Bharat China Geopolitics Policy Politics United States USA World

Ice Breaker or Thucydides Trap?

Presidents’ Xi and Donald J Trump see hope in this revolving relationship while contentious issues were swept under the carpet. K.A. Badarinath Did the ice finally break between President Xi Jingping and his US host Donald Trump? Were they able to transact some business at the White House after pomp and show displayed on arrival of President Xi. Diplomatic niceties and cordial atmosphere apart, there was not much in terms of take aways from the meeting held by Presidents’ Xi and Trump. Does that mean they are back to square one squabbling and pointing fingers at each other with military buildup thrown in? This again is a firm no. Huge ambitions and expectations apart, biggest outcome during UN General Assembly engagements in New York and later at bilateral summit in Washington DC is that both are willing to engage honestly and wee bit openly on key issues. They may continue to race with each other. The two may like to avoid direct confrontation. The G2 – USA and China – may open a range of communication points. Is the big billed summit all about just opening communication lines? Or, some baby steps taken? Donald Trump may have signed the Lindsay O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. If made operative, its implications are too huge. But Donald Trump may not be in a hurry to apply various provisions of this law on China. In effect, US will not slap 100 per cent tariffs on Chinese goods and services exports. The 100 per cent tariff is tied to China buying oil, gas and other merchandise from Russia and backing its partner Iran. The existing 26 per cent tariff will stay. Well, even the three months pause on application of this one-sided draconian law would mean that Beijing will continue with its merchandise and goods exports to US. Beijing has a whopping US $ one trillion plus trade surpluses in its annual transactions with America. Communist Party of China and its oligarchs’ breath easy next three months as they scramble ways and means to doing business with US without derailing the delicate apple cart with Russia and Iran. The duo has been trusted partners of Beijing. Xi may not be willing to let go of his friendship with both Moscow and Tehran easily. The three months reprieve would give time and enough elbow room to Beijing for readying counter measures and take on the deep state propelled United States that has not logically dealt with either friends or foes. For Trump, these three months would help shore up his dwindling electoral fortunes ahead of the November midterm polls where Republicans may be facing tough time with the electorate. Wall Street Journal polls have reported that Trump’s approval ratings have dropped to 37 per cent, lowest for any incumbent President since 1990s. Inflationary pressure, economic uncertainties due to continued flare up in West Asia is what President Trump may be against while he seeks to campaign for Republican candidates in half a dozen states beginning next week. Both Presidents, Xi and Trump seem to have reconciled that geo-strategic and economic differences will continue to mar their chances of striking a working relationship. For instance, President Xi may not have got any assurance from his American host on withdrawing support to Taiwan which Beijing considers as part of its larger communist empire. Normalization of trade and investment relations in medium to long term may be too early to predict given competing interests, divergence in opinions and strategies. President Xi did not take any of his top business representatives to US. This definitely speaks volumes. On Indo-Pacific also there may be no road map anytime soon given the divergent positions on freedom to navigate as per international maritime pacts without interference from Chinese naval vessels. Reports suggest that there’s no convergence on Artificial Intelligence related framework as well though top AI honchos were lined up by Trump at the dinner with President Xi. Presence of Sundar Pichai, Sam Altman and Jensen Huang at the state dinner did not un-nerve the Chinese delegation. There was no joint communique at the end of summit level talks between President Xi and Donald Trump. And, this gave enough fodder for the paparazzi to make wild but intelligent guesses on what transpired between the two leaders and their A teams. At the end, the big question was did the two leaders get into Thucydides trap? Or, is it an evolving relationship holding promise? (author is a veteran journalist, Director & Chief Executive of non-partisan, New Delhi based think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Bharat Business Economy Geopolitics Policy Trade United States USA World

Is US a Trusted Ally?

