China Cyber Security Defence Geopolitics Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

Beyond “Iron Brothers”: The Cracks in the China-Pakistan Defence Partnership

N. C. Bipindra Pakistan’s engagement with both Washington and Beijing raises concerns about its relationship with China. Despite claims of trust and shared interests, Pakistan’s foreign policy history reveals a consistent pattern of duplicity. This poses risks for China, affecting its security and technological dominance. Let us analyse Pakistan’s dual alignments, urging caution from Beijing regarding military technology transfers to Islamabad. Pakistan’s foreign policy traits, transactionalism, opportunism, and dependence on external allies, suggest a potential shift in technology flow from the U.S. to China in a new geopolitical landscape. Historical Patterns of Technology Transfers Pakistan has long capitalised on its geostrategic location to obtain military and economic concessions from major powers. During the Cold War, it accommodated CIA operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan and received sophisticated U.S. armaments; however, not all of it remained in Pakistani possession. Two instances are particularly noteworthy. In the 1990s, U.S. intelligence asserted that Pakistan transferred American-supplied Stinger missiles to China, a claim that Islamabad refuted. After the 2011 Abbottabad raid, The New York Times disclosed that Chinese engineers were permitted to examine the remnants of a downed U.S. stealth-modified Black Hawk helicopter. Although definitive evidence was lacking, U.S. officials referenced intercepted communications to substantiate the allegation. These occurrences, notwithstanding Pakistani refutations, solidified perceptions of duplicity. For Beijing, the implication is unequivocal: if Pakistan was unable to protect U.S. technologies, it cannot be entirely relied upon to safeguard Chinese ones. Pakistan’s Contemporary Balancing Act Today, Pakistan faces a transformed strategic environment. Following Operation Bunyaan-un-Marsoos and subsequent outreach efforts, Islamabad has sought to re-engage Washington, particularly to secure tariff concessions and financial relief amid severe economic strain. Simultaneously, it remains dependent on Beijing for military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons and sensors to drones. The private lunch hosted for Asim Munir at the White House on June 18, 2025, is not merely a ceremonial bonhomie. It is a fact that such courtesies are rarely extended without an eye on strategic dividends. It appears that, in an era where China has surged ahead of the U.S. in technologies like AI, 5G, and advanced manufacturing, Washington views Pakistan not merely as an old battlefield ally but as a potential conduit for intelligence, leverage, and Chinese tech transfer. Perhaps, for Washington, cultivating ties with Pakistan’s generals is about far more than courtesy. It offers a discreet channel for access, legitimacy, and potentially even Chinese technology. However, this balancing act carries profound risks for China. Sensitive Chinese systems, long assumed to be secure within the framework of an “all-weather” partnership, may become vulnerable to American scrutiny as Pakistan attempts to cultivate favor in Washington. What was once an unshakable partnership is beginning to look increasingly fragile, as Pakistan’s loyalties are often dictated not by long-term commitments but by immediate strategic and financial incentives. