On the 7th anniversary of #Pulwama terrorist attack, we release our new brief on Jaish-e-Mohammed (#JeM): major attacks, India’s counter-terror response, and global actions; UN listings, bans, sanctions, and FATF-linked pressure. It also tracks Pakistan’s retrospective denial and optics, even as JeM’s infrastructure persists. A seven-year audit of accountability, impunity, and what constrains terror.
Brig Brijesh Pandey Seven years after the Pulwama suicide bombing claimed the lives of 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel, India’s security strategy still carries the imprints of that national tragedy. The body bags wrapped in the National Flag catalysed the strategic shift. This terrorist attack by Pakistan-based and backed terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), from the Pakistan-occupied territories of Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK), was not merely an act of terrorism; it marked a geopolitical turning point that permanently reshaped India’s approach to deterrence. This incident also signaled a strategic shift toward Pakistan, emphasising the development of asymmetric capabilities and consequently, reshaping the balance of power in South Asia. The anniversary, however, should not turn out to be just a solemn remembrance; it should impel us to ponder over more serious questions, such as what changed after the Pulwama terror strike? What was the overall spectrum of India’s response? Have the risks been resolved? The Shock and Aftershock Pulwama suicide bombing was one of the most heinous attacks in over a decade. Within 12 days of the incident, India responded with a Trans-Line of Control (LoC) air strike at Balakot, deep inside PoJK. Trans LoC action, employing conventional forces, had thus far been defined as an “act of war.” Consequently, Pakistan was expected to respond with conventional kinetic action inside Indian territory. Perhaps the shock of the air strike was so great that it shook the military planners in Pakistan. They not only preferred to give it a pass, but also quickly returned the Indian pilot, the then Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who was taken as a prisoner after his aircraft crashed inside PoJK. In the pre-2019 era, India’s response to terrorist initiated incidents (TIIs) was characterised by restraint. It oscillated between diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, ceasefire violations across the LoC, limited covert operations and return to normalcy. What changed with Pulwama was India’s definition of “terror acts” and the unwarranted restraint caused by the term “act of war.” The most remarkable part was India smashing the glass ceiling of nuclear overhang, making a statement that Proxy War will no longer be cost- free. So what was the significance of the Balakot air strike? Firstly, it brought about a paradigm shift in the security policy from strategic restraint to calibrated punishment. Secondly, India dislodged Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and reinforced the deterrence established through the Uri Surgical strikes of 2016. Thirdly, at the global level, India suddenly altered the threshold levels of tolerance towards conflict between two nuclear-armed states. End of Strategic Restraint Balakot air strikes were domestically followed with a decisive mandate in favour of the ruling dispensation in India. This served not only as the public endorsement of India’s punitive action against Pakistan but also as the National consensus on “zero tolerance” towards any form of attack, conventional or sub-conventional. What followed was silent yet substantive: – There is no ambiguity about the dismantling of terror infrastructure post abrogation of Article 370 substantively. There has also been a remarkable improvement in most of the parameters of terrorism, such as recruitment, infiltration by foreign terrorists, number of TIIs and the resultant loss of lives. However, to assume that the entire framework of Proxy War encompassing ideological radicalisation, nexus networks and terror infrastructures will get dismantled so easily, will be a fallacy. So long as the “idea of terrorism” is alive, peace will remain elusive and the trajectory of stability can be altered in the blink of an eye. Deterrence in South Asia In the immediate aftermath of the Balakot air strikes, it was believed that deterrence had been restored and would dissuade Pakistan from orchestrating a major terror strike against India. This belief was shattered by the terror attacks at Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, killing 26 tourists after segregating them in the name of religion. Given the nature of the attacks and manner of execution, it can well be called a step higher than the Pulwama suicide bombing. Consequently, this led the Indian security planners once again to redefine the boundaries of deterrence through Operation Sindoor. For Pakistan, the costs were multiplied manifold, and the spectrum of punishment was enhanced to encompass the entire length and breadth of Pakistan. Even foreign assets stationed in Pakistan were not spared, and the attacks signalled a “conventional anti-dote” to the strategic comfort Pakistan derived from India’s “no first use” nuclear doctrine. Despite such a decisive action, compelling Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations to rush to seek a ceasefire, the Delhi Car Bombing of 10 November 2025 at Red Fort Metro Station occurred. This time too, the trail pointed towards Pakistan, though the network differed in character and the arc of orchestration extended as far as Türkiye. Recurrence of terror attacks underscores a basic reality that deterrence in South Asia is neither static nor absolute. It is a dynamic contest shaped by big power alignments, multiple regional actors (often working in concert), proxy players embedded within the society, internal political machinations, and ideological currents. The challenge is further compounded by the constant mutation of terrorist organisations, evolving new methods, funding patterns and operational space. This helps them to evade the conventional operational responses. Consequently, even decisive actions such as Balakot or sophisticated, high-precision operations such as Operation Sindoor cannot be expected to create permanent deterrence. Pakistan Army, whose relevance has long been based on perpetual hostility with India, will continue to innovate and rewire its Proxy Warfare. Moreover, the regional and global players whose geostrategic interests are served by constraining India’s rise or drawing India into asymmetric dependencies that undermine India’s strategic autonomy will keep discovering new ways of supporting Pakistan’s disruptive designs. Internal Security Question Beyond the realm of geopolitics and external dimensions lies an uncomfortable yet fundamental question: could Pulwama have been prevented through an anticipatory mechanism? Investigations into major TIIs have constantly indicated the gaps in intelligence, inter-agency coordination, integrated threat assessment, and the last-mile operational preparedness of forces operating in various conflict zones. While procedural and structural measures
Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.
