Afghanistan Bharat China Geopolitics International Leadership Pakistan Policy

Pragmatic, Strategic Pivot

Muttaqi’s visit marks a milestone; opens up opportunity for Bharat to regain its presence in Afghanistan, keep a vigil on China, Pak & US. Brig Brijesh Pandey Bharat’s engagement with Afghanistan has historically been shaped less by cultural outreach and more by hard security imperatives. The strategists in New Delhi have long understood that Afghanistan occupied the only viable land corridor for India to access Central Asia and the vast Eurasian heartland – an assessment that predates independence. From King Zahir Shah’s regime to its support for Northern Alliance, Bharat consistently aligned with political and military factions in Kabul that counter-balanced Pakistani influence. After 2001, Bharat emerged as one of the most critical development partners, constructing Zerang – Delaram highway, Parliament complex and Salma dam while training Afghan national army officers. These initiatives were not driven purely by humanitarian considerations; they also reflected a calibrated strategy to ensure that a friendly government in Kabul could undercut Pakistan’s pursuit of exclusive strategic depth to its West. Re-Engaging Taliban Regime Taliban’s return to power in 2021 created a significant operational void due to Bharat’s absence from Afghan soil. With diplomatic staff evacuated and intelligence linkages abruptly severed, India’s continental outreach was overly reliant on external nodes such as Chabahar Port. It is with this strategic calculus that recent visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India must be assessed. Away from media portrayal, the visit carries far deeper operational and strategic implications. Bharat’s foreign office made it explicit that formal recognition of Taliban Regime was not on the table, but structured engagement, certainly is. External Affairs minister, S. Jaishankar stated, “India will engage with authorities in Kabul based on our national interests and regional security priorities,” underscoring that New Delhi’s approach is based on pragmatic realpolitik rather than ideological endorsement. Up-gradation of technical mission in Kabul to a fully functional Embassy should be read as a move to re-activate intelligence networks and re-establish Bharat’s influence inside Afghanistan’s evolving power structure. For Taliban leadership, visit of its Foreign Minister to New Delhi served a different purpose. Before departing from Kabul, Muttaqi stated “Afghanistan seeks constructive relations with all regional countries including India” and during his interaction in Delhi, he expressed a desire to “open doors for economic cooperation, particularly through Chabahar.” These formulations signal a deliberate attempt by Kabul to reduce its excessive dependence on Pakistan and China by establishing a channel of engagement with India. By doing so, Taliban wants to diversify external partnerships and in turn enhance their strategic bargaining leverage in the region. Military Implications of Muttaqi’s Visit The visit was preceded by a series of regional developments that cumulatively restricted India’s maneuverability – US strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Washington’s renewed embrace of Pakistan, Saudi- Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement, US decision to withdraw sanctions waiver on Chabahar, escalating tariff related issues between US, China and US – India. Each of these chipped away at India’s continental outreach and signaled covering of ground by Pakistan in US calculations. In this backdrop, reactivation of India’s Kabul Embassy must be taken as more than a symbolic gesture. It represents a well thought out step towards regaining ground presence – restoring Human Intelligence (HUMINT) channels, conducting security risk audits for Indian- funded projects and improving real time surveillance over terrorist movements along Nangarhar – Kandahar axis. Traditional Indian threat assessment models for Kashmir and key Indian cities have had footprints in Afghanistan based launch pads and training camps. Moreover, India’s development projects create local employment, subtly shaping internal security dynamics of Afghanistan in Bharat’s favour. Pakistan’s Attempt to Disrupt the Visit Even as Amir Khan Muttaqi was in New Delhi, Pakistan attempted to register its discomfort by escalating military pressure along the Durand Line. Cross border firing was initiated by Pakistani forces in sectors such as Kurram, Angoor Adda and Spin Boldak, possibly expecting that Taliban would either remain passive or align with Islamabad’s position. Taliban response defied those expectations. Taliban border units responded with direct fire and aggressive action overrunning number of Pakistani border outposts in select sectors. Though limited in scale, the tactical outcome held strategic significance. Exchange may not have been high on scale but during his press interaction in New Delhi, Muttaqi stated “Afghanistan desires peaceful and sovereign relations with all neighbours. No country should interfere in Afghan affairs or expect Afghanistan to serve other country’s strategic agenda.” Without naming, the message was clearly directed at Pakistan’s long-standing expectation that Afghanistan would remain within its security orbit. Security Tremors in Pakistan The events have accentuated Pakistan’s existing fault lines in internal and external security grid: US Factor When questioned about India’s re-engagement with Kabul, a US State Department spokesperson said, “we expect regional actors to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a platform for instability. ” a carefully worded statement that neither endorses India’s outreach nor objects to it. Having suffered strategic withdrawal from Bagram Air Base and lacking boots on ground, tacitly sees value in limited Indian re-entry as a counter-weight to China-Pakistan axis. Yet it remains cautious about India-Iran logistical coordination through Chabahar, especially if it entails dual use military corridor. India Aims Re-entry Not Recognition In military terms, India is not seeking dominance or regime endorsement in Afghanistan but sustainable operational access. Intelligence depth and denial of Pakistani leverage is what remains critical for India, particularly after US-Pakistan embrace. The re-opening of Kabul Embassy is first step towards ensuring long term security interests. With Bagram under Taliban control and Chinese evaluation of the air base for dual use, this theatre is undergoing a shift that demands Indian presence, though a calibrated one for now. India’s Security Concerns Taliban still shelters ideological and operational elements that align with anti-India terror infrastructure. Pakistan, on the other hand retains the option of re-directing proxy assets towards Kashmir as asymmetric retaliation for India’s outreach to Kabul. If Chabahar – Zahedan corridor becomes fully operational without disruption, it could bypass Pakistan entirely, fundamentally altering