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel has long observed, “Pakistani generals can be bought any time,” a reminder of how transactional and compromised the country’s military elite remain. Compounding this vulnerability is the conduct of Pakistan’s civil–military elite. Many former army chiefs, including Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa, have relocated abroad or maintained significant overseas assets after retirement. Such behavior underscores an entrenched pattern of ethical and moral corruption: leaders prioritise personal enrichment and external safe havens over national development, leaving the public to suffer under chronic instability and economic decline. Case of the J-35 Stealth Fighter Pakistan’s reported withdrawal from a planned deal for 40 J-35 stealth fighters highlights these dynamics. Once poised to be the jet’s first foreign buyer, Islamabad later dismissed the reports, despite earlier claims of pilot training in China. Battlefield lessons from Operation Sindoor — where Chinese systems underperformed against India’s BrahMos and S-400 — fueled doubts about the untested J-35. Economic pressures, including IMF austerity and a stretched defence budget, further undermined the $5 billion deal. For Beijing, Pakistan’s reversal exposed the fragility of trust: a flagship transfer was abandoned in favor of renewed U.S. outreach, underscoring China’s vulnerability to Islamabad’s hedging. Hypersonic Missiles: China Draws a Line Another case highlighting Beijing’s caution is its reported rejection of Pakistan’s request for hypersonic missiles and related technology. Media reports suggest China refused both sales and tech transfers, fearing Islamabad’s growing outreach to the U.S. could expose sensitive systems. Unlike fighter jets or conventional missiles, hypersonic platforms like the DF-17 are central to China’s strategic deterrence and lack downgraded export versions, reflecting their sensitivity and immaturity. The denial underscores a key reality: even in an “all-weather” partnership, Beijing does not fully trust Pakistan with its most advanced technologies. Strategic Implications for China The implications of this dynamic for China are far-reaching. First, Pakistan represents both an asset and a liability for Beijing. It provides strategic depth in South Asia, a reliable arms market, and political support in international forums. Yet these benefits come at the cost of significant vulnerability: advanced Chinese systems risk exposure through Pakistani networks, intentionally or inadvertently, to Western intelligence. Second, the problem is structural rather than episodic. Pakistan’s foreign policy has long been characterised by transactionalism, with loyalty subordinated to immediate material gains. As Islamabad draws closer to Washington, Beijing must anticipate that Pakistan’s defence partnership could once again become a conduit for technological leakage, this time at China’s expense. Third, the nature of emerging technologies magnifies the risk. Whereas conventional hardware could be downgraded for export, dual-use and software-driven systems cannot be so easily restricted. For Beijing, the possibility of losing control over AI, cyber, or hypersonic technologies through Pakistan would represent a strategic disaster, undermining years of investment and eroding its position vis-à-vis the United States. In this sense, Pakistan’s growing closeness with Washington is about far more than counterterrorism cooperation or financial bailouts. It is “more than what meets the eye”: for the West, Pakistan provides a potential backdoor to scrutinize and even reverse-engineer Chinese technologies in domains like AI, quantum, and stealth areas where Beijing has made significant advances over the United States. Washington now views Beijing not merely as a rising