Arun Anand Myanmar (formerly Burma) sits at a critical crossroads in Asia, both geographically and geopolitically. The country’s location – bordering China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Laos, with a long coastline on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – makes it a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. In fact, Myanmar is often described as the “main connecting hub” linking East, South, and Southeast Asia. Its shores provide access to the Indian Ocean’s major shipping lanes, which has long attracted great power interest. In short, Myanmar’s geostrategic location grants it outsized importance: it is the only Southeast Asian nation sharing borders with both India and China, and it offers a land gateway from the Bay of Bengal into the heart of Asia.
Vivekananda for Gen Z on National Youth Day 2026 CIHS DESK Gen Z is at a turning point in 2026. Many young minds, surrounded by information, polarised narratives, and instant outrage, are drawn towards extremes, ideological, political or social, not always out of conviction but frequently out of confusion, rage or a need for meaning. In this context, Swami Vivekananda appears not just as a historical figure but also as a mentor for young people looking for meaning. National Youth Day, which is marked on January 12 to commemorate the birth anniversary of Vivekananda, one of India’s most influential intellectuals and enduring voices for youth upliftment, serves as a reminder that while youth power can be destructive if left unchecked, it can also be transformative when it is grounded in strong values. Long before the internet era, Vivekananda was aware of this threat. He cautioned against mental weakness, emotional excess, and mindless imitation, conditions that frequently lead to vulnerability and exploitation in our times. His timeless teachings connect directly to Gen Z, a generation living through uncertainty and hyper-connectedness, navigating imported “woke” cultural constructs, and increasingly vulnerable to disruptive and extremist ideologies. Vivekananda addressed young people as active creators of the future rather than as passive inheritors of tradition. His message was straightforward but profound: develop inner strength, have faith in yourself, and direct your energy towards positive endeavours. Vivekananda’s teachings provide an alternate route based on purpose, balance, and accountability at a time when many young people look for significance in extremes, whether they be ideological, digital, or social. The notion that education is the unfolding of each person’s inherent excellence rather than just the acquisition of knowledge was fundamental to his worldview. Gen Z, generation rich in knowledge and experience but frequently weighed down by comparison, worry and outside approval, finds great resonance in this concept. Young people are reminded by Vivekananda’s emphasis on self-belief that one’s value is determined by one’s character and inner convictions rather than by followers, trends or approbation. His conviction that knowledge without integrity is worthless feels particularly important in this day and age, when radical groups frequently draw highly educated but morally disengaged adolescents. Self-belief was a fundamental tenet of Swami Vivekananda’s philosophy, as seen by his statement, “Weakness is sin.” He encouraged the young people to believe in themselves by acknowledging the limitless potential that each person possesses. According to him, self-belief is not conceit but rather a profound understanding of one’s inherent power and moral obligation, which elevates people to overcome obstacles, take responsibility and strive for greater goals. This inner confidence, according to Vivekananda, is the cornerstone of nation-building: strong, fearless and disciplined people inevitably develop into responsible citizens who advance society. He thought that a country created by self-assured people would be durable, forward-thinking and cohesive, strong not just materially but also morally and purposefully. Vivekananda’s emphasis on character development over credentials was equally significant. He cautioned that knowledge devoid of integrity is meaningless in an era fixated on rapid success and immediate recognition. He held that the moral foundation of both people and nations is composed of integrity, bravery, empathy and selflessness. Vivekananda’s emphasis on education as the “manifestation of inner perfection” is vital for Generation Z, who are often faced with narratives that split the world into adversaries and allies. This serves as a reminder that trustworthiness and moral fortitude, rather than indignation or radicalism, are the sources of long-lasting impact. Another foundation of the ideals held by Vivekananda was discipline. For him, discipline served as a link between values and conduct. People who possess self-discipline in their thoughts and actions can focus on their goals and use their energy in constructive