Geopolitics Human Rights International Policy World

Denials Versus Corrective Action

On this world social justice day, industrialised economies should pledge to take affirmative action to assuage indigenous communities that were subject to abuse, genocide & extinction. Rohan Giri World Social Justice Day seeks to encourage societies to slow down and confront challenging truths. It is not intended to elevate authority or reinforce inherited moral hierarchies. But, global discourse on social justice frequently takes a typical path. Bharat is scrutinized with its caste system portrayed as proof of civilizational failure whereas industrial world speaks from a position of purported ethical maturity. What’s rarely discussed is comparison of how different countries have treated indigenous and marginalized populations not through slogans, but by law, policy, consequences and lived experience. Let’s not forget that modern industrial economies were not built on organic progress but on conquest after bloody wars. When European powers entered American continent at the end of fifteenth century, they found cultures with intricate political systems, agricultural knowledge and cultural continuity that dated back generations. Scholars believe that indigenous population of US before European contact ranged between 50 and 60 million. By the early seventeenth century, this number fell by 90 percent. This virtual extinction was not due to disease, sickness or lack of facilities. Colonial records show that forced work, deliberate famine, mass killings and displacement were used as imperial instruments. In places like Caribbean, entire indigenous populations were eradicated within decades. Potosí silver mines in Bolivia reflect dark reality. Millions of indigenous people were forced to mine under harsh conditions using methods such as mita, a Spanish colonial forced-labour system that compelled indigenous communities to work in mines under brutal conditions. Owing to high mortality rate, colonial administrators considered indigenous labour to be disposable. The extracted silver from these mines bank-rolled European trade, wars and early industrial expansion. This pattern got duplicated in sugar plantations, lumber exploitation zones and later industrial agriculture. Indigenous territory was not incorporated into the contemporary state through consent or reform. It was seized, cleared and monetized. In North America, the story was no different. Treaties with Native American tribes were routinely broken as settlers moved westward. By the late nineteenth century, most tribes were restricted to reservations, typically on marginal terrain unsuitable for long-term economic viability. Indian boarding school system that was prevalent in late 1800s until the twentieth century forcibly separated indigenous students from their families. The explicit purpose was cultural erasure. Children were punished for speaking their languages or following their rituals. Canada’s residential school system followed the same reasoning and lasted until 1996. Official investigations have revealed pervasive physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Mass graves uncovered around former school locations have resurrected scars that were never fully healed. Europe frequently separates itself from colonial misdeeds by pointing to Atlantic, but its indigenous inhabitants tell a different version. Sami people of Norway, Sweden and Finland endured decades of forced assimilation. Their languages were discouraged or prohibited in schools. Traditional livelihoods like reindeer herding were affected by national borders, mining operations and infrastructure construction. Recognition of these abuses occurred of late through investigation panels and formal apologies, long after economic and cultural damage has become irreversible. These histories aren’t stuck in the past. Their ramifications are now measurable. Indigenous communities in US and Canada have much higher poverty rates than national average. Life expectancy is lower. Suicides, substance misuse, and imprisonment are disproportionately high. In Latin America, indigenous land defenders are among the most targeted campaigners facing violence for opposing mining, logging and dam construction projects. Justice in these communities is frequently manifested as symbolic acknowledgement rather than tangible compensation. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 2007 upholds self-determination, land rights, cultural autonomy, and free, prior, and informed consent. However, it is non-binding. Many industrialized countries supported it despite maintaining policies that blatantly clash with its values. Large-scale development projects on indigenous lands continue to be allowed without any substantive consultation. Legal conflicts for land compensation span generations. The gap between word and material behaviour remains large. Against this backdrop, Bharat’s treatment of its indigenous and marginalized populations must be evaluated both scientifically and on the basis of evidence. Bharat has more than 100 million tribal people, making it one of the world’s largest indigenous communities. Unlike settler states, Bharat did not establish its national identity through eradication or displacement of these populations. At independence, Indian Constitution clearly recognized domestic social inequity. Untouchability was abolished by law. Affirmative action in education, employment and political representation was built into the constitutional structure. Tribal regions were given special administrative structures to protect their territory, culture and local government. This approach is important since it reflects intent. Bharat never pretended that inequality and exclusion did not exist. It assigned an obligation to the state to right historical wrongs. The results are varied, but the trend is clear. Literacy rates in indigenous communities, while still lower than national average have increased dramatically in recent decades. Political representation for Scheduled Tribes and Castes is guaranteed in legislatures, local governments and public institutions. Courts often hear disputes involving caste and tribal rights, accepting them as systemic issues rather than disputing their legitimacy. Laws that recognize forest and land rights strive, albeit poorly, to undo rather than normalize colonial dispossession. Welfare schemes, educational reservations and targeted development initiatives are specifically designed with the assumption that past injustice necessitates governmental action. These policies are freely debated, challenged in courts and scrutinized in public discourse. The struggle is on-going but the framework is intended to repair rather than eliminate. When comparisons are made honestly, distinction becomes evident. In industrial world, indigenous peoples were viewed as barriers to progress. Their customs were to be eradicated and their land exploited. Recognition arrived centuries later, often following irreversible loss. Marginalized communities in Bharagt have been regarded as members of the nation-state since its creation. The Constitution regarded them as rights-bearing citizens whose advancement was a collective national responsibility. This does not mean that caste discrimination has ended. It hasn’t. It still has

