Human Rights Kashmir Pakistan Terrorism War

Why Rawalakot Is Burning: Exploitation Dressed as Administration

Seven are dead and an internet blackout has fallen over the hills, but the protesters in Pakistan’s Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir have refused to go home. After seventy-nine years, the territory Islamabad occupied is deciding it will no longer be ruled. Rahul Pawa | X @imrahulpawa The bridge at Khaigala is not the sort of place where states are supposed to lose their grip. It is a modest crossing in a green fold of the Pir Panjal, the kind of spot a traveller passes without noticing. Yet this past weekend the air above Rawalakot filled with tear gas and gunfire. By the time it cleared, seven people were dead, four police personnel and three civilians, with around forty injured, and the people in the road did the one thing an occupier never expects. They stayed. Days before the strike was due, the Joint Awami Action Committee had already been outlawed, dozens arrested, and the internet throttled across the region. To understand why an agitation over flour and electricity has hardened into something Islamabad now answers with bullets, you have to go back to the original sin. In October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession that made the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir part of India, the same legal document every other prince signed. Before the ink was dry, Pakistan had already sent tribal raiders and regular soldiers pouring across the western frontier. The invaders brought violence and occupation. In Mirpur, eyewitnesses recorded a massacre so complete that, by some accounts, the overwhelming majority of a town of twenty-five thousand was slaughtered over three days that November. Hundreds of thousands fled. The land those raiders seized and held when the guns fell silent in 1949 became what Pakistan euphemistically calls “Azad” Jammu and Kashmir . There is no azadi there. There never was. What there has been, for nearly eight decades, is exploitation dressed as administration. Consider the rivers. The gorges of this territory carry some of the richest hydropower potential in South Asia, and Pakistan has exploited them relentlessly.. The Mangla reservoir drowned the old town of Mirpur and displaced its people. Pakistan draws much of its electricity from these mountains, yet the power projects sit elsewhere, depriving the region of the royalties that are rightfully its own. The current flows down to the plains of Punjab. The dignity does not flow back up. It is precisely this absurdity, a people sitting in the dark while their rivers light other cities, that has driven crowds into the streets every year since. Then came the corridor. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was sold as a forty-billion-dollar dream, and for the Pakistan’s occupied territories it has been something closer to a second occupation. Ancestral land in Gilgit-Baltistan has been acquired forcibly, without consent or fair compensation, by the provincial government and the Pakistan army. The promised jobs evaporated as Chinese workers arrived to fill them, leaving locals dejected and shut out of the very projects carved through their valleys. Those who dare protest the corridor are booked under anti-terrorism laws and branded anti-state elements. The banks of the world lend against this land; its people are not invited to the counting house. The cost of that closeness with Beijing has reached into the region’s homes. Hundreds of men from Gilgit-Baltistan married Uyghur women from neighbouring Xinjiang, and since 2017 those wives have been swept into China’s mass detention camps, leaving husbands and children stranded on the wrong side of the Khunjerab pass. The Gilgit-Baltistan assembly passed a unanimous resolution demanding their release; the families have protested through sub-zero winters; Islamabad, unwilling to disturb its benefactor, has done effectively nothing. An occupier that will not lift a finger to bring home its subjects’ own wives and mothers has told them precisely where they stand. Nowhere was that indifference starker than in the spring of 2020. As the Wuhan-epicentre pandemic climbed into the mountains, activists described a public-health system that existed mostly on paper. Gilgit-Baltistan, they reported, had two ageing ventilators for a region of millions and had received no meaningful medical aid from Islamabad, even as the same government broke ground on the fourteen-billion-dollar Diamer-Bhasha dam. Hospitals functioned as little more than referral desks, dispatching the seriously ill down the highway to Rawalpindi to fend for themselves. A land rich enough to power a country was not worth two machines that breathe. The people have had enough. The Joint Awami Action Committee, born in 2023 from traders, lawyers, labourers and transporters, learned in 2024 and 2025 they have to voice their rights. But the demand that frightens Rawalpindi was never about groceries. It is the abolition of twelve seats in the local assembly reserved for refugees who settled in mainland Pakistan after 1947, seats the committee says mainstream Pakistani parties use to install governments in Muzaffarabad. Strip away the procedural language and the message is plain: stop rigging the house. On Sunday, 7 June, the territory’s Supreme Court ruled that those seats enjoy constitutional protection and can be altered only by amendment, dealing a blow to the movement that had been pushing against them. And so this weekend the state answered the way it always has here, with proscription, arrests, a blackout and live rounds. This is not a problem Pakistan can solve. What is failing is slower and more fatal: consent. An occupation can outlast oppressive deeds; it cannot outlast the people it claims to govern deciding, town by town, that they were never asked and no longer agree. When British MPs are rising in their own parliament to flag a communications blackout, fielding messages from constituents who cannot reach their families in the region, the cost of holding this land has begun to outrun the reason for holding it. Jinnah’s two-nation theory was an argument for Pakistan. It was never an argument for these territories Pakistan occupied with raiders and regulars, for they belonged to a state that had lawfully acceded to India before the invasion

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Why Spew Venom Against RSS & Hindus?