ways. According to Vivekananda, disciplined people construct powerful organisations and nations and disciplined minds produce ordered lives. He believed that discipline was liberating rather than limiting, enabling people to overcome obstacles and flaws. Another characteristic that set him apart was his fearlessness. Vivekananda exhorted the young people to behave bravely, talk honestly, and think for themselves. But wisdom, not recklessness, was the source of his fearlessness. He was as opposed to blind revolt as he was to blind conformity. This is especially important now since polarisation, fear, and false information can lead young people to adopt extreme viewpoints. Young people are empowered by Vivekananda’s bravery to think critically, question, and change without resorting to violence or hatred. Today, when extremism frequently poses as bravery while stifling introspection and discussion, striking this balance is crucial. Swami Vivekananda, who helped bring Vedanta and Yoga to Western audiences, understood Bhagwan (God) as the universal, formless, all-pervading Truth. He stressed personal, direct realisation over rigid dogma, taught that the divine dwells in every soul, and encouraged people to seek Bhagwan through love, service, and compassion, an outlook profoundly shaped by his guru, Sri Ramakrishna. Combining faith in Bhagwan with self-belief establishes equilibrium, ensuring that power is used for everyone’s benefit and anchoring human endeavour in higher ideals. For Vivekananda, spirituality is a force that propels national advancement and humanitarian service rather than an escape. These principles together create a comprehensive foundation for greatness. Swami Vivekananda envisioned young people who are self-assured but modest, disciplined and energetic, courageous and caring and socially engaged but deeply rooted in their spirituality. He felt that these people are the real builders of a powerful, enlightened, and cohesive civilisation. National Youth Day serves as a reminder that, when directed by admirable ideals, young people’s enthusiasm, inventiveness and tenacity may influence society. Vivekananda’s teachings, “Believe in yourself and believe in Bhagwan (God),” is still relevant and continue to motivate young people to overcome obstacles, give freely to humanity and strive for a just as young people look for significance outside of extremes: true power comes from character, clarity and service rather than radicalism. On his birth anniversary, we are reminded to reflect upon his teachings and inspire young people to lead with honesty, bravery, and compassion, influencing not only their own future but
By N. C. Bipindra As Bangladesh moves toward the general elections scheduled for February 2026, the country is experiencing its most far-reaching political realignment in decades. The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s long-entrenched Awami League dominance following the 2024 mass uprising has dismantled the familiar two-party framework and given rise to a fragmented, competitive political arena. New coalitions, revived Islamist forces and youth-driven political platforms are all vying for space, and their manoeuvring is unfolding amid intensifying regional and global interest. For India, China, the United States and Pakistan, the choices Bangladeshi voters and parties make in 2026 will shape not only domestic governance but also Dhaka’s strategic orientation in South Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. From Awami League Dominance to Political Fragmentation For more than a decade, Bangladesh’s political and foreign policy trajectory was closely associated with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League. Domestically, the party presided over a strong centralised system that delivered economic growth while constricting political competition. Internationally, it cultivated a close strategic partnership with India, maintained extensive economic and infrastructure engagement with China and managed an increasingly strained relationship with the United States over issues of democracy, elections and human rights. The upheaval of 2024 abruptly ended this equilibrium. The interim administration under Muhammad Yunus pledged institutional reform and credible elections, but it also left the Awami League politically marginalised, creating a vacuum that rival forces are now racing to fill. BNP: Strategic Balancer with a Nationalist Tilt In this transformed landscape, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has emerged as the most significant electoral contender. Long the principal opposition to the Awami League, BNP now sees itself as the natural governing alternative in a post-Hasina order. Its campaign narrative centres on restoring democratic norms, recalibrating economic policy, and reasserting civilian political authority. The death of party chairperson Khaleda Zia in December 2025 has accelerated a generational shift within the BNP, with her son Tarique Rahman assuming