Britain's Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

China Geopolitics International Policy Security United Kingdom

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Britain’s Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American WestAsia. Britain just made that job easier. Rahul Pawa On 21 September 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer broke with decades of U.K. policy formally recognising the state of Palestine. It was Britain’s most consequential West East move since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, made over explicit U.S. objections and Israeli fury. In London’s rush to show moral leadership, one reality was ignored: Beijing had spent six decades preparing for this moment. The CCP’s Palestinian project began in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1970, Beijing sent small arms, mortars and anti-tank weapons to the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It trained cadres at the Whampoa Military Academy in Nanning and dispatched instructors to Syria and Algeria. In May 1966 Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Ahmad al-Shuqairy thanked “Peking” for constant arms and training shipments. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli commanders displayed captured Chinese-made AK-47s, 81mm mortars and chemical decontamination gear seized in Gaza and Sinai. Alongside, Beijing also built a diplomatic bridge. In December 1995 it opened a foreign office in Gaza; a de facto embassy to the Palestinian Authority, decades before most Western states considered recognition. Its message to Palestinians was consistent: you can count on us when the West won’t. By Xi Jinping’s era the posture turned strategic. In 2017 the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a Red Sea hub housing thousands of Chinese troops. Beijing secured port stakes from Gwadar in Pakistan to Haifa in Israel, embedding itself along the arteries that supply Europe and the Gulf. A 25-year strategic agreement with Iran in 2021 locked in $400 billion in Chinese investments across oil, gas and transport corridors. CCP’s pattern is clear: first ports, then troops. Djibouti proved it, Hambantota confirmed it, Gaza may be next. Beijing has already demonstrated how commercial access becomes military power, and a recognised Palestine gives it the opening to repeat the same playbook on the Mediterranean. While Beijing built bricks abroad it built narratives at home. State-aligned Arabic media channels and TikTok streams pump out Gaza content at scale. A July 2025 Program on Extremism report mapped how the CCP’s influence runs through Western activism itself. That report details how Shanghai-based tech investor Neville Roy Singham, a onetime Huawei adviser, poured millions into U.S. and U.K. activist groups after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack. Groups like the People’s Forum, ANSWER Coalition and “Shut It Down for Palestine” became organising hubs for anti-Israel protests. BreakThrough News, their media arm, live-streamed marches while praising Xi Jinping Thought and Maoist revolution. Investigators concluded the effect was “to project the CCP as a defender of justice while undermining U.S. influence.” In December 2023 the People’s Forum hosted a “China75” event lauding Beijing’s governance model; by early 2024 its funding spiked from under $500,000 to $4.4 million as it expanded pro-Palestinian actions. The same network underwrote protests at Columbia University and in Whitehall, echoing CCP state rhetoric about “imperialist Zionism.” When Starmer spoke to recognise Palestine, Beijing didn’t improvise. Chinese State media instantly framed Britain’s recognition as vindication of the CCP’s “historic” support for Palestinian independence. Chinese diplomats in Ramallah pointed out they had welcomed Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing two years earlier and had pushed a ceasefire plan in 2023. They reminded Palestinian officials who had invested in them when no one else would. With London’s imprimatur, a Palestinian government now has every incentive to turn to CCP for reconstruction finance and infrastructure contracts. Beijing can bolt these onto its Belt and Road Initiative, locking in leverage over a new state at the heart of the Levant. U.S. influence, already eroded by drift and divided Congresses, will shrink further. China’s record speaks for itself. In Djibouti, commercial port access became a PLA base within three years. In Sri Lanka, Chinese loans turned into a 99-year lease at Hambantota. CCP has cultivated a pattern: ports, logistics, security co-operation and then military presence. If Palestine’s future leadership wants investment and security guarantees, CCP will deliver both. Even a small PLA signals unit or intelligence station would tilt the Eastern Mediterranean’s security balance. By presenting any facility as humanitarian or anti-piracy, Beijing can minimise Western backlash while gaining a front-row vantage on Israel, Egypt and NATO operations. Britain’s recognition may have been meant as a rebuke to Israel. However, in practice it is a strategic gift to Beijing. It signals to the Arab world that the West’s will is fractured and that China, not America, not Europe is the constant patron. It creates a diplomatic vacuum China is already moving to fill, from Gaza reconstruction bids to Palestinian security training. This is not hypothetical. Chinese firms dominated Iraq’s post-2003 oil fields; they built most of Africa’s new ports in the last decade. Palestine is a likely next. And unlike the United States or the U.K., the CCP fuses infrastructure with intelligence collection and military access as policy. Starmer’s Downing Street statement marks not the dawn of West Asia peace but a milestone in Beijing’s global ascent. The CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American West Asia. Britain just made that job easier. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Is Islamic Alliance in offing, With Ambiguities

