Bharat Hindus Human Rights Kashmir Pakistan Security

Pakistan’s Kashmir Lie Exposed to the World

5th February: Pakistan’s Propaganda Day, Not Kashmir’s Solidarity Vivek Raina Pakistan has conducted one of the longest-running disinformation campaigns in geopolitics for more than 75 years. It hides a fundamental truth while posing as an advocate for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Parts of J&K are unlawfully occupied by Pakistan, which has also actively encouraged terrorism and violence in the area. The rhetoric of “concern” conceals a history of hate and terror. Pakistan aggressed into Jammu and Kashmir through tribal raiders supported by the Pakistan Army, forcibly invaded the region in 1947. The invasion resulted in massacres, widespread displacement and the illegal dismemberment of a historically unified territory. Rather than being “liberated,” Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, including parts of China Occupied Ladakh territories and areas across the Line of Control, were seized by force and remain under army control to this day. However, Pakistan observance of Kashmir Solidarity Day on February 5th each year has evolved into one of the most calculated propaganda exercises in world geopolitics, far from a sincere show of care for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. To portray 5th February as a sign of “solidarity” is actually a mockery of Jammu and Kashmir’s more than seven-decade-long struggle against Pakistan’s illegal occupation, manipulation, sponsorship of terror and ongoing atrocities in the area. The day has no organic roots in Jammu and Kashmir’s history, resistance or public sentiment. It was neither born out of a people’s movement nor linked to any significant milestone in Jammu and Kashmir. Instead, it is a state-sponsored narrative manufactured by Pakistan to internationalise and to deflect attention from its occupied terrorises and its terrorism in the region. This manipulation reached a troubling point in 2021 when the New York State Assembly passed a resolution urging the Governor to recognise 5th February as Kashmir American Day. Of all possible dates relevant to Kashmir, the choice of Pakistan’s Kashmir Solidarity Day was deeply ironic and offensive. It was akin to asking a perpetrator to define justice. Such decisions reflect the influence of Pakistan’s sustained propaganda campaign. By exporting a False narrative, Pakistan has been influencing international forums and institutions to adopt narratives and language that align with its interests, not with Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh realities. This appropriation insults the people of India specially Jammu and Kashmir, who have consistently rejected Pakistan’s ideology and interference. People of Jammu and Kashmir do not observe or identify with 5th February; instead, they see it as a reminder of the Pakistan forceful occupation of its territories. Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir has been marked by terror and extremism from the very beginning. Whether it is the Mirpur Massacre of 1947, or the massacre of Kashmiri Hindus in 1990, or be it a Chattisinghpura massacre of 2000, which stand as grim reminders of the brutality unleashed by Pakistan- since 1947. Yet international bodies that today echo Pakistan’s rhetoric have historically failed to acknowledge or address these crimes. This selective outrage raises serious questions about the misuse of human rights. The situation in Gilgit Baltistan further exposes the hollowness of Pakistan’s claims. In the name of development and integration, the region has witnessed poverty, illiteracy, demographic manipulation and systematic denial of basic human rights. Residents of Gilgit Baltistan lack constitutional protection, political representation and control over their resources. This reality starkly contrasts with Pakistan’s loud claims of standing for Jammu and Kashmir welfare. Pakistan’s obsession with internationalising Jammu and Kashmir has also served as a distraction from its internal crises. Pakistan, a terror hub struggling under massive global debt, economic instability and governance failures, continues to knock on international doors to sell false narratives rather than addressing its own domestic challenges. When ceasefire violations, infiltration attempts, and cross-border terrorism failed to achieve strategic objectives, Pakistan turned to diplomatic theatrics and propaganda resolutions. On the other hand, the contrast across the Line of Control is evident. Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of India, is witnessing development, infrastructure growth, democratic participation and improved security conditions. Legally and constitutionally, the case is unambiguous. The accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India in 1947, including the illegally occupied territories of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan, was lawful and final, completely excluding Pakistan. Pakistan’s presence in illegally-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir is forceful and sustained only through army control and suppression. Attempts to internationalise Jammu and Kashmir internal sovereign through the United Nations have consistently failed because it lacks legal merit. India, as a responsible and rising global power, has shown remarkable restraint despite repeated provocations. However, it cannot and will not tolerate interference in its internal affairs. Jammu and Kashmir is an integral and inalienable part of India, culturally, historically and legally. India celebrates its oneness, including the rich culture of Jammu and Kashmir and remains committed to peace, development and dignity for all its people. In this context, Pakistan’s propaganda day on 5th February is more symbolic of its illegal occupation and misleading. True solidarity with Jammu and Kashmir would begin with acknowledging Pakistan’s role in terrorism, exploitation and acknowledging its illegal occupation rather than amplifying a narrative designed to conceal it. (Author Vivek Raina is Manager Outreach & Dissemination at Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS)

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Europe Between US Unpredictability and Chinese Dependence