a central leadership role and directing alliance-building efforts ahead of the polls. This transition has infused the party with renewed urgency but also heightened scrutiny of its internal cohesion and strategic direction. Geopolitically, a BNP-led government would likely pursue a more balanced and less India-centric foreign policy than the Awami League. While ties with New Delhi would remain important, BNP has historically been more cautious, sometimes sceptical, of India’s influence and would seek a relationship framed more explicitly around reciprocity and sovereignty. At the same time, BNP is open to deepening economic engagement with China, viewing Beijing primarily as a source of investment and infrastructure rather than an ideological partner. Relations with the United States are expected to improve relative to the later Awami League years, as Washington sees BNP as more receptive to competitive politics, though US support would remain contingent on credible elections and limits on Islamist influence. Any warming of ties with Pakistan under a BNP government would likely be symbolic rather than transformative, constrained by historical sensitivities and limited economic incentives. Islamist Bloc: Ideological Identity, Strategic Ambiguity Alongside BNP’s resurgence, the return of Islamist politics has added a new layer of complexity to the electoral contest. The reinstatement of Jamaat-e-Islami has allowed it to rebuild an Islamist-leaning bloc drawing on conservative rural constituencies and religious networks. Although Jamaat is unlikely to dominate nationally, it is well-positioned to influence outcomes in a fragmented parliament. Its re-entry into mainstream politics has unsettled secular and centrist forces, raising questions about Bangladesh’s ideological trajectory after years of enforced secularism under the Awami League. From a geopolitical perspective, Jamaat’s participation is viewed with unease by both India and the United States. New Delhi associates Islamist political mobilisation with potential risks to border security and counter-extremism cooperation, while Washington remains wary of Jamaat’s ideological orientation and historical baggage. Pakistan, by contrast, sees a degree of ideological affinity in Jamaat’s worldview, though this does not automatically translate into strategic alignment. China has taken a more pragmatic stance, showing little concern for Jamaat’s ideology so long as political stability is maintained and economic engagements remain intact. In this sense, Islamist influence complicates Bangladesh’s external relationships without clearly anchoring the country to any single power. National Citizen Party (NCP): Reformist Politics, Geopolitical Ambiguity Another significant player in the evolving political landscape is the National Citizen Party, a youth-led formation that emerged from the 2024 protest movement. The NCP articulates a reformist agenda centred on institutional accountability, anti-corruption measures and generational change in politics. Its rise reflects widespread public fatigue with dynastic politics and entrenched elites. However, the party’s limited grassroots organisation and inexperience have constrained its electoral prospects, pushing it toward alliance calculations that have sparked internal divisions, particularly over potential cooperation with Islamist groups. Internationally, NCP’s discourse resonates most strongly with Western actors, especially the United States, which views its emphasis on transparency and civic rights as aligned with democratic norms. The party has not articulated a clear or consistent stance toward India or China, reflecting both its novelty and its focus on domestic reform rather than foreign policy. Over the longer term, NCP represents a potential new political elite that could tilt Bangladesh toward stronger engagement with Western institutions, but in the immediate electoral cycle, its influence is likely to be indirect, mediated through alliances. Awami League Remnant: Pro-India, Diminished but Not Irrelevant Although the Awami League has been largely sidelined, its residual networks within the bureaucracy, business community and local governance structures continue to matter. Any partial rehabilitation of the party would be welcomed in New Delhi, which still regards the Awami League as its most reliable partner in Bangladesh. However, strained relations with the United States and deep hostility toward Pakistan would remain defining features of an Awami League foreign policy orientation, limiting its room for manoeuvre even if it regains political relevance. Democracy, Stability, and Strategic Competition For the United States, 2026 election represents a test of process rather than personalities. Washington’s primary concerns revolve around electoral credibility, political pluralism and the containment of violent extremism. A BNP-led or broadly technocratic