Bharat Artificial Intelligence Business International Technology

AI & Three-Layer Diplomacy: India’s Strategic Moment

New Delhi must play the role of an enabler in ethical governance of AI to shape the new humane order. R K Raina Artificial Intelligence is no longer merely a technological tool, nor simply a factor influencing economic growth or military capabilities. It has evolved into a transformative force that intervene governance, security, finance, culture, communication and even human cognition. AI is not on the table; it’s shaping the table itself. As global leaders gather at AI summits and strategic forums, central question is no longer whether AI will influence sovereignty but how sovereignty itself will be redefined in the age of AI. The world is entering a phase where what was achieved in five decades of industrial transformation may now unfold within five years through algorithmic acceleration. In this emerging order, a new structure of global engagement is visible, which may be called the Three-Layer Diplomacy of AI. The future of global influence may not be determined by who builds the most expensive AI systems, but by who shapes its: India does not need to outspend the superpowers. It must out-think and out-ethic them. The real strategic equation of the AI age is: Soft Power + Mathematics + Language = Technological Sovereignty If harnessed effectively, India can: First Layer: Strategic Rivalry at the Apex At the highest level, AI has become central to strategic rivalry between United States and China. This competition is not rhetorical; it is embedded in semiconductor supply chains, export controls, advanced chip fabrication, rare earth dependencies, cloud infrastructure and defence applications. Investment figures in AI research and hardware ecosystems are staggering, but more consequential development is the attempt to shape global dependencies. Control over foundational models, advanced chips and data infrastructures translates into influence over financial systems, digital communications and military intelligence. AI in this layer is capital-intensive, vertically integrated and closely aligned with national security doctrines. The risk is not merely technological inequality; it is the emergence of algorithmic spheres of influence. For countries outside this rivalry, the concern is clear: will access to advanced AI become conditional on political alignment? Second Layer: Middle-Order Balancers Second diplomatic layer consists of technologically capable but strategically cautious powers: India, Europe, Japan, South Korea and several advanced developing economies. These states recognise AI’s transformative potential for productivity, healthcare, climate modelling and governance. At the same time, they are wary of technological dependence on either pole of the first layer. Their strategic objective is not dominance but resilience. Europe emphasises regulatory sovereignty. Japan and South Korea invest heavily in semiconductor capacity to avoid supply disruptions. India has pioneered digital public infrastructure models that demonstrate scale without prohibitive capital expenditure. This layer’s challenge is coordination. Without collaborative frameworks on standards, data governance and ethical deployment, middle powers risk fragmentation, each negotiating bilaterally with larger actors instead of collectively shaping norms. Third Layer: Developmental Majority Third layer comprises the least developed and small economies across Asia, Africa and island states. For them, AI is neither a prestige competition nor a regulatory puzzle; it is a developmental lever. Properly deployed, AI can optimise agricultural output, strengthen disaster response, expand financial inclusion and compensate for shortages in skilled workforce. However, they also fear that AI could: The question for third layer is existential: Will AI liberate them or bind them into new dependencies? Yet these countries face a paradox. The most advanced AI systems are expensive, proprietary and cloud-dependent. Without domestic capacity, adoption can create digital dependency rather than digital empowerment. Algorithmic governance risks being externally influenced. This is where India’s role becomes strategically significant. India as Bridge Power India is uniquely positioned to operate across all three layers without being absorbed by any single one. Its strengths are not merely demographic or market-based; they are structural. First, India’s mathematical and engineering talent pool is globally integrated. From foundational research to scalable software engineering, India’s human capital is embedded in global AI ecosystems. This offers leverage beyond hardware capability alone. Second, India’s experience with digital public infrastructure, identity platforms, payment systems and scalable governance technology demonstrates that high-impact digital systems can be built without replicating the capital intensity of Western or Chinese models. The emphasis has been on interoperability and cost efficiency rather than exclusivity. Third, India’s linguistic and cultural diversity offers an advantage in the next frontier of AI language models and contextual adaptation. AI systems trained only on dominant linguistic frameworks risk marginalising vast populations. India’s multilingual ecosystem can inform more inclusive design principles. Finally, India brings a civilisational vocabulary that emphasises balance between innovation and restraint, growth and sustainability, capability and responsibility. As AI systems increasingly influence decision-making, the ethical framing of deployment becomes a strategic variable, not a philosophical afterthought. Three-Layer Diplomatic Strategy For India, engagement must be parallel rather than sequential. With the first layer, India must safeguard strategic autonomy, diversifying semiconductor partnerships, investing in domestic R&D and resisting monopolistic dependencies. With the second layer, India should anchor coalitions around interoperable standards, shared research platforms and responsible AI frameworks that prioritise access and resilience. With the third layer, India can emerge as an enabler, providing capacity building, affordable AI tools adapted to local needs and policy advisory support that strengthens digital sovereignty rather than eroding it. Beyond Race Narrative The dominant global discourse treats AI as a race to be won. A more accurate framing is that AI is a system to be governed. The AI era is not simply about technological competition; it is about the reconfiguration of global order. Through a carefully structured Three-Layer Diplomacy, India can: In doing so, India does not merely secure its own future; it helps safeguard the human future. India must now become its ethical architect. The coming decade will determine which trajectory prevails. India’s strategic choice is whether to remain a participant in technological competition or to become an architect of a more balanced AI order. The three-layer diplomacy of the AI age is already taking shape. The question is whether India will recognise that it is uniquely

Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security Sikh Terrorism

100

Debt Bondage: Pakistan’s way of exploiting its minorities

Forced labour, servile marriages, bonded inhuman labour, physical torture and abuses against women, children and the elderly have threatened Sindh’s minorities. I. Executive Summary Debt bondage in Sindh is systemic, inter-generational and structurally embedded. Legal prohibitions and international commitments notwithstanding, serious gaps in enforcement and socioeconomic inequalities sustain a cycle of exploitation. Without coordinated, evidence-based and politically accountable reform, millions of minorities, women and children remain at risk of continued slavery. Scale of Crisis Debt Bondage in Sindh High-Risk Districts & Sectors Impact on Minorities Child Labour Dimension Legal and Policy Gaps Structural Drivers Challenges in Rehabilitation & Reintegration Human Rights Relevance II. Context Debt bondage, a contemporary type of slavery wherein employees are obligated to their employers against unpaid advances and structural pressure, remains deeply ingrained in Sindh’s rural economy. It continues to be one of the most pervasive yet under-addressed human rights issues. Statutory prohibitions notwithstanding, international commitments and constitutional protections, exploitative practices continue unhindered due to systemic socioeconomic and governance failures, trapping millions of people in debt bondage, forced labour and coercive exploitation across important economic sectors. Minorities, especially low-caste Hindus, are disproportionately affected by cycles of inequality and exploitation perpetuated. Millions of people are still working in bonded labour in agricultural, brick kiln and informal sectors, according to extensive data and field reports. Minorities are disproportionately affected due to socio-cultural marginalisation. III. Background: Sindh, one of the world’s oldest centres of civilisation, is home to the Indus Valley and has historically served as a hub for ideas, trade and cultural development. The region’s multi-layered history, which includes Persian, Afghan, Mughal and eventually British colonial dominance, illustrates both cultural richness and repeated conquest from Mauryan, Kushan and Gupta rule to its significance as a centre of Islamic study and trade under Arab and Turkic rulers. Sindh has struggled with persistent concerns about political centralisation, unequal resource distribution and influences on its linguistic and cultural identity ever since it joined Pakistan in 1947.Discussion about representation, economic justice and provincial autonomy is still essential for understanding current conflicts and the Sindhi movement’s desire for increased involvement in choices affecting the future of the area. Owing to mistreatment and mismanagement, there have been persistent demands for complete independence as a sovereign Sindh nation. As of 2023, Sindh, one of Pakistan’s four provinces, is home to an estimated 55 million people and occupies 140,914 square kilometres. In addition to serving as the provincial capital, Karachi is the biggest metropolis and centre of Pakistan’s economy. English is commonly used in government, administration and education, whereas Sindhi is the official provincial language and Urdu is the national language. Due to Sindh’s historically complex social fabric, majority of the province is Muslims (around 91 per cent) with Hindus making up the largest religious minority (about eight per cent). World Sindhi Congress (WSC), which represents Sindh abroad at Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), promotes Sindhi political, cultural and human rights concerns on a global platform. Sindh has a long history of civilisation that dates back to ancient times. The ancient homeland of the Sindhu (Indus) River is known as Sindhudesh or Sindhu Kingdom in Mahabharata. Sindh’s longstanding status as a unique cultural and political entity in early South Asian history is reflected in the name. Sindhi people face increasing environmental, socioeconomic and human rights challenges that require immediate international attention. The targeting of ethnic Sindhis and religious minorities, together with reports of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and dissent repression, highlights a very alarming accountability vacuum. Religious prejudice has escalated, making minority groups, especially Hindu girls, more susceptible to kidnapping and coerced conversion. Simultaneously, Sindh’s agrarian economy has been severely damaged by climate vulnerability, rising sea levels, soil salinity and frequent flooding. Economic Corridor (CPEC) have accelerated ecological degradation, industrial pollution and displacement without sufficient local consultation. Sindh’s socioeconomic stability and cultural security have been undermined by these intertwined crises that have strengthened calls for greater political representation, minority rights protection, environmental protection and meaningful involvement in decisions that impact the region’s resources and future development. IV. Debt Bondage: A Silent Killer Debt bondage also known as bonded labour is contemporary form of slavery. It happens when someone is forced to pay back debt or advance payments (commonly referred to as peshgi) on terms that make it nearly difficult to comply due to exorbitant interest rates and pitifully low salaries. They are unable to refuse or flee exploitative labour which traps workers and their families. Forced labour, human trafficking, servile marriage and bonded labour are all considered forms of modern slavery and are included in the Global Slavery Index framework. On paper, millions of Sindhis in Pakistan enjoy freedom, but in practice, bondage rules their lives. Debt is a multigenerational trap designed to keep an indigenous community economically reliant, socially immobile, and politically silent in rural Sindh. It is not a short-term misery. Poverty is not the cause of this. It is a social order that was created. Districts where agriculture and kiln-based labour dominate local economies, such as Tharparkar, Umerkot, Sanghar, Mirpurkhas, Badin, Thatta and portions of Hyderabad division, are regularly designated as high-risk. V. Signature Patterns in Sindh In Sindh, bonded labour is still widely used, especially in brick kilns and agriculture, where unskilled labourers and landless peasants (haris) take advance loans from kiln owners or landowners and get caught in never-ending debt cycles that last for generations. Farmers are frequently forced to give up a disproportionate amount of their produce due to informal and opaque sharecropping arrangements, which increase their financial dependence and restrict any feasible route to repayment. Importantly, bonded labour is not limited to adult male workers; women and children are also ensnared in household debt commitments, making them more susceptible to abuse, exploitation and systematic denial of their basic rights. These obligations are: A Sindhi child is often born with debts that will never be paid off, including money the child never borrowed and working land he/she will never own. This isn’t labour but ‘hereditary imprisonment’. VI.

Bharat Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

Seven Years after Pulwama Terrorist Attack: Global Responses

On the 7th anniversary of #Pulwama terrorist attack, we release our new brief on Jaish-e-Mohammed (#JeM): major attacks, India’s counter-terror response, and global actions; UN listings, bans, sanctions, and FATF-linked pressure. It also tracks Pakistan’s retrospective denial and optics, even as JeM’s infrastructure persists. A seven-year audit of accountability, impunity, and what constrains terror.