Geopolitics Human Rights Pakistan Security Terrorism

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Enforced Disappearances, Human Rights and BLA’s Independence Call

By N. C. Bipindra Balochistan has yet again entered a dangerous phase of political and humanitarian uncertainty. Recent declaration by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) to form an independent army and seek international recognition as a sovereign nation has brought decades-long freedom struggle against Pakistan’s reported occupation into sharp focus. While BLA’s statement marks a new and more assertive phase in the struggle to take governance into their own hands, it also threatens to worsen an already grim human rights landscape. For years, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and suppression of dissent have scarred the province. Now, with renewed calls for being recognized as a separate nation, Balochistan risks sliding deeper into vortex of violence and repression that shows little sign of abating. Pakistan’s army and security establishment has come down heavily on Baloch people seeking their basic rights to live peacefully and honourably. Islamabad’s new found friend in US President Donald Trump may be oblivious to this grim situation and only interested in excavating the high value rare earth metals and specialized molecules with high precision application across industries in America. A Province in Perpetual Conflict Balochistan, rich in natural resources but poor in development and representation has long been a theatre of conflict between Pakistani state and various Baloch nationalist groups. The grievances are old and deep, rooted in reported political marginalization, economic exploitation and cultural erasure. BLA’s recent announcement seeking international recognition and establishment of diplomatic missions represents a bold political escalation. It reframes the struggle from one of autonomy within Pakistan to outright independence. Predictably, such a declaration is being treated in Islamabad not as political dissent but as a direct challenge to national sovereignty, setting the stage for intensified military operations. Beneath the political grandstanding lies a darker humanitarian crisis that predates this declaration: persistent phenomenon of unexplained disappearances and human rights abuses that have come to define life in Balochistan. Missing People of Balochistan For families in Balochistan, the phrase “missing persons” has become an everyday horror. Thousands of Baloch men — students, teachers, activists, and ordinary civilians — have disappeared over the years, allegedly picked up by security forces or intelligence agencies. Many are never seen again; others turn up dead, often bearing signs of torture. According to the Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB), 123 enforced disappearances and 26 killings were recorded in just August 2025. Earlier in March that year, the group documented 151 disappearances and 80 killings. Such numbers are staggering for a single province, and they are likely underestimates, given the difficulty of reporting in militarised areas. The Pakistan Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) has received over 10,000 cases nationwide, with a disproportionate number from Balochistan. Yet, rights groups say that official mechanisms lack independence and transparency. Investigations rarely lead to prosecutions, and security agencies operate with near-total impunity. The HRCB and other local NGOs have documented a recurring pattern: night-time raids, arrests without warrants, and bodies discovered days or weeks later in desolate areas. Families often face intimidation when they speak out or join protests demanding the return of their loved ones. Many have spent years camped outside press clubs or government offices, holding faded photographs and placards that ask a simple question: “Where is my son?” Fear and Silence: A Society Under Siege The psychological toll on the province is immense. Entire communities live under a shadow of fear. In cities like Turbat, Kech, Awaran, and Gwadar, once bustling trade hubs, silence has replaced debate. Even student activism is seen as a potential act of rebellion. Students have been frequent victims of disappearances, especially those affiliated with Baloch student organisations. Human rights defender Dr. Mahrang Baloch, who spearheaded a peaceful movement for missing persons, was herself detained in 2024, a move widely condemned internationally as an attempt to crush dissent. Journalists, too, face censorship and threats. Many have been warned against reporting on disappearances or military operations. The result is a near-total blackout on independent information from much of Balochistan, leaving only official narratives and sporadic social media updates from activists who risk their lives to post them. Extrajudicial Killings and the “Kill-and-Dump” Policy One of the most disturbing aspects of the crisis is what local activists describe as the “kill-and-dump” policy. Individuals who disappear are later found dead, their bodies dumped on roadsides or in remote deserts. These victims are often presented by authorities as “terrorists” killed in encounters, but human rights groups say many of these encounters are staged. The state’s security establishment insists its operations target armed insurgents, not civilians. Yet the blurred line between militant and civilian in such operations has made accountability nearly impossible. In some cases, the victims had no political affiliation at all. Families are left with bodies to bury and no answers about why their loved ones were taken or killed. Legal and Institutional Failures Pakistan is a signatory to major international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention Against Enforced Disappearances. Yet, in practice, these obligations remain largely unfulfilled. The COIED, established to investigate missing persons cases, has been criticised as toothless. It lacks the authority to compel powerful agencies like the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the Frontier Corps (FC) to produce detainees or disclose information. Its reports are rarely made public, and few cases have led to convictions. In the absence of credible accountability, enforced disappearances have become normalised as a tool of control. Human rights lawyers describe it as a deliberate policy, a way to silence opposition without legal consequence. BLA’s Declaration and Its Fallout The BLA’s move to declare a separate “army” and seek global recognition adds a dangerous new layer to this human rights tragedy. The Pakistani state, already hypersensitive to any challenge in Balochistan, is likely to respond with harsher counter-insurgency measures, which could lead to more disappearances, arrests, and extrajudicial killings under the banner of fighting terrorism. Civilians will, as always, bear the brunt. In areas where the BLA has