In a world where tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions are instruments of statecraft, Europe’s new realism is simple: it isn’t choosing a side; it is buying room to manoeuvre. Rahul PAWA | x – iamrahulpawa Mario Draghi sketched Europe’s predicament in blunt, unsentimental terms. The economist and former Prime Minister of Italy argued that the old operating system of the global economy is breaking down, and Europe is exposed in ways its balance sheets can’t fix. He warned that Europe’s strengths, its market size, regulatory reach, and industrial base don’t automatically shield its vulnerabilities: security dependence on the United States, and material dependence on supply chains that run through China. That diagnosis is landing in European capitals because it maps onto an everyday reality: the EU is being pushed from two directions at once. Washington has become harder to predict, more transactional, more willing to dangle tariffs, and more comfortable turning alliance relationships into leverage. Beijing, meanwhile, has spent two decades building choke points in critical inputs; minerals, magnets, processing capacity so quietly essential to Europe’s green transition and defence production that they barely feature in public debates until something breaks. Europe’s new mood isn’t choosing China over America. It is something colder: hedging against both. Europe’s current security architecture still rests on U.S. power. That fact doesn’t change because of a tense summit or an angry speech. But the confidence in how that power will be deployed, how reliable it will be, what it will cost, what conditions it will carry has thinned. In early February, Germany’s foreign minister Johann Wadephul made the point Europe keeps trying to thread: Berlin remains closer to Washington than Beijing, and sees the U.S. as its most important partner, especially on security, yet Europe is also confronting transatlantic strains, including U.S. pressure over NATO burden-sharing and Europe’s reliance on American defence support. This is the tension Draghi is pointing to: Europe can be economically formidable and still strategically dependent. In practical terms, it means every new episode of U.S. unpredictability; tariff threats, pressure campaigns, sudden demands raise the same question in Brussels and Berlin: what happens to Europe’s risk model if America’s commitments come with more volatility and a higher price tag? That question becomes sharper when allies feel they must keep economic channels open with China partly because their industries need access, partly because diversification takes time, and partly because U.S. politics may punish them either way. China doesn’t need to “win Europe over” to gain leverage. It needs only to remain central in the parts of the supply chain Europe cannot quickly replace. The EU’s own institutions have started putting hard numbers on what used to be hand-waving. The European Commission notes that Europe doesn’t produce rare earth elements itself, and that 98% of the EU’s total rare-earth magnet demand is met by imports from China, magnets that sit inside EV motors, wind turbines, robotics, and advanced electronics. Then came the auditors. A European Court of Auditors report amplified widely across European media lays out dependence with uncomfortable specificity: the EU imports all of its 17 rare earth elements; it is fully dependent on imports for 10 of 26 critical minerals; and it relies heavily on China for key materials such as magnesium (97%) and gallium (71%), alongside major shares of rare-earth materials used in permanent magnets (including neodymium and praseodymium). The report also underlines the time problem: mines and processing capacity can take a decade or more to bring online, sometimes far longer. The strategic implication is straightforward: even if Europe is politically determined, it is physically constrained. China’s leverage isn’t mainly a threat of tanks or missiles; it is the ability to slow, raise the cost of, or selectively disrupt the material flows that power Europe’s industrial priorities, green tech, advanced manufacturing, and rearmament. Europeans increasingly talk about “de-risking” because they have lived through a dependence shock before. The Russian gas crisis was the tutorial. Now the lesson is being applied to China, except the inputs are more embedded and the substitution is harder. Europe is learning that resilience is not a slogan but an industrial timeline. It cannot “regulate” its way out of dependence, and it cannot “summit” its way back to certainty. What is emerging is neither a pivot to China nor a break from America, but a recalibration shaped by hard experience. Dependence has become exposure, and exposure is something others can price, punish, or exploit. The EU will remain anchored to the United States for security because the alternatives are not yet credible, but it will try to shrink the extent to which U.S. politics can whipsaw European strategy. It will keep channels open with China because European industry still runs on Chinese inputs, while working to cap single-country choke points in the minerals, magnets, and processing that underpin the green transition and defence production. This is the colder mood Draghi was pointing to, less faith in any single guarantor, more investment in self-insurance. In a world where tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions are instruments of statecraft, Europe’s new realism is simple: it isn’t choosing a side; it is buying room to manoeuvre. (The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS).

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Global Resonance of Sanatan Dharma