Bharat Human Rights Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

Pulwama@Seven: No Room for Complacency

Brig Brijesh Pandey Seven years after the Pulwama suicide bombing claimed the lives of 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel, India’s security strategy still carries the imprints of that national tragedy. The body bags wrapped in the National Flag catalysed the strategic shift. This terrorist attack by Pakistan-based and backed terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), from the Pakistan-occupied territories of Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK), was not merely an act of terrorism; it marked a geopolitical turning point that permanently reshaped India’s approach to deterrence. This incident also signaled a strategic shift toward Pakistan, emphasising the development of asymmetric capabilities and consequently, reshaping the balance of power in South Asia. The anniversary, however, should not turn out to be just a solemn remembrance; it should impel us to ponder over more serious questions, such as what changed after the Pulwama terror strike? What was the overall spectrum of India’s response? Have the risks been resolved? The Shock and Aftershock Pulwama suicide bombing was one of the most heinous attacks in over a decade. Within 12 days of the incident, India responded with a Trans-Line of Control (LoC) air strike at Balakot, deep inside PoJK. Trans LoC action, employing conventional forces, had thus far been defined as an “act of war.” Consequently, Pakistan was expected to respond with conventional kinetic action inside Indian territory. Perhaps the shock of the air strike was so great that it shook the military planners in Pakistan. They not only preferred to give it a pass, but also quickly returned the Indian pilot, the then Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who was taken as a prisoner after his aircraft crashed inside PoJK. In the pre-2019 era, India’s response to terrorist initiated incidents (TIIs) was characterised by restraint. It oscillated between diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, ceasefire violations across the LoC, limited covert operations and return to normalcy. What changed with Pulwama was India’s definition of “terror acts” and the unwarranted restraint caused by the term “act of war.” The most remarkable part was India smashing the glass ceiling of nuclear overhang, making a statement that Proxy War will no longer be cost- free. So what was the significance of the Balakot air strike? Firstly, it brought about a paradigm shift in the security policy from strategic restraint to calibrated punishment. Secondly, India dislodged Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and reinforced the deterrence established through the Uri Surgical strikes of 2016. Thirdly, at the global level, India suddenly altered the threshold levels of tolerance towards conflict between two nuclear-armed states. End of Strategic Restraint Balakot air strikes were domestically followed with a decisive mandate in favour of the ruling dispensation in India. This served not only as the public endorsement of India’s punitive action against Pakistan but also as the National consensus on “zero tolerance” towards any form of attack, conventional or sub-conventional. What followed was silent yet substantive: – There is no ambiguity about the dismantling of terror infrastructure post abrogation of Article 370 substantively. There has also been a remarkable improvement in most of the parameters of terrorism, such as recruitment, infiltration by foreign terrorists, number of TIIs and the resultant loss of lives. However, to assume that the entire framework of Proxy War encompassing ideological radicalisation, nexus networks and terror infrastructures will get dismantled so easily, will be a fallacy. So long as the “idea of terrorism” is alive, peace will remain elusive and the trajectory of stability can be altered in the blink of an eye. Deterrence in South Asia In the immediate aftermath of the Balakot air strikes, it was believed that deterrence had been restored and would dissuade Pakistan from orchestrating a major terror strike against India. This belief was shattered by the terror attacks at Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, killing 26 tourists after segregating them in the name of religion. Given the nature of the attacks and manner of execution, it can well be called a step higher than the Pulwama suicide bombing. Consequently, this led the Indian security planners once again to redefine the boundaries of deterrence through Operation Sindoor. For Pakistan, the costs were multiplied manifold, and the spectrum of punishment was enhanced to encompass the entire length and breadth of Pakistan. Even foreign assets stationed in Pakistan were not spared, and the attacks signalled a “conventional anti-dote” to the strategic comfort Pakistan derived from India’s “no first use” nuclear doctrine. Despite such a decisive action, compelling Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations to rush to seek a ceasefire, the Delhi Car Bombing of 10 November 2025 at Red Fort Metro Station occurred. This time too, the trail pointed towards Pakistan, though the network differed in character and the arc of orchestration extended as far as Türkiye. Recurrence of terror attacks underscores a basic reality that deterrence in South Asia is neither static nor absolute. It is a dynamic contest shaped by big power alignments, multiple regional actors (often working in concert), proxy players embedded within the society, internal political machinations, and ideological currents. The challenge is further compounded by the constant mutation of terrorist organisations, evolving new methods, funding patterns and operational space. This helps them to evade the conventional operational responses. Consequently, even decisive actions such as Balakot or sophisticated, high-precision operations such as Operation Sindoor cannot be expected to create permanent deterrence. Pakistan Army, whose relevance has long been based on perpetual hostility with India, will continue to innovate and rewire its Proxy Warfare. Moreover, the regional and global players whose geostrategic interests are served by constraining India’s rise or drawing India into asymmetric dependencies that undermine India’s strategic autonomy will keep discovering new ways of supporting Pakistan’s disruptive designs. Internal Security Question Beyond the realm of geopolitics and external dimensions lies an uncomfortable yet fundamental question: could Pulwama have been prevented through an anticipatory mechanism? Investigations into major TIIs have constantly indicated the gaps in intelligence, inter-agency coordination, integrated threat assessment, and the last-mile operational preparedness of forces operating in various conflict zones. While procedural and structural measures

Bangladesh Election Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Politics

Client State or Regional Player?