Bharat has too much at stake with President Trump signing the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act. It is bound to impact free trade deal. N. C. Bipindra President Donald Trump signed Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law on September 18, 2026 at a White House ceremony expanding statutory sanctions, tariffs, and prohibitions targeting Russia and extending existing sanctions on Iran. Named after late Republican senator who championed it prior to his death in July, the bill had been a long journey since Graham introduced an earlier version in the Senate in April 2025 and was eventually co-written with Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal to secure bipartisan backing. US Senate cleared it 86-11 in August before the House passed it 262-159. The law’s most consequential provision for New Delhi: it allows President Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on goods from each of the top five importers of Russian oil and natural gas, a group in which India figures prominently. Will Trump Pull the Trigger? Crucially, the tariff is discretionary, not automatic. The measure does not automatically impose 100 per cent tariff on any specific country, and legal analysts note the United States may impose a lower rate, providing India with diplomatic space to negotiate a reduced tariff, an exemption, a transition period, or a formal presidential waiver. This is not Trump’s first use of tariffs as coercive leverage against India over Russian crude. He had already raised India tariffs to 50 per cent adding 25 per cent penalty tied to Russian oil purchases, framing India as “directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil” despite calling it a friend with unusually high tariffs. Given that history, most trade analysts expect Trump to use the new authority as a negotiating cudgel rather than a blunt instrument, deploying the threat to extract further concessions in the ongoing Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) rather than triggering an immediate 100 per cent duty that could derail a deal both sides say is nearly finished. While India’s foreign minister Subramanyam Jaishankar flagged the tariff issue with his US counterpart Marc Rubio, Bharat’s Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal said that the trade deal with US was a ‘done deal’. If key provisions of US Free Trade Agreement have already been frozen, then the new anti-Russia law may not have a bearing on India. Impact on US-India FTA The timing is delicate. Just days before the Act’s signing, Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said the two countries were “about 99 percent” done with first tranche of a trade deal, with a US delegation led by Assistant USTR Brendan Lynch holding three days of talks in New Delhi. Bharat’s Ministry of External Affairs separately described the latest round as “positive and forward-looking,” covering a broad range of issues aimed at reaching an early agreement, while reaffirming India’s commitment to comprehensive global strategic partnership with Washington. The new sanctions law effectively hangs a sword over that near-final text: New Delhi now has to weigh how any energy-related concession might be legally required to keep the tariff dormant, even as Commerce Secretary-level officials examine how recent legal changes should be reflected in the final agreement text. A prolonged standoff could push the interim deal’s signing further into 2027, jeopardising the two countries’ shared target of boosting bilateral trade to $ 500 billion by 2030. Wider Implications for US-India Ties India’s official response has been measured but firm. Ministry of External Affairs said it had noted the Act’s passage. It reiterated its commitment to ensuring energy security for 1.4 billion people through diversified sourcing, adding that the issue had been discussed at high levels with US interlocutors and that India would take necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests. That “people-first” framing, echoed in Hindi-language coverage describing India’s insistence that energy security for its citizens is the priority, signals New Delhi will not publicly capitulate, even as it continues quiet diplomacy. The exposure is real: Russia supplied more than 51 per cent of India’s crude-oil imports in July 2026, up sharply from roughly a third of imports before the Ukraine war intensified price arbitrage in Russia’s favour. Analysts warn that repeated coercive tariff threats, layered atop the earlier 50 per cent duties, risk eroding trust in the “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership,” pushing India to hedge harder towards BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and its own strategic autonomy doctrine, even as defence and technology cooperation, such as iCET and jet-engine co-production, continue on a separate track. Russia-Ukraine Dimension Beyond India, the law is squarely aimed at blocking financing Russia’s war machine. It imposes sanctions on Russian officials, financial institutions, defence-related networks and “shadow fleet” of vessels used to evade Western restrictions, while extending the Iran Sanctions Act for five years. Senator Katie Britt called it a message that “the United States stands unified in our opposition to their acts of aggression against Ukraine”. Democratic senators have taken an even harder line: Richard Blumenthal reportedly warned India to “better clean up your act” on Russian oil purchases. Moscow, for its part, has dismissed the law as an unfriendly act, while Beijing called it “long-arm jurisdiction” lacking authorisation under international law or the UN Security Council, both countries signalling they will not bow to pressure. The standoff between Washington DC and Moscow notwithstanding, US has extended an invite to President Putin to participate in the G-20 summit it would host later in the year. Putin acknowledged the invite but has not yet decided on his participation. Global Implications The law’s five-largest-importer trigger effectively targets China and India simultaneously and the Atlantic Council has noted it could authorise tariffs of up to 100 per cent on Chinese imports on national-security grounds if Beijing continues buying Russian oil. That dual exposure could push Beijing and New Delhi, usually rivals, toward tactical coordination on sanctions-evasion workarounds, alternative payment rails and diversified crude sourcing from the Gulf, West Africa, and the Americas. A blanket 100 per cent tariff

Bharat China Economy Geopolitics International Leadership Policy

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India and the Next BRICS: Turning Diversity into Strategic Influence