Self-styled Christian lobbyists’ campaign against Hindus outreach in US & Europe has not worked even with scaremongering and demonization tactics. Aniket Pingley There is a genre of writing immune to journalistic standards in gathering evidence, retaining balance and complete disclosure. It is the opinion piece. In its honest form, it declares a position and argues it. In its dishonest form, it uses the opinion format as legal exemption, a space where alarming assertions are made, dehumanising imagery deployed and contested allegations stated as settled fact, all under the protective cover of “these are merely my views.” John Dayal’s piece in UCA News, headlined, “The Indian paramilitary organization’s tentacles in the US,” is a distinguished specimen of the dishonest form. It is tactical scaremongering – calibrated to produce a specific emotional and political effect amongst a specific audience at a chosen moment in Washington lobbying calendar. The article makes claims about the RSS, Gujarat, lobbying firms, FCRA and about Indian-origin officials in the US government. I will not engage those claims here. They are matters of public record, available to any reader willing to search. Readers are capable of forming their own opinions about Gujarat 2002, Modi visa episode, Squire Patton Boggs and India’s FCRA regime. They do not need me to defend the RSS against Dayal’s version of events. What I will do is more useful: identify what this article actually is, what it is attempting at and why its final sentence, the most revealing sentence in the piece, tells the reader everything they need to know. Confession in last sentence Dayal ends his article with, “The RSS has money, access, a friendly executive environment, and the weight of geopolitics on its side, and for the moment seems able to counter the evangelical campaign.” Read it slowly. Counter the evangelical campaign. Not “respond to criticism.” Not “defend itself against allegations.” Counter the evangelical campaign. Dayal told his readers, in his own words, what this is actually about. There is an evangelical campaign, organised, funded and directed, targeting RSS in Washington DC. And, what is Dayal lamenting is that this campaign is not working. RSS is successfully countering it. This is the most important fact in the entire article and it appears in the last line, almost as an afterthought. Everything before it, the alarming language, assembled allegations, USCIRF references, lobbying firm drama, is the infrastructure in that evangelical campaign. The article is a dispatch from one side of an active lobbying contest, written by one of its participants, lamenting that the other side is holding ground. And, RSS has every right to hold its ground. USCIRF’s annual report is not scripture. It is not axiomatic truth. It is not a judicial finding. It is the output of an advisory commission whose India recommendations the US State Department has declined to act upon for six consecutive years, a fact Dayal buries in his final paragraph as if it were a footnote, rather than the most consequential sentence in his piece. American foreign policy operates on classified intelligence, diplomatic relationships and a comprehensive picture of the world that an advisory commission does not possess. What’s this Evangelical Campaign? The campaign Dayal laments, RSS is successfully countering, is a coordinated effort to have United States designate India as a Country of Particular Concern on religious freedom, impose targeted sanctions on RSS and restrict its members from entering the US. It runs through USCIRF, Congressional testimony, UN Special Rapporteur submissions and in coordination with International Christian Concern, National Association of Evangelicals and the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission. Its substance: Christian organisations in India are being persecuted, FCRA restrictions choke Christian churches and anti-conversion laws are religious oppression. Each of these claims deserves a question Dayal never asks: why are there so many foreign-funded Christian organisations operating in India and what precisely are they doing? The answer is not theoretical. It is on the record. Compassion International (CI), a major US-based Christian child sponsorship charity that operated in India for 48 years, provides the most precise forensic answer available. In 2017, Indian Government placed CI on “prior permission” list under FCRA, requiring explicit case-by-case approval for every financial transaction, effectively halting flow of approximately $50 million annually. The government’s case rested on CBI First Information Report and Income Tax investigation into CI’s primary Indian affiliate, Chennai-based Caruna Bal Vikas (CBV). CBV was registered under FCRA with its legally declared nature of association as “economic, educational and social.” The CBI found it had, in its own documents, “invariably indulged in religious activities.” More precisely, in CBV’s own stated long-term organisational objective, the goal was “converting poor children into fulfilled Christian adults.” That is not a characterisation by the Indian government. It is what the organisation wrote about itself. Furthermore, CI was identified as part of an organised international missionary industry focused on what its own practitioners call “10-40 Window”, a geographic band encompassing majority of the world’s Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists, deliberately targeted as a conversion frontier. This is what the FCRA regime was responding to. Not the practice of Christianity, the Saint Thomas Christians of Kerala have worshipped in this land since the first century, and nobody has targeted them. What was being regulated is a specific, documented, foreign-funded, institutionally organised project of converting economically vulnerable children using charitable cover. When an organisation tells CBI investigators, through its own documents, that its goal is to convert poor children, it is not a policy concern. That is evidence. India’s state governments have enacted anti-conversion laws through elected legislative assemblies using constitutional procedures with clear majorities. These laws do not prohibit practice of Christianity. They regulate coercive, fraudulent or inducement-based conversions. Twelve states have enacted such legislation. That is Indian democratic federalism functioning as designed. Whether those laws are sound policy is a matter for Indian courts and voters, not for an American advisory commission whose mandate derives from US domestic legislation with no jurisdiction over a sovereign parliament. FCRA regime applies

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As Iran Fights the Allies, China Learns from It