BNP’s huge victory puts a big responsibility on Tarique Rahman to reshape Bangladesh’s politics, re-balance power equations globally and rejig economic policy formulation. N. C. Bipindra The outcome of February 12, 2026, general elections marked a watershed moment in Bangladesh’s political history. It has dramatically altered balance of power and set the stage for a new era in governance. Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) resounding victory signals not merely a change in government but reflect a deeper shift in Bangladesh’s domestic political order. With a commanding parliamentary majority in 13th Jatiya Sangsad, BNP has tromped home to power after nearly two decades in opposition. The political space once dominated by Awami League has undergone an unprecedented shift. The election is widely regarded as most competitive and consequential since political upheaval of 2024 which saw fall of long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, following mass protests and civil unrest. The absence of Awami League from electoral fray reshaped competitive landscape, effectively ending entrenched two-party rivalry that had defined Bangladeshi politics for decades. In its place, a new alignment has emerged, with BNP consolidating power while Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami got mainstreamed, strengthened its parliamentary footprint as principal opposition formation. At the centre of this political transformation stands Tarique Rahman, BNP leader, who is poised to assume the office of prime minister. His return to frontline politics after years in exile represents a dramatic personal and institutional comeback. For BNP, the electoral mandate is both a vindication of its long campaign against what it described as authoritarian rule and heavy responsibility to deliver institutional reform, economic recovery and political reconciliation. One of the most significant developments accompanying the election was approval of constitutional reforms through a parallel referendum. The amendments introduce term limits for prime minister, strengthen judicial independence and expand safeguards aimed at preventing executive overreach. These reforms are designed to address concerns about excessive concentration of power that had accumulated over past decade and a half. The referendum’s success indicates broad public appetite for systemic recalibration and democratic consolidation, reflecting a desire to prevent re-emergence of dominant-party rule. Domestically, BNP’s victory reshapes political calculus in several critical ways. First, it dismantles old Awami League–BNP binary that had structured electoral competition since the 1990s. The sidelining of the Awami League leaves a significant vacuum in secular-nationalist political space. Whether that space is eventually reoccupied by reconstituted Awami League, a new centrist force or remains fragmented will determine durability of the new political order. For now, BNP’s dominance gives it legislative freedom to pursue policy reforms without the constraints of a fragmented parliament. Second, the rise of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami as a strong opposition block introduces new ideological dynamics into parliamentary politics. Jamaat’s improved electoral performance underscores continued resonance of conservative and religiously oriented political narratives in certain regions. While BNP and Jamaat have historically cooperated tactically, the evolving relationship between them will shape legislative debates on social policy, education, socio-religious equations and governance norms. The presence of a robust Islamist opposition also complicates BNP’s balancing act between appealing to its traditional base and projecting a reformist, moderate image to urban and business constituencies. The collapse or marginalisation of smaller parties, including the once-influential Jatiyo Party highlights another structural shift. The electorate appears to have consolidated around clearer poles of power, reducing role of kingmakers and coalition brokers. This concentration of power can enhance decision-making efficiency but also raises concerns about reduced pluralism if institutional checks are not effectively maintained. The newly introduced constitutional safeguards will therefore face an early stress test under BNP stewardship. Youth participation and civic mobilisation have emerged as defining undercurrents of this electoral cycle. The protests of 2024 were largely driven by younger Bangladeshis demanding accountability, employment opportunities and an end to entrenched patronage networks. Although youth-led political platforms did not translate that energy into sweeping parliamentary gains, their influence on public discourse has been unmistakable. All major parties, including BNP were compelled to address issues such as job creation, digital governance, anti-corruption measures and institutional transparency. The durability of youth engagement will determine whether Bangladesh’s political evolution moves toward participatory reform or reverts to personality-driven politics. Economically, the new government inherits a fragile macroeconomic environment marked by inflationary pressures, currency volatility and strains in the export sector. The garment industry considered backbone of Bangladesh’s economy, experienced disruptions amid political instability. BNP has pledged to restore investor confidence, stimulate private-sector growth and reform regulatory institutions. Achieving these objectives will require careful fiscal management and sustained political stability. A decisive parliamentary majority gives the government room to legislate, but it also removes excuses for policy paralysis. Governance credibility remains a crucial question. The BNP’s previous tenure in government was marred by allegations of corruption and administrative inefficiency. To differentiate itself from the era it replaces, the party must demonstrate a tangible commitment to institutional strengthening rather than patronage redistribution. Early actions on judicial independence, anti-corruption enforcement and civil service reform will serve as signals of intent. Failure to meet heightened public expectations could rapidly erode the legitimacy conferred by the electoral mandate. The broader significance of the 12 February 12 2026 election lies in its redefinition of political legitimacy in Bangladesh. For years, electoral contests were overshadowed by boycotts, disputes and questions about inclusivity. The competitive nature of this poll and comparatively strong voter participation suggest renewed engagement with democratic processes. However, the absence of a historically dominant party complicates narratives of full inclusiveness. Long-term stability will depend on whether political competition remains open and institutionalised rather than episodic and crisis-driven. Ultimately, the 2026 election represents both an end and a beginning. It ends an era defined by prolonged single-party dominance and inaugurates a phase of recalibration in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. When Tarique Rahman assumes office as prime minister, Bangladesh’s external alignments are likely to undergo calibrated adjustments rather than abrupt reversals. Relations with India may enter a more negotiated and transactional phase. Historically, BNP has taken a more sovereignty-centric approach compared to Awami League, particularly on issues such as water sharing,