Vinod Kumar Shukla Among the foundational “Trayi” (the first three Vedas), the Sam Veda stands as a celestial musical invocation dedicated to various Gods, Goddesses and Deities. It was upon these rhythmic foundations that Bharat Muni authored the Natya Shastra, bridging the gap between divine sound and terrestrial art. So, musical rendition, spiritual inquiry and philosophical discourse are not merely cultural artefacts but age-old traditions within Sanatan Dharma, pathways designed to lead the seeker toward peace and Nirvana. People of all ages have been drawn to these creations. Celebrities from all over the world are drawn to Sanatan Dharma in the current era for its profound inner calm, freedom (Moksha), spiritual growth, intellectual discussions, and the great amount of knowledge that Bharat possesses. Celebrities express their decision to follow the path of Sanatan Dharma by being drawn to and embracing them. There is a long list of celebrities joining the fold for something that they lacked despite their professional successes, material achievements and fame. They get absolute contentment by just being in the Sanatan fold. Sanatan transcended Himalayan height, oceanic depth and is beyond continental limits by offering its treasure trove of knowledge and spiritual capital with its various streams and different offshoots. So much so that many Islamic countries in Central Asia have allowed huge temples, which are otherwise not permissible. To begin with, the Japanese singer and songwriter Fujii Kaze, who is a cult figure across the globe, calls Bharat his “spiritual hometown.” Kaze had been absorbing Hindu philosophy, mantra, culture and ideas of non-attachment through his family and tells the world, “My parents are fascinated by Hindu teachings, and so am I.” Naming his 2024 album as ‘Prema,’ which means love in Sanskrit, feels less like a pop project and more like a meditation; this is how he expressed himself. Kaze, whose music varies from Jazz, R&B, Gospel and J-pop, is not only drawn towards Sanatan, who yearns for peace, grace and meaning in the noisy and parallel material world. Moreover, Kaze is not the only one who is drawing inspiration from Sanatan, but lots of other celebrities and hundreds of thousands of others who are deep into its practices. Known for her celluloid avatar as ‘Pretty Woman’, Hollywood actor Julia Roberts also follows Sanatan. She has been a practising Sanatani since 2010, having been drawn towards it after seeing a picture of Neem Karoli Baba. She even changed names of her children after Hindu deities, with Hazel as Laxmi, Phinnaeus as Ganesh and Henry as Krishna Balaram, who are practising Hinduism now, including her husband. Her production company is named “Red Om Films”. The family regularly visits temples. The American actor Robert Downey Jr has a profound connection with Sanatan philosophy and spirituality, which he has credited for helping him through his journey of recovery from addiction and self-discovery. Downey Jr frequently speaks about his association with the Hare Krishna movement, the Srimad Bhagavad Gita and the practice of Yoga. He acknowledges that principles of mindfulness, self-awareness and karma philosophy (Vedant School of thought) of Sanatan helped him overcome addiction and rebuild his life. The Sanatan philosophy seems to have helped him even to focus and balance his life. Russell Brand, an English actor and comedian, has had an evolving relationship with Sanatan and its core spirituality. He unequivocally credited it for helping him get de-addicted and finally get mental serenity. His devotion to the Hare Krishna movement after meeting with spiritual leaders like Radhanath Swami tells the tale of his belief in Sanatan. In the year 2010, Brand married pop star Katy Perry in a traditional Hindu wedding ceremony near the Ranthambhore tiger sanctuary in Rajasthan. Unfortunately, they are separated now. Brand practices yoga and meditation regularly and believes in karma and reincarnation, which are part of the revelations of Srimad Bhagavad Gita. He has a Sanskrit tattoo that is interpreted as “Anuugacchatu Pravaha,” which means “go with the flow”. Australian actor, singer and producer, Hugh Jackman, who has expressed a deep, long-term personal connection to Sanatan, its philosophy and Transcendental Meditation, has integrated its teachings and belief system into his life. He often describes how these teachings feel more instinctive to him than the Western tradition he was raised in. He spent more than thirty years studying and exploring Vedic philosophy, the Upanishads and Srimad Bhagavad Gita. He found that the Vedic epistemology matched his sensibility and was inspired by Vedanta ideas. Jackman wears a wedding ring inscribed with the Sanskrit phrase “Om Paramar Mainamar”, which means “We dedicate our union to a greater source.” Jackman has spoken about his admiration for the Srimad Bhagavad Gita, especially its teachings on life, death and making peace with oneself. George Harrison, an English musician who was the lead guitarist of the Beatles, known as “the quiet Beatle,” developed an affinity for Sanatan Dharma, Philosophy and culture after meeting sitar maestro Ravi Shankar. His engagement with Sanatan led him to the doorstep of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, embracing chanting of mantras and integrating Hindu themes into his music, most famously with “My Sweet Lord.” He significantly supported the ISKCON movement by donating Bhaktivedanta Manor. Harrison’s dedication helped popularise Sanatan concepts, teachings and practices in Western countries, making him a significant figure in bridging Hindu spirituality and Western pop culture. One of the most notable Western followers of Sanatan included the prominent American businessman Alfred Ford, aka Ambarish Das, the great-grandson of Henry Ford. He adopted Hindutva in 1974 after becoming a disciple of Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada. He is involved in building the Vedic Planetarium temple in India. While he is a dedicated practitioner of Sanatan, his involvement is specifically with the spiritual and cultural aspects of Gaudiya Vaishnavism. As a central figure of the 1960s counterculture, Allen Ginsberg’s stay in India during 1962–1963 marked his profound engagement with Sanatana and the Bhakti tradition. Immersing himself in the Srimad Bhagavad Gita and the Upanishads, Ginsberg utilised Hare Krishna chanting as a spiritual tool to bypass “Western rationalism.” His

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Baloch Question in Pakistan’s Army State