China did not start this war and will not finish it. What it will do is walk away with something more valuable than victory; the data, the proof, the blueprint for the confrontation it is quietly rehearsing on the other side of the world in the western Pacific. Rahul PAWA | March 3, 2026 | x- imrahulpawa When three American F-15E Strike Eagles spiralled out of the sky over Kuwait on the night of March 1, the story that dominated headlines was one of tragic friendly fire. Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, overwhelmed by the sheer volume of Iranian drones and ballistic missiles crisscrossing the Gulf, misidentified their own side’s aircraft in a chaotic, saturated battlespace. All six aircrew ejected safely. The jets did not survive. CENTCOM was unambiguous: friendly fire in a saturated sky, not Iranian action. Iranian state media claimed otherwise. The Pentagon held its line. But the deeper question remains: why that sky was so saturated in the first place. The answer leads not to Tehran. It leads to Beijing. China has not fired a single shot in this war. It has condemned the strikes on Tehran as violations of international law. And yet the weapons flying over the Gulf, the drones that refused to be jammed, the missiles that found their targets, the internet blackout sealing 93 million Iranians from the outside world, all rest on a technological architecture Beijing spent a decade carefully constructing. Not as charity. As a field test. This is the war behind the war. China using Iran as a live laboratory for systems it will one day need against adversaries whose weapons it is now learning to defeat. Every drone that navigates through Western jamming. Every radar that acquires a stealth aircraft. Every $20,000 drone that forces the expenditure of a $4 million Patriot interceptor. Beijing is watching, logging, and learning. The most operationally significant Chinese technology active in this conflict is BeiDou-3, China’s sovereign alternative to GPS. Following Isreal-Iran’s Twelve-Day War last year, in which GPS spoofing partially blinded Iran’s guided munitions, Iran drew a hard lesson. It formally abandoned the American system and transitioned its military navigation architecture to BeiDou. The encrypted network resists allied electronic warfare; its integrated short-message service sustains command node communication even when terrestrial infrastructure is destroyed. Iran’s 2026 missile campaign has demonstrated navigational resilience its 2025 predecessor lacked, striking targets across all six GCC states simultaneously and forcing the UAE alone to intercept 161 of 174 ballistic missiles fired at it. But BeiDou is not merely Iran’s tool. It is China’s proof of concept, a navigation system battle-hardened against the world’s most sophisticated jamming apparatus, stress-tested under real combat conditions. The telemetry flowing back to Beijing from every Iranian strike package is worth more than any simulation its engineers could run. The same scenario applies to the YLC-8B anti-stealth radar, reportedly transferred to Iran after the 2025 war. Engineered to operate on VHF frequencies that defeat radar-absorbent coatings, it addresses the defining challenge of modern air warfare: how do you acquire what your adversary designed to be invisible? Whether the YLC-8B batteries survived the opening strikes of Operation Epic Fury remains unclear, the IDF claims over 200 Iranian air defence systems destroyed. But even degraded performance data feeds directly into China’s own development cycle. Iran is the test range. The PLA is the end customer. This Chinese pattern of real-world testing was visible long before this war. Last May, during India’s Operation Sindoor strikes on terrorist and Pakistani army infrastructure, Chinese-origin PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles and HQ-9 surface-to-air systems were active on the Pakistani side. Beijing opportunistically leveraged the conflict to test its weapons in live combat. It did not stop at data collection. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission confirmed that China deployed fake social media accounts to circulate AI-generated imagery purporting to show debris from aircraft destroyed by Chinese weapons. A deliberate campaign to discredit India’s Rafale purchase and advance sales of China’s J-35. Chinese embassy officials reportedly persuaded Indonesia to pause a Rafale procurement already in process. Beijing said nothing publicly. It did not need to. Iran and Pakistan have become China’s two most valuable proving grounds. One tests area-denial and air defence against American and Israeli platforms. The other tests beyond-visual-range air combat against Indian platforms. China supplied roughly 82% of Pakistan’s arms imports between 2019 and 2023, it had substantial strategic investment in the outcome. Together, both theatres are delivering what no exercise can replicate: live performance data against real Western hardware. The supply chain completes the picture. On February 25, three days before the strikes began, the US Treasury sanctioned procurement networks supplying precursor chemicals and sensitive machinery to Iran’s IRGC missile and drone programmes, following 2025 designations of six Hong Kong and PRC-based entities feeding Iranian arms production. The $20,000 drones flooding the Gulf, cheap enough to force the expenditure of interceptors costing two hundred times more are products of that chain. A think tank report warned that US high-end interceptors including SM-3, PAC-3 MSE and THAAD could be depleted within days of sustained high-tempo operations. That attrition calculus is now live. Away from the battlefield, Iranian internet connectivity has collapsed to roughly 4% of normal levels. The tools enforcing that blackout bear Chinese brand names: Huawei and ZTE deep-packet-inspection platforms, Tiandy facial-recognition hardware explicitly supplying the IRGC. The function is unambiguous; seal the population off, suppress evidence of military degradation, keep the regime viable long enough to matter. Prima facie, none of this has made Iran invincible. Khamenei is dead. The IDF has conducted over 700 strike missions. What Chinese technology has done, in both theatres, is keep the fight going longer than it otherwise would have, and send data back to Beijing that no laboratory can replicate. The drones are still flying. The missiles are still navigating. The lights inside Iran are still off. And in Beijing, someone is taking very careful notes. Preparing for the western Pacific. (Rahul Pawa is an international criminal lawyer and

Bharat Defence Economy Geopolitics International Policy Politics Security Technology Trade

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Narendra Modi in Israel: Friendship Reborn

Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Israel goes beyond symbolism. Substantive outcomes may lead to redrawing alliances in West Asia. Paushali Lass For decades, India and Israel were close yet cautious partners, working behind the scenes. This week, that changed. Prime Minister Modi’s visit did more than make history. It marked dawn of “Special Strategic Partnership,” a status Israel reserves for select nations. Historic Embrace: Modi at Knesset During his address to Knesset, Modi spoke with clarity and warmth, praising shared democratic values and civilizational bonds between India and Israel. Members of parliament took selfies, posted on social media, visibly enthusiastic. Modi was not merely welcomed; he was embraced. In recognition of his leadership in deepening India–Israel ties, he was bestowed Speaker of the Knesset Medal, a historic first. The award was not just a personal accolade but public affirmation of renewed strategic friendship, reflecting trust, shared values and civilizational bonds that his visit celebrated[1]. For many Israelis, this was the moment India stepped out from behind diplomatic caution and said simply: we are friends. Modi invoked deep historical ties, highlighting that India has been part of Jewish story for millennia. He reminded the Knesset that Jews found refuge in India long before modern states existed, citing the story of Queen Esther in Bible and mentions of India in Talmudic texts[2]. Modi made a powerful, unequivocal statement condemning barbaric acts of Hamas, supporting Israel without ifs or buts. For many Israelis, this clarity of friendship was unprecedented. Sharp criticism at home from certain quarters questioned how an Indian Prime Minister could visit Israel at a time when allegations of genocide in Gaza loomed large. But, Modi proceeded and made a bold declaration of solidarity. He not only condemned the atrocities committed by Hamas as acts of ‘terror’ but also expressed profound grief over loss of innocent lives on October 7, 2023. Interestingly, Modi highlighted a deeper point that may help explain the particular affinity between India and Israel from perspective of ancient civilization and culture. Although India, a majority-Hindu nation and Israel, a majority-Jewish state, may appear to have fundamentally different faith systems, there exists a philosophical thread that binds the two peoples more closely than one might assume. Modi drew parallels between Jewish concept of Tikkun Olam (repairing and healing the world) and Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the ancient Sanskrit declaration that world is one family. These deep-rooted philosophical traditions of both nations should not be underestimated. They offer precisely the kind of moral and spiritual foundation the world needs today as it seeks to promote global security and combat terrorism. After all, the world cannot be made a better place through political and economic deals alone; spiritual dimensions of these ancient civilizations must also be recognized and strengthened. The two-day visit was especially meaningful for Indian Jewish community. Prime Minister Modi met Indian Jewish community, creating a historic and emotional connect. Revital Moses[3], who dedicated herself to strengthening India–Israel cultural ties described the experience as “surreal”, meeting a leader she had grown up watching on television, whose vision she had admired for decades. The visit carried deep symbolic weight. Modi took out time to be at Yad Vashem and paid tributes to Holocaust victims, highlighting shared commitment to humanity. What many may not be aware of is that India gave refuge to Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust during World War II. Modi also held a private meeting with President Herzog who thanked him for India’s unwavering support and friendship towards Israel. Something that surprised many and instantly went viral was Modi’s meeting with immensely popular stars of Israeli TV series Fauda, celebrating creative talent that has become one of Israel’s global cultural exports. He engaged with Israel’s innovation leaders in a special tech forum, reflecting the cutting-edge technological landscape of the country. And then there were visuals that linger: Indian flags waving on Jerusalem streets. This is a profoundly moving sight. Agreements to Action: Strategic Partnership Modi’s visit translated goodwill into action. Together with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he oversaw signing of sixteen major agreements (Memorandum of Understanding) covering defence, technology, trade, agriculture, finance and people-to-people engagement. Highlights include: In short, it was more than a diplomatic exercise. It was roadmap for peace, innovation and prosperity, built on mutual trust, democratic values and complementary capabilities. Beyond MoUs and agreements, the visit signals a strong social and economic agreement: businesses, innovators, cultural leaders and citizens on both sides are invited into the partnership, encouraged to collaborate and recognised as part of the strategic equation. This public acknowledgement of friendship between the two nations also gives fresh momentum for private sector businesses to collaborate more actively, while also encouraging deeper people-to-people engagement, allowing citizens to explore and appreciate each other’s cultures. Geopolitical Implications: New Alignment Indian Prime Minister’s open friendship with Israel, warm reception he received across political spectrum, his huge popularity among Israelis and unequivocal condemnation of Hamas terror, not only deepens strategic and civilisational ties with Israel but invoked anger among adversaries. This partnership indicated a potential broader regional alignment with Greece, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Somaliland as counterweight to Turkey, Pakistan and Iran line up.The latter countries havea proven record of destabilizing Middle East and Indian subcontinent that are now sharpening their capabilities to challenge this emerging alliance. Consolidation of these partnerships is a significant shift in regional geopolitics, reflecting shared security priorities, mutual economic interests and concerted effort to safeguard stability and counter terrorism. Beyond defence and technology deals, what strikes the most is subtle but profound shift in how Israeli society is responding to relationship with India. Modi’s unequivocal acknowledgment of October 7 massacre has touched hearts of Israelis like few other world leaders’ speeches ever have. What truly sets this visit apart is that Modi has won hearts, from top leadership to regular Israelis on the street. (Paushali Lass is an India-born intercultural educator, writer and international speaker based in Germany. She authored Tasting Faith: Jews of India and works to build cultural and business bridges between Israel,