Hindus Human Rights International Misinformation Security United States USA

CIHS: Letter to New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy Raises Concern Over Biased Event on “Hindutva in America” at Rutgers University

The Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS), a New Delhi–based independent think tank, has written to New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy expressing concern over Rutgers University’s upcoming event titled “Hindutva in America: A Threat to Equality and Religious Pluralism.” .

NPR’s Covert Operation to Market Fear on Hindus & RSS

Bharat Disinformation Hindus Media Misinformation News Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

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NPR’s Covert Operation to Market Fear on Hindus & RSS

Dr Aniket Pingley / Nagpur Were someone to write a handbook on “Pandering to Prejudice while Pretending to Report,” they need look no further than Diaa Hadid’s National Public Radio (NPR) write-up and radio broadcast RSS. Hadid hides lack of diligence behind familiar imagery and attempts to flatter an audience expectation instead of testing them. Hollywood often turns social problems into entertainment. Crime, addiction and family breakdown appear again and again in films. These stories do not describe society as it is; they present a pattern that audiences already know. By recycling them, filmmakers sell a sense of realism itself. Sociologists have called this commodification of stereotypes where social anxieties are turned into products that people can consume. Hadid’s radio report for NPR titled “A Hindu nationalist movement celebrates 100 years. Now what?” follows the very pattern? The report attempts to present Bharat through a ready-made frame of danger and division. The listeners / readers are not invited to learn something new; they are prodded to recognize something familiar, a martial or fascist Hindu organisation, fearful Muslims and a society leaning toward intolerance. This works well for Western audience who have been mentally “incepted” for years by shoddy journalism to consume such stories as both alarm and entertainment. It becomes a reaffirmation that their liberal conscience remains intact. I have lived in the USA for more than a decade. I have listened to NPR on radio for years during my daily commute. Over time, I came to notice a pattern in its coverage of India. Their tone is rarely one of inquiry or balance; it is one of quiet moral certainty. Their general method is not to argue openly but to evoke unease through association, mood and selective recall. It is in this sense that Diaa Hadid’s report on the centenary of RSS fits perfectly within NPR’s broader narrative framework. I will expose anatomy of NPR’s covert style of building narrative. To this end, I will first explain the covert devices used by Hadid. Covert Devices Hadid’s piece works through three main covert devices: visual cues, selective use of authority and affective storytelling. a. Visual cues The report opens with the image of “more than 1,000 men in khaki pants, white shirts, black hats marched in step, bamboo canes at the ready.” This picture establishes the mood before any facts are given. The imagery evokes paramilitary spectacle; audience’s imagination supplies menace before any argument begins. It does not explain what the event represents; it signals threat. Once this image is fixed, every later detail reinforces it. b. Selective authority Hadid then attempts to construct credibility through Sangh baiters like Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay and Saba Naqvi. Their observations are not contextualised; the audience is not told that these voices represent one interpretive tradition among many. Their audio bytes are cherry-picked to deliver a uniform message: Hindu nationalism feeds resentment, controls institutions and endangers pluralism. This is nothing more than an echo-chamber. c. Affective storytelling A later section features an unnamed Muslim activist who “fears retribution.” No evidence or data is offered to support how widespread this fear is. The emotion itself is projected as the proof. The audience does not have to ask for data or context; feeling replaces verification. In short, where evidence should appear, emotion takes its place. Symbols and Stigma Reference to the film, The Kerala Story, is most telling rhetorical move. The film bears no institutional connection to RSS and belongs to the domain of popular cinema. Its presence in the report functions as symbolic contagion, i.e., by mentioning the movie immediately after discussing RSS “influence on Bollywood,” Hadid fuses disparate cultural artefacts into a single moral field. The RSS thus becomes responsible not only for political developments but also for cinematic representations of Muslims. For a Western audience already primed to associate “Hindu nationalism” with intolerance, such conflation produces instant engagement. To amplify stigma about RSS, Hadid retrieves the prevalent elements of Western archive on the RSS – (1) Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination and (2) Ram Janmabhoomi movement. There is no acknowledgment that RSS was exonerated after Gandhi’s death or that it operates legally within India’s constitutional framework, or that Ram temple was built via Supreme Court judgment after a long, patient waiting by the entire nation. Hadid repeats familiar falsehood that “Godse was once a follower of the RSS. Godse’s family insists he never left,” ignoring Godse’s own courtroom statement that he had left the RSS to join the Hindu Mahasabha. But then, fact-checking has never been a priority for those committed to manufacturing history and Hadid is neither the first nor the last to do so. Here, each reference functions to deliberately misguide or act as a cue that re-connects today’s audience to an existing moral verdict. The long and the short of it The anatomy of NPR’s false narrative building has the following parts: Exposing the institutional motive of NPR Hadid’s report exemplifies an institutional pattern within Western public media: to convert complex national phenomena into moral parables for liberal consumption. RSS becomes a semiotic device, a shorthand for all that is wrong with contemporary India. In this symbolic economy, factual depth is secondary to recognizability. Diaa Hadid’s NPR piece about RSS centenary does not break new ground. It follows Hollywood model of selling familiar anxieties. This is not an individual failure of journalism but a sign of how certain institutions continue to operate. They produce stories that confirm a shared moral outlook rather than test it. The result is not better understanding of Bharat or RSS, but another example of how complex realities can be reduced to simple and marketable fears. P.S. As for “Now what?” from the title — perhaps, now, some real journalism 😊 (Author is an accomplished computer scientist, educator, and holds expertise in media content strategy)

