Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security

Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh

Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.

Bharat Hindus Human Rights Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism

122

Kashmiri Hindus and Atrocity Crimes: A Legal Brief on Persecution and Forced Displacement

The brief argues that the removal of Kashmiri Hindus from the Valley must be read through the law of atrocity crimes, not through the language of “fear,” “sporadic violence,” or “voluntary migration.” Where civilians flee under targeted killings, sexual violence, intimidation, and the collapse of any real safety, the law treats the outcome as coerced displacement. The report applies the tribunal-tested standard of “genuine choice”: if staying is realistically impossible, leaving is not consent. The report aligns the record of atrocities with a structured legal framework. It traces a core objective consistent with ethnic cleansing: the creation of an ethnically homogeneous space through terror-driven removal. It then shows how the victim group was selected on inherited identity, not conduct, Kashmiri Hindus marked as a community. It documents the methods used to compel flight and prevent return: targeted assassinations and massacres, rape and sexual violence as terror, threats and social intimidation, property stripping and cultural erasure. Emblematic cases are examined to demonstrate how individual crimes served a collective outcome, including the assassination of advocate Tika Lal Taploo and the abduction, rape, and murder of Sarla Bhat. Legally, the brief explains that “ethnic cleansing” is not a standalone treaty offence, yet the conduct it describes is fully prosecutable through established categories: persecution, murder, rape, and forcible transfer as crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes within a conflict setting. It situates these findings within Indian constitutional guarantees, equality, life, movement, and religious freedom, alongside public international law standards on forced displacement and persecution. The report also sets out a responsibility chain. It argues that the perpetrator ecosystem was sustained by Pakistan-backed jihad infrastructure and local terrorist networks, and that the enabling environment was reinforced by ideological mobilisation and “soft separatist” cover that normalised denial and insulated perpetrators. Groups discussed include JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-linked networks, Dukhtaran-e-Millat, and separatist fronts operating as political shields, most prominently the Hurriyat Conference. The brief outlines the legal rationale for examining cross-border financing, training, infiltration, and sanctuary under doctrines of state responsibility and aiding-and-assisting.

Geopolitics Human Rights Insurgency International Judiciary Leadership Media News Policy Politics Security United States USA War World