Balochistan remains a place where the promises of 1947 are still argued, remembered and resisted. Rahul PAWA | X @imrahulpawa In the vast, rugged expanses stretching from the Arabian Sea to the deserts bordering Iran and Afghanistan lies Balochistan, land rich in minerals, memory and unresolved history. Today, it is Pakistan’s largest province by territory, yet it’s least developed, and for decades it has remained the stage for one of South Asia’s longest-running struggles for liberation. At the heart of the conflict is a dispute older than Pakistan itself: whether Balochistan chose its fate in 1947 or had it imposed. The modern struggle traces back to the princely State of Kalat. Under the 1876 Treaty with British India, Kalat retained internal autonomy, distinguishing it from directly administered colonial territories. As British rule prepared to withdraw in 1947, Kalat’s leadership sought the restoration of sovereignty. On August 4, 1947, a decisive meeting in Delhi brought together Lord Mountbatten, Jawaharlal Nehru, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat. Discussions concluded with recognition that Kalat would become independent upon British departure. Days later, on August 11, Kalat and the Muslim League signed an agreement acknowledging Kalat as a sovereign state, with the understanding that its independence would be respected. On August 15, as India and Pakistan emerged as independent dominions, Kalat also declared independence. Its traditional flag was raised and sermons were read in the Khan of Kalat’s name as ruler of a free state. But independence proved fragile. British memoranda issued weeks later questioned Kalat’s capacity to function as a fully independent entity in international affairs. Political pressure mounted from the new Pakistani leadership to integrate Kalat into Pakistan. In meetings later recalled in Taj Mohammad Breseeg’s work, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development up to 1980, Jinnah sought accession, while the Khan insisted that tribal consent was essential before any binding decision. In March 1948, Pakistani forces moved into Kalat and acceded by force. For Baloch, this marked annexation and not a voluntary union, a scar that has fueled repeated uprisings ever since. Five insurgencies have erupted since 1948, each shaped by shifting politics but driven by familiar complaints: economic neglect, loss of autonomy, military repression and extraction of local resources without corresponding development. Balochistan holds significant natural gas reserves, copper, gold and strategic coastal access at Gwadar, yet many residents argue they see little benefit from these riches. In recent years, tensions have intensified around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a CPC (Communist Party of China) infrastructure initiative linking western China to the Arabian Sea. While Islamabad views it as lucrative and transformative, Baloch activists see exploitation, displacement, demographic change and militarisation. Security deployments meant to protect investments have also deepened local resentment. Rebel resistance groups have evolved within this environment. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) are among the most prominent armed groups seeking independence or greater autonomy. Their attacks have frequently targeted security forces, infrastructure, and occasionally foreign interests linked to CPC projects. For years, Baloch activist and rebel groups, including BLA and BRA, alongside a wider civil resistance, have tried to peacefully advocate their case. Through diaspora mobilisations, human-rights advocacy and appeals framed around political repression and missing persons. That push has met limited sustained global action, even as major rights bodies and UN-linked voices have repeatedly flagged concerns about human rights crackdowns and enforced disappearances. International human rights groups have documented patterns of disappearances attributed to state security institutions, while the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has publicised experts’ calls for Pakistan to end coercive measures against Baloch activists. As space for non-violent mobilisation narrows, rebel factions have increasingly argued that only armed resistance can force the world to look. That arc resurfaced at the end of January 2026. Coordinated assaults across districts, including Quetta and Gwadar, aimed largely at Pakistan Army targets, led Pakistani security forces to report dozens of rebel deaths in the immediate response, followed by later claims of at least 177 rebel deaths in subsequent operations. Baloch women have also become a visible front line of this escalation: after the 26 April 2022 University of Karachi bombing carried out by Shari Baloch, BLA messaging around the 2026 offensive highlighted two Gen-Z, educated women identified in media reports as Hawa Baloch and Asifa Mengal, linking Mengal to a suicide attack on a Pakistani intelligence facility in Nushki and Hawa Baloch to the earlier killing of her father, a BLA fighter, in clashes with Pakistani Army. The rebel movement’s turn toward headline-grabbing operations has already travelled beyond provincial boundaries. The March 11, 2025, Jaffar Express hijacking became an international story precisely because it fused mass fear with political messaging, projecting the Baloch cause outward even as it deepened public trauma. And running parallel to these attacks is the quieter, grinding image that Baloch campaigners have long used to rally global attention: families outside press clubs, searching for the disappeared; allegations of extrajudicial killings; and a widening gulf between Islamabad’s security-first narrative and the community’s lived experience of pain and coercion. Another shadow lingers from the past. Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in the Chagai hills of Balochistan in May 1998. While celebrated nationally as a strategic milestone, many local Baloch argue the aftermath left lasting geological and human scars that remain insufficiently studied and inadequately addressed: radioactive contamination is alleged to have seeped into nearby soil and water sources; stretches of land in Chagai that were once used for grazing or cultivation are described as turning barren; and the blast sites are said to have deformed the local terrain, damaging flora and fauna. Residents and activists have also long pointed to a pattern of health and social disruption in surrounding communities, reported rises in cancers, skin and eye ailments, and claims of birth defects among children, alongside migration by families who say the area became too hazardous to sustain normal life. Across Europe and the Middle East, diaspora Baloch communities mark March 27,

Canada’s Separatism Double Standard on 'Free Speech Vs Treason' Knocked Out by Trump's Right Hook

Bharat Canada Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Khalistan Pakistan Security