Beyond “Iron Brothers” - The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

China Cyber Security Defence Geopolitics Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

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Beyond “Iron Brothers”: The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

N. C. Bipindra Pakistan’s engagement with both Washington and Beijing raises concerns about its relationship with China. Despite claims of trust and shared interests, Pakistan’s foreign policy history reveals a consistent pattern of duplicity. This poses risks for China, affecting its security and technological dominance. Let us analyse Pakistan’s dual alignments, urging caution from Beijing regarding military technology transfers to Islamabad. Pakistan’s foreign policy traits, transactionalism, opportunism, and dependence on external allies, suggest a potential shift in technology flow from the U.S. to China in a new geopolitical landscape. Historical Patterns of Technology Transfers Pakistan has long capitalised on its geostrategic location to obtain military and economic concessions from major powers. During the Cold War, it accommodated CIA operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan and received sophisticated U.S. armaments; however, not all of it remained in Pakistani possession. Two instances are particularly noteworthy. In the 1990s, U.S. intelligence asserted that Pakistan transferred American-supplied Stinger missiles to China, a claim that Islamabad refuted. After the 2011 Abbottabad raid, The New York Times disclosed that Chinese engineers were permitted to examine the remnants of a downed U.S. stealth-modified Black Hawk helicopter. Although definitive evidence was lacking, U.S. officials referenced intercepted communications to substantiate the allegation. These occurrences, notwithstanding Pakistani refutations, solidified perceptions of duplicity. For Beijing, the implication is unequivocal: if Pakistan was unable to protect U.S. technologies, it cannot be entirely relied upon to safeguard Chinese ones. Pakistan’s Contemporary Balancing Act Today, Pakistan faces a transformed strategic environment. Following Operation Bunyaan-un-Marsoos and subsequent outreach efforts, Islamabad has sought to re-engage Washington, particularly to secure tariff concessions and financial relief amid severe economic strain. Simultaneously, it remains dependent on Beijing for military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons and sensors to drones. The private lunch hosted for Asim Munir at the White House on June 18, 2025, is not merely a ceremonial bonhomie. It is a fact that such courtesies are rarely extended without an eye on strategic dividends. It appears that, in an era where China has surged ahead of the U.S. in technologies like AI, 5G, and advanced manufacturing, Washington views Pakistan not merely as an old battlefield ally but as a potential conduit for intelligence, leverage, and Chinese tech transfer. Perhaps, for Washington, cultivating ties with Pakistan’s generals is about far more than courtesy. It offers a discreet channel for access, legitimacy, and potentially even Chinese technology. However, this balancing act carries profound risks for China. Sensitive Chinese systems, long assumed to be secure within the framework of an “all-weather” partnership, may become vulnerable to American scrutiny as Pakistan attempts to cultivate favor in Washington. What was once an unshakable partnership is beginning to look increasingly fragile, as Pakistan’s loyalties are often dictated not by long-term commitments but by immediate strategic and financial incentives. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel has long observed, “Pakistani generals can be bought any time,” a reminder of how transactional and compromised the country’s military elite remain. Compounding this vulnerability is the conduct of Pakistan’s civil–military elite. Many former army chiefs, including Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa, have relocated abroad or maintained significant overseas assets after retirement. Such behavior underscores an entrenched pattern of ethical and moral corruption: leaders prioritise personal enrichment and external safe havens over national development, leaving the public to suffer under chronic instability and economic decline. Case of the J-35 Stealth Fighter Pakistan’s reported withdrawal from a