Bharat Technology

From Intent to Impact: India’s AI Summit

The subtext of the summit is that integration capacity, not just frontier leadership may shape long‑run advantage. Rahul PAWA | x – @imrahulpawa In the week ahead, the India AI Impact Summit convenes at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, promoted by its organisers as a first global AI summit hosted in the Global South and designed to produce tangible outputs, not just declarations. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that Emmanuel Macron and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will participate during their February visits. A government guide also positions the summit as a mass convening of governments, industry leaders, researchers, startups, students and citizens. Its philosophical anchor is unusually explicit for an AI conference. In remarks preceding the summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi set the theme as “Sarvajana Hitaya, Sarvajana Sukhaya” (welfare for all, happiness for all) and advocated for equitable access, population‑scale skilling, and responsible deployment AI that is safety‑by‑design, transparent, and auditable in high‑impact settings. Intriguingly, India is hosting at a moment when the global AI governance stack is fragmenting. The United States is pushing for innovation velocity and national coordination. A 2025 executive order sets “global AI dominance” as policy and directs agencies to revoke or revise prior federal AI actions seen as barriers to innovation. A later order argues for a “minimally burdensome” national standard and launches federal litigation against state AI laws that create a compliance patchwork or constrain model behaviour.The European Union is coding caution into law. The European Commission describes the AI Act as a four‑level risk regime that bans “unacceptable risk” practices and imposes strict obligations on “high‑risk” systems, risk management, data quality, logging, documentation, human oversight, robustness and cybersecurity under a phased timeline. Implementation is politically contested; reported calls from a major tech lobbying group to pause parts of the rollout, warning that missing implementation pieces and rushed timelines could stall innovation. China combines rapid deployment with guardrails bound to state priorities. In the generative‑AI rules (translated by the China Aerospace Studies Institute), providers must “adhere to the socialist core values,” avoid specified content categories, and submit services with public‑opinion or social‑mobilisation attributes to security assessment and algorithm filing. However, India’s positioning diverges from all three. Rather than betting primarily on capital‑intensive frontier model races, it is trying to make deployment the moat: shared inputs and repeatable governance that let AI plug into public services and regulated industries without reinventing the stack each time. The summit’s structure reflects that engineering mindset. Official material describes “People, Planet, Progress” as pillars, with working groups tasked to present deliverables such as an “AI Commons,” trusted tools, shared compute infrastructure and sector compendiums of use cases. This is infrastructure policy framed as an implementation programme. That focus matches what diffusion research emphasises. An OECD working paper on digital technology diffusion argues that advanced tech adoption builds on enabling systems, varies across sectors and firm sizes, and depends heavily on skills and digitisation; it calls for policy mixes that accelerate diffusion to unlock productivity. The subtext of the summit is that integration capacity, not just frontier leadership may shape long‑run advantage. A government explainer says that, under the IndiaAI Mission, more than 38,000 high‑end GPUs and 1,050 TPUs have been onboarded for shared access, with subsidised pricing positioned as a democratisation tool for startups, researchers and public agencies. On the data side, the same release positions AIKosh as a shared repository and reports thousands of datasets and hundreds of models aggregated across sectors. Together, compute plus data commons turn “intent” into something implementers can plan against: predictable unit costs, reusable artefacts, and a shorter path from prototype to audited deployment. This framing also echoes the G20 concept of digital public infrastructure: modular, interoperable building blocks; identity, payments and consented data flows that multiple actors can reuse across sectors. India’s AI story is “DPI, but for models”: reduce duplication and make safeguards portable. The summit’s most consequential test is whether “responsible deployment” stays concrete at scale. India’s stated stance is that high‑impact AI should be auditable and human‑overseen, with explicit guardrails on misuse such as deepfakes, crime and terrorism. The summit’s own deliverables; trusted tools, sector playbooks, and shared infrastructure implicitly treat assurance as a prerequisite for diffusion, not an afterthought. If the week produces reusable assets, an implementable AI Commons, sector compendiums that specify data and evaluation standards, and scalable access to compute. India’s thesis becomes plausible: long‑term AI advantage may belong to whoever can make systems reliable, affordable, multilingual and governable for the largest number of institutions, not only whoever trains the largest frontier model first. (The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS).