Defence Geopolitics International Pakistan Policy Security Trade

213

Is Islamic Alliance in Offing, With Ambiguities

Only a true test, a moment of crisis, will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. Rahul Pawa When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a sweeping mutual defense agreement in Riyadh this month, it marked a strategic pivot. The agreement, termed a “Strategic Mutual Defence” agreement declares that an attack on one is an attack on both, echoing NATO’s famous Article 5 commitment. It’s an unprecedented pledge between the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the only Muslim nation armed with nuclear weapons. Yet behind the celebratory rhetoric, the agreement’s true scope and weight remain uncertain. A NATO-Style on paper, the agreement’s collective defense vow is explicit: “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” Pakistan’s government said. In practice, much is left vague. Notably, the agreement is silent on whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Islamic world’s only nukes is now at Saudi Arabia’s disposal. Pressed about a potential Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Riyadh, a senior Saudi official would only say the agreement “encompasses all military means”. This careful ambiguity hints at a broad commitment while stopping short of any explicit nuclear guarantee. Another grey area is the agreement’s status. Riyadh and Islamabad pointedly call it an “agreement” and not a treaty. By definition, though, any written inter-state accord intended to bind is a treaty under international law, regardless of its label. The absence of a published text and the flexible wording suggest the parties prefer some wiggle room. Saudi Arabia has pursued grand defense coalitions before like a 2015 pan-Islamic military alliance against terrorism that proved “more symbolic than operational”. This time, the language of collective defense is tied to plans for concrete cooperation (joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, arms training). Whether it matures into a robust alliance or remains largely aspirational will only be clear with time. The agreement’s timing is telling. It came days after a surprise Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar that killed Hamas figures and stunned the Gulf States. Qatar hosts a major US airbase, yet Washington did not prevent the strike, a jolt to regional confidence in American protection. Saudi Arabia, already uneasy about U.S. reliability, seized the moment to bolster its own security. Officially, Riyadh says the deal “institutionalises” long-standing cooperation rather than targeting any specific incident. Still, it unmistakably signals that the kingdom can seek safeguards beyond the U.S. umbrella. The agreement even revived talk of an “Islamic NATO.” Saudi Arabia binding itself to Pakistan, Islam’s spiritual heart partnering with its only nuclear-armed state is a powerful image. Observers speculate that other Muslim countries might one day align under a similar framework. Yet longstanding sectarian and political rifts (Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab) have doomed past unity efforts. For now, the Riyadh-Islamabad agreement is as much a message to big powers as a foundation for any broader alliance. Perhaps the toughest diplomatic test for Riyadh is managing the agreement’s fallout in New Delhi. India has spent years cultivating Saudi Arabia as a partner, a top source of oil, investment and Islamic-world backing on contentious issues. A formal Saudi-Pakistani security link is exactly what India hoped to avoid. New Delhi “would not welcome an explicit security tether between its principal energy supplier and its strategic rival,” one analysis noted. In effect, the agreement edges Saudi Arabia closer to Pakistan, risking awkward strain in Saudi-India ties. Indian government reacted in measured tones, acknowledging the agreement and saying it would “study the implications” for her security. The real worry in New Delhi is not that Saudi forces would fight on Pakistan’s side which remains far-fetched but that Pakistan will feel politically bolstered by Riyadh’s backing. Pakistani hardliners may adopt a tougher posture in future confrontations, believing a wealthy Arab power has their back. There’s also concern that Saudi aid or arms could flow to Pakistan over time, indirectly strengthening India’s longtime foe. Aware of these optics, Saudi officials have been quick to reassure India. One senior official stressed that Saudi’s relationship with India “is more robust than it has ever been” and vowed to keep deepening it. Riyadh clearly wants to show it can defend its interests with Pakistan without abandoning its friendship with India. Even so, the balancing act is delicate. New Delhi will likely respond by tightening its own strategic bonds, for instance, with Israel, a close defense partner – and by quietly urging Riyadh to stay neutral in South Asian issues. Much progress in India-Saudi relations has come in recent years, and both sides have incentives to prevent this new alignment from derailing that momentum. As the dust settles, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement stands as a bold statement, but one not yet tested by crisis. Its ripple effects are already evident. Israel, which had been inching toward a historic normalisation with Riyadh, now sees that prospect put on hold Washington, too, must grapple with a Gulf ally hedging its bets on security. Ultimately, the agreement’s significance will hinge on how seriously Riyadh and Islamabad implement it. Regular joint drills coordinated planning or clear mutual defense protocols could turn the promise into genuine deterrence. Absent that, skeptics may view it as more posturing than substance. History offers caution: Pakistan’s past defense agreement s (such as Cold War alliances with the U.S.) often fell short when real wars loomed, and Gulf unity schemes have tended to fragment under pressure. For now, Saudi Arabia has made a dramatic bid to diversify its security options, a gamble on Pakistan’s reliability and on charting a more independent course without alienating old partners. If the gamble succeeds, it could redraw the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia. If it falters, it will remind everyone that even grand agreements can carry unspoken caveats. Only a true test, a moment of crisis will reveal whether this new alliance is as ironclad as advertised, or more of a strategic signal than a binding shield. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi

China Geopolitics International Leadership Policy

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Keeping The Window Open!