planned deal for 40 J-35 stealth fighters highlights these dynamics. Once poised to be the jet’s first foreign buyer, Islamabad later dismissed the reports, despite earlier claims of pilot training in China. Battlefield lessons from Operation Sindoor — where Chinese systems underperformed against India’s BrahMos and S-400 — fueled doubts about the untested J-35. Economic pressures, including IMF austerity and a stretched defence budget, further undermined the $5 billion deal. For Beijing, Pakistan’s reversal exposed the fragility of trust: a flagship transfer was abandoned in favor of renewed U.S. outreach, underscoring China’s vulnerability to Islamabad’s hedging. Hypersonic Missiles: China Draws a Line Another case highlighting Beijing’s caution is its reported rejection of Pakistan’s request for hypersonic missiles and related technology. Media reports suggest China refused both sales and tech transfers, fearing Islamabad’s growing outreach to the U.S. could expose sensitive systems. Unlike fighter jets or conventional missiles, hypersonic platforms like the DF-17 are central to China’s strategic deterrence and lack downgraded export versions, reflecting their sensitivity and immaturity. The denial underscores a key reality: even in an “all-weather” partnership, Beijing does not fully trust Pakistan with its most advanced technologies. Strategic Implications for China The implications of this dynamic for China are far-reaching. First, Pakistan represents both an asset and a liability for Beijing. It provides strategic depth in South Asia, a reliable arms market, and political support in international forums. Yet these benefits come at the cost of significant vulnerability: advanced Chinese systems risk exposure through Pakistani networks, intentionally or inadvertently, to Western intelligence. Second, the problem is structural rather than episodic. Pakistan’s foreign policy has long been characterised by transactionalism, with loyalty subordinated to immediate material gains. As Islamabad draws closer to Washington, Beijing must anticipate that Pakistan’s defence partnership could once again become a conduit for technological leakage, this time at China’s expense. Third, the nature of emerging technologies magnifies the risk. Whereas conventional hardware could be downgraded for export, dual-use and software-driven systems cannot be so easily restricted. For Beijing, the possibility of losing control over AI, cyber, or hypersonic technologies through Pakistan would represent a strategic disaster, undermining years of investment and eroding its position vis-à-vis the United States. In this sense, Pakistan’s growing closeness with Washington is about far more than counterterrorism cooperation or financial bailouts. It is “more than what meets the eye”: for the West, Pakistan provides a potential backdoor to scrutinize and even reverse-engineer Chinese technologies in domains like AI, quantum, and stealth areas where Beijing has made significant advances over the United States. Washington now views Beijing not merely as a rising

Hindus Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

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RSS at a Glance

Introducing “RSS at a Glance” a crisp infographic-ready snapshot of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s scale and momentum. It captures headline metrics you can cite at a glance: volunteers (swayamsevaks), daily shakhas, annual seva projects, educational initiatives and schools, disaster-relief deployments. A numerical backbone behind a century of volunteerism and nation-building.

Hindus Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

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An introduction to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

As the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) enters its centennial year, we present “An introduction to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)” a primer on RSS’s origins, ethos, and impact. From daily shakhas and disciplined selfless volunteerism to nationwide seva initiatives in education, social harmony, environment, and disaster relief, this primer shows how character-building and community leadership translate into nation-building. Explore the milestones, the organisational cadence, and the living culture that has impacted social life across Bharat for a hundred years and continues to do so with purpose.