Europe Between US Unpredictability and Chinese Dependence

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263

Europe Between US Unpredictability and Chinese Dependence

In a world where tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions are instruments of statecraft, Europe’s new realism is simple: it isn’t choosing a side; it is buying room to manoeuvre. Rahul PAWA | x – iamrahulpawa Mario Draghi sketched Europe’s predicament in blunt, unsentimental terms. The economist and former Prime Minister of Italy argued that the old operating system of the global economy is breaking down, and Europe is exposed in ways its balance sheets can’t fix. He warned that Europe’s strengths, its market size, regulatory reach, and industrial base don’t automatically shield its vulnerabilities: security dependence on the United States, and material dependence on supply chains that run through China. That diagnosis is landing in European capitals because it maps onto an everyday reality: the EU is being pushed from two directions at once. Washington has become harder to predict, more transactional, more willing to dangle tariffs, and more comfortable turning alliance relationships into leverage. Beijing, meanwhile, has spent two decades building choke points in critical inputs; minerals, magnets, processing capacity so quietly essential to Europe’s green transition and defence production that they barely feature in public debates until something breaks. Europe’s new mood isn’t choosing China over America. It is something colder: hedging against both. Europe’s current security architecture still rests on U.S. power. That fact doesn’t change because of a tense summit or an angry speech. But the confidence in how that power will be deployed, how reliable it will be, what it will cost, what conditions it will carry has thinned. In early February, Germany’s foreign minister Johann Wadephul made the point Europe keeps trying to thread: Berlin remains closer to Washington than Beijing, and sees the U.S. as its most important partner, especially on security, yet Europe is also confronting transatlantic strains, including U.S. pressure over NATO burden-sharing and Europe’s reliance on American defence support. This is the tension Draghi is pointing to: Europe can be economically formidable and still strategically dependent. In practical terms, it means every new episode of U.S. unpredictability; tariff threats, pressure campaigns, sudden demands raise the same question in Brussels and Berlin: what happens to Europe’s risk model if America’s commitments come with more volatility and a higher price tag? That question becomes sharper when allies feel they must keep economic channels open with China partly because their industries need access, partly because diversification takes time, and partly because U.S. politics may punish them either way. China doesn’t need to “win Europe over” to gain leverage. It needs only to remain central in the parts of the supply chain Europe cannot quickly replace. The EU’s own institutions have started putting hard numbers on what used to be hand-waving. The European Commission notes that Europe doesn’t produce rare earth elements itself, and that 98% of the EU’s total rare-earth magnet demand is met by imports from China, magnets that sit inside EV motors, wind turbines, robotics, and advanced electronics. Then came the auditors. A European Court of Auditors report amplified widely across European media lays out dependence with uncomfortable specificity: the EU imports all of its 17 rare earth elements; it is fully dependent on imports for 10 of 26 critical minerals; and it relies heavily on China for key materials such as magnesium (97%) and gallium (71%), alongside major shares of rare-earth materials used in permanent magnets (including neodymium and praseodymium). The report also underlines the time problem: mines and processing capacity can take a decade or more to bring online, sometimes far longer. The strategic implication is straightforward: even if Europe is politically determined, it is physically constrained. China’s leverage isn’t mainly a threat of tanks or missiles; it is the ability to slow, raise the cost of, or selectively disrupt the material flows that power Europe’s industrial priorities, green tech, advanced manufacturing, and rearmament. Europeans increasingly talk about “de-risking” because they have lived through a dependence shock before. The Russian gas crisis was the tutorial. Now the lesson is being applied to China, except the inputs are more embedded and the substitution is harder. Europe is learning that resilience is not a slogan but an industrial timeline. It cannot “regulate” its way out of dependence, and it cannot “summit” its way back to certainty. What is emerging is neither a pivot to China nor a break from America, but a recalibration shaped by hard experience. Dependence has become exposure, and exposure is something others can price, punish, or exploit. The EU will remain anchored to the United States for security because the alternatives are not yet credible, but it will try to shrink the extent to which U.S. politics can whipsaw European strategy. It will keep channels open with China because European industry still runs on Chinese inputs, while working to cap single-country choke points in the minerals, magnets, and processing that underpin the green transition and defence production. This is the colder mood Draghi was pointing to, less faith in any single guarantor, more investment in self-insurance. In a world where tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions are instruments of statecraft, Europe’s new realism is simple: it isn’t choosing a side; it is buying room to manoeuvre. (The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS).