Delicate balancing of relations between US, China & Russia is test of Bharat’s foreign policy framework that centres on strategic autonomy. K.A.Badarinath Will there be a huge shift in Bharat’s foreign policy framework? Or, possible tilt towards China, Russia conglomeration, a permanent feature? Will this lead to increased distancing between India and US under Republican White House stewardship? What’s in store on geo-political, strategic and economic engagement for Bharat and the world? There are several unanswered and unsettling questions that pop up in inter-personal conversations and on the information highways as one scans on Google, Weibo to Douyin. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China and Japan has set off a flurry of conversations internationally. Both, Beijing and Tokyo are most intrinsic foes that do not have much in common especially after the war leading to Japan’s surrender in 1945. Several questions that analysts, anchors and seasoned newsmen are also awe-stuck given that in the first place he lined up the visits to both China and Japan in one go. Secondly, not only do they keep distance but belong to two diametrically opposite camps but have huge issues in global equations. While China and Russia have had rivalled US-led NATO group, Japan falls into the latter alliance. Thirdly, this visit of Prime Minister Modi is significant in the backdrop of United States President Donald Trump weaponising trade, imposing 50 per cent tariff on Bharat’s goods and services and thereby burning bridges. Fourthly, Prime Minister Modi’s two nation visit gained prominence as the ‘global south’ network seeks to consolidate its position via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization whose twentieth session was held in Tianjin as China holds the rotating chair as of now. Fifth, most analysts think that Bharat’s ‘strategic autonomy’ policy framework is being put to test with re-setting its relations vis-à-vis US and China. Sixth, however, top hawks in Bharat’s foreign affairs department do expect the relations with United States to bounce back to normalcy as had happened in the past after Washington DC imposed unilateral sanctions in aftermath of Pokharan nuclear tests. Seventh, the probability of a ‘delicate balancing act’ that New Delhi would enact with caution but firmness of purpose as its near time posturing without yielding to bullying tactics of US. Eighth, there’s no reason why Bharat should not continue oil trade with Russia or any other country depending on prevailing market conditions. Neither US nor Europe have locus standi to corner Bharat citing oil trade given their own continued ‘lucrative gas deals’ with Russia and its partners. Ninth, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to both Japan and China indicate that Bharat has the depth to manage diversities. For instance, enhancing Japanese investments to US $ 68 billion from $ 34 billion through 170 deals is a big take away for both Bharat and Japan who enjoy strategic and special relationship. This is a firm message for US that sought to dry up the foreign investment pipeline in Bharat to push for a ‘bad trade deal’. By not participating in a significant programme to commemorate China’s victory over Japan is again a big message to Beijing that New Delhi has its friends elsewhere as well. Bilateral summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping has been regarded as pivotal to ‘resetting relations’ as development partners and ‘not as rivals’. While the intent is good, first step has been taken to normalise relations, there are several challenges especially on borders, Belt and Roads Initiative that brings Chinese projects to the doorstep via Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Apprehensions seem to be very high on both over outcome of these meetings even as China and Bharat ready to celebrate 75-years of diplomatic relations. One significant point made by Prime Minister Modi that has gone viral was border peace and tranquillity was like an insurance policy for future enduring relations. Can the dragon and elephant in the room tango seamlessly is a billion dollar question as resetting of relations is attempted. As one Chinese scholar wrote ‘it’s rational choice and shared responsibility for both India and China to reset relations’. A big take away is a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin with carpooling and Ridge Carlton delegation level talks happening in a ‘delightful’ atmosphere. The visuals and videos of Modi, Putin traveling in a Russian made car throwing protocols to winds is not something European Union or US will want to watch. Given that US described Russia and Ukraine conflict as ‘Modi’s war’ has had no impact on the two leaders’ summit deliberations that extended a wee-bit. Also, 2025 marks 15 years of Indo-Russian strategic relationship that would come into full play later this year. From Bharat’s perspective, there have been a few takeaways from 20-members SCO summit. Unadulterated condemnation of Pahalgam attack by terrorists from across the borders is what India expected and achieved. Also, expanding trade relations between different SCO member countries with payments squared off in respective currencies is big. This would also mean that increasingly trade would get delinked from US dollar and euro while Chinese Renminbi, Russian rouble and Indian Rupee would gain in terms of acceptability. While the show in China came to a near close, the implications of new found friendship between Presidents’ Xi, Putin and Prime Minister Modi will result in sleepless nights for those in Trump administration and Brussels, housing headquarters of European Union. (Author is Director and Chief Executive of New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies) Keeping The Window Open!