Dr. Aniket Pingley I am not a journalist by profession. But like any reader who values intellectual honesty, I expect journalism to adhere to its own stated standards of ethics, verification, and fairness. In its article published by NYT titled “From the Shadows to Power: How the Hindu Right Reshaped India,” that expectation is repeatedly taken for a toss. If the NYT is willing to relax on standards when writing about the RSS, readers are entitled to ask whether what is being offered is reporting at all, or merely a predetermined story wearing the language of journalism. This essay examines where and how the article by Mashal and Kumar departs from those standards. My critique does not rest on disagreement with conclusions alone, but on demonstrable violations of widely accepted journalistic ethics, as codified in the IFJ Global Charter of Ethics for Journalists, the Munich Charter, and the Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics. In the sections that follow, I identify specific statements from the article, map them to the standards they violate, and offer rewritten versions showing how the same points could have been presented in a professional manner. 1. Failure: Fact–Opinion Separation Violated Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “The far-right group known as the R.S.S. has spent a century trying to make India a Hindu-first nation.” “The journalist shall make sure to clearly distinguish factual information from commentary and criticism.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 2 Founded in 1925, the RSS has articulated a vision of national identity centered on Hindu cultural/civilizational unity. Critics interpret this vision as seeking a Hindu-first political order, an interpretation the organization has refuted consistently. India, that is Bharat, is a Hindu nation. The word Hindu transcends Hinduism (religion). Hindu is the collective identity of the people of this nation called Bharat. The nationhood of Hindus has evolved over thousands of years independently of the kingdoms in Bharat and their political boundaries. 2. Failure: Loaded Language Used as Factual Description Statement Violated standard How should it have been written Some common sense “The R.S.S. originated as a shadowy cabal for the revival of Hindu pride after a long history of Muslim invasions and colonial rule in India, its early leaders openly drawing inspiration from the nationalist formula of Fascist parties in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” “Avoid stereotyping. Journalists should examine the ways their values and experiences may shape their reporting.” – SPJ Code of Ethics The RSS began as a small, closely organized volunteer movement during the colonial period, operating primarily through local branches, called as shakhas, rather than public political platforms. An honest discussion with the RSS leadership reveals that the founder Dr. Hedgewar was inspired by the vision of Swami Vivekananda, Yogi Aurobindo, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Bal Gangadhar Tilak etc. The RSS was founded in 1925, about half a decade prior to the start fascism in Europe. Why would anyone in the RSS had to go to Europe to learn about martial discipline if they could simply observe the British exercise the same, first-hand and for free? Suggested reading for NYT: Bhawani Mandir pamphlet written by Yogi Aurobindo in 1905. 3. Failure: Suppression of Essential Context Statement Violated standard How should it have been written RSS’s stated position “It’s philosophy casts India’s Muslims and Christians as descendants of foreign invaders who need to be put in their place.” “The journalist shall not suppress essential information or falsify any document.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 3 Some critics argue that certain Hindutva interpretations frame Indian history through a civilizational lens that emphasizes foreign invasions. RSS leaders, however, state that their definition of national belonging is cultural rather than religious and applies to all citizens. As a matter of fact, Sarasanghachalak Dr. Mohan Bhagwat has stated, on record, umpteen times that everyone in Bharat shares a “common DNA”, irrespective of their faith. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/living-in-harmony-is-our-culture-mohan-bhagwat-says-dna-of-people-in-undivided-india-same-for-40000-years-as-rss-marks-100-years/articleshow/123528212.cms The article itself states: “Their definition is a cultural one, and they consider everyone living in India as Hindu, he (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) said.” 4 & 5. Failure: Causal Claims Without Verification and Prediction Presented as Fact 2 Statements Violated standards How should it have been written “The R.S.S. has infiltrated and co-opted India’s institutions to such a degree …” “that its deep roots will ensure it remains a powerful force long after Mr. Modi is gone.” “Never confuse the work of a journalist with that of a publicist or a propagandist.” – Charter of Munich, Responsibility 9 “The notion of urgency or immediacy in the dissemination of information shall not take precedence over verification.