asian geopolitics, Tibet and India’s neighbourhood. He contributes to leading think tanks and policy platforms on regional and civilisational issues.)

1971 Genocide and the Unhealed Scars of Bangladesh

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

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1971 Genocide and the Unhealed Scars of Bangladesh

Bangladesh may paper over its wounds one by one, but the scars of systematic genocide during 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War will remain permanent. Pummy M. Pandita The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War was marked by a systematic campaign of genocide carried out by the Pakistan Army and its supporting forces, Razakars, against the Bengali population, pro-independence activists, intellectuals and civilians. The Razakar Force, officially established by the Pakistan Army under the command of General Tikka Khan and acknowledged as a proxy paramilitary entity, was pivotal in the perpetration of these offenses at the direct command from Pakistan. More than fifty years post-independence, Bangladesh persistently pursued international acknowledgment and a formal apology from Pakistan; however, these requests remain unmet. The enduring impact of violence and denial has resulted in lasting sociopolitical wounds that continue to manifest in both domestic and diplomatic contexts. Established pursuant to the East Pakistan Razakars Ordinance issued in August 1971, this militia group was intentionally created to serve as a local support mechanism for Pakistan’s counter-insurgency efforts against the Bengalis of erstwhile East Pakistan. The establishment and functioning of this militia group were crucial to the genocidal tactics employed by the military leadership of Pakistan in order to stifle the aspirations for independence from Pakistan. The contingent comprised roughly 50,000 volunteers, primarily sourced from Islamist groupings in Pakistan political groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, Al Badr, Al Shams and others that resisted Bengali autonomy. In stark contrast to purported accounts, the Razakars were not merely engaged in “internal security” operations; they were complicit in heinous acts of mass murder, sexual violence, torture and terror directed at civilians, with a particular focus on Hindu communities, political dissidents, scholars and advocates for independence from Pakistan. After the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, approximately 200,000 women and girls, predominantly Hindus, were raped by the Pakistani Army and its allied proxies (Razakars). These heinous acts were part of an effort to create a “pure” Muslim race in Bangladesh. The targeting of Hindu women has continued, with sexual violence being used to intimidate and displace Hindu families. Multiple thoroughly recorded massacres during 1971 by Razakars alongside the Pakistan Army, encompassing extensive killings in Jathibhanga (approximately 3,000–3,500 victims), Gabha Narerkathi (95–100 Hindu victims), Akhira and Char Bhadrasan, among others, each exemplifying methodical assaults on defenseless populations. In December 2019, almost fifty years post Bangladeshi independence, the Government of Bangladesh released an official enumeration of 10,789 individuals recognized as Razakars, a clear initiative to identify and document those who supported the Pakistan Army’s operations against the Bengali population. The aim was to guarantee that future generations retain awareness of the genuine perpetrators of violence and treason, opposing any efforts to obscure or sanitise this historical narrative. Notwithstanding these actions, the pursuit of justice remains unfulfilled and the scars of history endure. The lack of