Bali Jatra Reflects Bharat’s Maritime Prowess

Guest Column International Policy Security

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Bali Jatra Reflects Bharat’s Maritime Prowess

India and Southeast Asia share civilizational connect, maritime and cultural heritage that’s now dubbed as Global South. Dr Aniket Pingley Connections between India and Southeast Asia go back more than two thousand years, shaped by vast waters of Indian Ocean. These seas were not barriers but bridges, linking ports of ancient India with the islands and coastal regions of what we now call Southeast Asia. Merchants, monks, artisans and travelers carried more than goods; they carried stories, languages, faiths and practices. Over time, these exchanges left enduring marks on societies from Sumatra to the Malay Peninsula and beyond. In many ways, Southeast Asia became a mirror that reflected civilizational outreach of Bharat. Trade was the most visible layer of this relationship. India exported textiles, spices, beads and ivory while importing gold, tin, camphor and exotic wood from Southeast Asia. These exchanges were never limited to commerce alone. Maritime routes were also pathways for ideas. Ramayana and the Mahabharata were retold in local languages; Sanskrit and later Pali shaped courts and religious practices and Indian temple architecture inspired monuments from Angkor in Cambodia to Borobudur in Indonesia. The very names of places such as Yogyakarta, Ayutthaya and Srivijaya testify to these cultural flows. These interactions reveal how India’s influence went beyond its borders helping to form cosmopolitan societies in Southeast Asia that were both rooted in local traditions and open to outside influences. Diplomatic and political exchanges played an important role. Rulers in Java, Bali and Sumatra often drew on Indian ideas of kingship, legitimizing their authority through symbols and rituals derived from the subcontinent. The legend of King Airlangga of Java, for example, shows how Indian epics and models of governance were woven into local traditions [5]. Similarly, in Malay Peninsula, early polities combined maritime trade with cultural borrowing from India, laying the foundations for the region’s lasting connections with the subcontinent [7]. These layers of connection commercial, cultural, religious and political formed a civilizational network that is now increasingly referred to as “Global South.” India’s historic outreach demonstrated how societies of South could link with each other, exchange resources, and build hybrid cultures without external domination. This perspective is particularly important today as countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America seek greater cooperation outside the traditional frameworks of the West [7]. Bali Jatra: Memory of the Ocean Voyages Odisha, known as Kalinga in ancient times, was a formidable maritime power. Its strategic location along Bharat’s eastern coast made it a hub for trade and cultural exchange. Major ports like Tamralipti, Palur and Manikapatna were bustling centres of commerce, facilitating movement of goods and ideas between India and Southeast Asia. It is in this context that festival of Bali Jatra (Baliyatra), celebrated in Cuttack, Odisha, hold such significance. Literally meaning “voyage to Bali,” the festival commemorates the journeys once undertaken by Sadhabas or Odia merchants, who sailed across the Bay of Bengal to trade