Sankalp Singh Chauhan India’s historic BRICS Presidency comes at a defining moment for the global order. Its challenge is not to build another bloc, but to make a more diverse world capable of working together. What began as BRIC, Brazil, Russia, India and China, formally came together at its first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, transformed it into BRICS after South Africa’s inclusion. For more than a decade the five-country grouping steadily developed cooperation in finance, development and global governance. The major expansion of 2024 brought Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates into the fold, while Indonesia joined in 2025, taking BRICS to 11 full members. India now assumes the chair at a particularly consequential moment: the grouping has evolved from a compact association of emerging economies into a much broader platform representing a significant voice of the Global South. The world itself is entering an era of profound geopolitical and economic realignment. Wars and conflicts, supply-chain disruptions, economic uncertainty, technological competition and growing dissatisfaction with existing multilateral institutions are reshaping the international system. Against this backdrop, India’s 2026 Presidency is not merely another turn in the rotational calendar; it is an opportunity to shape what the expanded BRICS becomes next. With 11 full members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, BRICS now has considerably greater geopolitical and economic weight. Its influence is further widened by 10 partner countries viz., Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. This expansion gives BRICS greater reach, but also a harder task: how can countries with different political systems, economic interests and strategic priorities translate diversity into cooperation? That is where India can make a distinctive contribution. From Expansion to Delivery: India’s presidency has an opportunity to move BRICS beyond declarations and towards practical cooperation. The priorities are clear: trade and investment, resilient supply chains, energy and food security, health, climate action, digital public infrastructure, technology, connectivity and reform of global institutions. The test will be whether these priorities produce institutions and mechanisms that citizens and businesses can actually use. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure offers an important model. Greater interoperability of digital payment systems, cross-border transactions and financial technology could lower transaction costs and strengthen economic ties across the Global South. The ambition should be neither isolation from the West nor confrontation with it. It should be strategic autonomy combined with inclusive multilateralism. The Currency Question: Few ideas surrounding BRICS attract as much attention as the possibility of a BRICS currency. Yet credibility requires distinguishing aspiration from reality. A common currency is not an established BRICS policy. The more immediate and practical path is the expansion of local-currency trade, payment-system interoperability and alternative cross-border financial mechanisms. Over time, these could evolve into a broader financial architecture, including a possible common unit of account or other settlement mechanism, without requiring an immediate monetary union. The objective is therefore not simply “de-dollarisation.” It is to create more choice, resilience and efficiency in international finance. BRICS as an Innovation Platform: The next phase of BRICS should also be defined by technological cooperation. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum technologies, space, clean energy, agricultural technology and digital commerce offer areas where emerging economies can move from being technology consumers to technology creators. A BRICS innovation ecosystem, supported by research partnerships, start-up networks, technology funds and easier movement of knowledge and capital, could become one of the grouping’s most consequential long-term projects. Equally important are areas of human security: affordable healthcare, food security, climate resilience, disaster management and sustainable infrastructure. A Wider Global South: The expansion of BRICS has made its relationship with the wider developing world increasingly important. Partner countries and BRICS Plus outreach can give smaller and emerging economies a greater voice without requiring every country to become a full member. This broader architecture could become one of BRICS’s greatest strengths, provided expansion does not overwhelm decision-making. India’s diplomatic challenge is therefore to build consensus without sacrificing ambition. What Success Should Look Like: The success of India’s Presidency should ultimately be judged not by the number of declarations issued, but by what changes after the summit. First, BRICS should deliver measurable progress in trade and investment, including easier market access, stronger supply-chain resilience, greater MSME participation and mechanisms that make South-South commerce faster and less costly. Second, it should advance a genuinely connected digital and financial architecture. Interoperable payment systems, greater use of national currencies and more efficient cross-border settlements could provide an immediate, practical foundation for deeper financial cooperation. Third, success should mean tangible cooperation in energy, food, health and climate security. In a world vulnerable to energy shocks, food disruptions, pandemics and extreme weather, these are not peripheral development issues; they are questions of global stability. Fourth, BRICS should create an innovation and technology agenda capable of connecting universities, researchers, entrepreneurs and industries across member and partner countries. Cooperation in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum technology, space and clean energy could determine whether the Global South becomes merely a larger market or a major source of future innovation. Finally, India’s Presidency should strengthen the voice of developing countries in global governance. Reform of institutions such as the United Nations, IMF and World Bank should aim at greater representation, legitimacy and responsiveness, not at replacing one hierarchy with another. Perhaps the most important measure of success will be whether BRICS can demonstrate that geopolitical diversity does not have to produce institutional paralysis. Can countries with competing strategic interests still cooperate on issues of common interest? Can BRICS remain economically ambitious without becoming an anti-Western alliance? Can its expanded membership create wider representation without diluting effectiveness? And can India preserve its role as a bridge between competing centres of power? If the answer is yes, BRICS could move from being primarily a grouping of emerging economies to becoming a credible platform for a more balanced international system. India’s role will be central to that transition. India has

China Geopolitics International Leadership Policy

896

Keeping The Window Open!

