CIHS – Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies

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Britain's Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

Britain’s Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American WestAsia. Britain just made that job easier. Rahul Pawa On 21 September 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer broke with decades of U.K. policy formally recognising the state of Palestine. It was Britain’s most consequential West East move since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, made over explicit U.S. objections and Israeli fury. In London’s rush to show moral leadership, one reality was ignored: Beijing had spent six decades preparing for this moment. The CCP’s Palestinian project began in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1970, Beijing sent small arms, mortars and anti-tank weapons to the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It trained cadres at the Whampoa Military Academy in Nanning and dispatched instructors to Syria and Algeria. In May 1966 Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Ahmad al-Shuqairy thanked “Peking” for constant arms and training shipments. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli commanders displayed captured Chinese-made AK-47s, 81mm mortars and chemical decontamination gear seized in Gaza and Sinai. Alongside, Beijing also built a diplomatic bridge. In December 1995 it opened a foreign office in Gaza; a de facto embassy to the Palestinian Authority, decades before most Western states considered recognition. Its message to Palestinians was consistent: you can count on us when the West won’t. By Xi Jinping’s era the posture turned strategic. In 2017 the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a Red Sea hub housing thousands of Chinese troops. Beijing secured port stakes from Gwadar in Pakistan to Haifa in Israel, embedding itself along the arteries that supply Europe and the Gulf. A 25-year strategic agreement with Iran in 2021 locked in $400 billion in Chinese investments across oil, gas and transport corridors. CCP’s pattern is clear: first ports, then troops. Djibouti proved it, Hambantota confirmed it, Gaza may be next. Beijing has already demonstrated how commercial access becomes military power, and a recognised Palestine gives it the opening to repeat the same playbook on the Mediterranean. While Beijing built bricks abroad it built narratives at home. State-aligned Arabic media channels and TikTok streams pump out Gaza content at scale. A July 2025 Program on Extremism report mapped how the CCP’s influence runs through Western activism itself. That report details how Shanghai-based tech investor Neville Roy Singham, a onetime Huawei adviser, poured millions into U.S. and U.K. activist groups after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack. Groups like the People’s Forum, ANSWER Coalition and “Shut It Down for Palestine” became organising hubs for anti-Israel protests. BreakThrough News, their media arm, live-streamed marches while praising Xi Jinping Thought and Maoist revolution. Investigators concluded the effect was “to project the CCP as a defender of justice while undermining U.S. influence.” In December 2023 the People’s Forum hosted a “China75” event lauding Beijing’s governance model; by early 2024 its funding spiked from under $500,000 to $4.4 million as it expanded pro-Palestinian actions. The same network underwrote protests at Columbia University and in Whitehall, echoing CCP state rhetoric about “imperialist Zionism.” When Starmer spoke to recognise Palestine, Beijing didn’t improvise. Chinese State media instantly framed Britain’s recognition as vindication of the CCP’s “historic” support for Palestinian independence. Chinese diplomats in Ramallah pointed out they had welcomed Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing two years earlier and had pushed a ceasefire plan in 2023. They reminded Palestinian officials who had invested in them when no one else would. With London’s imprimatur, a Palestinian government now has every incentive to turn to CCP for reconstruction finance and infrastructure contracts. Beijing can bolt these onto its Belt and Road Initiative, locking in leverage over a new state at the heart of the Levant. U.S. influence, already eroded by drift and divided Congresses, will shrink further. China’s record speaks for itself. In Djibouti, commercial port access became a PLA base within three years. In Sri Lanka, Chinese loans turned into a 99-year lease at Hambantota. CCP has cultivated a pattern: ports, logistics, security co-operation and then military presence. If Palestine’s future leadership wants investment and security guarantees, CCP will deliver both. Even a small PLA signals unit or intelligence station would tilt the Eastern Mediterranean’s security balance. By presenting any facility as humanitarian or anti-piracy, Beijing can minimise Western backlash while gaining a front-row vantage on Israel, Egypt and NATO operations. Britain’s recognition may have been meant as a rebuke to Israel. However, in practice it is a strategic gift to Beijing. It signals to the Arab world that the West’s will is fractured and that China, not America, not Europe is the constant patron. It creates a diplomatic vacuum China is already moving to fill, from Gaza reconstruction bids to Palestinian security training. This is not hypothetical. Chinese firms dominated Iraq’s post-2003 oil fields; they built most of Africa’s new ports in the last decade. Palestine is a likely next. And unlike the United States or the U.K., the CCP fuses infrastructure with intelligence collection and military access as policy. Starmer’s Downing Street statement marks not the dawn of West Asia peace but a milestone in Beijing’s global ascent. The CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American West Asia. Britain just made that job easier. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

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Is Islamic Alliance in offing, With Ambiguities