with Java, Bali, Sumatra and other parts of Southeast Asia [1][2]. During full moon of Kartik Purnima every year, families in Odisha still set afloat small boats made of banana bark, paper, or cork, symbolizing vessels that once braved seas. The Balinese celebration of Nyepi, Hindu New Year, bears similarities to rituals of Kartik Purnima in Odisha. Both festivals involve offerings to the gods, prayers for prosperity and rituals closely tied to agricultural and maritime cycles. The practice is more than a regional ritual; it is a living archive of India’s maritime past. Bali Jatra reminds us that Indian Ocean trade was not incidental but central to Bharat’s engagement with Southeast Asia. At its height, these voyages established a dense web of relationships that enriched both sides. For Southeast Asia, Indian traders brought goods and technologies that supported local economies. For India, the voyages opened access to new markets, resources and cultural influences. The festival, therefore, is not only about nostalgia but also about acknowledging an interconnected past. Today, Bali Jatra has grown into one of the largest open-air fairs in Asia, attracting millions of visitors [3]. It showcases not just Odisha’s heritage but wider story of India’s role in maritime Asia. The festival includes cultural performances, food, handicrafts, and exhibitions that highlight the living traditions of seafaring communities. It also increasingly serves as a site of cultural diplomacy, inviting participation from Southeast Asian countries whose histories are tied to these voyages. Contemporary Relevance & Policy Play The significance of Bali Jatra does not end with heritage. It has clear implications for policy and diplomacy in the present. India and ASEAN today are strategic partners, cooperating in trade, security and cultural exchange. Yet for these partnerships to deepen, they need narratives that bind them beyond statistics. Bali Jatra provides one such narrative, rooted in shared history and civilizational connect. For Bharat’s policymakers, the festival is an example of India’s civilizational diplomacy. The presence of diplomats and foreign representatives at recent Bali Jatra celebrations shows growing recognition of its potential [3]. By inviting Southeast Asian leaders, academics, and artists to participate in the event, India can use the festival to create dialogues that are both cultural and strategic. Such engagements could align with forums like the Delhi Dialogue and ASEAN–India summits [8], making cultural heritage an integral part of foreign policy. For Southeast Asian nations, acknowledging festivals like Bali Jatra opens space to emphasize shared heritage while respecting national diversity. Countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, where Indian cultural imprints remain visible, can view these connections not as relics of the past but as foundations for renewed cooperation. Policy research papers from think tanks such as Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia already suggest that cultural diplomacy can strengthen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Malaysia [6]. Similarly, Indonesian scholars point to the shared legacy of figures like King Airlangga as a reminder of intertweaved histories [4]. For the academic community, Bali Jatra offers a platform for dialogue on the meaning of the Global South. As scholars note, the Global South is not only