Delicate balancing of relations between US, China & Russia is test of Bharat’s foreign policy framework that centres on strategic autonomy. K.A.Badarinath Will there be a huge shift in Bharat’s foreign policy framework? Or, possible tilt towards China, Russia conglomeration, a permanent feature? Will this lead to increased distancing between India and US under Republican White House stewardship? What’s in store on geo-political, strategic and economic engagement for Bharat and the world? There are several unanswered and unsettling questions that pop up in inter-personal conversations and on the information highways as one scans on Google, Weibo to Douyin. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China and Japan has set off a flurry of conversations internationally. Both, Beijing and Tokyo are most intrinsic foes that do not have much in common especially after the war leading to Japan’s surrender in 1945. Several questions that analysts, anchors and seasoned newsmen are also awe-stuck given that in the first place he lined up the visits to both China and Japan in one go. Secondly, not only do they keep distance but belong to two diametrically opposite camps but have huge issues in global equations. While China and Russia have had rivalled US-led NATO group, Japan falls into the latter alliance. Thirdly, this visit of Prime Minister Modi is significant in the backdrop of United States President Donald Trump weaponising trade, imposing 50 per cent tariff on Bharat’s goods and services and thereby burning bridges. Fourthly, Prime Minister Modi’s two nation visit gained prominence as the ‘global south’ network seeks to consolidate its position via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization whose twentieth session was held in Tianjin as China holds the rotating chair as of now. Fifth, most analysts think that Bharat’s ‘strategic autonomy’ policy framework is being put to test with re-setting its relations vis-à-vis US and China. Sixth, however, top hawks in Bharat’s foreign affairs department do expect the relations with United States to bounce back to normalcy as had happened in the past after Washington DC imposed unilateral sanctions in aftermath of Pokharan nuclear tests. Seventh, the probability of a ‘delicate balancing act’ that New Delhi would enact with caution but firmness of purpose as its near time posturing without yielding to bullying tactics of US. Eighth, there’s no reason why Bharat should not continue oil trade with Russia or any other country depending on prevailing market conditions. Neither US nor Europe have locus standi to corner Bharat citing oil trade given their own continued ‘lucrative gas deals’ with Russia and its partners. Ninth, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to both Japan and China indicate that Bharat has the depth to manage diversities. For instance, enhancing Japanese investments to US $ 68 billion from $ 34 billion through 170 deals is a big take away for both Bharat and Japan who enjoy strategic and special relationship. This is a firm message for US that sought to dry up the foreign investment pipeline in Bharat to push for a ‘bad trade deal’. By not participating in a significant programme to commemorate China’s victory over Japan is again a big message to Beijing that New Delhi has its friends elsewhere as well. Bilateral summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping has been regarded as pivotal to ‘resetting relations’ as development partners and ‘not as rivals’. While the intent is good, first step has been taken to normalise relations, there are several challenges especially on borders, Belt and Roads Initiative that brings Chinese projects to the doorstep via Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Apprehensions seem to be very high on both over outcome of these meetings even as China and Bharat ready to celebrate 75-years of diplomatic relations. One significant point made by Prime Minister Modi that has gone viral was border peace and tranquillity was like an insurance policy for future enduring relations. Can the dragon and elephant in the room tango seamlessly is a billion dollar question as resetting of relations is attempted. As one Chinese scholar wrote ‘it’s rational choice and shared responsibility for both India and China to reset relations’. A big take away is a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin with carpooling and Ridge Carlton delegation level talks happening in a ‘delightful’ atmosphere. The visuals and videos of Modi, Putin traveling in a Russian made car throwing protocols to winds is not something European Union or US will want to watch. Given that US described Russia and Ukraine conflict as ‘Modi’s war’ has had no impact on the two leaders’ summit deliberations that extended a wee-bit. Also, 2025 marks 15 years of Indo-Russian strategic relationship that would come into full play later this year. From Bharat’s perspective, there have been a few takeaways from 20-members SCO summit. Unadulterated condemnation of Pahalgam attack by terrorists from across the borders is what India expected and achieved. Also, expanding trade relations between different SCO member countries with payments squared off in respective currencies is big. This would also mean that increasingly trade would get delinked from US dollar and euro while Chinese Renminbi, Russian rouble and Indian Rupee would gain in terms of acceptability. While the show in China came to a near close, the implications of new found friendship between Presidents’ Xi, Putin and Prime Minister Modi will result in sleepless nights for those in Trump administration and Brussels, housing headquarters of European Union. (Author is Director and Chief Executive of New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies) Keeping The Window Open!

Business Economy Geopolitics Trade World

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Damn EU Oil sanctions!