an official apology transcends mere diplomatic obstruction; it signifies a refusal to acknowledge historical responsibility, thereby exacerbating the anguish of survivors, the families of victims and the broader communities deeply affected by the events of 1971. For a significant segment of Bangladeshi society, especially among Hindu communities that were disproportionately targeted, the ongoing lack of recognition constitutes not merely an omission but a deliberate erasure. It denies victims and survivors both justice and historical recognition, making their suffering invisible and original crimes even worse. This silence reinforces impunity, invalidates experienced trauma and indicates a systemic reluctance to address the violence perpetrated by Razakars and Pakistan Army against these communities. The Razakar legacy stands as a profound and enduring mark in the collective consciousness of Bangladesh, serving as a proof to the genocidal tactics employed by the Pakistan Army and its accomplices. It highlights the necessity for healing from mass atrocities, which hinges on the pursuit of truth and formal accountability, elements that cannot be fully achieved without clear recognition and apology from those who hold historical responsibility. The plight of Hindu communities in present-day Bangladesh finds its roots in the tragic events of the 1971 Liberation War and this suffering has persisted in a sporadic manner throughout the subsequent decades. In the year 1971, the Pakistan Army, in conjunction with the Razakars, engaged in state-sanctioned violence that resulted in widespread atrocities, including mass killings, sexual violence and the deliberate persecution of the Hindu community as a distinct religious group. The immediate consequences resulted in significant refugee movements and a sustained demographic reduction of Hindus in Bangladesh. Since the attainment of independence from Pakistan, there has been a recurring pattern of communal violence, biased governance practices, assaults on property and places of worship and a prevailing sense of impunity for those who commit such acts. This troubling trend has notably escalated during periods of political instability in 2024–25, resulting in cycles characterised by fear, displacement and the erosion of rights. Historical context: targeted violence in 1971 “Operation Searchlight” on March 25, 1971, started the Bangladesh Liberation War, which lasted from March to December 1971. The campaign conducted by the Pakistan military specifically aimed at Bengali freedom fighters, scholars, students and, with notable intensity, Hindu civilians. Recent and ongoing research show that there were coordinated mass executions, gang rapes used as weapons against women (especially Hindu women) and communal cleansing in towns and rural areas where Hindus lived. Independent scholarly reviews, government compilations of incident reports and survivor testimonies delineate massacres nationwide, enumerating particular incidents with substantial civilian casualties. Scholars and post-war accounts emphasise that although Bengalis were the primary targets, Hindus were subjected to extreme brutality due to their perceived political and cultural alignment with India and the Bengali freedom struggle. The ongoing vulnerability of Hindu communities in Bangladesh from 1972 to 2024 has been perpetuated by a combination of systemic impunity, inadequate legal accountability and politicised justice. Post 1971 period promised justice, but convictions for war crimes were few and far between, allowing many criminals and their networks to become part of local power structures again. Even when accountability mechanisms like the International Crimes Tribunal were used, the idea and practice of