Kashmir to Kyrenia, Modi Resets Eurasian Chessboard

Geopolitics International Leadership Policy

378

Kashmir to Kyrenia, Modi Resets Eurasian Chessboard

Modi’s choice of gift, a hand-knotted Kashmiri silk carpet, was a polite but firm reminder that Jammu and Kashmir is unquestionably India’s sovereign terrain, just as a reunited Cyprus remains Nicosia’s non-negotiable objective. Rahul Pawa The world took only passing notice when Prime Minister Narendra Modi touched down in Nicosia on June 15. Yet for close watchers of Eurasian geopolitics, the visit was a strategic inflection point: New Delhi’s most pointed riposte to Ankara’s unabashed support for Islamabad and a deft assertion of India’s own red lines on sovereignty. Turkey’s dictatorial President Erdogan has, for years, amplified Pakistan’s Jammu and Kashmir narrative at the UN, transferred unlawful killer drone technology to Rawalpindi, and aligned diplomatically after every India-Pakistan flare-up in May 2025. For New Delhi, Indo-Pacific is no longer the only arena where coercive partnerships need balancing; the Eastern Mediterranean now figures prominently in India’s “extended neighbourhood.” With its 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Turkey occupies roughly 36 percent of the island, a fait accompli recognised only by Ankara. The occupation like the Pakistani Occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and territories of Ladakh namely Gilgit-Baltistan is rarely headline news. But Modi’s landing in Cyprus made sure it briefly elbowed Gaza war, Red Sea shipping routes and Ukraine off analysts’ front pages. Nominally, the trip produced standard diplomatic deliverables: a joint declaration pledging intensified defence – industrial collaboration, an information-sharing framework on counter-terrorism & cyber security and expanded naval cooperation, Indian warships will make more calls at Cypriot ports and conduct joint search-and-rescue drills. What made the optics powerful was less the paperwork than symbolism. Modi’s choice of gift, a hand-knotted Kashmiri silk carpet, was a polite but firm reminder that Jammu and Kashmir is unquestionably India’s sovereign terrain, just as a reunited Cyprus remains Nicosia’s non-negotiable objective. The Cypriot leadership reciprocated by publicly thanking India for “standing up for sovereignty,” words that landed like a shot across the bow in Ankara, where strategic planners have banked on the Islamic world’s silence over Northern Cyprus. Modi offered no press-conference grandstanding; the statement of support appeared in the joint communiquéé and in Cyprus gratitude, proof that deliberate ambiguity often resonates louder than televised barbs. For decades Eastern Mediterranean has been Turkey’s strategic back-yard. The Turkish Navy exerts sea control; Turkish petroleum parastatals map offshore gas blocks; and Ankara leverages the “Cyprus question” to box out European Union pressure. India’s arrival alters that mental map. Regular Indian Navy port calls, if operationalised, will put a blue-water Asian presence at the doorstep of NATO’s southern flank. That has twin signaling value: to Turkey, that its actions in South Asia carry costs in its own neighbourhood and to the EU-27, that India is willing to shoulder limited security responsibilities in Europe’s periphery. The visit also dovetails neatly with the nascent India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). Cyprus, an EU member and chair in 2026 with convenient trans-shipment facilities and legal clarity, can serve as the Mediterranean gateway for IMEC sea–land–rail lattice, reducing dependence on Suez chokepoint and giving Indian exporters a predictable entry point into the European single market. By grafting strategic access onto an economic corridor, New Delhi builds dual-use leverage without flaunting gunboat diplomacy. Domestically, Modi’s subtle poke at Ankara offers an answer to critics who argue that New Delhi is often too restrained when foreign capitals weaponise the Jammu and Kashmir discourse. Internationally, the gambit helps India consolidate support among small and medium European states that resent Turkish maximalism but lack the heft to counter it alone. For Nicosia, partnering with G-20 heavyweight boosts deterrence far beyond what Brussels has provided. There is a United Nations angle, too. Turkey’s military presence in Northern Cyprus violates multiple Security Council resolutions, but enforcement has languished. By throwing India’s diplomatic weight behind Cyprus’s territorial integrity, Modi has effectively globalised what Ankara hoped would remain a regional wrinkle. Elevated visibility complicates any future attempt by Turkey to extract concessions, whether on gas exploration blocs or on a two-state settlement, by holding European unity hostage. Great-power statecraft often hinges on narrative as much as kinetics. In Cyprus, Modi wrote a concise but compelling script: sovereignty is indivisible, occupations are unacceptable, and India has the agency to intervene, politically and symbolically, well beyond the Indian Ocean. In doing so, New Delhi inserted itself into a theatre where it had little historical presence, turned Turkey’s Cyprus problem into a talking point in South Asia, and reminded Pakistan that its external backers have vulnerabilities of their own. Analysts inclined to dismiss the visit as a minor European detour miss the slow-burn strategic dividend. Like Cheniere’s gas cargoes that transformed LNG markets after years of obscurity, today’s silk-carpet diplomacy may look mundane until the first Indian Navy destroyer docks in Limassol or the first IMEC freight train off-loads Indian pharmaceuticals bound for Central Europe. By then, the message to Ankara will require no amplification: alignments have consequences, and India now writes a few of the footnotes in the Eastern Mediterranean ledger. For a world fatigued by protracted altercations, Cyprus often feels like a frozen footnote to history. Modi’s masterstroke reminds us that frozen conflicts can thaw and when they do, new actors will shape the meltwater. The sooner chancelleries from Washington to Brussels internalise that reality, the better prepared they will be for the next iteration of Mediterranean geopolitics. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)