Violent protests by students against job quotas may have been conveniently used by Beijing & Islamabad to further their interests
Rahul Pawa
China, Pakistan, geo-political interest groups and international stakeholders may have muddied Bangladesh waters. They may have either directly or indirectly contributed to current wave of violent protests that resulted in 130 fatalities.
These players may have conveniently used the anger against quotas for government jobs as a cover to stroke flames of dissent against Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League government.
The current spate of violent incidents seems to have been triggered by Communist Party of China and Pakistan that have taken an adversarial position and spread discontent against Sheikh Hasina’s government.
Protests erupted after Appellate Division of the Supreme Court decided on July 10, 2024 to maintain status quo on quota system intended for freedom fighters and their families for four weeks. This came after a High Court ruled on June 5, 2024 that declared 2018 government circular canceling 30 per cent quota for freedom fighter’s descendants in government jobs illegal. This sparked widespread anger among students and larger population, culminating in violent clashes and a death toll that continued to rise.
Students from various universities in Dhaka united to demand quota reforms. After initial postponement owing to Eid and summer holidays, students movement resumed on July 1 with demonstrations. Students and teachers from public universities like University of Dhaka, Rajshahi University of Engineering and Technology and Jahangirnagar University, among others were soon joined by counterparts from private institutions such as North South University and BRAC University.
Under the banner of Anti-discrimination Students Movement, they launched ‘Bangla Blockade’ (Bangladesh Shutdown) thereby disrupting domestic train and road transportation networks. Online activism surged with calls for “another 2018” in reference to previous quota reform movement. Subsequently, protestors call for a ‘Bangla Blockade’ intensified on July 7. As demonstrations spread nationwide, clashes with police on July 11 marked a significant escalation.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s remarks on July 14, referring to Razakars (Bangladeshis who collaborated with Pakistan during 1971war) made during a press conference after her return from China coupled with the ruling Awami League’s hardened stance intensified the situation. This led to violent suppressions by Chhatra League and resulted in hundreds of injuries.
The kindling for this unrest had been laid well before the court’s ruling as flames were fanned earlier this month during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Beijing from July 8 to 10, 2024. The visit, intended to secure significant financial aid and strengthen bilateral ties ended abruptly, hinting at Hasina’s deep-seated dissatisfaction with the Communist Party of China (CPC). China offered only $100 million in financial assistance, a far cry from the initially promised $5 billion.
Adding to the discord, Xi gave Hasina very little time as Beijing proposed a controversial ten-year re-education policy aimed at countering Islamic culture and promoting Chinese lifestyles, similar to measures implemented in Pakistan during 2010. This proposal, perceived as racist and a direct affront to Bangladesh’s cultural sovereignty, significantly strained Dhaka – Beijing relationship.
The protests in Dhaka quickly escalated as protesting students and citizens voiced their dissatisfaction with reinstated job reservation quota. This policy initially abolished in 2018 reserved 30 percent government jobs for families of 1971 independence war veterans. The new quota system, viewed as unreasonable and discriminatory, exacerbated existing frustrations amid high unemployment and rampant inflation. Pakistan-backed Islamist groups such as Jamat-e-Islami, which have significantly undermined Bangladesh’s private sector, exacerbating economic challenges the country already faces.This influence, funded by the Middle East via Pakistan, has made government jobs even more sought after. The resulting volatility in the private sector has created a hostile environment, where economic grievances easily morph into political unrest.
This destabilising influence was earlier evident during the violent response to the Bangladesh government’s attempt to modernise labor laws in 2018. The proposed changes aimed to attract more foreign investment by aligning local labour practices with international standards. However, Islamist groups, heavily funded by Pakistan vehemently opposed these changes arguing they would undermine Islamic values and worker rights. Jamat-e-Islami with its significant political clout mobilised large-scale protests and strikes which paralysed many sectors of the economy including the vital garment industry. This unrest discouraged foreign investment and highlighted the fragility of private sector in the face of Islamist political and religious extremism.
Moreover, China’s involvement in Bangladesh’s student unions further escalates the situation. Reports indicate that CPC has infiltrated Bangladesh universities through education and student exchange programmes. Five Chinese universities in Yunnan province alone teach Bangla language and culture, sending students to Dhaka to create intelligence assets and funding channels for student wings.
This strategy aims to mobilise Bangladeshi students against their own government’s policies thereby creating more space for CPC influence. Notably, student unions that staunchly defended Islam in Bangladesh remained conspicuously silent on CPC policies against Uyghur Muslims. The current situation reiterates CPC’s potential to influence and organise student protests in Bangladesh. Earlier, on April 13, 2021, students gathered at the Dhaka Press Club, demanding better arrangements from Hasina Administration for studying in China. The protest pressuring the Bangladeshi government nearly turned violent, demonstrating CPC’s influence and capability to mobilise students in Dhaka, highlighting its broader strategy of using education and cultural programs as tools of influence.
Moreover, China-Pakistan nexus in Bangladesh adds another layer of complexity. Pakistani students often affiliated with Jamat-e-Islami collaborate with their Bangladeshi counterparts facilitating communication and coordination for protests. The human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity of Pakistan’s ISI has been instrumental in channeling Chinese funds to stage ongoing protests in Dhaka. Bangladeshi workers in Chinese companies are reported to have been trained to mobilise pro-China rallies as seen in 2019 when workers of Jingjiu Group in Bangladesh who were seen chanting Pro-China slogans in Mandarin.
Intriguingly, CPC’s interest in Bangladesh extends beyond financial aid. Beijing aimed to establish strong foothold in South Asia leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aspiring to integrate Bangladesh into its economic sphere. Despite the disappointing loan offer, China has committed to supporting the Southern Integrated Development Initiative (SIDI) which focused on developing Payra Port and other infrastructure projects in Bangladesh and recent contention with Hasina, wasn’t in its interests. This commitment showcases CPC’s strategic intent to maintain and expand its influence in the region.
Whereas, Pakistan’s involvement in Bangladesh’s current turmoil is deeply rooted in historical animosities. Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, gained independence in 1971 after a brutal war that left deep scars. Pakistan’s defeat in that war still resonated and Islamabad’s attempts to influence Bangladesh’s political landscape can be seen as efforts to save its face and regain lost ground. Overall, the collaboration between Pakistan-backed Islamist groups and Chinese interests add a layer of geopolitical intrigue to the ongoing unrest.
Ultimately, the current unrest in Bangladesh is potent reminder of fragile balance in Asian geopolitics. The protests, driven by economic nuances and exacerbated by external influences, underscore the challenges faced by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s administration. The strategic decisions made by Bangladesh’s leadership in navigating these influences will be crucial in determining the nation’s trajectory in the coming years.
(Author is Director – research at Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies, a bipartisan think tank based out of New Delhi)
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