Venezuela Case & UN: Crisis of Global Institutions

The US aggression on Venezuela and the forcible capture of President Maduro raise a serious question about the efficiency of the UN as a global watchdog. It’s time to examine whether nations, which designed the post-1945 system, still regard themselves as committed to it, or treat the UN anchored treaty-based project as optional. Rahul Pawa On January 3, 2026, the U.S. forces launched a surprise strike inside Venezuela and forcibly removed President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, flying them to New York to face the U.S. charges. Reports described explosions in Caracas and the Maduro Government denounced an “imperialist attack” on national sovereignty. President Trump boasted on social media that the strike was carried out “in conjunction with U.S. law enforcement,” heralding Maduro’s capture as a triumph. The world responded with alarm. Venezuela’s interim Vice President, Delcy Rodríguez, demanded proof that the couple was alive. Russia and China voiced their strongest objections. Japan stressed the safety of its nationals, reaffirmed its commitment to “freedom, democracy, and the rule of law,” and indicated that it would work with G7 partners to help stabilise the region, while India expressed “deep concern” and reaffirmed support for the security of the Indian community and the people of Venezuela. Even within the United States, Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged at a press briefing that Congress had not been consulted. These events raise stark legal questions. The core issues are jus ad bellum limits on the use of force, the prohibition on intervention and extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, the personal immunities of incumbent senior officials, and the consequences if the incursion triggered an international armed conflict. U.S. constitutional processes and the War Powers Resolution may constrain American decision-makers as a matter of domestic law, but they do not alter Venezuela’s rights under international law. Armed Assault or Law Enforcement Operation? Under the U.N. Charter, no state may unilaterally use military force against another except with Security Council approval or genuine self-defense. The US administration claims this was a cross-border “law enforcement” operation, but international law treats armed assaults like this as uses of force. As one expert summary notes, counter-narcotics or “illegitimacy” justifications cannot override Article 2(4)’s prohibition. Legal scholars agree that drug trafficking, even if a global scourge, is a criminal matter, not an armed conflict that justifies invasion. Customary international law adds another dimension: sitting heads of state have absolute immunity from arrest by foreign courts. Under the Arrest Warrant case and related practice, Maduro, as the incumbent Venezuelan President enjoys complete “inviolability” from forcible seizure. The U.S. might say it no longer recognises Maduro as legitimate, but international law does not allow one country to strip another’s leader of all protection while still holding it to its obligations. Even if Washington claims Noriega-like precedent, “unilateral kidnapping is unlawful regardless of recognition, and immunity questions aggravate, rather than cure, the illegality.”. Likewise, the principle of non-intervention is clear. “Cross-border apprehension” by force without the host state’s consent is an “unlawful exercise of enforcement power”. By sneaking in Marines or special ops to snatch Maduro, the U.S. bypassed all Venezuelan authorities and UN mechanisms. It also bypassed its own procedures by not informing Congress. As France’s foreign minister noted, the U.S., a Security Council member violated the principle of non-use of force and imposed an external solution, warning that “no sustainable political solution can be imposed from the outside” By employing bombs and missiles on Caracas, the operation arguably triggered an international armed conflict between two states. If so, the full body of international humanitarian law (IHL) applies. Every strike must meet IHL’s distinction and proportionality tests. For example, reported strikes that knocked out civilian power infrastructure would be illegal if the civilian harm outweighed any military gain. Moreover, once Maduro was captured, he became a protected person under the Geneva Conventions. He and his wife would be entitled to safe detention conditions and eventual release or trial, but under domestic law, not as prisoners of war. Importantly, even the abduction itself violates the duty to take “prisoners” only lawfully. In practical terms, neither side seems prepared to declare war, but the weapons used leave no doubt: the U.S. struck fixed targets with lethal force on foreign soil. Still, any escalation (for example armed skirmishes with Venezuelan forces) would immediately invoke full wartime protections. The Maduro abduction cannot be seen in isolation. In recent years, permanent members of the UN Security Council have repeatedly tested, stretched, or disregarded legal constraints: China has rejected the legal effect of the South China Sea arbitral award; Russia’s conduct in Ukraine has triggered sustained allegations of Charter breach; and the United States has its own history of unilateral uses of force, including the closely analogous 1989 intervention in Panama (Operation Just Cause). Each episode erodes confidence that treaties and the Charter’s restraints bind the most powerful as much as the rest. The United States is central to this story not only because it helped design the post-1945 order and was among the earliest to ratify the Charter, but also because its subsequent engagement with the UN’s treaty architecture has been selective. This is illustrated by continued non-ratification of major UN-linked instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Those choices do not reduce UN Charter obligations, but they sharpen doubts about commitment to the wider treaty-based project the UN Charter was designed to anchor. Unsurprisingly, the fiercest reaction came from Russia and China. After a China‑sponsored UNSC emergency session, several members condemned the raid as illegal, echoing concerns about a dangerous precedent. Russia’s Foreign Ministry condemned the raid online as “an act of armed aggression.” Intriguingly, France’s envoy reminded that any UN Security Council permanent member breaking the force ban would have “grave consequences for global security”. The cumulative message is clear: when the great powers act unilaterally, the

Bangladesh Bharat China Economy Geopolitics Human Rights Policy Security

107

Myanmar’s Strategic Crossroads China’s Influence, Western Interests and a Turbulent Election

Arun Anand Myanmar (formerly Burma) sits at a critical crossroads in Asia, both geographically and geopolitically. The country’s location – bordering China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Laos, with a long coastline on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – makes it a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. In fact, Myanmar is often described as the “main connecting hub” linking East, South, and Southeast Asia. Its shores provide access to the Indian Ocean’s major shipping lanes, which has long attracted great power interest. In short, Myanmar’s geostrategic location grants it outsized importance: it is the only Southeast Asian nation sharing borders with both India and China, and it offers a land gateway from the Bay of Bengal into the heart of Asia.