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 5 Individuals associated with organizations that describe ideological affinity with the RSS are present across political parties, civil society groups, and public institutions in India. Scholars and analysts disagree on whether this presence reflects coordinated organizational strategy, informal ideological influence, or the broader political mobilization of Hindu nationalist ideas. However, no judicial findings or investigative agency has proven that the R.S.S exercises institutional control over state bodies or established centralized direction of such influence. 6. Failure: Unfounded Accusations by Association Statement Violated standard Counter question for the NYT “And when you see Hindu vigilantes parading through Muslim neighbourhoods or ransacking churches, you are seeing the R.S.S. affiliates exercising their vision of supremacy.” “Slander, libel, defamation, unfounded accusations are serious professional misconduct.” – IFJ Global Charter, Article 10 The article itself states: “He (Dr. Mohan Bhagwat) discouraged engaging in hooliganism and incitement of violence”. The basis of this article is a study conducted by Felix Pal that attempts to establish RSS having a tight control over all its affiliates. So does the RSS’s discouragement to incitement of violence and its affiliates’ “exercising their vision of supremacy” through hooliganism logically add up? 7. Failure: Unverified causal theory presented as settled fact Statement Violated standard Counter statement with similar flavour “But the formula has remained central to its success ever since: uniting Hindus around grievances from the past and injecting
CIHS Desk On the morning of 30 December 1943, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose fulfilled his vow, he hoisted the tricolour at Port Blair. This was no ritual gesture but a declaration that the soul of Bharat had arisen. Under Bose’s leadership of the Azad Hind Fauj, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were liberated from British colonial occupation. The solemn Cellular Jail, long the symbol of British cruelty, now looked on as its jailors empire began to crumble. The flag fluttering at Netaji Stadium (then the Gymkhana Ground) proclaimed that India’s freedom was no longer a distant dream, it was being claimed here and now. In mid-1943, Bose had already proclaimed the Azad Hind Sarkar, India’s first provisional government in Singapore. He made clear that this was not a symbolic cabinet-in-exile, but a strategic, ideological and military assertion of India’s right to self-rule. The INA raised its own treasury and even issued stamps and currency under Bose’s tricolour, signaling real statehood. India’s freedom struggle had transformed into a true war of liberation. Bose explicitly rejected petitions and half-measures: “India would fight for her freedom not through pleas or petitions, but through armed struggle and sacrifice,” he declared. In his words, the Azad Hind Government was “the Government of the free Indians… representing the will of the entire Indian people”. This fiery claim of sovereignty stunned the colonial occupiers. By late 1943, even a Japanese handover made Port Blair and nearby islands the first piece of Indian soil “freed from British rule.” On 30 December itself, Bose stood before a crowd of freedom-loving Andamanis. With pride and resolve he unfurled the tricolour at the very spot where countless patriots like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar had once been tortured. The effect was electric. In a speech charged with the fervor of Bharat Mata, Bose invoked the martyrs of the Cellular Jail, comparing its gates opening to the fall of the Bastille in France, and consecrated the day as one of liberation. He renamed the Andaman’s as Shaheed Dweep (Martyr’s Island) and the Nicobar’s as Swaraj Dweep (Self-Rule Island), dedicating them to the memory of India’s sacrificed heroes. This was more than pageantry, the tricolour rising there “symbolised not just the freedom of the islands but the resurgence of India’s spirit”. The colonial empire understood the message: Indians had moved from petitions to power, and Britain’s colonial story was broken. Bose’s act proclaimed that India would seize its destiny “through determination, sacrifice, disciplined action and uncompromising courage,” not through British concession. 30 December 1943 therefore must be remembered not as a footnote, but as a defining assertion of Bharat’s civilizational will. On that day, Netaji, born of a family steeped in patriotism, rekindled the ancient flame of Bharat’s freedom. The raising of the tricolour at Port Blair stands as a witness that India’s independence was not granted but earned, seized by heroes who embodied the country’s spiritual resilience. This is the legacy of that day, a story of national awakening that resonates with the soul of Bharat.