Canada’s Separatism Hypocrisy Knocked Out by Trump

By N. C. Bipindra For years, India has accused Canada of sheltering Khalistani separatist networks that openly call for the dismemberment of the Indian state, often through rallies, illegal referendums and fundraising activities conducted on Canadian soil. Ottawa’s standard response has been predictable: these activities, however offensive to India, fall under the protection of free speech in a liberal democracy. Now, as Canadian leaders bristle at the idea of their own separatists allegedly courting sympathy or support from the United States under a Trump-led political climate, the rhetoric has shifted dramatically. Suddenly, “free expression” has a boundary, and that boundary is labelled “treason.” British Columbia Premier David Eby’s remark captures the mood shift succinctly: “To go to a foreign country and to ask for assistance in breaking up Canada, there’s an old-fashioned word for that. And that word is treason.” The statement, in addition to its directness, stands out for its contrast to Canada’s long-standing defence of Khalistani advocacy as constitutionally protected speech in response to India’s objections. This contradiction sits at the heart of Canada’s current predicament, exposing the uncomfortable gap between universalist liberal principles and national interest-driven political reflexes. Canada’s Long, Uneasy History with Separatism Canada is no stranger to separatist movements. Quebec nationalism has shaped federal politics for decades, ranging from constitutional negotiations to two referendums on secession in 1980 and 1995. Western alienation, particularly in Alberta and Saskatchewan, has periodically spawned its own secessionist rhetoric, often tied to energy policy and perceptions of Ottawa-centric governance. British Columbia, while less institutionally separatist, has its own strains of regional grievance politics. Ottawa’s approach to these movements has generally been pragmatic: tolerate speech, discourage violence, and rely on federalism, economic integration and constitutionalism to keep the country together. Even the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) crisis of the 1970s, marked by terrorism, eventually gave way to political accommodation once violence was rejected. It is against this backdrop that Canada framed its response to Khalistani activism. Ottawa repeatedly argued that as long as these groups did not directly engage in violence within Canada, their advocacy, even for secession abroad, fell under lawful political expression. Khalistan, India and the Free Speech Shield Canada Misused From New Delhi’s perspective, this position has always felt disingenuous. Khalistan is not a theoretical grievance movement. It is tied to a violent insurgency in the 1980s, the assassination of an Indian Prime Minister and the bombing of Air India Flight 182, Canada’s deadliest terrorist attack. India’s argument has been straightforward: allowing individuals and organisations linked to this ideology to operate freely is not neutral liberalism. It is permissiveness with security consequences. Canada, however, consistently invoked a rights-based framework. When India asked Ottawa to curb rallies, posters and “referendums” glorifying separatism or violence, Canadian officials responded with lectures on freedom of expression, rule of law and judicial independence. The message to India was clear: liberal democracies must tolerate even uncomfortable speech. That moral posture is now under strain. Separatism Meets Trump’s Transactional Power Politics The recent US moves under Donald Trump, courting or at least engaging Canadian separatist voices while simultaneously escalating economic pressure, have jolted Ottawa out of its comfort zone. Trump’s statement threatening to decertify Canadian-made aircraft and impose a 50% tariff unless Canada changes its certification practices for Gulfstream jets is classic Trumpian coercive diplomacy: blend trade, nationalism and public spectacle into one negotiating weapon. What makes the moment explosive is the “symbolic overlap” between economic punishment and political messaging. If Canadian separatist leaders are perceived to be seeking favour or leverage in Washington, especially under a president who thrives on exploiting internal divisions abroad, it strikes at the core of Canadian sovereignty anxieties. Hence, the sharp pivot in tone. What was once “speech” becomes “treason” the moment foreign power politics enter the picture. Hypocrisy Problem: Liberal Universalism or Strategic Nationalism Canada’s dilemma is not unique, but it is particularly visible. Liberal democracies often defend abstract principles, such as free speech, association and protest, until those same principles are weaponised against them. When Khalistani groups lobby foreign governments, celebrate separatism or even implicitly threaten India’s territorial integrity, Canada frames it as diaspora politics. When Canadian separatists allegedly seek US backing, it becomes an existential threat. This asymmetry is not lost on India or on other states watching closely. The core inconsistency lies in selective contextualisation. Canada contextualises its own separatist challenges as dangerous and destabilising, but decontextualised India’s, treating Khalistan as merely expressive politics rather than a historically violent movement. The standards change depending on whose national unity is at stake. Law, Treason and the Political Language Elasticity Premier Eby’s use of the word “treason” is politically powerful but legally loaded. In most democracies, treason is narrowly defined, usually involving direct assistance to an enemy during wartime. Stretching the term to cover lobbying or rhetorical appeals abroad may resonate emotionally, but it undermines Canada’s earlier insistence on strict legalism when responding to Indian concerns. This matters because once political language expands to suit convenience, it exposes prior moral claims as contingent rather than principled. India has long argued that separatist advocacy cannot be divorced from geopolitical consequences. Canada is now discovering the same truth, only from the opposite side of the mirror. Trump’s Tariffs and Certification Weaponisation Trump’s aircraft ultimatum adds another layer: economic nationalism as leverage over sovereignty disputes. By tying aircraft certification to trade retaliation, Trump is signalling that regulatory processes themselves are negotiable instruments of power. For Canada, this is doubly uncomfortable. First, it challenges the legitimacy of its regulatory institutions. Second, it reinforces the perception that internal political vulnerabilities, like separatist murmurs, can invite external pressure. Ironically, this is precisely the logic India has used to argue that tolerating extremist diaspora politics weakens state credibility and invites instability. Strategic Implications for India-Canada Relations For New Delhi, the moment offers not only vindication but also opportunity. The contrast between Canada’s moral posturing on Khalistan and its alarm over domestic separatism strengthens India’s long-standing claim of double standards. It also gives Indian diplomats

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The Atlantic Umbrella Is Folding, and Europe Is Relearning Power