Bharat Education

114

Vivekananda for Gen Z on National Youth Day 2026

Vivekananda for Gen Z on National Youth Day 2026 CIHS DESK Gen Z is at a turning point in 2026. Many young minds, surrounded by information, polarised narratives, and instant outrage, are drawn towards extremes, ideological, political or social, not always out of conviction but frequently out of confusion, rage or a need for meaning. In this context, Swami Vivekananda appears not just as a historical figure but also as a mentor for young people looking for meaning. National Youth Day, which is marked on January 12 to commemorate the birth anniversary of Vivekananda, one of India’s most influential intellectuals and enduring voices for youth upliftment, serves as a reminder that while youth power can be destructive if left unchecked, it can also be transformative when it is grounded in strong values. Long before the internet era, Vivekananda was aware of this threat. He cautioned against mental weakness, emotional excess, and mindless imitation, conditions that frequently lead to vulnerability and exploitation in our times. His timeless teachings connect directly to Gen Z, a generation living through uncertainty and hyper-connectedness, navigating imported “woke” cultural constructs, and increasingly vulnerable to disruptive and extremist ideologies. Vivekananda addressed young people as active creators of the future rather than as passive inheritors of tradition. His message was straightforward but profound: develop inner strength, have faith in yourself, and direct your energy towards positive endeavours. Vivekananda’s teachings provide an alternate route based on purpose, balance, and accountability at a time when many young people look for significance in extremes, whether they be ideological, digital, or social. The notion that education is the unfolding of each person’s inherent excellence rather than just the acquisition of knowledge was fundamental to his worldview. Gen Z, generation rich in knowledge and experience but frequently weighed down by comparison, worry and outside approval, finds great resonance in this concept. Young people are reminded by Vivekananda’s emphasis on self-belief that one’s value is determined by one’s character and inner convictions rather than by followers, trends or approbation. His conviction that knowledge without integrity is worthless feels particularly important in this day and age, when radical groups frequently draw highly educated but morally disengaged adolescents. Self-belief was a fundamental tenet of Swami Vivekananda’s philosophy, as seen by his statement, “Weakness is sin.” He encouraged the young people to believe in themselves by acknowledging the limitless potential that each person possesses. According to him, self-belief is not conceit but rather a profound understanding of one’s inherent power and moral obligation, which elevates people to overcome obstacles, take responsibility and strive for greater goals. This inner confidence, according to Vivekananda, is the cornerstone of nation-building: strong, fearless and disciplined people inevitably develop into responsible citizens who advance society. He thought that a country created by self-assured people would be durable, forward-thinking and cohesive, strong not just materially but also morally and purposefully. Vivekananda’s emphasis on character development over credentials was equally significant. He cautioned that knowledge devoid of integrity is meaningless in an era fixated on rapid success and immediate recognition. He held that the moral foundation of both people and nations is composed of integrity, bravery, empathy and selflessness. Vivekananda’s emphasis on education as the “manifestation of inner perfection” is vital for Generation Z, who are often faced with narratives that split the world into adversaries and allies. This serves as a reminder that trustworthiness and moral fortitude, rather than indignation or radicalism, are the sources of long-lasting impact. Another foundation of the ideals held by Vivekananda was discipline. For him, discipline served as a link between values and conduct. People who possess self-discipline in their thoughts and actions can focus on their goals and use their energy in constructive ways. According to Vivekananda, disciplined people construct powerful organisations and nations and disciplined minds produce ordered lives. He believed that discipline was liberating rather than limiting, enabling people to overcome obstacles and flaws. Another characteristic that set him apart was his fearlessness. Vivekananda exhorted the young people to behave bravely, talk honestly, and think for themselves. But wisdom, not recklessness, was the source of his fearlessness. He was as opposed to blind revolt as he was to blind conformity. This is especially important now since polarisation, fear, and false information can lead young people to adopt extreme viewpoints. Young people are empowered by Vivekananda’s bravery to think critically, question, and change without resorting to violence or hatred. Today, when extremism frequently poses as bravery while stifling introspection and discussion, striking this balance is crucial. Swami Vivekananda, who helped bring Vedanta and Yoga to Western audiences, understood Bhagwan (God) as the universal, formless, all-pervading Truth. He stressed personal, direct realisation over rigid dogma, taught that the divine dwells in every soul, and encouraged people to seek Bhagwan through love, service, and compassion, an outlook profoundly shaped by his guru, Sri Ramakrishna. Combining faith in Bhagwan with self-belief establishes equilibrium, ensuring that power is used for everyone’s benefit and anchoring human endeavour in higher ideals. For Vivekananda, spirituality is a force that propels national advancement and humanitarian service rather than an escape. These principles together create a comprehensive foundation for greatness. Swami Vivekananda envisioned young people who are self-assured but modest, disciplined and energetic, courageous and caring and socially engaged but deeply rooted in their spirituality. He felt that these people are the real builders of a powerful, enlightened, and cohesive civilisation. National Youth Day serves as a reminder that, when directed by admirable ideals, young people’s enthusiasm, inventiveness and tenacity may influence society. Vivekananda’s teachings, “Believe in yourself and believe in Bhagwan (God),” is still relevant and continue to motivate young people to overcome obstacles, give freely to humanity and strive for a just as young people look for significance outside of extremes: true power comes from character, clarity and service rather than radicalism. On his birth anniversary, we are reminded to reflect upon his teachings and inspire young people to lead with honesty, bravery, and compassion, influencing not only their own future but

Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Hindus Bangladesh Bharat Human Rights Khalistan

124

Situational Analysis: Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Khalistani support for Islamist-linked violence and minority killings in Bangladesh, and the appearance of anti-Hindu and anti-India sloganeering outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, reiterate that this is not simply a local Western “public order” problem. It is foreign territory being utilised as an outward-facing theatre for a Pakistan-rooted, anti-India orientation, where street spectacle and digital amplification do the work of deniable pressure.

Bangladesh’s Political Alliances Ahead of the 2026 Elections: Domestic Shifts and Geopolitical Alignments

Bangladesh Bharat Election Hindus Human Rights Leadership Pakistan Policy Politics

163

Bangladesh’s Political Alliances Ahead of the 2026 Elections: Domestic Shifts and Geopolitical Alignments

By N. C. Bipindra As Bangladesh moves toward the general elections scheduled for February 2026, the country is experiencing its most far-reaching political realignment in decades. The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s long-entrenched Awami League dominance following the 2024 mass uprising has dismantled the familiar two-party framework and given rise to a fragmented, competitive political arena. New coalitions, revived Islamist forces and youth-driven political platforms are all vying for space, and their manoeuvring is unfolding amid intensifying regional and global interest. For India, China, the United States and Pakistan, the choices Bangladeshi voters and parties make in 2026 will shape not only domestic governance but also Dhaka’s strategic orientation in South Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. From Awami League Dominance to Political Fragmentation For more than a decade, Bangladesh’s political and foreign policy trajectory was closely associated with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League. Domestically, the party presided over a strong centralised system that delivered economic growth while constricting political competition. Internationally, it cultivated a close strategic partnership with India, maintained extensive economic and infrastructure engagement with China and managed an increasingly strained relationship with the United States over issues of democracy, elections and human rights. The upheaval of 2024 abruptly ended this equilibrium. The interim administration under Muhammad Yunus pledged institutional reform and credible elections, but it also left the Awami League politically marginalised, creating a vacuum that rival forces are now racing to fill. BNP: Strategic Balancer with a Nationalist Tilt In this transformed landscape, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has emerged as the most significant electoral contender. Long the principal opposition to the Awami League, BNP now sees itself as the natural governing alternative in a post-Hasina order. Its campaign narrative centres on restoring democratic norms, recalibrating economic policy, and reasserting civilian political authority. The death of party chairperson Khaleda Zia in December 2025 has accelerated a generational shift within the BNP, with her son Tarique Rahman assuming a central leadership role and directing alliance-building efforts ahead of the polls. This transition has infused the party with renewed urgency but also heightened scrutiny of its internal cohesion and strategic direction. Geopolitically, a BNP-led government would likely pursue a more balanced and less India-centric foreign policy than the Awami League. While ties with New Delhi would remain important, BNP has historically been more cautious, sometimes sceptical, of India’s influence and would seek a relationship framed more explicitly around reciprocity and sovereignty. At the same time, BNP is open to deepening economic engagement with China, viewing Beijing primarily as a source of investment and infrastructure rather than an ideological partner. Relations with the United States are expected