Business Economy Geopolitics International Policy

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India-EU ‘Mother of All Deals’ Achieved Biggest Global Trade Shake-Up That Redefined Power

By N. C. Bipindra India and the European Union (EU), on January 27, 2026, signed what leaders are calling the “mother of all trade deals,” a sweeping Free Trade Agreement (FTA) two decades in the making. The pact, agreed during a summit in New Delhi, links two of the world’s largest democratic powers, India with its rapidly expanding economy and the EU with its integrated market of 27 countries, creating a massive economic zone spanning nearly 2 billion people and a quarter of global GDP. This is not just another trade deal. It is a geopolitical pivot point: one that strengthens India’s global economic role, accelerates Europe’s search for reliable partners amid fracturing US relations and reshapes the global trade architecture at a time when traditional trade alliances are under strain. What Is This FTA and Why Has It Been So Big? Negotiations began in 2007 but repeatedly stumbled over tariffs, market access, regulatory differences and standards. Only in recent years, especially amid growing global trade tensions, did talks gain momentum. The final pact aims to lower or eliminate tariffs on over 90% of goods for both sides, expand market access for services, reduce non-tariff barriers and boost investment flows. Key sectors from automobiles to textiles and pharmaceuticals are covered, although sensitive areas like agriculture remain largely excluded due to domestic political concerns. Leaders described it as not just a trade deal, but a strategic partnership, including cooperation in mobility, security and future industrial collaboration. Why This Deal Matters to India Indian exporters now gain preferential or zero-tariff access to the massive EU market, particularly in labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, leather goods, chemicals and marine products: historically areas where India has struggled to secure deep market entry. With India’s manufacturing push seeking global scale, easier access to European inputs, such as machinery, medical devices, high-quality components, means lower production costs and better global supply chain integration. This aligns with India’s broader strategy of becoming a global manufacturing hub rather than a primarily services-oriented economy. Indian exporters have felt the impact of rising US tariff barriers, especially under recent American policies that saw levies of up to 50% on Indian goods in certain sectors. The EU FTA offers a valuable alternative destination at a critical time. EU companies are expected to scale up investments across Indian manufacturing, technology, infrastructure and clean energy sectors, bringing capital, innovation and higher-end industrial activity to India. Why Europe Is Betting Big on India Europe needs stable, diversified markets. China’s slowing growth and geopolitical tensions with the EU over technology and security have encouraged Brussels to seek deeper ties with other large economies. India’s fast-growing consumer base and manufacturing capacity make it an ideal partner. The EU expects its exports to India to potentially double by 2032, saving billions in tariffs and opening opportunities for European cars, machinery and premium goods. Strong economic ties can underpin greater geopolitical alignment on issues from climate policy to digital standards and global governance. How This Compares to US-India and US-EU Trade Talks The US-India talks on an FTA are still in progress, but they have not yet resulted in a comprehensive agreement. US tariff hikes on Indian exports have strained trust and talks have been slow, partly due to competing domestic political agendas and protectionist pressures. Despite long-standing strategic cooperation, not least through defence and technology partnerships, a full trade deal remains elusive, giving the EU an opening to build momentum with India that the United States has so far not fully matched. The EU and US remain massive economic partners, combined they account for trillions in goods and services trade, yet they do not have a dedicated free trade agreement like the one just signed with India. Negotiations toward a free trade pact, notably the 2013 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) proposal, ultimately collapsed in 2016 and recent talks aimed at a new framework have been complicated by political differences. The US and EU signed a “reciprocal, fair and balanced trade” framework in 2025, but the path to comprehensive tariff reduction and deeper market integration remains fraught. Trade disputes aren’t rare either between the US and the EU. Issues like steel and aluminium tariffs, regulatory taxes on tech and agriculture have periodically flared up. A recent flashpoint between the United States and Europe has been tensions over Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark. Trump has been threatening military operations to annex Greenland, a key Arctic territory that could be the key to controlling navigation and the resultant exploitation of the ice-capped region. Throughout 2025–2026, the US made headlines with proposals to acquire Greenland, triggering protests in Copenhagen and raising broader alarm in the EU about US intentions in the Arctic. US threats to levy tariffs on European countries opposing this move sparked fears of a transatlantic trade confrontation. Although President Trump backed off the strongest threats at the World Economic Forum in 2026, the episode has contributed to a sense in some European capitals that Washington’s trade policies can be erratic and unpredictable, fuelling EU efforts to pursue more autonomous global economic partnerships. This isn’t just about Greenland. It reflects deeper frustrations with US unilateral trade policies and protectionist impulses that, in Europe’s view, undermine long-standing transatlantic cooperation. What This Means for the Future of Global Trade The India-EU FTA is a milestone in a world where traditional trade alliances are being reconfigured. Partnerships are no longer simply North Atlantic or US-centric; Asia, Europe and emerging market ties are gaining prominence. Despite a more fragmented global economy and rising protectionism, the India-EU deal demonstrates that deep, rules-based trade agreements remain possible and can drive economic growth and strategic stability. As China continues to assert its economic reach and the US focuses on domestic political priorities, partnerships like the India-EU FTA become crucial counterweights that help middle powers shape the global order. Final Take on India-EU FTA Implications The India-EU free trade agreement is far more than a tariff-cutting pact. It is a powerful global political

Beyond “Iron Brothers” - The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

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Beyond “Iron Brothers”: The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