Hindus Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

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Sangh@100 with People’s Support

Dattatreya Hosabale The work of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has now completed one hundred years. In this long journey, countless people have been companions, contributors, and well-wishers. This journey was full of hard work and challenges, but the unwavering support of ordinary citizens turned it into a fulfilling one. As we pause in the centenary year and look back, memories of many such moments and people come alive—those who devoted their everything to ensure the success of this mission. In the early years, young karyakartas set forth across the country like dedicated warriors, driven entirely by their love for the nation. Family man like Appaji Joshi or full-time pracharaks such as Dadarav Parmarth, Balasaheb and Bhaurao Deoras brothers, Yadavrao Joshi, Eknath Ranade—all of them, under the guidance of Dr. Hedgewar, took Sangh work as a sacred vow of lifelong service to the nation. The progress of the Sangh has always rested on society’s constant support. Because its work remained in tune with the spirit of the people, acceptance grew steadily over time. Once, Swami Vivekananda was asked during his foreign travels: “Most of your countrymen are uneducated, they don’t even know English, so how will they understand these profound things you talk about?” Swamiji had replied, “Just as ants do not need to learn English to find sugar, my people do not need foreign tongues to recognise a noble and spiritual cause. Their inner wisdom will guide them.” This statement turned out to be remarkably true. Similarly, despite the slow pace, society at large has continuously recognised and supported the Sangh’s sincere efforts. From the very beginning, Sangh Karyakartas received blessings, shelter, and encouragement from ordinary families. In fact, the households of swayamsevaks themselves became the foundational centres of the work. The contribution of mothers and sisters has been critical in giving completeness to this journey. Inspired figures like Dattopant Thengadi, Yashwantrao Kelkar, Balasaheb Deshpande, Eknath Ranade, Deendayal Upadhyaya, and Dadasaheb Apte drew strength from the Sangh and went on to build several organisations in different walks of social life. Today these organisations, with immense growth, have brought about constructive changes across many fields. Among women too, towering personalities like Mausiji Kelkar and Pramila Tai Medhe, through the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti, have offered a motherly strength that has been central to this mission. Over the decades, the Sangh has raised several issues of national importance, always with society standing in support. At times even those publicly opposed have lent their voices for the larger Hindu cause. The Sangh consistently sought consensus and cooperation on matters of Hindu unity, national security, social harmony, democracy, and preservation of culture. Thousands of Swayamsevaks endured unimaginable hardships, and many laid down their lives. Through all this, society’s hand of support was always there. In 1981, when a few Hindus in Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu, were converted under misleading circumstances, a massive Hindu awakening movement followed. A conference attended by nearly half a million people was presided over by Dr. Karan Singh, then a senior Congress leader. In 1964, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad was founded with the active participation of renowned spiritual leaders like Swami Chinmayananda, Master Tara Singh, Jain muni Sushil Kumar, Buddhist bhikshu Kushok Bakula, and Namdhari Sikh Guru Jagjit Singh. The initiative was inspired by Shri Guruji Golwalkar, with the purpose of reaffirming that untouchability had no place in Hindu scriptures. To uphold this principle a grand World Hindu Conference was conveyed in Udupi where revered spiritual leaders, saints and mahants came together extending their blessings and support. The spirit voiced earlier at the Prayagraj conference—that Na Hindu patito bhavet (No Hindu can ever fall from grace) was echoed at this conference as Hindavah Sodara Sarve (All Hindus are brothers, children of Bharat Mata.) From the campaign for cow protection, to the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, Sant-samaj (saintly fraternity) has always given blessings to the Sangh swayamsevaks. After Independence, when political reasons led to a ban on the Sangh’s activities, it was not only ordinary people but also highly respected figures who openly stood by it, giving courage in those difficult times. The same was experienced during the Emergency. That is why, despite so many obstacles, Sangh work has continued seamlessly and steadily. Through crises, it has often been the mothers and sisters who shouldered the responsibility of keeping Swayamsevaks and their work intact, becoming a constant source of inspiration. Looking ahead, in this centenary year, Sangh Swayamsevaks will make a special effort to reach every household—across big cities, remote villages, and among all sections of society—to invite wider cooperation and participation in the mission of national service. With the coordinated effort of all well-meaning forces of society, the next stage of our nation’s journey—towards holistic development—will certainly be smoother and more successful. (The writer is the Sarkaryavah of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh)Sangh@100 with People’s Support