to improve relative to the later Awami League years, as Washington sees BNP as more receptive to competitive politics, though US support would remain contingent on credible elections and limits on Islamist influence. Any warming of ties with Pakistan under a BNP government would likely be symbolic rather than transformative, constrained by historical sensitivities and limited economic incentives. Islamist Bloc: Ideological Identity, Strategic Ambiguity Alongside BNP’s resurgence, the return of Islamist politics has added a new layer of complexity to the electoral contest. The reinstatement of Jamaat-e-Islami has allowed it to rebuild an Islamist-leaning bloc drawing on conservative rural constituencies and religious networks. Although Jamaat is unlikely to dominate nationally, it is well-positioned to influence outcomes in a fragmented parliament. Its re-entry into mainstream politics has unsettled secular and centrist forces, raising questions about Bangladesh’s ideological trajectory after years of enforced secularism under the Awami League. From a geopolitical perspective, Jamaat’s participation is viewed with unease by both India and the United States. New Delhi associates Islamist political mobilisation with potential risks to border security and counter-extremism cooperation, while Washington remains wary of Jamaat’s ideological orientation and historical baggage. Pakistan, by contrast, sees a degree of ideological affinity in Jamaat’s worldview, though this does not automatically translate into strategic alignment. China has taken a more pragmatic stance, showing little concern for Jamaat’s ideology so long as political stability is maintained and economic engagements remain intact. In this sense, Islamist influence complicates Bangladesh’s external relationships without clearly anchoring the country to any single power. National Citizen Party (NCP): Reformist Politics, Geopolitical Ambiguity Another significant player in the evolving political landscape is the National Citizen Party, a youth-led formation that emerged from the 2024 protest movement. The NCP articulates a reformist agenda centred on institutional accountability, anti-corruption measures and generational change in politics. Its rise reflects widespread public fatigue with dynastic politics and entrenched elites. However, the party’s limited grassroots organisation and inexperience have constrained its electoral prospects, pushing it toward alliance calculations that have sparked internal divisions, particularly over potential cooperation with Islamist groups. Internationally, NCP’s discourse resonates most strongly with Western actors, especially the United States, which views its emphasis on transparency and civic rights as aligned with democratic norms. The party has not articulated a clear or consistent stance toward India or China, reflecting both its novelty and its focus on domestic reform rather than foreign policy. Over the longer term, NCP represents a potential new political elite that could tilt Bangladesh toward stronger engagement with Western institutions, but in the immediate electoral cycle, its influence is likely to be indirect, mediated through alliances. Awami League Remnant: Pro-India, Diminished but Not Irrelevant Although the Awami League has been largely sidelined, its residual networks within the bureaucracy, business community and local governance structures continue to matter. Any partial rehabilitation of the party would be welcomed in New Delhi, which still regards the Awami League as its most reliable partner in Bangladesh. However, strained relations with the United States and deep hostility toward Pakistan would remain defining features of an Awami League foreign policy orientation, limiting its room for manoeuvre even if it regains political relevance. Democracy, Stability, and Strategic Competition For the United States, 2026 election represents a test of process rather than personalities. Washington’s primary concerns revolve around electoral credibility, political pluralism and the containment of violent extremism. A BNP-led or broadly technocratic