Strategic autonomy coupled with its right to source crude at affordable prices and quality is non-negotiable. Here’s New India… By NC Bipindra Latest round of sanctions announced by European Union on July 18, 2025, has opened a new chapter in the growing geopolitical standoff between Brussels and New Delhi. For the first time, EU has directly targeted Indian oil trade, specifically naming Nayara Energy’s Vadinar refinery which is majority-owned by Russia’s Rosneft. The EU sanctions, coming as it does within days of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s warning about secondary sanctions on India, are part of these regional institutions’ crackdown on what it calls indirect financing of Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. At the heart of this issue lies India’s continued and unapologetic purchase of discounted Russian crude. India has been refining this oil and exporting resultant diesel and jet fuel, some of which flows back into Europe. While New Delhi views this as a perfectly legal and economically sound strategy, Brussels sees it as a dangerous workaround that weakens Western sanctions regime. What makes this clash more than a bureaucratic quarrel is its broader significance for global energy markets, economic diplomacy and tests limits of Western pressure in a multipolar world. Why Is the EU Escalating Pressure on India over Russian Oil Purchases? EU wants to isolate Russia economically. India, however, is determined not to compromise its energy security and strategic autonomy, the principles it considers non-negotiable. From European perspective, India’s growing role as a refinery hub for Russian crude threatens to undercut its sanctions framework. Eighteenth package of EU sanctions which includes lowering price cap on Russian crude to about $ 47.60 per barrel and sanctioning over 100 tankers in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” is aimed at choking off alternative routes for Russian oil revenue. By focusing on Indian exports and targeting refineries like Vadinar, Europe is sending a clear message that it will go after any actor — state or private — that contributes to propping up Moscow’s war chest. What are Its Strategic Imperatives? But India isn’t taking this lightly. Ministry of External Affairs responded swiftly and sternly, calling the EU’s actions unilateral and unjust. Officials in New Delhi accused the bloc of practicing double standards, pointing to Europe’s own imports of Russian LNG and uranium even after war in Ukraine escalated. Energy security, Indian leaders assert, is not just a matter of policy but a constitutional duty, especially for a developing nation with over 1.4 billion people striving for economic growth and social stability. From New Delhi’s standpoint, its trade with Russia is both lawful and pragmatic. Indian officials frequently cite EU Regulation 833 / 2014, which states that once a good is substantially transformed in a third country, it is no longer considered to originate from the sanctioned country. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar and Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri have made this argument repeatedly, maintaining that diesel refined in India is legally distinct from the Russian crude it was made from. The economic logic behind this policy is also compelling. Minister Puri has stated that importing discounted oil from Russia has saved India billions of dollars, helped stabilise inflation and shielded consumers from worst of global energy shock. In a world still reeling from economic aftershocks of the pandemic and the war, these savings have helped India remain on a steady growth trajectory while other economies faltered. India’s position is also shaped by deeper strategic calculations. The country has long prided itself on its foreign policy of non-alignment, now recast as “strategic autonomy.” This allows New Delhi to navigate complex relationships with both the West and traditional partners like Russia without being forced to pick sides. India’s close defence and energy ties with Moscow continue, even as it deepens cooperation with the United States and European Union in other areas like technology, trade, and counterterrorism. What are India’s Strategic Options? Rather than cave in to external pressure, India has quietly but effectively diversified its oil imports. Over past year, it has increased purchases from Middle Eastern countries, United States, Brazil and new suppliers in Africa and Latin America. This diversification has enabled India to demonstrate that it is not wholly dependent on Russian oil, even as it defends its right to continue buying it. At the same time, India has expanded its investment in natural gas, renewables and long-term energy security. A 15-year LNG deal with United Arab Emirates’ ADNOC, for example, will bring in one million tonnes of gas annually, supporting the country’s gradual shift toward cleaner fuels. India’s resilience is also built on its ability to conduct trade outside of Western financial and logistical systems. Russia has set up rupee-based trade settlements, used vostro accounts through Indian banks and relied on non-Western insurance and shipping firms. This alternative infrastructure insulates India-Russia energy trade from Western sanctions to a large extent and helps maintain stability despite external disruptions. Even as EU tightens restrictions and hints at possible secondary sanctions, India continues to find new export markets for its refined petroleum products. Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America have emerged as key destinations where buyers are less concerned about the origins of crude and more focused on price and availability. These regions offer India a buffer against any loss of European markets, keeping its refineries running and export revenues intact. At the legal level, India has pushed back forcefully the very idea of violating sanctions. Indian legal experts argue that under international law, unilateral sanctions not backed by United Nations are not binding. New Delhi has taken this position consistently and has also pointed out hypocrisy of Europe’s own uneven implementation of sanctions where Russian LNG and enriched uranium remain untouched by embargoes. Behind all this lies a larger philosophical question. Should developing countries bear the brunt of economic disruptions caused by conflicts they did not start and do not control? India has answered this with a firm no. It argues that energy access at affordable prices is a matter of global

Geopolitics International Security War World

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Ukraine Takes Drone Wars to Next Level