Bangladesh Pakistan Terrorism

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Bangladesh’s self-goal: tilt to Pakistan

Jamat e Islami and Muhammed Yunus seek to shape Bangladesh into politically radical Islamic nation and threaten its Bengali Identity N. C. Bipindra During a 1955 debate in Pakistan’s Second Constituent Assembly on whether the eastern province should be called East Bengal or East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said, “We have demanded so many times that you should use East Bengal instead of East Pakistan. The word Bengal has a history and a tradition of its own.” Today, Bangladeshis share Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s sentiments: Bengali is their ethnicity and Bangladesh is their nation. In fact, Bangladesh’s formation in 1971 was built on Bengali nationalism spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Father of Bangladesh. In August 2024, during uprising that led to ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, radical Islamic groups with an affinity to Pakistan were unleashed under the garb of student protests who attempted to vandalise the legacy of true hero of Bangla identity Sheikh Mujibur. The same Sheikh Mujiibur who was hailed as greatest Bengali of all time ahead of Rabindranath Tagore by BBC Bengali Language Service Survey, about whom Cuban leader Fidel Castro once said, “I have not seen the Himalayas. But I have seen Sheikh Mujib.” Pakistan has historically rejoiced vandalism of Bengali identity (in fact, any identity other than their own). Urdu-speaking Pakistanis, who hate local languages including Punjabi or Sindhi, have neither sympathy nor commonality with Bengali culture, language, or societal beliefs. Since partition in 1947, the policies and outlook of Pakistan have been indifferent, irrational and mired in hatred for Bengali identity of Bangladesh. The entire world took note of utter neglect and callous treatment meted out to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in aftermath of cyclone Bhola in 1970 by the Pakistani central government. To date, the aid that was promised by Pakistan to East Pakistan has not been transferred. Rather than offering a nursing hand, a year later, Pakistan launched terror on the streets of Bangladesh under Operation Searchlight. The horror of ‘Operation Searchlight’ undertaken by Pakistani military on March 25, 1971, to crush Bengali nationalist movement after Awami League won a majority in the general elections is still fresh and painful for the conscience of Bengali people. The stark and ignoble truth about Pakistan’s genocide in Bangladesh is that it was a conscious military policy steered at the government level to undermine Bengali society and in some cases attempt to change Bengali gene pool. For over 52 years, Pakistan has neither established nor attempted open, direct, people-to-people connections with those inside Bangladesh who support Bangla nationalism. Of the hundreds of cuts inflicted by Pakistan on Bangladesh, the most noticeable is an ongoing attempt at systemic erosion of Bangla identity and its replacement with the ideology of political Islam, which is the basis of governance in Pakistan. The underlying role of Jamat e Islami, a radical organisation which was banned in 2013 (and such other organisations), is hard to miss in the ouster of a democratically elected government in 2024. No wonder Jamat e Islami has found favour with Bangladesh’s current interim administration under Muhammed Yunus, who lifted the ban on the radical organisation. While other Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh do have connections with Pakistan, since 1971, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh has been Pakistan’s true friend and partner. These radical Islamic groups have left no stone unturned to shred the fabric of Bangla identity and colour the whole of Bangladesh in politically radicalised Islam. Therefore, people of Bangladesh need to view Pakistan’s recent warming to Bangladesh through a historic and nationalistic lens. The recent developments coincide with an unusual wave of military and diplomatic engagement between Bangladesh and Pakistan, marked by the visit of Pakistan’s Navy Chief to Dhaka and the first docking of a Pakistani naval vessel at Chattogram port since 1971. Bangladesh, at this stage, must remember and side with friends who were steadfast with them through their biggest economic transformation and offered a helping hand in times of crisis. The more Bangladesh leans towards becoming Pakistan-like in text and tenor, its economy will further tank. Radicalism and a healthy economy simply cannot coexist. Over the past year alone, Bangladesh’s GDP growth has fallen from a flying 6.1% to crawling 3.76%. A year ago, Bangladesh’s growth was comparable to India’s and China’s and was considered one of the enterprising economies in Asia. Bangladesh must understand that Pakistan, which is mired with deep corruption, radicalism, a struggling economy, and is often part of the FATF ‘grey list’ and is home to most of the recognised terrorist organisations in the world, and works as a puppet state to China, cannot assist Bangladesh in any meaningful way. On the contrary, Bangladesh must seek a rational division of the pre-1971 assets of the state of Pakistan, and the aid that was promised in the aftermath of Cyclone Bhola. The evidence conclusively indicates that the recent shift in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations would further push political instability in Bangladesh, foster political Islam, provoke conflicts along shared borders, and, most importantly, pose a threat to the Bangla identity, which is the basis of the foundation of Bangladesh. Additionally, fondness towards Pakistan would dent Bangladesh’s image at world forums. Friendship with a failing (failed) state like Pakistan cannot bring more than this. The world has faith in Bangladesh; that Bangladesh would learn its lessons from history, as exact events of 1971 may not repeat themselves, but they may rhyme. Georg Hegel, a German philosopher, once said, “What experience and history teach is that nations and governments have never learned anything from history or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it.” This now sounds true and apt for Bangladesh’s recent shift towards Pakistan. (Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS)

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Bondi Terror Massacre and States That Enable Jihad