Ideology Before Inquiry? A Rejoinder to New York Times RSS Narrative

Bharat Disinformation Geopolitics Hindus

223

Ideology Before Inquiry? A Rejoinder to New York Times RSS Narrative

Dr. Aniket Pingley I am not a journalist by profession. But like any reader who values intellectual honesty, I expect journalism to adhere to its own stated standards of ethics, verification, and fairness. In its article published by NYT titled “From the Shadows to Power: How the Hindu Right Reshaped India,” that expectation is repeatedly taken for a toss. If the NYT is willing to relax on standards when writing about the RSS, readers are entitled to ask whether what is being offered is reporting at all, or merely a predetermined story wearing the language of journalism. This essay examines where and how the article by Mashal and Kumar departs from those standards. My critique does not rest on disagreement with conclusions alone, but on demonstrable violations of widely accepted journalistic ethics, as codified in the IFJ Global Charter of Ethics for Journalists, the Munich Charter, and the Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics. In the sections that follow, I identify specific statements from the article, map them to the standards they violate, and offer rewritten versions showing how the same points could have been presented in a professional manner. 1. Failure: Fact–Opinion Separation Violated Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “The far-right group known as the R.S.S. has spent a century trying to make India a Hindu-first nation.” “The journalist shall make sure to clearly distinguish factual information from commentary and criticism.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 2 Founded in 1925, the RSS has articulated a vision of national identity centered on Hindu cultural/civilizational unity. Critics interpret this vision as seeking a Hindu-first political order, an interpretation the organization has refuted consistently. India, that is Bharat, is a Hindu nation. The word Hindu transcends Hinduism (religion). Hindu is the collective identity of the people of this nation called Bharat. The nationhood of Hindus has evolved over thousands of years independently of the kingdoms in Bharat and their political boundaries. 2. Failure: Loaded Language Used as Factual Description Statement Violated standard How should it have been written Some common sense “The R.S.S. originated as a shadowy cabal for the revival of Hindu pride after a long history of Muslim invasions and colonial rule in India, its early leaders openly drawing inspiration from the nationalist formula of Fascist parties in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” “Avoid stereotyping. Journalists should examine the ways their values and experiences may shape their reporting.” – SPJ Code of Ethics The RSS began as a small, closely organized volunteer movement during the colonial period, operating primarily through local branches, called as shakhas, rather than public political platforms. An honest discussion with the RSS leadership reveals that the founder Dr. Hedgewar was inspired by the vision of Swami Vivekananda, Yogi Aurobindo, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Bal Gangadhar Tilak etc. The RSS was founded in 1925, about half a decade prior to the start fascism in Europe. Why would anyone in the RSS had to go to Europe to learn about martial discipline if they could simply observe the British exercise the same, first-hand and for free? Suggested reading for NYT: Bhawani Mandir pamphlet written by Yogi Aurobindo in 1905. 3. Failure: Suppression of Essential Context Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “It’s philosophy casts India’s Muslims and Christians as descendants of foreign invaders who need to be put in their place.” “The journalist shall not suppress essential information or falsify any document.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 3 Some critics argue that certain Hindutva interpretations frame Indian history through a civilizational lens that emphasizes foreign invasions. RSS leaders, however, state that their definition of national belonging is cultural rather than religious and applies to all citizens. As a matter of fact, Sarasanghachalak Dr. Mohan Bhagwat has stated, on record, umpteen times that everyone in Bharat shares a “common DNA”, irrespective of their faith. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/living-in-harmony-is-our-culture-mohan-bhagwat-says-dna-of-people-in-undivided-india-same-for-40000-years-as-rss-marks-100-years/articleshow/123528212.cms The article itself states: “Their definition is a cultural one, and they consider everyone living in India as Hindu, he (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) said.” 4 & 5. Failure: Causal Claims Without Verification and Prediction Presented as Fact 2 Statements Violated standards How should it have been written “The R.S.S. has infiltrated and co-opted India’s institutions to such a degree …” “that its deep roots will ensure it remains a powerful force long after Mr. Modi is gone.” “Never confuse the work of a journalist with that of a publicist or a propagandist.” – Charter of Munich, Responsibility 9 “The notion of urgency or immediacy in the dissemination of information shall not take precedence over verification.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 5 Individuals associated with organizations that describe ideological affinity with the RSS are present across political parties, civil society groups, and public institutions in India. Scholars and analysts disagree on whether this presence reflects coordinated organizational strategy, informal ideological influence, or the broader political mobilization of Hindu nationalist ideas. However, no judicial findings or investigative agency has proven that the R.S.S exercises institutional control over state bodies or established centralized direction of such influence. 6. Failure: Unfounded Accusations by Association Statement Violated standard Counter question for the NYT “And when you see Hindu vigilantes parading through Muslim neighbourhoods or ransacking churches, you are seeing the R.S.S. affiliates exercising their vision of supremacy.” “Slander, libel, defamation, unfounded accusations are serious professional misconduct.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 10 The article itself states: “He (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) discouraged engaging in hooliganism and incitement of violence”. The basis of this article is a study conducted by Felix Pal that attempts to establish RSS having a tight control over all its affiliates. So does the RSS’s discouragement to incitement of violence and its affiliates’ “exercising their vision of supremacy” through hooliganism logically add up? 7. Failure: Unverified causal theory presented as settled fact Statement Violated standard Counter statement with similar flavour “But the formula has remained central to its success ever since: uniting Hindus around grievances from the past and injecting