Bharat Defence Security Technology

Agni-Prime: India’s Futuristic Rail based Strike Advantage

There is an India-vision lesson beyond missiles. Great powers don’t just buy deterrence, they industrialise it, converting national scale into military leverage. Rahul PAWA | x – @imrahulpawa Deterrence is capability in motion. It is measured by one brutal test. Can a force still launch after the first attack? Last September, Agni-Prime gave India a clean answer. A missile lifted off from a rail mobile launcher, not a fixed pad. That choice was the message: Mobility is capability. After the flight, the official readout set the tone. The launch was described as a “textbook launch,” with tracking by multiple ground stations. The statement also signalled what the test was meant to unlock. Success would enable the induction of rail-based systems into service. The most telling lines focused on wartime design. The launcher was described as self-sustained, with independent launch features, advanced communications, and protection mechanisms. This was not showcase language. This was readiness language for a battlefield where minutes decide advantage. Why rails, and why now? Because the contest is increasingly about the kill chain: find, fix, track, target, engage, assess. In a region where warning timelines can be short and intelligence collection relentless, even commercial imagery compresses uncertainty. Mobility is the oldest counter-measure and rail mobility is mobility with mass. A rail-based launcher can reposition across long distances with less logistical drag than heavy road convoys, and it can do so while blending into everyday freight and passenger traffic. The global contrast is instructive. Rail-mobile missiles are not new in theory; they are rare in practice because they demand heavy engineering, a resilient rail grid, and peacetime discipline to keep strategic movement invisible inside civilian patterns. Cold War basing debates showed why major powers flirted with rail mobility: it multiplies potential launch areas and complicates counterforce targeting. India is not inventing the logic; it is applying it to a harsher surveillance environment where persistent ISR is cheaper, faster, and more widely available than ever. India’s unique advantage is structural. Its railways are not a niche logistics channel; they are infrastructure at continental scale. Reporting in 2025 put the network at roughly 69,800 route-kilometres, with over 99% electrification achieved by mid-2025 and full electrification targeted ahead of March 2026. That density creates a military benefit that is easy to miss. A strategic launcher can move through yards, loops, sidings, tunnels, and varied corridors without advertising a distinct “military convoy signature” that analysts can learn and exploit. This is why “short reaction time” and “reduced visibility” are operational claims, not slogans. Capability is measured in minutes: how quickly a system can disperse, receive authenticated orders, appear briefly, and execute. Rail basing shortens long-haul repositioning and reduces the signature of repeated heavy-vehicle movement that can be profiled over time. For an adversary, the challenge is not just spotting a launcher; it is proving, with confidence, where it will be when it matters. Rail mobility attacks that confidence. Rail mobility also aligns with India’s deterrence posture. Under credible minimum deterrence, India does not need symmetrical numbers; it needs survivable capability. Survivable forces reduce incentives for early escalation because they keep retaliation credible even under pressure. Mobility, therefore, becomes stabilising: it discourages any adversary belief that a first strike could be clean, decisive, or cost-free. But rail mobility is not magic. Tracks create chokepoints; bridges, tunnels, critical junctions that can be targeted by sabotage or precision strike. Command links can be attacked through cyber and electronic means. The answer is not to romanticise rail basing; it is to treat it as a system-of-systems problem: route redundancy, hardened holding areas, layered security, counter-sabotage forces, encrypted resilient communications, and strict discipline. Even the best launcher is only as survivable as its command-and-control and security architecture. There is an India-vision lesson beyond missiles. Great powers don’t just buy deterrence, they industrialise it, converting national scale into military leverage. India’s rail grid is one of the few on earth large enough to turn mobility into concealment, and concealment into capability. Rarer still is the combination India is now demonstrating: native missile engineering, a rail ecosystem dense enough to disappear inside, and a command architecture capable of integrating a new basing mode without broadcasting repeatable patterns. The most revealing phrase is the least dramatic reduced visibility. In deterrence, ambiguity is not confusion; it is deliberate uncertainty imposed on an adversary’s targeting cycle. If an opponent cannot be sure where the launcher is, they cannot be sure they can neutralise it and if they cannot be sure, they must plan for retaliation. That is the quiet mechanics of stability. Agni-Prime, India’s futuristic rail-based strike advantage, is therefore more than a new launcher configuration. It is India converting infrastructure into capability, turning mobility into second-strike assurance, and using geography and scale to harden deterrence through operational unpredictability. (The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS).

Pakistan’s Kashmir Lie Exposed to the World

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Pakistan’s Kashmir Lie Exposed to the World

5th February: Pakistan’s Propaganda Day, Not Kashmir’s Solidarity Vivek Raina Pakistan has conducted one of the longest-running disinformation campaigns in geopolitics for more than 75 years. It hides a fundamental truth while posing as an advocate for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Parts of J&K are unlawfully occupied by Pakistan, which has also actively encouraged terrorism and violence in the area. The rhetoric of “concern” conceals a history of hate and terror. Pakistan aggressed into Jammu and Kashmir through tribal raiders supported by the Pakistan Army, forcibly invaded the region in 1947. The invasion resulted in massacres, widespread displacement and the illegal dismemberment of a historically unified territory. Rather than being “liberated,” Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, including parts of China Occupied Ladakh territories and areas across the Line of Control, were seized by force and remain under army control to this day. However, Pakistan observance of Kashmir Solidarity Day on February 5th each year has evolved into one of the most calculated propaganda exercises in world geopolitics, far from a sincere show of care for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. To portray 5th February as a sign of “solidarity” is actually a mockery of Jammu and Kashmir’s more than seven-decade-long struggle against Pakistan’s illegal occupation, manipulation, sponsorship of terror and ongoing atrocities in the area. The day has no organic roots in Jammu and Kashmir’s history, resistance or public sentiment. It was neither born out of a people’s movement nor linked to any significant milestone in Jammu and Kashmir. Instead, it is a state-sponsored narrative manufactured by Pakistan to internationalise and to deflect attention from its occupied terrorises and its terrorism in the region. This manipulation reached a troubling point in 2021 when the New York State Assembly passed a resolution urging the Governor to recognise 5th February as Kashmir American Day. Of all possible dates relevant to Kashmir, the choice of Pakistan’s Kashmir Solidarity Day was deeply ironic and offensive. It was akin to asking a perpetrator to define justice. Such decisions reflect the influence of Pakistan’s sustained propaganda campaign. By exporting a False narrative, Pakistan has been influencing international forums and institutions to adopt narratives and language that align with its interests, not with Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh realities. This appropriation insults the people of India specially Jammu and Kashmir, who have consistently rejected Pakistan’s ideology and interference. People of Jammu and Kashmir do not observe or identify with 5th February; instead, they see it as a reminder of the Pakistan forceful occupation of its territories. Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir has been marked by terror and extremism from the very beginning. Whether it is the Mirpur Massacre of 1947, or the massacre of Kashmiri Hindus in 1990, or be it a Chattisinghpura massacre of 2000, which stand as grim reminders of the brutality unleashed by Pakistan- since 1947. Yet international bodies that today echo Pakistan’s rhetoric have historically failed to acknowledge or address these crimes. This selective outrage raises serious questions about the misuse of human rights. The situation in Gilgit Baltistan further exposes the hollowness of Pakistan’s claims. In the name of development and integration, the region has witnessed poverty, illiteracy, demographic manipulation and systematic denial of basic human rights. Residents of Gilgit Baltistan lack constitutional protection, political representation and control over their resources. This reality starkly contrasts with Pakistan’s loud claims of standing for Jammu and Kashmir welfare. Pakistan’s obsession with internationalising Jammu and Kashmir has also served as a distraction from its internal crises. Pakistan, a terror hub struggling under massive global debt, economic instability and governance failures, continues to knock on international doors to sell false narratives rather than addressing its own domestic challenges. When ceasefire violations, infiltration attempts, and cross-border terrorism failed to achieve strategic objectives, Pakistan turned to diplomatic theatrics and propaganda resolutions. On the other hand, the contrast across the Line of Control is evident. Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of India, is witnessing development, infrastructure growth, democratic participation and improved security conditions. Legally and constitutionally, the case is unambiguous. The accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India in 1947, including the illegally occupied territories of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan, was lawful and final, completely excluding Pakistan. Pakistan’s presence in illegally-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir is forceful and sustained only through army control and suppression. Attempts to internationalise Jammu and Kashmir internal sovereign through the United Nations have consistently failed because it lacks legal merit. India, as a responsible and rising global power, has shown remarkable restraint despite repeated provocations. However, it cannot and will not tolerate interference in its internal affairs. Jammu and Kashmir is an integral and inalienable part of India, culturally, historically and legally. India celebrates its oneness, including the rich culture of Jammu and Kashmir and remains committed to peace, development and dignity for all its people. In this context, Pakistan’s propaganda day on 5th February is more symbolic of its illegal occupation and misleading. True solidarity with Jammu and Kashmir would begin with acknowledging Pakistan’s role in terrorism, exploitation and acknowledging its illegal occupation rather than amplifying a narrative designed to conceal it. (Author Vivek Raina is Manager Outreach & Dissemination at Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS)