Sydney’s Bondi Beach terror attack comes amid a disturbing surge of antisemitic violence and Islamist radicalism across the West Rahul PAWA | @imrahulpawa Sydney’s Bondi Beach was the scene of a chilling mass shooting during a public Hanukkah celebration. Witnesses say two masked gunmen opened fire on dozens of peaceful Jewish worshippers lighting the first candle of Chanukah on the beach. Authorities now report at least 15 people killed (including a 10-year-old girl) and dozens wounded. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned it and has advocated for tougher gun laws. UK Chief Rabbi noting the attackers deliberately targeted Jews merely for gathering “visibly and peacefully as Jews”. It is Australia’s deadliest terrorist assault in years, and it once again shows how safe spaces for Jewish life are being converted into active crime scenes. Investigators say the terrorists were a father-and-son team of Islamist extremists. Both were armed with long-barrelled rifles and dressed in black tactical gear. Police identified them as 50-year-old Sajid Akram and his 24-year-old son Naveed Akram, Pakistani-origin nationals. Sajid was shot dead by officers at the scene, and Naveed remains in custody in critical condition. Officials found two ISIS flags in their getaway vehicle and believe both men had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Remarkably, Australian intelligence had even interviewed Naveed six years ago about ties to a local IS cell. The father legally owned multiple firearms and reportedly stockpiled explosive materials, indicating this was a premeditated terror operation. Clearly, this was not a random rampage by troubled loners but a coordinated attack by Islamist jihadists emboldened by extremist networks. This massacre comes amid a disturbing surge of antisemitic violence and Islamist radicalism across the West. In the United States last year, FBI crime statistics show Jews, just 2% of Americans were the target in 69% of all religion-based hate crimes along with Hindus, crimes against whom have doubled in recent years. This unprecedented spike of 1,938 incidents of anti-Jewish hate became particularly evident on US campuses during protests following Israel’s military response to the October 7 Hamas attack. Jewish communities report unprecedented fear and harassment. Europe has seen similar trends, a recent EU survey found 80% of Jews across member states feel antisemitism has grown in recent years and many now conceal their identity in public. Analysts warn this trend is aided by on-line radicalisation and echo chambers: there are “no lone wolves”, only networks of extremists linking movements from North America to Europe. Indeed, authorities have foiled multiple Islamist-inspired plots just this year, from individual attackers to organized cells and intelligence agencies caution that democratic societies remain prime targets. To counter these threats, public venues have adopted stringent new security. Across Germany and other countries, Christmas markets (symbolic of Western holiday culture) now open behind concrete barriers, metal detectors and armed guards. For example, Berlin’s famed Gendarmenmarkt Christmas village has raised concrete barricades and expanded CCTV and police patrols. Security budgets are soaring, in fact, German city authorities report a 44% increase in spending on public-event security over the past three years. These measures recall last winter’s deadly car-ramming in Magdeburg killing six and injuring hundreds. This year’s images of heavily-armed officers at a Munich market highlight how normal life is now treated as a potential target. Even routine outings are screened: just weeks ago police arrested five suspected Islamist extremists plotting a vehicle-ramming at a Bavarian market. New bans on large knives in crowds, random security checks and surging police presence at synagogues and malls have become the norm. Paris, once synonymous with joie de vivre (cheerful enjoyment of life), has officially cancelled its New Year’s Eve midnight concert, citing concerns over “unpredictable crowd movements”, in a break with a tradition that has run for more than six decades. The attack has also deepened global tensions over Islamist terrorism, especially in South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was swift to condemn the Bondi massacre on “first day of the Jewish festival of Hanukkah” and offered India’s “deepest condolences and full support” to Australia. His post declared that “India stands in solidarity” with the victims and reiterated that India has “zero tolerance towards terrorism”. Those words resonated most in India, a country long been a victim of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism practiced by Pakistan against it as a part of its state policy. Earlier this year, India had itself been struck by terror on April 22, when Pakistani backed terrorists massacred 24 Hindu tourists in Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi immediately tracked Pakistan Army-backed jihadists for the Pahalgam terror attack and retaliated with force launching “Operation Sindoor.” During the initial three-day period of operation, India obliterated nine globally acknowledged terrorist camps and infrastructure inside Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir hitting training and indoctrination sites of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (globally proscribed Pakistan-based terror groups) to “dismantle” infrastructure for further attacks. Later the country foiled an extraordinary scale Bio-terror plot and accidental blast in Delhi following the country’s crackdown on terrorism. From Sydney’s Bondi Beach Hanukkah massacre to Britain’s 7/7 bombings and the 2006 transatlantic “liquid bomb” plot, to the Denmark recce by David Headley and to India’s own horrors in Mumbai in 2008, Pahalgam in 2025 and Delhi 2025 counter-terror case files keep converging on the same connective tissue of facilitation, training and operational enabling that investigators have repeatedly traced to Pakistan based and Pakistani Army backed jihadist networks, even when the attackers themselves hold Western passports, much as the 9/11 Commission identified Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the principal architect of 9/11 and he was later captured in Pakistan. The Bondi Beach shooting tragically reaffirmed this harsh reality. In today’s world, no place is immune from Islamist violence, not sunny Sydney, not a festive holiday market in Europe and not the high Himalayas in India. Defending free societies therefore requires more than platitudes. It demands relentless pressure on the entire pipeline of radicalisation, from online indoctrination to real world facilitation, financing, travel and logistics. That pipeline is rarely

International Pakistan Terrorism Uncategorized

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2001 INDIAN PARLIAMENT ATTACK

Pummy Mattoo Pandita 13 December 2001 is remembered as a turning point in Bharat’s democratic history, when democracy was not merely challenged but violently attacked by Jaish-e-Mohammed, targeting not just lives, but the very sovereignty, constitutional stability and civic trust on which the nation stands.