A Europe that wants to survive Trump-proofing will have to spend more, produce more, and de-risk more. An India that seeks lasting global standing will have to convert demographic and economic scale into defence-industrial outcomes that allies can bank on. Rahul PAWA | x – @imrahulpawa The fracture in the Western security story is no longer subtle. It is loud, transactional, and increasingly personal, driven by the return of Donald Trump to the world’s most consequential bully pulpit. Europe can still pretend this is a temporary mood swing in Washington, but its institutions are behaving like they know better. The continent that once outsourced deterrence to America, cheap energy to Russia, and industrial inputs to China is now discovering what strategic adulthood costs, and how fast. The war in Ukraine remains the anvil on which Europe’s assumptions keep breaking. For three years, the battlefield has acted like an audit. It has tested whether NATO stockpiles are real, whether European procurement can scale, and whether democracies can sustain willpower when the price is no longer abstract. It is not that Europe has done nothing. It has moved money, missiles, and ammunition. Yet the tempo of the war has repeatedly exposed a deeper weakness: Europe’s defence industry and political cohesion were built for peacetime optimisation, not wartime surge. Even the European Union’s own internal papers and proposals have treated ammunition as a headline requirement, not a footnote, a recognition that industrial mass has returned as a strategic variable. Over this, Trump has layered a second stress test: alliance reliability. NATO is still standing, but it is being bent into a shape that looks less like shared purpose and more like a subscription service. The 5% defence-spending target that began as a negotiating cudgel has become a psychological ceiling Europe is being dared to hit, with public threats and political theatre attached. In June 2025, NATO leaders endorsed a higher spending goal under U.S. pressure, while Trump openly signalled punitive instincts toward laggards, turning collective defence into a live bargaining arena. The Arctic question around Greenland sharpened the point. When the leader of the alliance’s dominant power toys with the idea of coercion against territory tied to Denmark, the damage is not merely diplomatic. It is doctrinal. It normalises the language of acquisition over sovereignty, and it teaches smaller allies that Article 5 comfort depends on the mood in the Oval Office. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen responded in January 2026 by saying dialogue on Arctic security must respect territorial integrity, a sentence that should never have needed repeating inside NATO. The mood has also infected the broader “rules-based order” that Europe invokes as if it were self-executing law. Consider the case of Mauritius and the Chagos Archipelago. In 2019, the International Court of Justice advised that the UK’s separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius was unlawful, and the UN General Assembly called on the United Kingdom to withdraw its administration. Yet great-power interests and basing realities, including the military footprint on Diego Garcia, ensured that legal clarity did not translate into clean compliance. The lesson is corrosive: international law is decisive until it collides with strategic utility. At the United Nations itself, the crisis is even less theoretical. Antonio Guterres warned in late January 2026 of “imminent financial collapse” driven by unpaid dues and structural budget rules, with reporting that the United States is the largest debtor across multiple UN accounts. This is not just a spreadsheet problem. It is a strategic signal: when Washington delays or withholds, the institution’s operational capacity shrinks, and its political centre of gravity shifts. It is also important to be accurate about the money. The United States remains the largest assessed contributor to the UN regular budget, with China close behind; Russia is not remotely the biggest funder, even if it remains a permanent Security Council veto-holder. On peacekeeping assessments, China is a top payer as Russia sits far lower in the table. Europe’s problem is not that Beijing and Moscow have “bought” the UN with donations. It is that a cash-strapped UN becomes more brittle, more politicised, and easier for hard powers to pressure, while America’s own commitment becomes a variable. Trump, meanwhile, has turned the symbolism of peace into another performance metric. He has repeatedly argued he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize, claiming credit for “ending” multiple conflicts, a claim that none beyond the oval office back. The pursuit has become so brazen that it has dragged Nordic leaders into his orbit. Reporting around his communications with Jonas Gahr Støre, and commentary from the Nobel ecosystem, illustrates how a prize meant to sanctify moral authority is being treated as a transactional trophy. All of this lands on a Europe that is trying to rearm while still living inside yesterday’s dependencies. Energy is the most obvious. Before 2022, Russia supplied more than 40% of the EU’s gas. Even after the shock, Russia’s share fell but did not vanish, and the EU has only now finalised a phased ban on Russian gas imports stretching into 2027. Europe lectures the world on strategic discipline while paying, even if less than before, for molecules that help finance the adversary it condemns. The second dependency is industrial: critical minerals, rare earths, magnets, and supply-chain choke points where China remains dominant. The EU’s own Council materials acknowledge cases of near-total reliance, including heavy rare earths. The European Central Bank has warned that export restrictions and disruptions can feed inflation and strategic vulnerability across key industries. Europe cannot speak credibly about sovereignty while its clean-tech and defence-adjacent manufacturing remains exposed to upstream controls. So Europe is talking again, sometimes quietly, sometimes theatrically, about what it once treated as taboo: autonomous deterrence. French President Emmanuel Macron said in March 2025 that he would open a debate on using France’s nuclear deterrent to protect European partners, insisting control would remain French. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has publicly pushed back on fantasies of a separate European army, warning that real autonomy

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Union Budget 2026–27: India’s Fiscal Moment in a Re-Shaped Europe Partnership