Is Islamic Alliance in Offing, With Ambiguities 

Only a true test, a moment of crisis, will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. Rahul Pawa When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a sweeping mutual defense agreement in Riyadh this month, it marked a strategic pivot. The agreement, termed a “Strategic Mutual Defence” agreement declares that an attack on one is an attack on both, echoing NATO’s famous Article 5 commitment. It’s an unprecedented pledge between the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the only Muslim nation armed with nuclear weapons. Yet behind the celebratory rhetoric, the agreement’s true scope and weight remain uncertain. A NATO-Style on paper, the agreement’s collective defense vow is explicit: “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” Pakistan’s government said. In practice, much is left vague. Notably, the agreement is silent on whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Islamic world’s only nukes is now at Saudi Arabia’s disposal. Pressed about a potential Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Riyadh, a senior Saudi official would only say the agreement “encompasses all military means”. This careful ambiguity hints at a broad commitment while stopping short of any explicit nuclear guarantee. Another grey area is the agreement’s status. Riyadh and Islamabad pointedly call it an “agreement” and not a treaty. By definition, though, any written inter-state accord intended to bind is a treaty under international law, regardless of its label. The absence of a published text and the flexible wording suggest the parties prefer some wiggle room. Saudi Arabia has pursued grand defense coalitions before like a 2015 pan-Islamic military alliance against terrorism that proved “more symbolic than operational”. This time, the language of collective defense is tied to plans for concrete cooperation (joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, arms training). Whether it matures into a robust alliance or remains largely aspirational will only be clear with time. The agreement’s timing is telling. It came days after a surprise Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar that killed Hamas figures and stunned the Gulf States. Qatar hosts a major US airbase, yet Washington did not prevent the strike, a jolt to regional confidence in American protection. Saudi Arabia, already uneasy about U.S. reliability, seized the moment to bolster its own security. Officially, Riyadh says the deal “institutionalises” long-standing cooperation rather than targeting any specific incident. Still, it unmistakably signals that the kingdom can seek safeguards beyond the U.S. umbrella. The agreement even revived talk of an “Islamic NATO.” Saudi Arabia binding itself to Pakistan, Islam’s spiritual heart partnering with its only nuclear-armed state is a powerful image. Observers speculate that other Muslim countries might one day align under a similar framework. Yet longstanding sectarian and political rifts (Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab) have doomed past unity efforts. For now, the Riyadh-Islamabad agreement is as much a message to big powers as a foundation for any broader alliance. Perhaps the toughest diplomatic test for Riyadh is managing the agreement’s fallout in New Delhi. India has spent years cultivating Saudi Arabia as a partner, a top source of oil, investment and Islamic-world backing on contentious issues. A formal Saudi-Pakistani security link is exactly what India hoped to avoid. New Delhi “would not welcome an explicit security tether between its principal energy supplier and its strategic rival,” one analysis noted. In effect, the agreement edges Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan, risking awkward strain in Saudi-India ties. Indian government reacted in measured tones, acknowledging the agreement  and saying it would “study the implications” for her security. The real worry in New Delhi is not that Saudi forces would fight on Pakistan’s side which remains far-fetched but that Pakistan will feel politically bolstered by Riyadh’s backing. Pakistani hardliners may adopt a tougher posture in future confrontations, believing a wealthy Arab power has their back. There’s also concern that Saudi aid or arms could flow to Pakistan over time, indirectly strengthening India’s longtime foe. Aware of these optics, Saudi officials have been quick to reassure India. One senior official stressed that Saudi’s relationship with India “is more robust than it has ever been” and vowed to keep deepening it. Riyadh clearly wants to show it can defend its interests with Pakistan without abandoning its friendship with India. Even so, the balancing act is delicate. New Delhi will likely respond by tightening its own strategic bonds, for instance, with Israel, a close defense partner – and by quietly urging Riyadh to stay neutral in South Asian issues. Much progress in India-Saudi relations has come in recent years, and both sides have incentives to prevent this new alignment from derailing that momentum. As the dust settles, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement stands as a bold statement, but one not yet tested by crisis. Its ripple effects are already evident. Israel, which had been inching toward a historic normalisation with Riyadh, now sees that prospect put on hold Washington, too, must grapple with a Gulf ally hedging its bets on security. Ultimately, the agreement’s significance will hinge on how seriously Riyadh and Islamabad implement it. Regular joint drills coordinated planning or clear mutual defense protocols could turn the promise into genuine deterrence. Absent that, skeptics may view it as more posturing than substance. History offers caution: Pakistan’s past defense agreement s (such as Cold War alliances with the U.S.) often fell short when real wars loomed, and Gulf unity schemes have tended to fragment under pressure. For now, Saudi Arabia has made a dramatic bid to diversify its security options, a gamble on Pakistan’s reliability and on charting a more independent course without alienating old partners. If the gamble succeeds, it could redraw the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia. If it falters, it will remind everyone that even grand agreements can carry unspoken caveats. Only a true test, a moment of crisis will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi

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Beyond Brick and Mortar!

Opening of magnificent Hindu mandir in Abu Dhabi mark tectonic shift in India – UAE friendship that’s transcended commercial, diplomatic & strategic issues BAPS Hindu Mandir that rose majestically in Abu Dhabi is a symbol of Middle Eastern tolerance of different faiths and cross-cultural mosaic. This architectural wonder represents harmony and understanding across cultures and is much more than just a place of worship. When Pramukh Swami Maharaj visited United Arab Emirates in 1997, he floated the idea of building a temple in Abu Dhabi that would unite two “countries, closer together by cultures, and religions.” This is how journey to the temple began. In August 2015, UAE government declared that land for a Hindu temple (mandir) would be provided in Abu Dhabi. The land was gifted for mandir (temple) by Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan who was then crown prince of Abu Dhabi & Deputy Supreme commander of UAE Armed force.

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