China Economy Hindus International Misinformation Policy World

166

Reject Hindu Label to Slow Growth

Hinduphobia, colonial enslavement led certain intellectuals, socialists to frame Hinduness for tardy progress. Real culprits are socialists and their handlers! K.A.Badarinath It’s a colonial era slur. None has the right to deride about two billion Hindus living in 100 countries on some pretext or the other. Debunking Hindutva as being somehow responsible for Bharat’s tardy progress or sub-optimal GDP growth of 3.5 per cent in 1950s and 1980s era reeks of hatred. At last week’s Hindustan Times annual leadership summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi rightly pointed to colonial mind-set for framing Hindu faith with tardy economic growth. Big question is why does one attribute slow economic progress and development to Hindutva? Why do some scholars make derogatory remarks and prejudiced framework to point fingers at Hindu people? Why do self-proclaimed intellectuals and economists ignore Bharat’s seven to eight per cent growth in last two decades was precisely due to these very Hindus? Colonial overhang and socialist underpinning of some intellectuals may have led to bracket low growth with Hindutva. As per The Oxford Companion to Economics in India, economist Raj Krishna made an attempt in 1982 to link the then 3.5 per cent economic growth to an inherent cultural phenomenon. Raj Krishna, a faculty member with Delhi School of Economics, blamed Hindus for not thinking big, staying reticent sans ambition etc. Well, Raj Krishna or his disciples’ arguments are not tenable. He may have grossly erred on intent and by design. Economic progress and development models hitherto adopted during Smt Indira Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru were largely socialist in orientation and governance. Till, economic reforms were unveiled in 1991, state controls were overbearing and stifled growth. In pre-liberation era, strangulating free enterprise, spirit of Bharat’s businesses and individuals was the norm. Even the governance model was socialist in nature with most power concentrated in Prime Minister like the communist oligarchy. Most annoying was accusing Hindus of strangulating socio-economic development in Bharat and slowing down fight against poverty. It’s rather well documented that economist Raghuram Rajan had revived the debate on linking Hindutva to slow growth rates in 2023. In last quarter ending September 2025, Bharat’s economy reported an expansion of 8.2 per cent with about 65 crore people going to work. Similarly, Bharat was the top major economy to report growth of 7.3 per cent globally, highest amongst G-20 nations with China and Indonesia at second and third position with 5.3 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively in 2024-25. Countries like Italy and Canada reported contractions in their economies during some quarters. Germany reportedly was at bottom of the pyramid with a feeble 0.2 per cent growth. Stellar economic performance by Bharat was not given a cultural, civilizational or Dharmic label? If it’s not Hinduphobic mind-set, why did self-proclaimed intellectuals bring in Hindu angle to lack of or slow economic progress? Consequence of this Hinduphobic mind-set was that ‘Hindu rate of growth’ gained credence internationally amongst academics and audience thereby driving wrong notion and reinforcing that Bharat and Hindus was incapable of development. Attaching a civilizational label or wrongly portraying Hindus as lethargic or not being innovative may be rejected lock stock barrel. In fact, socialist policies adopted in first four decades put Bharat’s economy on a slumber. Unleashing the potential in a free, flexible and predictable policy paradigm would allow Bharat to realize its potential and emerge the ace. Getting out of colonial mind-set and rejecting out-dated socialist doctrines is pre-requisite to further hastening growth the Bharatiya way. (author is Director & Chief Executive at New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Bharat Defence Human Rights Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

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Analysis: From Siege to Staccato Strikes: 26/11 Mumbai Attack to 10/11 Red Fort Blast

From foreign-directed, 26/11-style mega-operations to low-signature, micro-cell, digitally inspired strikes like 10/11 and the foiled ricin plot, India’s terror landscape has changed. Through community monitoring, hardened cities, quick forensics and sharper intelligence India has reduced incidences significantly. In order to combat terror ecosystems at their root, world must now embrace India’s zero-tolerance policy and modernise international counter-terrorism frameworks.