N. C. Bipindra Pakistan’s engagement with both Washington and Beijing raises concerns about its relationship with China. Despite claims of trust and shared interests, Pakistan’s foreign policy history reveals a consistent pattern of duplicity. This poses risks for China, affecting its security and technological dominance. Let us analyse Pakistan’s dual alignments, urging caution from Beijing regarding military technology transfers to Islamabad. Pakistan’s foreign policy traits, transactionalism, opportunism, and dependence on external allies, suggest a potential shift in technology flow from the U.S. to China in a new geopolitical landscape. Historical Patterns of Technology Transfers Pakistan has long capitalised on its geostrategic location to obtain military and economic concessions from major powers. During the Cold War, it accommodated CIA operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan and received sophisticated U.S. armaments; however, not all of it remained in Pakistani possession. Two instances are particularly noteworthy. In the 1990s, U.S. intelligence asserted that Pakistan transferred American-supplied Stinger missiles to China, a claim that Islamabad refuted. After the 2011 Abbottabad raid, The New York Times disclosed that Chinese engineers were permitted to examine the remnants of a downed U.S. stealth-modified Black Hawk helicopter. Although definitive evidence was lacking, U.S. officials referenced intercepted communications to substantiate the allegation. These occurrences, notwithstanding Pakistani refutations, solidified perceptions of duplicity. For Beijing, the implication is unequivocal: if Pakistan was unable to protect U.S. technologies, it cannot be entirely relied upon to safeguard Chinese ones. Pakistan’s Contemporary Balancing Act Today, Pakistan faces a transformed strategic environment. Following Operation Bunyaan-un-Marsoos and subsequent outreach efforts, Islamabad has sought to re-engage Washington, particularly to secure tariff concessions and financial relief amid severe economic strain. Simultaneously, it remains dependent on Beijing for military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons and sensors to drones. The private lunch hosted for Asim Munir at the White House on June 18, 2025, is not merely a ceremonial bonhomie. It is a fact that such courtesies are rarely extended without an eye on strategic dividends. It appears that, in an era where China has surged ahead of the U.S. in technologies like AI, 5G, and advanced manufacturing, Washington views Pakistan not merely as an old battlefield ally but as a potential conduit for intelligence, leverage, and Chinese tech transfer. Perhaps, for Washington, cultivating ties with Pakistan’s generals is about far more than courtesy. It offers a discreet channel for access, legitimacy, and potentially even Chinese technology. However, this balancing act carries profound risks for China. Sensitive Chinese systems, long assumed to be secure within the framework of an “all-weather” partnership, may become vulnerable to American scrutiny as Pakistan attempts to cultivate favor in Washington. What was once an unshakable partnership is beginning to look increasingly fragile, as Pakistan’s loyalties are often dictated not by long-term commitments but by immediate strategic and financial incentives. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel has long observed, “Pakistani generals can be bought any time,” a reminder of how transactional and compromised the country’s military elite remain. Compounding this vulnerability is the conduct of Pakistan’s civil–military elite. Many former army chiefs, including Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa, have relocated abroad or maintained significant overseas assets after retirement. Such behavior underscores an entrenched pattern of ethical and moral corruption: leaders prioritise personal enrichment and external safe havens over national development, leaving the public to suffer under chronic instability and economic decline. Case of the J-35 Stealth Fighter Pakistan’s reported withdrawal from a planned deal for 40 J-35 stealth fighters highlights these dynamics. Once poised to be the jet’s first foreign buyer, Islamabad later dismissed the reports, despite earlier claims of pilot training in China. Battlefield lessons from Operation Sindoor — where Chinese systems underperformed against India’s BrahMos and S-400 — fueled doubts about the untested J-35. Economic pressures, including IMF austerity and a stretched defence budget, further undermined the $5 billion deal. For Beijing, Pakistan’s reversal exposed the fragility of trust: a flagship transfer was abandoned in favor of renewed U.S. outreach, underscoring China’s vulnerability to Islamabad’s hedging. Hypersonic Missiles: China Draws a Line Another case highlighting Beijing’s caution is its reported rejection of Pakistan’s request for hypersonic missiles and related technology. Media reports suggest China refused both sales and tech transfers, fearing Islamabad’s growing outreach to the U.S. could expose sensitive systems. Unlike fighter jets or conventional missiles, hypersonic platforms like the DF-17 are central to China’s strategic deterrence and lack downgraded export versions, reflecting their sensitivity and immaturity. The denial underscores a key reality: even in an “all-weather” partnership, Beijing does not fully trust Pakistan with its most advanced technologies. Strategic Implications for China The implications of this dynamic for China are far-reaching. First, Pakistan represents both an asset and a liability for Beijing. It provides strategic depth in South Asia, a reliable arms market, and political support in international forums. Yet these benefits come at the cost of significant vulnerability: advanced Chinese systems risk exposure through Pakistani networks, intentionally or inadvertently, to Western intelligence. Second, the problem is structural rather than episodic. Pakistan’s foreign policy has long been characterised by transactionalism, with loyalty subordinated to immediate material gains. As Islamabad draws closer to Washington, Beijing must anticipate that Pakistan’s defence partnership could once again become a conduit for technological leakage, this time at China’s expense. Third, the nature of emerging technologies magnifies the risk. Whereas conventional hardware could be downgraded for export, dual-use and software-driven systems cannot be so easily restricted. For Beijing, the possibility of losing control over AI, cyber, or hypersonic technologies through Pakistan would represent a strategic disaster, undermining years of investment and eroding its position vis-à-vis the United States. In this sense, Pakistan’s growing closeness with Washington is about far more than counterterrorism cooperation or financial bailouts. It is “more than what meets the eye”: for the West, Pakistan provides a potential backdoor to scrutinize and even reverse-engineer Chinese technologies in domains like AI, quantum, and stealth areas where Beijing has made significant advances over the United States. Washington now views Beijing not merely as a rising