From Trojan Horse to pager bombs, Ukraine’s drones have rewritten war tactics while Russia puts up a red face. N. C. Bipindra Ukraine’s audacious drone attacks on airbases deep inside Russian territory are so brazen that such tactics have never been attempted before. The targeting of five Russian airbases — one of them over 4,500 km away from the Ukrainian border has reportedly destroyed over 40 military aircraft, including some long-distance bombers that were tormenting Ukrainians for nearly two years now. The use of cheap, off-the-shelf modified and armed drones is asymmetry in warfare taken to the next level. The drone strikes on June 1, 2025, are now being likened to Israeli Mossad pager bombs that took out a massive number of Hezbollah terror operatives inside Lebanon and the visit of unknown gunmen to wanted terrorists inside Pakistan in recent years. The drone attacks came after a long-drawn-out plan by Ukrainian military along with its intelligence units. The Ukrainians packed the armed drones onto cargo trucks and hid them with wooden planks under the truck roofs. Once the trucks reached too close to four airbases that were targeted — Belaya in Siberia’s Irkutsk region, Olenya in Arctic Murmansk area, Ivanovo Severny near Ivanovo city, Dyagilevo in Ryazan and Ukrainka in Russia’s Far East the drones swarms were unleashed on Russian military aviation assets parked there. While the Belaya base in Irkutsk region was some 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles) from Ukraine’s border with Russia, the Olenya base near Murmansk in the Arctic Circle was more than 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) from Ukraine’s border. The shortest distances covered by drone-carrying trucks were to Diaghilev airbase in Ryazan Oblast, some 520 kilometers (320 miles) from Ukraine and Ivanovo air base for Russian military transport aircraft was some 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the border. These visible distances notwithstanding, Ukraine’s daring drone attacks under Operation Spider Web targeted Ukrainka, the furthest airbase at over 8,000 km in Russia’s East, too far away from the war frontline. In Trojan-horse style attacks, Ukraine launched 117 drones concealed in container trucks, according to one Ukrainian account, striking with precision at airbases across Russia. Ukraine seems to have chosen this covert operation because the Western missiles supplied to it, such as the American ATACMS and European Storm Shadow, lacked the range to reach so deep inside Russia. Ukraine has been using drones against Russian targets, including Moscow, for last three years now. But majority of these drone attacks have been intercepted by Russians, essentially due to low speed of these unmanned aerial vehicles. Operation Spider Web’s audacity essentially played out due to Ukraine smuggling them into Russia and deploying them next to its target sites. Russia, obviously, was complacent with security of at least three of the five air bases, comfortable in the thought that it was too deep inside its territory for Ukrainians to even think of targeting them, a devastating mistake in defence preparedness, when military operations were prolonged beyond what was first envisaged when it began in February 2022. Moscow had presumed its airbases and military facilities deep inside its territory were safe, given their distance from Ukraine. Russia-Ukraine war, progressing for last three years now, has turned the warfare paradigm upside down. Till the Russia-Ukraine war began over Kyiv’s attempt to join the anti-Russia military bloc in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), military thought leadership was talking for nearly two decades about a short, swift and destructive warfare. Russia’s obvious military strength notwithstanding, its military operations did not result in quick surrender of a comparatively weaker Ukraine. The Russian neighbour a nation that was once part of the Soviet bloc held back the military onslaught for a while and by doing so, got the support of its friends in NATO. The US, Germany and other NATO nations sent billions of dollars’ worth arms and ammunition, battle tanks, air defence systems and fighter jets to Ukraine for its David vs Goliath moment. Satellite images, videos and photographs of the damage on these five airbases show Russia’s Tu-160, Tu-22 and Tu-95 nuke-carrying bombers key to their air power were hit badly with plumes of black smoke rising. Among destroyed air assets of Russia were Ilyushin Il-78 airborne refueling aircraft and advanced A-50 early warning and control aircraft a prized possession for airborne intelligence and radar warnings. Though Russia had tried to protect these assets with decoys, these measures failed miserably. Whether Western powers were involved in planning and execution of Operation Spider Web will be known later as more details of Ukraine’s attacks on Russia become public. But what could be worrying both Ukraine and NATO nations would be Russia’s response to Operation Spider Web. Ukraine and its friends in the West would be hoping that Ukraine’s drones circumventing Russian defenses and blowing up their military aviation assets would cause a major psychological blow to Russia’s air force. Truth be told, Operation Spider Web did lift Kyiv’s spirits and it is a dent to Moscow’s morale. But what they may have discounted is that Russia still holds air superiority overall against Ukraine and it may come back to deliver a crushing blow to Ukrainians at a place and time of its choosing, including an unequal nuclear response. If the nukes get involved in Russia’s war, then it could be game over for both Ukraine and NATO. The current Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul have already stalled, with Russian officials signaling no desire for compromise. The Ukrainian drone strike could mean the end of peace with Russia altogether. In response, Britain has announced a £350 million package to supply 100,000 drones to Ukraine by April 2026, reinforcing Kyiv’s growing drone warfare capabilities. In the second Armenia-Azerbaijan war for Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, Azerbaijani forces widespread use of drones was seen as crucial in determining the conflict’s outcome in their favour. Since then, drone warfare, particularly the asymmetric nature of advantage cheap, easily modifiable unmanned aerial systems bring to the table, has been a major focus

Brief – Moscow Diplomacy: PM Modi’s Strategic Engagement in Russia

Geopolitics International

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Brief – Moscow Diplomacy: PM Modi’s Strategic Engagement in Russia

The official visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Moscow from July 8-9, 2024 was a watershed moment for relations between Delhi and Moscow. In his departure statement, PM Narendra Modi talked about special and privileged strategic partnership between India and Russia. He further stressed the achievements of both nations in the past decade in areas of energy, security, trade, investment, health, education, culture, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges. The strength of strategic partnerships between the two nations was demonstrated by this first bilateral summit since December 2021. The summit gave two leaders an opportunity to evaluate and strengthen bilateral ties. In constantly shifting global dynamics, pressing issues and new areas of collaboration exist for further bilateral developments.

Disinformation Geopolitics Policy Security

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Foreign Funding Has No Place in Democratic Self-Governance!