Britain's Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

China Geopolitics International Policy Security United Kingdom

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Britain’s Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American WestAsia. Britain just made that job easier. Rahul Pawa On 21 September 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer broke with decades of U.K. policy formally recognising the state of Palestine. It was Britain’s most consequential West East move since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, made over explicit U.S. objections and Israeli fury. In London’s rush to show moral leadership, one reality was ignored: Beijing had spent six decades preparing for this moment. The CCP’s Palestinian project began in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1970, Beijing sent small arms, mortars and anti-tank weapons to the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It trained cadres at the Whampoa Military Academy in Nanning and dispatched instructors to Syria and Algeria. In May 1966 Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Ahmad al-Shuqairy thanked “Peking” for constant arms and training shipments. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli commanders displayed captured Chinese-made AK-47s, 81mm mortars and chemical decontamination gear seized in Gaza and Sinai. Alongside, Beijing also built a diplomatic bridge. In December 1995 it opened a foreign office in Gaza; a de facto embassy to the Palestinian Authority, decades before most Western states considered recognition. Its message to Palestinians was consistent: you can count on us when the West won’t. By Xi Jinping’s era the posture turned strategic. In 2017 the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a Red Sea hub housing thousands of Chinese troops. Beijing secured port stakes from Gwadar in Pakistan to Haifa in Israel, embedding itself along the arteries that supply Europe and the Gulf. A 25-year strategic agreement with Iran in 2021 locked in $400 billion in Chinese investments across oil, gas and transport corridors. CCP’s pattern is clear: first ports, then troops. Djibouti proved it, Hambantota confirmed it, Gaza may be next. Beijing has already demonstrated how commercial access becomes military power, and a recognised Palestine gives it the opening to repeat the same playbook on the Mediterranean. While Beijing built bricks abroad it built narratives at home. State-aligned Arabic media channels and TikTok streams pump out Gaza content at scale. A July 2025 Program on Extremism report mapped how the CCP’s influence runs through Western activism itself. That report details how Shanghai-based tech investor Neville Roy Singham, a onetime Huawei adviser, poured millions into U.S. and U.K. activist groups after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack. Groups like the People’s Forum, ANSWER Coalition and “Shut It Down for Palestine” became organising hubs for anti-Israel protests. BreakThrough News, their media arm, live-streamed marches while praising Xi Jinping Thought and Maoist revolution. Investigators concluded the effect was “to project the CCP as a defender of justice while undermining U.S. influence.” In December 2023 the People’s Forum hosted a “China75” event lauding Beijing’s governance model; by early 2024 its funding spiked from under $500,000 to $4.4 million as it expanded pro-Palestinian actions. The same network underwrote protests at Columbia University and in Whitehall, echoing CCP state rhetoric about “imperialist Zionism.” When Starmer spoke to recognise Palestine, Beijing didn’t improvise. Chinese State media instantly framed Britain’s recognition as vindication of the CCP’s “historic” support for Palestinian independence. Chinese diplomats in Ramallah pointed out they had welcomed Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing two years earlier and had pushed a ceasefire plan in 2023. They reminded Palestinian officials who had invested in them when no one else would. With London’s imprimatur, a Palestinian government now has every incentive to turn to CCP for reconstruction finance and infrastructure contracts. Beijing can bolt these onto its Belt and Road Initiative, locking in leverage over a new state at the heart of the Levant. U.S. influence, already eroded by drift and divided Congresses, will shrink further. China’s record speaks for itself. In Djibouti, commercial port access became a PLA base within three years. In Sri Lanka, Chinese loans turned into a 99-year lease at Hambantota. CCP has cultivated a pattern: ports, logistics, security co-operation and then military presence. If Palestine’s future leadership wants investment and security guarantees, CCP will deliver both. Even a small PLA signals unit or intelligence station would tilt the Eastern Mediterranean’s security balance. By presenting any facility as humanitarian or anti-piracy, Beijing can minimise Western backlash while gaining a front-row vantage on Israel, Egypt and NATO operations. Britain’s recognition may have been meant as a rebuke to Israel. However, in practice it is a strategic gift to Beijing. It signals to the Arab world that the West’s will is fractured and that China, not America, not Europe is the constant patron. It creates a diplomatic vacuum China is already moving to fill, from Gaza reconstruction bids to Palestinian security training. This is not hypothetical. Chinese firms dominated Iraq’s post-2003 oil fields; they built most of Africa’s new ports in the last decade. Palestine is a likely next. And unlike the United States or the U.K., the CCP fuses infrastructure with intelligence collection and military access as policy. Starmer’s Downing Street statement marks not the dawn of West Asia peace but a milestone in Beijing’s global ascent. The CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American West Asia. Britain just made that job easier. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Is Islamic Alliance in offing, With Ambiguities

Defence Geopolitics International Pakistan Policy Security Trade

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Is Islamic Alliance in Offing, With Ambiguities