Bharat Hindus Leadership Policy

128

A Civilisational Reawakening in 1943

CIHS Desk On the morning of 30 December 1943, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose fulfilled his vow, he hoisted the tricolour at Port Blair. This was no ritual gesture but a declaration that the soul of Bharat had arisen. Under Bose’s leadership of the Azad Hind Fauj, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were liberated from British colonial occupation. The solemn Cellular Jail, long the symbol of British cruelty, now looked on as its jailors empire began to crumble. The flag fluttering at Netaji Stadium (then the Gymkhana Ground) proclaimed that India’s freedom was no longer a distant dream, it was being claimed here and now. In mid-1943, Bose had already proclaimed the Azad Hind Sarkar, India’s first provisional government in Singapore. He made clear that this was not a symbolic cabinet-in-exile, but a strategic, ideological and military assertion of India’s right to self-rule. The INA raised its own treasury and even issued stamps and currency under Bose’s tricolour, signaling real statehood. India’s freedom struggle had transformed into a true war of liberation. Bose explicitly rejected petitions and half-measures: “India would fight for her freedom not through pleas or petitions, but through armed struggle and sacrifice,” he declared. In his words, the Azad Hind Government was “the Government of the free Indians… representing the will of the entire Indian people”. This fiery claim of sovereignty stunned the colonial occupiers. By late 1943, even a Japanese handover made Port Blair and nearby islands the first piece of Indian soil “freed from British rule.” On 30 December itself, Bose stood before a crowd of freedom-loving Andamanis. With pride and resolve he unfurled the tricolour at the very spot where countless patriots like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar had once been tortured. The effect was electric. In a speech charged with the fervor of Bharat Mata, Bose invoked the martyrs of the Cellular Jail, comparing its gates opening to the fall of the Bastille in France, and consecrated the day as one of liberation. He renamed the Andaman’s as Shaheed Dweep (Martyr’s Island) and the Nicobar’s as Swaraj Dweep (Self-Rule Island), dedicating them to the memory of India’s sacrificed heroes. This was more than pageantry, the tricolour rising there “symbolised not just the freedom of the islands but the resurgence of India’s spirit”. The colonial empire understood the message: Indians had moved from petitions to power, and Britain’s colonial story was broken. Bose’s act proclaimed that India would seize its destiny “through determination, sacrifice, disciplined action and uncompromising courage,” not through British concession. 30 December 1943 therefore must be remembered not as a footnote, but as a defining assertion of Bharat’s civilizational will. On that day, Netaji, born of a family steeped in patriotism, rekindled the ancient flame of Bharat’s freedom. The raising of the tricolour at Port Blair stands as a witness that India’s independence was not granted but earned, seized by heroes who embodied the country’s spiritual resilience. This is the legacy of that day, a story of national awakening that resonates with the soul of Bharat.