Vinod Kumar Shukla In Abraham Lincoln’s words democracy is a government of the people, by the people and for the people which supposedly means free from any influence to protect the rights of citizens of democratic self-governance. But foreign intervention has become a big challenge for democratic countries around the world and the US is also not free from it. To facilitate all this, US federal law prohibits foreign citizens and governments from spending in any election in the US. But certain foreign players cocked a snook at law in 2016 and 2020 by spending huge money to influence US elections exposing vulnerabilities of campaign finance laws. Such elements are still at work in the 2024 elections. With the digital world being a reality, laws governing campaign finance systems failed to catch up. Inaction by Federal Election Commission (FEC) and inadequate Electoral Transparency Laws allow foreign players to influence US elections. Around $1 billion “dark money,” has been spent over the past one decade. National Counterintelligence And Security Center tells that foreign interference fall into five categories: Cyber operations targeting election infrastructure; Cyber operations targeting political parties, campaigns, and public officials; Covert influence operations to assist or harm political organizations, campaigns, or public officials; Covert influence operations to influence public opinion and sow division; and Covert efforts to influence policymakers and the public. Narrative of political image; internet communities created for specific electoral goals and extensive use of humour and satire to influence electorates were at play in the campaigns in the US. The US State Department recently alleged Russia for covertly spending over $300 million since 2014 to influence elections in more than two dozen countries which is just the tip of the iceberg. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his three-day visit to China in April 2024 said that there is evidence of Chinese attempts to “influence and arguably interfere” upcoming US elections, despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s commitment not to do so. A Microsoft research report published in April 2024 suggests that Russian online campaigns to influence November 2024 US elections geared up over the past 45 days, but the pace is slower than the past elections. Russia-linked accounts are allegedly disseminating divisive content. The observation of Microsoft is that activities of Russia are not as intense as in previous elections but it may increase in the days to come. Online disinformation campaigns are unleashed with posts starting with a whistleblower or citizen journalist posting content on a video channel or social media. That content is mostly taken up by websites like DC Weekly, Miami Chronicle and The Intel Drop. However, the Kremlin has denied any such meddling in November 2024 elections and also in 2016 and 2020 elections. China too has been interfering in the democratic process of countries across the world for a long time which has now become a foreign policy trouble for the US administration especially for those managing the poll process. Both Joe Biden and Donald Trump are of the view that China has the intent and capabilities to challenge the US-led world order. But the Biden administration has outlined several reasons to remain engaged with China. This might make sense to US companies working in China and to political realists who don’t see much wrong in working out a way to coexist with another great power. But 81 per cent Republicans, 59 per cent Independents and 56 per cent Democrats see China as a threat giving Republicans a political stick to beat Biden with for going soft on China. As it gives green signal to foreign interests to spend money on elections despite the fact that there is a ban on foreign spending in Federal, State, and local elections. The FEC interprets the ban applicable on contesting elections and letting foreign players pour millions in elections. For the US, dealing with foreign interference in elections has been critical since Russia allegedly worked to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Investigations reveal that Russia targeted Black Americans on social media to disincentivize them from voting in the 2016 election — the tactics were aimed at magnifying race-based societal divisions. Since then, the US adopted a whole-of-government approach against election cyberthreats and foreign interference ensuring that all government agencies work in tandem to track and counter cyberthreats on election-related manipulations to protect voters’ objectivity and election infrastructure. China has been meddling elections in every corner of the globe and the US being the most apparent target for its geopolitical interests. In February 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated: “Beijing is expanding its global covert influence posture to better support the CCP’s goals. The PRC aims to sow doubts about US leadership, undermine democracy, and extend Beijing’s influence.” The US media extensively reported that covert Chinese accounts were masquerading online as American supporters of former President Donald Trump, promoting conspiracy theories, stoking domestic divisions and attacking President Biden ahead of the November election. This ‘spamouflage’ prompted Meta to take down thousands of fake Facebook accounts operating in China. But Chinese interference in elections is a significant policy change. In 2021, the US intelligence departments concluded that China would not interfere in US elections. The Chinese decision was attributed to the fact that costs of being caught meddling harms the country of potential benefits as Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 election significantly damaged Moscow’s position and relationship with the US. Still the US authorities were not off guard and were looking at every aspect of foreign intervention knowing well that if there is any gap in the US laws and they remained unaddressed, foreign players can and will exploit them. Plugging loopholes that permit foreign spending and making the source of campaign funds transparent can prevent foreign players influencing the US elections. A strong policy to prevent foreign interference in elections must include updating treatment of digital campaign advertisements and requiring disclosure of the true source of campaign funds. But also spending in elections by

Geopolitics Leadership Policy

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Strategic Autonomy, Balancing Powers