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Europe Between US Unpredictability and Chinese Dependence

In a world where tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions are instruments of statecraft, Europe’s new realism is simple: it isn’t choosing a side; it is buying room to manoeuvre. Rahul PAWA | x – iamrahulpawa Mario Draghi sketched Europe’s predicament in blunt, unsentimental terms. The economist and former Prime Minister of Italy argued that the old operating system of the global economy is breaking down, and Europe is exposed in ways its balance sheets can’t fix. He warned that Europe’s strengths, its market size, regulatory reach, and industrial base don’t automatically shield its vulnerabilities: security dependence on the United States, and material dependence on supply chains that run through China. That diagnosis is landing in European capitals because it maps onto an everyday reality: the EU is being pushed from two directions at once. Washington has become harder to predict, more transactional, more willing to dangle tariffs, and more comfortable turning alliance relationships into leverage. Beijing, meanwhile, has spent two decades building choke points in critical inputs; minerals, magnets, processing capacity so quietly essential to Europe’s green transition and defence production that they barely feature in public debates until something breaks. Europe’s new mood isn’t choosing China over America. It is something colder: hedging against both. Europe’s current security architecture still rests on U.S. power. That fact doesn’t change because of a tense summit or an angry speech. But the confidence in how that power will be deployed, how reliable it will be, what it will cost, what conditions it will carry has thinned. In early February, Germany’s foreign minister Johann Wadephul made the point Europe keeps trying to thread: Berlin remains closer to Washington than Beijing, and sees the U.S. as its most important partner, especially on security, yet Europe is also confronting transatlantic strains, including U.S. pressure over NATO burden-sharing and Europe’s reliance on American defence support. This is the tension Draghi is pointing to: Europe can be economically formidable and still strategically dependent. In practical terms, it means every new episode of U.S. unpredictability; tariff threats, pressure campaigns, sudden demands raise the same question in Brussels and Berlin: what happens to Europe’s risk model if America’s commitments come with more volatility and a higher price tag? That question becomes sharper when allies feel they must keep economic channels open with China partly because their industries need access, partly because diversification takes time, and partly because U.S. politics may punish them either way. China doesn’t need to “win Europe over” to gain leverage. It needs only to remain central in the parts of the supply chain Europe cannot quickly replace. The EU’s own institutions have started putting hard numbers on what used to be hand-waving. The European Commission notes that Europe doesn’t produce rare earth elements itself, and that 98% of the EU’s total rare-earth magnet demand is met by imports from China, magnets that sit inside EV motors, wind turbines, robotics, and advanced electronics. Then came the auditors. A European Court of Auditors report amplified widely across European media lays out dependence with uncomfortable specificity: the EU imports all of its 17 rare earth elements; it is fully dependent on imports for 10 of 26 critical minerals; and it relies heavily on China for key materials such as magnesium (97%) and gallium (71%), alongside major shares of rare-earth materials used in permanent magnets (including neodymium and praseodymium). The report also underlines the time problem: mines and processing capacity can take a decade or more to bring online, sometimes far longer. The strategic implication is straightforward: even if Europe is politically determined, it is physically constrained. China’s leverage isn’t mainly a threat of tanks or missiles; it is the ability to slow, raise the cost of, or selectively disrupt the material flows that power Europe’s industrial priorities, green tech, advanced manufacturing, and rearmament. Europeans increasingly talk about “de-risking” because they have lived through a dependence shock before. The Russian gas crisis was the tutorial. Now the lesson is being applied to China, except the inputs are more embedded and the substitution is harder. Europe is learning that resilience is not a slogan but an industrial timeline. It cannot “regulate” its way out of dependence, and it cannot “summit” its way back to certainty. What is emerging is neither a pivot to China nor a break from America, but a recalibration shaped by hard experience. Dependence has become exposure, and exposure is something others can price, punish, or exploit. The EU will remain anchored to the United States for security because the alternatives are not yet credible, but it will try to shrink the extent to which U.S. politics can whipsaw European strategy. It will keep channels open with China because European industry still runs on Chinese inputs, while working to cap single-country choke points in the minerals, magnets, and processing that underpin the green transition and defence production. This is the colder mood Draghi was pointing to, less faith in any single guarantor, more investment in self-insurance. In a world where tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions are instruments of statecraft, Europe’s new realism is simple: it isn’t choosing a side; it is buying room to manoeuvre. (The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS).

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