Between Washington and Beijing, India Steadily Rewrites the Space Race

Bharat China Defence International Technology United States USA

103

Between Washington and Beijing, India Steadily Rewrites the Space Race

In an era increasingly defined by a U.S.-China contest for orbit, India’s space wave is emerging as the third force: not just competitive but trusted. Rahul PAWA | @imrahulpawa (X) From Sriharikota’s launch pads to orbiting skies, India’s space agency ISRO has quietly become the go-to commercial launcher for dozens of countries. In the past decade, Indian rockets have placed nearly 390 foreign satellites into orbit. The United States is by far the biggest client, 232 U.S. built satellites have hitched rides with India since 2014, but others are close behind. For example, Britain has sent roughly 83 satellites via ISRO, Singapore about 19, with Canada and South Korea also among the customers (8 and 5 satellites respectively). Space industry analysts note that ISRO “has become a symbol of reliability and innovation, with rockets praised for precision, efficiency and affordability. This reputation for dependable, cost-effective launches helps explain why a dozen nations now entrust key payloads to India’s launchers. At the heart of ISRO’s appeal is its workhorse rocket, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). Decades of development have yielded an unusually high success rate, about 94% over 63 missions to date and even occasional world records. In 2017, for instance, a single PSLV mission put 104 satellites into orbit at once shattering the previous record and demonstrating ISRO’s scheduling precision and multi-payload management. As ISRO executives have noted, each launch showcases India’s growing expertise and boosts international confidence. This technical reliability comes with a financial edge. ISRO’s launch prices are substantially lower than many competitor rates. One survey finds PSLV missions run on the order of $21-31 million apiece, compared with roughly $62-67 million for a SpaceX Falcon 9 and $178 million for a Europe’s Ariane 5. Even for very small satellites, India is pushing the cost down. Its new Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) is advertised around $3.7 million per flight, a tiny fraction of Western ride-share prices. In short, ISRO offers clients a low-cost, high reliability launch option. No wonder space agencies and companies in emerging markets often choose India when budgets are tight or missions are sensitive. Countries and companies have leveraged ISRO’s launchers across a range of applications. In Europe-India collaborations, the UK’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. contracted ISRO to orbit two remote-sensing satellites in 2018: NovaSAR (an S-band synthetic-aperture radar craft) and S1-4 (a high-resolution optical imager) to monitor forests, floods and ships. Likewise, Brazil launched its Amazonia-1 Earth-observation satellite on a PSLV in 2021, gathering critical imagery of Amazon deforestation and agriculture. Singapore has also joined the client roster: in 2023 PSLV carried the TeLEOS‑2 radar satellite and a small experimental payload (LUMILITE‑4) for Singapore’s government, both intended for maritime and environmental data collection. American commercial entities make heavy use of India’s ride shares. For example, a single 2017 launch carried 96 cubesats built by U.S. companies: 88 from Planet Labs for high-resolution Earth imaging and 8 from Spire Global carrying weather and ship-tracking sensors. ISRO’s track record gives confidence even to sensitive payloads, from Earth-observation craft to communication satellites. Recent missions have included U.S. tech-firms communications spacecraft (AST Space Mobile’s BlueBird satellite) and French company data-relay microsats, all trusting PSLV or India’s heavy-lift GSLV rocket to deliver them to precise orbits. In every case, India’s rockets deliver their payloads efficiently attracting clients from around the globe. Back home, this international success has coincided with a boom in India’s private space industry. Since 2020 the PM Narendra Modi led government has opened the sector, launching an independent regulator (IN-SPACe) and a dedicated $1.2 billion venture fund to back innovation. The result: over 200 new space startups have emerged, from launch-vehicle builders to satellite manufacturers and data analytics firms. These companies are designing everything from small rockets to Earth-observation constellations. Government studies project India’s space economy could quintuple, reaching around $44 billion by the early 2030s as the country captures 8-10% of a global market that could hit that size. Even global investors are taking notice: for example, Google’s parent Alphabet has put $36 million into one Indian satellite startup to build hyper spectral-imaging craft. Crucially, India’s startups stand to benefit from ISRO’s infrastructure even as they go commercial. By law, private launches must use ISRO launchpads, and new small-launcher ventures are in line to use the upcoming Sriharikota New Spaceport as well as the older coastal range. Meanwhile, partnerships abound: several startups work alongside ISRO labs (for avionics, propulsion or data downlinks), and some major projects (like Gaganyaan astronaut flights) channel advanced R&D that will have civilian spinoffs. In short, India’s homegrown space ecosystem is maturing just as global demand for satellites is exploding. This groundswell highlights the imperative that India is not just a launcher for others, but a growing hub of space innovation. In pure dollar terms, the satellite-launch business has so far yielded moderate sums for India. The official trade data show that ISRO’s foreign-launch revenue from 2015-2024 totalled on the order of $143 million. (By comparison, SpaceX alone earned tens of billions over the same period.) However, a more detailed breakdown highlights rapid growth: India’s Minister for Department of Space, Dr. Jitendra Singh recently reported about $172 million in receipts from U.S. satellite contracts and €292 million from Europe in the last decade, with more launches on the manifest. Crucially, these revenues come from launch service fees, not counting the wide range of data and technology that follow. What matters more is momentum. The global space market is on a steep upward trajectory. Goldman Sachs analysts estimate up to 70,000 new satellites will be launched worldwide in the next five years, as low-orbit constellations multiply and nations seek independent capabilities. To capture a share of that market, India leverages its reputation for reliability and low-cost service. Policy planners note that India’s portion of the global space economy (currently around 2%) could realistically rise into the high single digits or 10% range by the early 2030s. Now competing head-to-head with American and Chinese players, ISRO is no longer merely offering “low

Blog Post