Indo-Russian summit strengthened special & privileged strategic partnership. India offers to play role of a peacenik in Ukraine conflict Dr. Punit Gaur Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two day visit to Russia has been watched keenly across world capitals. Especially so, given that it is the first bilateral engagement of Modi in his third term and it coincided with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Washington DC. Modi’s Russia visit to participate in the twenty second annual summit of India and Russia invited sharp reactions from Indian allies and foes alike. From US, European Union to Ukraine, there were comments on what Prime Minister Modi should be doing in Moscow. The Moscow summit is a first after President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi in 2021 and this engagement has come in the backdrop of ongoing conflict on East European front with Ukraine. Perhaps, global leaders expected serious talks between Modi and Putin that paved for a swift and organic end to the bloody conflict in Ukraine. To their great comfort, Prime Minister Modi did not let them down, Modi made serious attempts to counsel and convince President Putin that peace in the region was not possible with blood on hands. At the same time, Modi played a balancing act not to annoy his host in Moscow who spent most of the two days with Indian Prime Minister. On its part, Keiv expressed its disappointment on Modi’s visit to Moscow though President Zelensky is fully aware of Bharat’s position vis-à-vis Russia. Resilience in relations between the two partners who have evolved relations despite challenges may not have missed Zelensky while stating the obvious on Modi’s Moscow visit. Even White House and European Union may have known the inseparable strategic relations between Bharat and Russia. Several firsts marked Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow. The milestones crossed during the visit underscore profound significance attached to this bilateral engagement. Russia’s highest state decoration, the Order of St Andrew was bestowed on Modi that may not go well with India bashers. This award signifies PM Modi’s efforts to cultivate bilateral relations between India and Russia. In 2000, India took the initiative to commence the cycle of annual summits between two countries at highest level. The tradition of having structured high-level discussions has been easily recognized by both sides as a way to take the bilateral relations to next level each time. India-Russia trade has seen an unprecedented surge to more than US $ 65 billion in 2022 owing to diverse products and services and there’s no denying the fact that energy constitute a big chunk of this bilateral transactions. India’s continued oil and gas dealings with Moscow have not gone well with the Western powers. US $ 100 billion bilateral trade targeted in six years during Modi’s visit is yet again a milestone that can be easily achieved. In recent years, Russia’s Far East and Arctic have drawn India’s attention as possible strategic investment sites. Though national currencies account for 60 per cent trade between India and Russia, the urgency for quicker and more real-time settlement of transactions is growing, especially in backdrop of Russia that got delinked from SWIFT ecosystem. Ignoring the unilateral sanctions on Russia and threats from US, India has not only maintained but strengthened its diplomatic and commercial ties with Moscow. These ties fraught with challenges and underscores the need for more diversified trade. Additionally, India has increased military collaboration with Russia announcing plans to work together on weapon manufacture, joint deployment of troops, vessels and fighter jets and access to military installations. India and Russia call on visa-free travel would significantly boost tourism and people-to-people connectivity. The move to allow students and visitors to use national currency, clearances for MiR cards in India and RuPay cards in Russia is again a significant first. The proposal to open two more consulates in Russia underlines the importance of economic and cultural ties and holds the potential for further economic growth. Bharat’s decision to go ahead with ‘strategic autonomy’ on multilateral issues is what most allies have been trying to come to terms with. When Modi and Putin spoke at Uzbekistan in 2022 during Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) conference, he reportedly told the Russian president, “This is not the time for war.” This stance was reiterated during Modi’s Moscow visit while amplifying Bharat’s policy framework. India adopted an autonomous neutral stance regarding Ukraine and did not sign a joint communiqué at the Switzerland Summit last insisting on conditions for participation of all parties including Russia for lasting peace. Upholding UN Charter’s tenets, especially concerning value of preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity was also insisted upon in Switzerland as well as Russia now. India firmly rejected the idea of using force to settle disputes. Peaceful negotiation and diplomacy are the most critical approaches for all disputes and this position reflected in Modi’s engagement with Russia. One significant development is Bharat’s willingness and commitment to offer a platform and play the role of a mediator for the peace process has again come to fore. At the same time, Bharat has emphasized that Russia should guarantee safety and repatriation of its citizens who are employed by Russian military ever since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began. President Putin’s ready agreement on this request is a significant take away from Moscow. Russia seeks to create a multipolar world order and India vying for for a key role among Global South countries regard one another as crucial political allies. Russia continues to be an essential supplier of weapons, energy and space technology, all of which India views as necessary for its transition to become a major developed country by 2047. Modi’s trip to Russia not only demonstrates New Delhi’s intention to grow ties with Russia but underscores the potential for significant mutual benefits and the importance of India’s strategic autonomy. (Author is a Research Fellow at Indian Council of World Affairs with focus on Eurasia)

Fact Sheet

Explainer:India’s energy security

In the last few decades, nation states have become increasingly aware of the limited resources which surround them and have formulated pointed strategies to ensure they have sufficient energy resources to keep their economy running. In the last year, when the conflict between Russia and Ukraine deepened, global supply chains of raw energy material have been put under the scanner. Several countries have imposed full or partial bans on Russian oil and gas while some have increased the intake of these Russian materials owing to discounted prices. The West, specially, the US, EU and other NATO countries have been urging other nations, like India to cut trade ties with Russia and to reduce their dependence on Russian crude oil and gas. In this backdrop, as data suggests, India must ensure its energy needs are met timely to sustain its economic growth and accelerate social progress and development. It is essential to analyse the energy requirements of India vis-a-vis the supply of energy raw materials and how India continues to diversify its energy supply. As India becomes the third biggest importer of crude oil from Russia, it is imperative for other nation states to holistically view the Indian energy demand patterns and its production.

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