Arun Anand When the Union Finance Minister rises to present the Budget for 2026–27, the speech will be heard not merely as an annual fiscal statement but as a strategic signal of how India intends to position itself in a rapidly re-ordering global economy. This Budget arrives at a moment when trade, geopolitics, and industrial policy are converging in unprecedented ways. At the heart of this convergence lies the India–European Union trade agreement, a long-negotiated pact that has moved from aspiration to actionable reality. For India, the European Union is not just another trading partner. It represents one of the world’s largest consumer markets, a hub of advanced manufacturing, a leader in sustainability standards, and a regulatory superpower. The conclusion of the trade agreement has altered the context in which fiscal choices will now be read. Budget 2026–27 is thus expected to go beyond accounting for revenues and expenditures; it must articulate how India plans to convert enhanced market access into competitiveness, jobs, and long-term economic resilience. The global environment in which this Budget is framed is anything but stable. Growth in major economies remains uneven, trade protectionism has not fully receded, and supply chains continue to be reshaped by geopolitical considerations. In this setting, India’s engagement with the EU reflects a strategic bet on rules-based trade, diversification away from over-concentrated markets, and integration into high-value global supply chains. The Budget, therefore, will be scrutinised for how well it aligns domestic policy instruments with this external opportunity. One of the most immediate expectations from Budget 2026–27 is a clear fiscal roadmap to support export-oriented sectors that stand to benefit from the EU agreement. Labour-intensive industries such as textiles, leather, footwear, gems and jewellery, and processed foods are likely to gain preferential access to European markets. However, access alone does not guarantee competitiveness. Indian firms must meet stringent standards relating to quality, safety, traceability, and sustainability. The Budget is expected to acknowledge this reality by prioritising investments in testing infrastructure, certification ecosystems, and compliance facilitation, particularly for small and medium enterprises. MSMEs, in fact, sit at the centre of the India–EU trade opportunity and the Budget challenge alike. While large corporations may have the scale and resources to adapt quickly to European regulatory norms, smaller firms often struggle with the costs of compliance and technology upgradation. Budget 2026–27 will be watched closely for targeted tax incentives, credit support, and technology adoption schemes that can help MSMEs integrate into EU-facing value chains rather than be crowded out by larger players. Another critical dimension is logistics and trade facilitation. Reduced tariffs can only translate into real gains if transaction costs within India are brought down. Delays at ports, fragmented logistics networks, and inconsistent state-level regulations erode export competitiveness. The Budget is expected to reinforce capital expenditure on ports, multimodal logistics parks, and digital trade infrastructure, ensuring that physical and procedural bottlenecks do not undermine the advantages secured through diplomacy. Beyond goods, the India–EU trade agreement also opens new possibilities in services, digital trade, and professional mobility. Europe remains a key destination for Indian IT services, engineering expertise, and skilled professionals. Budget 2026–27 may therefore carry signals on skilling initiatives, digital public infrastructure, and regulatory reforms that enable Indian service providers to scale up their presence in Europe while attracting European investment into India’s knowledge economy. Sustainability is another axis along which the Budget’s EU alignment will be assessed. European trade policy increasingly embeds climate and environmental considerations, and Indian exporters will face rising expectations related to carbon intensity, circular economy practices and responsible sourcing. Rather than viewing this as a constraint, Budget 2026–27 has the opportunity to frame sustainability as a competitiveness lever by supporting green manufacturing, renewable energy adoption in industry, and low-carbon logistics. Fiscal incentives in these areas would signal that India intends to meet global standards on its own terms, without compromising growth. Investment flows form the other side of the trade equation. The EU remains one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment into India, particularly in manufacturing, infrastructure, clean energy, and advanced technologies. The Budget’s approach to taxation stability, dispute resolution, and ease of doing business will therefore be read as a message to European investors. Any steps toward simplifying compliance, ensuring policy predictability, and strengthening contract enforcement would reinforce India’s credibility as a long-term investment destination. At a broader level, Budget 2026–27 will reflect how India sees its role in the emerging global economic architecture. The India–EU agreement is not merely commercial; it is also strategic, reinforcing India’s positioning as a trusted economic partner amid shifting power balances. Fiscal choices that support domestic manufacturing, innovation, and human capital development will be interpreted as India preparing itself not just to trade with Europe, but to co-shape global norms in areas such as digital governance, supply-chain resilience, and sustainable growth. There is also a domestic political economy dimension. Trade agreements often create both winners and adjustment pressures. The Budget will need to demonstrate sensitivity toward sectors and regions that may face increased competition, while ensuring that adjustment costs are managed through skilling, social protection, and targeted support. How effectively this balance is struck will determine whether the EU trade agreement is seen as a national opportunity or a sector-specific gain. Ultimately, Union Budget 2026–27 stands at the intersection of diplomacy and development. It has the potential to serve as India’s first full-fledged “trade-aligned Budget,” one that translates international commitments into domestic capacity. Markets, industries and global partners will look beyond headline numbers to discern the deeper story: whether India is ready to move from negotiating access to delivering outcomes. As Europe looks for reliable partners and India looks to scale its growth ambitions, this Budget could well define how the partnership evolves in practice. The fiscal choices made on this February morning may determine whether the India–EU trade agreement becomes a transformative economic chapter or remains an unrealised promise in the fine print of diplomacy. (Author is a senior journalist & columnist. He has authored more than

Business Economy Geopolitics International Trade

EXPLAINER: India-EU Free Trade Agreement

After roughly 18 years of intermittent negotiations, the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement (FTA), also referred to as a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), was affirmed as concluded on January 27, 2026. Branded as the “mother of all trade deals,” the agreement seeks to increase investment, liberalise trade in goods and services and strengthen strategic and economic ties between India and the EU, one of India’s significant trading partners. Together, India and the EU account for a market of about 2 billion people, a third of global trade and roughly 25% of the world’s GDP. It unites India, which has a sizable consumer market and a rapidly expanding economy, with the EU, one of the biggest economic blocs in the world. The negotiations are settled, but the FTA still has to undergo formal legal scrubbing and ratification by the European Parliament and member states and the Indian government before it can come into force. The implementation is expected in late 2026 or 2027. The India-EU Free Trade Agreement aims to significantly reduce, and in many cases eliminate, tariffs over a broad range of goods and services, facilitating easier trade between two of the world’s largest economic blocs. The importance of the agreement is magnified by the fact that it took a long and arduous path to completion, with negotiations starting in 2007, breaking up in 2013 amidst differences and remaining dormant for almost a decade before being restarted in a different global trade context.