Only a true test, a moment of crisis, will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. Rahul Pawa When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a sweeping mutual defense agreement in Riyadh this month, it marked a strategic pivot. The agreement, termed a “Strategic Mutual Defence” agreement declares that an attack on one is an attack on both, echoing NATO’s famous Article 5 commitment. It’s an unprecedented pledge between the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the only Muslim nation armed with nuclear weapons. Yet behind the celebratory rhetoric, the agreement’s true scope and weight remain uncertain. A NATO-Style on paper, the agreement’s collective defense vow is explicit: “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” Pakistan’s government said. In practice, much is left vague. Notably, the agreement is silent on whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Islamic world’s only nukes is now at Saudi Arabia’s disposal. Pressed about a potential Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Riyadh, a senior Saudi official would only say the agreement “encompasses all military means”. This careful ambiguity hints at a broad commitment while stopping short of any explicit nuclear guarantee. Another grey area is the agreement’s status. Riyadh and Islamabad pointedly call it an “agreement” and not a treaty. By definition, though, any written inter-state accord intended to bind is a treaty under international law, regardless of its label. The absence of a published text and the flexible wording suggest the parties prefer some wiggle room. Saudi Arabia has pursued grand defense coalitions before like a 2015 pan-Islamic military alliance against terrorism that proved “more symbolic than operational”. This time, the language of collective defense is tied to plans for concrete cooperation (joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, arms training). Whether it matures into a robust alliance or remains largely aspirational will only be clear with time. The agreement’s timing is telling. It came days after a surprise Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar that killed Hamas figures and stunned the Gulf States. Qatar hosts a major US airbase, yet Washington did not prevent the strike, a jolt to regional confidence in American protection. Saudi Arabia, already uneasy about U.S. reliability, seized the moment to bolster its own security. Officially, Riyadh says the deal “institutionalises” long-standing cooperation rather than targeting any specific incident. Still, it unmistakably signals that the kingdom can seek safeguards beyond the U.S. umbrella. The agreement even revived talk of an “Islamic NATO.” Saudi Arabia binding itself to Pakistan, Islam’s spiritual heart partnering with its only nuclear-armed state is a powerful image. Observers speculate that other Muslim countries might one day align under a similar framework. Yet longstanding sectarian and political rifts (Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab) have doomed past unity efforts. For now, the Riyadh-Islamabad agreement is as much a message to big powers as a foundation for any broader alliance. Perhaps the toughest diplomatic test for Riyadh is managing the agreement’s fallout in New Delhi. India has spent years cultivating Saudi Arabia as a partner, a top source of oil, investment and Islamic-world backing on contentious issues. A formal Saudi-Pakistani security link is exactly what India hoped to avoid. New Delhi “would not welcome an explicit security tether between its principal energy supplier and its strategic rival,” one analysis noted. In effect, the agreement edges Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan, risking awkward strain in Saudi-India ties. Indian government reacted in measured tones, acknowledging the agreement and saying it would “study the implications” for her security. The real worry in New Delhi is not that Saudi forces would fight on Pakistan’s side which remains far-fetched but that Pakistan will feel politically bolstered by Riyadh’s backing. Pakistani hardliners may adopt a tougher posture in future confrontations, believing a wealthy Arab power has their back. There’s also concern that Saudi aid or arms could flow to Pakistan over time, indirectly strengthening India’s longtime foe. Aware of these optics, Saudi officials have been quick to reassure India. One senior official stressed that Saudi’s relationship with India “is more robust than it has ever been” and vowed to keep deepening it. Riyadh clearly wants to show it can defend its interests with Pakistan without abandoning its friendship with India. Even so, the balancing act is delicate. New Delhi will likely respond by tightening its own strategic bonds, for instance, with Israel, a close defense partner – and by quietly urging Riyadh to stay neutral in South Asian issues. Much progress in India-Saudi relations has come in recent years, and both sides have incentives to prevent this new alignment from derailing that momentum. As the dust settles, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement stands as a bold statement, but one not yet tested by crisis. Its ripple effects are already evident. Israel, which had been inching toward a historic normalisation with Riyadh, now sees that prospect put on hold Washington, too, must grapple with a Gulf ally hedging its bets on security. Ultimately, the agreement’s significance will hinge on how seriously Riyadh and Islamabad implement it. Regular joint drills coordinated planning or clear mutual defense protocols could turn the promise into genuine deterrence. Absent that, skeptics may view it as more posturing than substance. History offers caution: Pakistan’s past defense agreement s (such as Cold War alliances with the U.S.) often fell short when real wars loomed, and Gulf unity schemes have tended to fragment under pressure. For now, Saudi Arabia has made a dramatic bid to diversify its security options, a gamble on Pakistan’s reliability and on charting a more independent course without alienating old partners. If the gamble succeeds, it could redraw the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia. If it falters, it will remind everyone that even grand agreements can carry unspoken caveats. Only a true test, a moment of crisis will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi

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