Bharat Human Rights Judiciary Policy

191

Negotiating Identity and Equality: The Intellectual Framework of the UCC Debate in the Assembly

Arun Anand Bharat commemorates ‘Constitution Day’ on 26 November every year as her Constituent Assembly had adopted the Constitution of the Country on 26 November 1949. It came into force on 26 January 1950. One of the key debates that happened in the Constituent assembly was on Uniform Civil Code. The issue was discussed at length in the Constituent Assembly on 23 November 1948. The discussion was initiated by Muslim members as they moved several amendments to the proposed constitutional provision (Article 35 at that time) which comprised legal directions for having a uniform civil code in the country. Mohammad Ismail, Naziruddin Ahmad, Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur, Hussain Imam were some of the members who moved these amendments. Naziruddin Ahmad moved the amendment saying, “That to article 35, the following proviso be added, namely: – ‘Provided that the personal law of any community which has been guaranteed by the statue shall not be changed except with the previous approval of the community ascertained in such manner as the Union Legislature may determine by law’.” Ahmad said, “In moving this, I do not wish to confine my remarks to the inconvenience felt by the Muslim community alone. I would put it on much broader ground. In fact, each community, each religious community has certain religious laws, and certain civil laws inseparably connected with religious beliefs and practices. I believe that in framing a uniform draft code these religious laws or semi-religious laws should be kept out of its way.” Moving another amendment, Mohamad Ismail Sahib, a Muslim member from Madras said: “Sir, I move that the following proviso be added to article 35: “Provided that any group, section or community of people shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it has such a law.” The right of a group or a community of people to follow and adhere to its own personal law is among the fundamental rights and this provision should really be made amongst statutory and justiciable fundamental rights. It is for this reason that I along with other friends have given amendments to certain other articles going previous to this which I will move at the proper time. Now the right to follow personal law is part of the way of life of those people who are following such laws; it is part of their religion and part of their culture. If anything is done affecting the personal laws, it will be tantamount to interference with the way of life of those people who have been observing these laws for generations and ages. This secular State which we are trying to create should not do anything to interfere with the way of life and religion of the people.” The counter argument to all these arguments was presented by Dr BR Ambedkar, KM Munshi and Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar. Ambedkar strongly advocated for a Uniform Civil Code for the country as he said, “I think most of my friends who have spoken on this amendment have quite forgotten that up to 1935 the North-West Frontier Province was not subject to the Shariat Law. It followed the Hindu Law in the matter of succession and in other matters, so much so that it was in 1939 that the Central Legislature had to come into the field and to abrogate the application of the Hindu Law to the Muslims of the Northwest Frontier Province and to apply the Shariat Law to them.” He further added, “I quite realise their feelings in the matter, but I think they have read rather too much into article 35, which merely proposes that the State shall endeavour to secure a civil code for the citizens of the country.” Munshi made a very interesting point in the case when he said, “… Look at the disadvantages that you will perpetuate if there is no Civil Code. Take for instance the Hindus. We have the law of Mayukha applying in some parts of India; we have Mithakshara in others; and we have the law-Dayabagha in Bengal. In this way even the Hindus themselves have separate laws and most of our Provinces and States have started making separate Hindu law for themselves. Are we going to permit this piecemeal legislation on the ground that it affects the personal law of the country? It is therefore not merely a question for minorities, but it also affects the majority.” Taking an example from one of the Islamic rulers himself, he further added, “This attitude of mind perpetuated under the British rule, that personal law is part of religion, has been fostered by the British and by British courts. We must, therefore, outgrow it. If I may just remind the honourable Member who spoke last of a particular incident from Fereshta which comes to my mind, Allauddin Khilji made several changes which offended against the Shariat, though he was the first ruler to establish Muslim Sultanate here. The Kazi of Delhi objected to some of his reforms, and his reply was–“I am an ignorant man and I am ruling this country in its best interests. I am sure, looking at my ignorance and my good intentions, the Almighty will forgive me, when he finds that I have not acted according to the Shariat.” If Allauddin could not, much less can a modern government accept the proposition that religious rights cover personal law or several other matters which we have been unfortunately trained to consider as part of our religion.” Speaking in favour of a Uniform Civil Code and opposing the amendments proposed by the Muslim members, “The second objection was that religion was in danger, that communities cannot live in amity if there is to be a uniform civil code. The article actually aims at amity. It does not destroy amity. The idea is that differential systems of inheritance and other matters are some of the factors which contribute to the differences among the different peoples of India. What it aims at is to try to arrive at

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