Britain's Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

China Geopolitics International Policy Security United Kingdom

577

Britain’s Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American WestAsia. Britain just made that job easier. Rahul Pawa On 21 September 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer broke with decades of U.K. policy formally recognising the state of Palestine. It was Britain’s most consequential West East move since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, made over explicit U.S. objections and Israeli fury. In London’s rush to show moral leadership, one reality was ignored: Beijing had spent six decades preparing for this moment. The CCP’s Palestinian project began in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1970, Beijing sent small arms, mortars and anti-tank weapons to the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It trained cadres at the Whampoa Military Academy in Nanning and dispatched instructors to Syria and Algeria. In May 1966 Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Ahmad al-Shuqairy thanked “Peking” for constant arms and training shipments. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli commanders displayed captured Chinese-made AK-47s, 81mm mortars and chemical decontamination gear seized in Gaza and Sinai. Alongside, Beijing also built a diplomatic bridge. In December 1995 it opened a foreign office in Gaza; a de facto embassy to the Palestinian Authority, decades before most Western states considered recognition. Its message to Palestinians was consistent: you can count on us when the West won’t. By Xi Jinping’s era the posture turned strategic. In 2017 the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a Red Sea hub housing thousands of Chinese troops. Beijing secured port stakes from Gwadar in Pakistan to Haifa in Israel, embedding itself along the arteries that supply Europe and the Gulf. A 25-year strategic agreement with Iran in 2021 locked in $400 billion in Chinese investments across oil, gas and transport corridors. CCP’s pattern is clear: first ports, then troops. Djibouti proved it, Hambantota confirmed it, Gaza may be next. Beijing has already demonstrated how commercial access becomes military power, and a recognised Palestine gives it the opening to repeat the same playbook on the Mediterranean. While Beijing built bricks abroad it built narratives at home. State-aligned Arabic media channels and TikTok streams pump out Gaza content at scale. A July 2025 Program on Extremism report mapped how the CCP’s influence runs through Western activism itself. That report details how Shanghai-based tech investor Neville Roy Singham, a onetime Huawei adviser, poured millions into U.S. and U.K. activist groups after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack. Groups like the People’s Forum, ANSWER Coalition and “Shut It Down for Palestine” became organising hubs for anti-Israel protests. BreakThrough News, their media arm, live-streamed marches while praising Xi Jinping Thought and Maoist revolution. Investigators concluded the effect was “to project the CCP as a defender of justice while undermining U.S. influence.” In December 2023 the People’s Forum hosted a “China75” event lauding Beijing’s governance model; by early 2024 its funding spiked from under $500,000 to $4.4 million as it expanded pro-Palestinian actions. The same network underwrote protests at Columbia University and in Whitehall, echoing CCP state rhetoric about “imperialist Zionism.” When Starmer spoke to recognise Palestine, Beijing didn’t improvise. Chinese State media instantly framed Britain’s recognition as vindication of the CCP’s “historic” support for Palestinian independence. Chinese diplomats in Ramallah pointed out they had welcomed Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing two years earlier and had pushed a ceasefire plan in 2023. They reminded Palestinian officials who had invested in them when no one else would. With London’s imprimatur, a Palestinian government now has every incentive to turn to CCP for reconstruction finance and infrastructure contracts. Beijing can bolt these onto its Belt and Road Initiative, locking in leverage over a new state at the heart of the Levant. U.S. influence, already eroded by drift and divided Congresses, will shrink further. China’s record speaks for itself. In Djibouti, commercial port access became a PLA base within three years. In Sri Lanka, Chinese loans turned into a 99-year lease at Hambantota. CCP has cultivated a pattern: ports, logistics, security co-operation and then military presence. If Palestine’s future leadership wants investment and security guarantees, CCP will deliver both. Even a small PLA signals unit or intelligence station would tilt the Eastern Mediterranean’s security balance. By presenting any facility as humanitarian or anti-piracy, Beijing can minimise Western backlash while gaining a front-row vantage on Israel, Egypt and NATO operations. Britain’s recognition may have been meant as a rebuke to Israel. However, in practice it is a strategic gift to Beijing. It signals to the Arab world that the West’s will is fractured and that China, not America, not Europe is the constant patron. It creates a diplomatic vacuum China is already moving to fill, from Gaza reconstruction bids to Palestinian security training. This is not hypothetical. Chinese firms dominated Iraq’s post-2003 oil fields; they built most of Africa’s new ports in the last decade. Palestine is a likely next. And unlike the United States or the U.K., the CCP fuses infrastructure with intelligence collection and military access as policy. Starmer’s Downing Street statement marks not the dawn of West Asia peace but a milestone in Beijing’s global ascent. The CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American West Asia. Britain just made that job easier. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Is Islamic Alliance in offing, With Ambiguities

Defence Geopolitics International Pakistan Policy Security Trade

513

Is Islamic Alliance in Offing, With Ambiguities

Only a true test, a moment of crisis, will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. Rahul Pawa When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a sweeping mutual defense agreement in Riyadh this month, it marked a strategic pivot. The agreement, termed a “Strategic Mutual Defence” agreement declares that an attack on one is an attack on both, echoing NATO’s famous Article 5 commitment. It’s an unprecedented pledge between the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the only Muslim nation armed with nuclear weapons. Yet behind the celebratory rhetoric, the agreement’s true scope and weight remain uncertain. A NATO-Style on paper, the agreement’s collective defense vow is explicit: “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” Pakistan’s government said. In practice, much is left vague. Notably, the agreement is silent on whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Islamic world’s only nukes is now at Saudi Arabia’s disposal. Pressed about a potential Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Riyadh, a senior Saudi official would only say the agreement “encompasses all military means”. This careful ambiguity hints at a broad commitment while stopping short of any explicit nuclear guarantee. Another grey area is the agreement’s status. Riyadh and Islamabad pointedly call it an “agreement” and not a treaty. By definition, though, any written inter-state accord intended to bind is a treaty under international law, regardless of its label. The absence of a published text and the flexible wording suggest the parties prefer some wiggle room. Saudi Arabia has pursued grand defense coalitions before like a 2015 pan-Islamic military alliance against terrorism that proved “more symbolic than operational”. This time, the language of collective defense is tied to plans for concrete cooperation (joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, arms training). Whether it matures into a robust alliance or remains largely aspirational will only be clear with time. The agreement’s timing is telling. It came days after a surprise Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar that killed Hamas figures and stunned the Gulf States. Qatar hosts a major US airbase, yet Washington did not prevent the strike, a jolt to regional confidence in American protection. Saudi Arabia, already uneasy about U.S. reliability, seized the moment to bolster its own security. Officially, Riyadh says the deal “institutionalises” long-standing cooperation rather than targeting any specific incident. Still, it unmistakably signals that the kingdom can seek safeguards beyond the U.S. umbrella. The agreement even revived talk of an “Islamic NATO.” Saudi Arabia binding itself to Pakistan, Islam’s spiritual heart partnering with its only nuclear-armed state is a powerful image. Observers speculate that other Muslim countries might one day align under a similar framework. Yet longstanding sectarian and political rifts (Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab) have doomed past unity efforts. For now, the Riyadh-Islamabad agreement is as much a message to big powers as a foundation for any broader alliance. Perhaps the toughest diplomatic test for Riyadh is managing the agreement’s fallout in New Delhi. India has spent years cultivating Saudi Arabia as a partner, a top source of oil, investment and Islamic-world backing on contentious issues. A formal Saudi-Pakistani security link is exactly what India hoped to avoid. New Delhi “would not welcome an explicit security tether between its principal energy supplier and its strategic rival,” one analysis noted. In effect, the agreement edges Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan, risking awkward strain in Saudi-India ties. Indian government reacted in measured tones, acknowledging the agreement and saying it would “study the implications” for her security. The real worry in New Delhi is not that Saudi forces would fight on Pakistan’s side which remains far-fetched but that Pakistan will feel politically bolstered by Riyadh’s backing. Pakistani hardliners may adopt a tougher posture in future confrontations, believing a wealthy Arab power has their back. There’s also concern that Saudi aid or arms could flow to Pakistan over time, indirectly strengthening India’s longtime foe. Aware of these optics, Saudi officials have been quick to reassure India. One senior official stressed that Saudi’s relationship with India “is more robust than it has ever been” and vowed to keep deepening it. Riyadh clearly wants to show it can defend its interests with Pakistan without abandoning its friendship with India. Even so, the balancing act is delicate. New Delhi will likely respond by tightening its own strategic bonds, for instance, with Israel, a close defense partner – and by quietly urging Riyadh to stay neutral in South Asian issues. Much progress in India-Saudi relations has come in recent years, and both sides have incentives to prevent this new alignment from derailing that momentum. As the dust settles, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement stands as a bold statement, but one not yet tested by crisis. Its ripple effects are already evident. Israel, which had been inching toward a historic normalisation with Riyadh, now sees that prospect put on hold Washington, too, must grapple with a Gulf ally hedging its bets on security. Ultimately, the agreement’s significance will hinge on how seriously Riyadh and Islamabad implement it. Regular joint drills coordinated planning or clear mutual defense protocols could turn the promise into genuine deterrence. Absent that, skeptics may view it as more posturing than substance. History offers caution: Pakistan’s past defense agreement s (such as Cold War alliances with the U.S.) often fell short when real wars loomed, and Gulf unity schemes have tended to fragment under pressure. For now, Saudi Arabia has made a dramatic bid to diversify its security options, a gamble on Pakistan’s reliability and on charting a more independent course without alienating old partners. If the gamble succeeds, it could redraw the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia. If it falters, it will remind everyone that even grand agreements can carry unspoken caveats. Only a true test, a moment of crisis will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi

China Geopolitics International Leadership Policy

719

Keeping The Window Open!

Delicate balancing of relations between US, China & Russia is test of Bharat’s foreign policy framework that centres on strategic autonomy. K.A.Badarinath Will there be a huge shift in Bharat’s foreign policy framework? Or, possible tilt towards China, Russia conglomeration, a permanent feature? Will this lead to increased distancing between India and US under Republican White House stewardship? What’s in store on geo-political, strategic and economic engagement for Bharat and the world? There are several unanswered and unsettling questions that pop up in inter-personal conversations and on the information highways as one scans on Google, Weibo to Douyin. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China and Japan has set off a flurry of conversations internationally. Both, Beijing and Tokyo are most intrinsic foes that do not have much in common especially after the war leading to Japan’s surrender in 1945. Several questions that analysts, anchors and seasoned newsmen are also awe-stuck given that in the first place he lined up the visits to both China and Japan in one go. Secondly, not only do they keep distance but belong to two diametrically opposite camps but have huge issues in global equations. While China and Russia have had rivalled US-led NATO group, Japan falls into the latter alliance. Thirdly, this visit of Prime Minister Modi is significant in the backdrop of United States President Donald Trump weaponising trade, imposing 50 per cent tariff on Bharat’s goods and services and thereby burning bridges. Fourthly, Prime Minister Modi’s two nation visit gained prominence as the ‘global south’ network seeks to consolidate its position via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization whose twentieth session was held in Tianjin as China holds the rotating chair as of now. Fifth, most analysts think that Bharat’s ‘strategic autonomy’ policy framework is being put to test with re-setting its relations vis-à-vis US and China. Sixth, however, top hawks in Bharat’s foreign affairs department do expect the relations with United States to bounce back to normalcy as had happened in the past after Washington DC imposed unilateral sanctions in aftermath of Pokharan nuclear tests. Seventh, the probability of a ‘delicate balancing act’ that New Delhi would enact with caution but firmness of purpose as its near time posturing without yielding to bullying tactics of US. Eighth, there’s no reason why Bharat should not continue oil trade with Russia or any other country depending on prevailing market conditions. Neither US nor Europe have locus standi to corner Bharat citing oil trade given their own continued ‘lucrative gas deals’ with Russia and its partners. Ninth, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to both Japan and China indicate that Bharat has the depth to manage diversities. For instance, enhancing Japanese investments to US $ 68 billion from $ 34 billion through 170 deals is a big take away for both Bharat and Japan who enjoy strategic and special relationship. This is a firm message for US that sought to dry up the foreign investment pipeline in Bharat to push for a ‘bad trade deal’. By not participating in a significant programme to commemorate China’s victory over Japan is again a big message to Beijing that New Delhi has its friends elsewhere as well. Bilateral summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping has been regarded as pivotal to ‘resetting relations’ as development partners and ‘not as rivals’. While the intent is good, first step has been taken to normalise relations, there are several challenges especially on borders, Belt and Roads Initiative that brings Chinese projects to the doorstep via Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Apprehensions seem to be very high on both over outcome of these meetings even as China and Bharat ready to celebrate 75-years of diplomatic relations. One significant point made by Prime Minister Modi that has gone viral was border peace and tranquillity was like an insurance policy for future enduring relations. Can the dragon and elephant in the room tango seamlessly is a billion dollar question as resetting of relations is attempted. As one Chinese scholar wrote ‘it’s rational choice and shared responsibility for both India and China to reset relations’. A big take away is a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin with carpooling and Ridge Carlton delegation level talks happening in a ‘delightful’ atmosphere. The visuals and videos of Modi, Putin traveling in a Russian made car throwing protocols to winds is not something European Union or US will want to watch. Given that US described Russia and Ukraine conflict as ‘Modi’s war’ has had no impact on the two leaders’ summit deliberations that extended a wee-bit. Also, 2025 marks 15 years of Indo-Russian strategic relationship that would come into full play later this year. From Bharat’s perspective, there have been a few takeaways from 20-members SCO summit. Unadulterated condemnation of Pahalgam attack by terrorists from across the borders is what India expected and achieved. Also, expanding trade relations between different SCO member countries with payments squared off in respective currencies is big. This would also mean that increasingly trade would get delinked from US dollar and euro while Chinese Renminbi, Russian rouble and Indian Rupee would gain in terms of acceptability. While the show in China came to a near close, the implications of new found friendship between Presidents’ Xi, Putin and Prime Minister Modi will result in sleepless nights for those in Trump administration and Brussels, housing headquarters of European Union. (Author is Director and Chief Executive of New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies) Keeping The Window Open!

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