Business Economy Geopolitics International Policy

India-EU ‘Mother of All Deals’ Achieved Biggest Global Trade Shake-Up That Redefined Power

By N. C. Bipindra India and the European Union (EU), on January 27, 2026, signed what leaders are calling the “mother of all trade deals,” a sweeping Free Trade Agreement (FTA) two decades in the making. The pact, agreed during a summit in New Delhi, links two of the world’s largest democratic powers, India with its rapidly expanding economy and the EU with its integrated market of 27 countries, creating a massive economic zone spanning nearly 2 billion people and a quarter of global GDP. This is not just another trade deal. It is a geopolitical pivot point: one that strengthens India’s global economic role, accelerates Europe’s search for reliable partners amid fracturing US relations and reshapes the global trade architecture at a time when traditional trade alliances are under strain. What Is This FTA and Why Has It Been So Big? Negotiations began in 2007 but repeatedly stumbled over tariffs, market access, regulatory differences and standards. Only in recent years, especially amid growing global trade tensions, did talks gain momentum. The final pact aims to lower or eliminate tariffs on over 90% of goods for both sides, expand market access for services, reduce non-tariff barriers and boost investment flows. Key sectors from automobiles to textiles and pharmaceuticals are covered, although sensitive areas like agriculture remain largely excluded due to domestic political concerns. Leaders described it as not just a trade deal, but a strategic partnership, including cooperation in mobility, security and future industrial collaboration. Why This Deal Matters to India Indian exporters now gain preferential or zero-tariff access to the massive EU market, particularly in labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, leather goods, chemicals and marine products: historically areas where India has struggled to secure deep market entry. With India’s manufacturing push seeking global scale, easier access to European inputs, such as machinery, medical devices, high-quality components, means lower production costs and better global supply chain integration. This aligns with India’s broader strategy of becoming a global manufacturing hub rather than a primarily services-oriented economy. Indian exporters have felt the impact of rising US tariff barriers, especially under recent American policies that saw levies of up to 50% on Indian goods in certain sectors. The EU FTA offers a valuable alternative destination at a critical time. EU companies are expected to scale up investments across Indian manufacturing, technology, infrastructure and clean energy sectors, bringing capital, innovation and higher-end industrial activity to India. Why Europe Is Betting Big on India Europe needs stable, diversified markets. China’s slowing growth and geopolitical tensions with the EU over technology and security have encouraged Brussels to seek deeper ties with other large economies. India’s fast-growing consumer base and manufacturing capacity make it an ideal partner. The EU expects its exports to India to potentially double by 2032, saving billions in tariffs and opening opportunities for European cars, machinery and premium goods. Strong economic ties can underpin greater geopolitical alignment on issues from climate policy to digital standards and global governance. How This Compares to US-India and US-EU Trade Talks The US-India talks on an FTA are still in progress, but they have not yet resulted in a comprehensive agreement. US tariff hikes on Indian exports have strained trust and talks have been slow, partly due to competing domestic political agendas and protectionist pressures. Despite long-standing strategic cooperation, not least through defence and technology partnerships, a full trade deal remains elusive, giving the EU an opening to build momentum with India that the United States has so far not fully matched. The EU and US remain massive economic partners, combined they account for trillions in goods and services trade, yet they do not have a dedicated free trade agreement like the one just signed with India. Negotiations toward a free trade pact, notably the 2013 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) proposal, ultimately collapsed in 2016 and recent talks aimed at a new framework have been complicated by political differences. The US and EU signed a “reciprocal, fair and balanced trade” framework in 2025, but the path to comprehensive tariff reduction and deeper market integration remains fraught. Trade disputes aren’t rare either between the US and the EU. Issues like steel and aluminium tariffs, regulatory taxes on tech and agriculture have periodically flared up. A recent flashpoint between the United States and Europe has been tensions over Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark. Trump has been threatening military operations to annex Greenland, a key Arctic territory that could be the key to controlling navigation and the resultant exploitation of the ice-capped region. Throughout 2025–2026, the US made headlines with proposals to acquire Greenland, triggering protests in Copenhagen and raising broader alarm in the EU about US intentions in the Arctic. US threats to levy tariffs on European countries opposing this move sparked fears of a transatlantic trade confrontation. Although President Trump backed off the strongest threats at the World Economic Forum in 2026, the episode has contributed to a sense in some European capitals that Washington’s trade policies can be erratic and unpredictable, fuelling EU efforts to pursue more autonomous global economic partnerships. This isn’t just about Greenland. It reflects deeper frustrations with US unilateral trade policies and protectionist impulses that, in Europe’s view, undermine long-standing transatlantic cooperation. What This Means for the Future of Global Trade The India-EU FTA is a milestone in a world where traditional trade alliances are being reconfigured. Partnerships are no longer simply North Atlantic or US-centric; Asia, Europe and emerging market ties are gaining prominence. Despite a more fragmented global economy and rising protectionism, the India-EU deal demonstrates that deep, rules-based trade agreements remain possible and can drive economic growth and strategic stability. As China continues to assert its economic reach and the US focuses on domestic political priorities, partnerships like the India-EU FTA become crucial counterweights that help middle powers shape the global order. Final Take on India-EU FTA Implications The India-EU free trade agreement is far more than a tariff-cutting pact. It is a powerful global political

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security

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Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh

Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.

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