Caravan’s purported study on Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and like-minded organisations smack of framing agenda for future Dr Aniket Pingley “A plausible explanation is not necessarily a true one.” Dr. Richard Feynman, American Physicist & Nobel Laureate Synopsis: The Caravan published a study on December 17, 2025 titled “Unveiling the RSS – Exposing the largest far-right network in history”. Its central hypothesis can be summarized as follows: The RSS is not a loose family of ideologically inspired but autonomous organizations, as claimed. Rather, it functions as a single, centrally coordinated political organism that strategically uses thousands of legally distinct civil-society entities as proxies to expand power, evade accountability, and manufacture the illusion of an organic grassroots movement. The study repeatedly asserts that what appears as decentralization has in fact concealed bureaucratic control and that RSS maintains a dual narrative: public denial of control and internal acknowledgment of centralized authority. The central hypothesis smuggles in multiple unstated claims that radically escalate its meaning. Here is what the study actually posits: The study advances several interlocking claims: This is not the first, nor the last, “study” that “attempts” to “demystify” RSS and a large bouquet of organizations with shared ideals. Keeping my subjective opinion about the intention behind this study aside, let us put it to an objective, rational and fundamental test. The test has three questions: “Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.” Supreme Court of India, February 2021 Mapping Caravan’s Claims Against Four Postulations The afore-stated verification framework which includes first-hand verification, evidentiary validity and inferential necessity, will be applied to all postulations. P1: “Claims of autonomy are intentionally deceptive; RSS is consciously lying.” This is an accusation of intentional deception and not mis-description. Here are Caravan’s claims. Failure on Verification Test: Caravan’s Proof #1: Caravan states that RSS public material states that it “runs” other organizations as well. The books by Rakesh Sinha and Ratan Sharda are used as a proof of RSS own public material. It also hand wavingly states, “It is, however, common knowledge that the RSS’s influence extends far beyond this limited circle.” Counter-questions for Caravan: What is the basis to qualify a certain literary work as RSS own public material? Does RSS own a publication or on the contrary publicly denies owning a publication? Are even the authors cited holding any official position in RSS? Did Caravan meet an RSS top-level functionary to ascertain if the authors in-fact officially represent RSS? How does Caravan define and measure extent of RSS’s circle of influence? Failure: By asserting and concluding, before offering any evidence, that any literary work by an RSS sympathizer, well-wisher or volunteer is automatically RSS public material, Caravan demonstrates that it treats its own conclusions as proof, rather than seeking actual substantiation. Caravan has accused RSS of obfuscation while it being blurry about the mechanism to measure RSS influence by making use of hand waving statements. Caravan’s Proof #2: Caravan states, “the RSS, as has been repeatedly noted, is —not registered—not as an NGO, not as a religious trust, nor as any other legal entity.” And, that “ … lack of traceability on paper allowed it to set up a headquarters in the heart of the national capital without having to disclose its sources of funding, or even who its members are.” Failure: Legalese, clearly, is not of Caravan’s botheration. RSS is legally recognized in India as a “body of individuals” under the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 2(31). This means that RSS, as a BOI, can be assessed for income tax purposes as a separate entity. Headquarters of RSS are built and operated under Dr. Hedgewar Smarak Samiti, an independent society registered under the Societies Act. Both these facts are (purposefully?) left-out from the study. A cursory reading on Internet shows several legal notices, defamation suits, sedition charges etc. levied against Caravan by a variety of individuals and entities. Perhaps, it is due to lack of rigour for the legalese. Counter questions for Caravan: Which legal obligation is actually being evaded by RSS? Provided its disregard for legal facts, should anything that Caravan states related to legality be taken seriously? Closing remarks: The “evidence” by Caravan supports an alternative explanation: a culturally networked movement with loose (or strong) coordination but no unitary legal control, since RSS is presented to be “not” a legal entity. If not legally backed, how is control defined or measured? P2: Decision-making authority flows from a central node; affiliates lack discretion Here are the claims made by Caravan: Failure on the Verification Test: Caravan’s Proof #3: I will take one example among a few similar ones. Caravan states “the Maharaja Pratap Singh Ved Vidyalaya was established by a Pune-based organisation, Maharshi Ved Vyas Pratishthan, whose founder, Govindadev Giri, is an RSS member, the treasurer of VHP-controlled trust Ramjanmabhoomi Tirth Kshetra and also sits on the advisory board of the Nagpur hospital Madhav Netralaya, named after former RSS chief Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. According to RSS mouthpiece, Organiser, Govindadev Giri’s “initial samskars as RSS swayamsevak are manifested in” the Pratishthan.” Counter-questions for Caravan: Is it being posited that Govinddev Giri (Maharaj) takes orders from RSS on how to conduct his activities? Even if Maharaj is advisor to Madhav Netralaya, does the eye hospital run on whims of RSS through him? If so, can the chain of command be established and proven to be enforced? Counter-example for Caravan: The creative director at Caravan happens to be alumni of the same University as many members of UK-based Conservative Party, so Caravan must be peddling Conservative views. Is there any apparatus to measure degree of ridiculousness of this “proof”? Failure: The establishment and operational excellence of Maharishi Ved Vyas Pratishthan is not being considered as a meritorious position of Govinddev Giri’s national influence; but his early association with RSS is posited as his de facto qualification. Caravan’s Proof #4: “Pracharaks are trained in central RSS mission and, upon qualifying, sent out to Sangh appendages to maintain and consolidate control over the network,
