Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security Terrorism

Bangladesh: A Nobel Halo, an Islamist State,Terror Networks and Radicalisation as State Policy

Rahul PAWA | @imrahulpawa (X) Global jihadists see an opening: a chance to reconnect their Pakistani networks with Bangladeshi extremists, reversing years of counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation gains. On a mid-December night in Bangladesh, 25-year-old Dipu Chandra Das, a Hindu garment factory worker was beaten by a frenzy of Islamists, hung from a tree, and set ablaze on a highway. His alleged “crime”? A rumor that he insulted Islam. Yet investigators have since confirmed there is zero evidence that Dipu ever blasphemed at all. Not one can point to a single derogatory remark he made; “no one saw or heard” anything offensive, a Rapid Action Battalion officer admitted. In other words, an innocent Hindu man was lynched and immolated over a lie. One would expect such a medieval atrocity, captured on video and circulated worldwide, to provoke an outpouring of shock from international human rights watchdogs. Imagine if the roles were reversed: a Muslim man lynched and burned by a mob in a Hindu-majority country. The global indignation would be instantaneous and deafening. But in Dipu’s case, the outrage has been oddly muted. Major human rights organizations and Western governments that normally champion minority rights barely mustered a whisper of protest. The deafening silence of these supposed watchdogs is as harrowing as the crime itself, and it exposes a disturbing double standard. Bangladesh’s own minority rights groups vehemently condemned the lynching, the Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council decried the “so-called blasphemy” killing as an assault on communal harmony. But where were the urgent press releases from Geneva, the high-profile tweets from Human Rights Watch, the emergency sessions at the UN? Their voices have been either absent or astonishingly subdued. Such restraint stands in stark contrast to their usual activism when religious persecution occurs elsewhere. The message implicit in this silence is chilling: that the lynching of a poor Hindu man in Bangladesh is somehow a lesser transgression on the global human rights ledger. The hypocrisy extends to Bangladesh’s interim rulers. The current government, led by Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus, swept to power in August 2024 after a Islamist-led “Monsoon Revolution” toppled Sheikh Hasina’s democratically elected administration. Internationally, Yunus is venerated for championing human rights and equality. Domestically, his regime’s actions tell a darker story. Chief Adviser Yunus was quick to issue a condemnation of Dipu’s lynching, vowing the perpetrators “will not be spared”. However, such words ring hollow against the regime’s track record: while it denounces one mob killing, it has concurrently overseen the release or escape of hundreds of criminals and Islamist extremists since taking power. At Hadi’s funeral, Yunus himself delivered a eulogy that should have set off international alarm bells. In front of tens of thousands, Yunus heaped praise on Hadi’s “mantra” and vowed to fulfill Hadi’s vision “generation after generation”. Let’s be clear: Hadi was explicitly known for his anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric and polarising, Islamist-tinged politics. By publicly sanctifying Hadi’s ideals, Yunus sent a dangerous signal that anti-India and anti-Hindu dictate is now quasi-official ideology in Dhaka. Unsurprisingly, the fallout was swift. Days after Hadi’s death, Bangladesh erupted in fury, not just against alleged conspirators in his killing, but against perceived Indian influence. Mobs attacked the Indian Assistant High Commission in Chittagong, and hundreds of protesters marched on the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, chanting anti-India slogans and even hurling stones at diplomatic compounds. Bangladesh’s police hinted (without evidence) that Hadi’s assassins might have fled to India – where ex-PM Hasina has taken refuge – a claim that only inflamed public paranoia. In the frenzy, fact and fiction mattered little: ‘anti-India and anti-Hindu agenda’ was the rallying cry. Caught in the crossfire were Bangladesh’s Hindu minorities, now doubly scapegoated as both “blasphemers” at home and perceived fifth-columnists for India. Attacks on Hindu homes, temples and community leaders have spiked over the past year and a half. Even before Dipu Das’s lynching, minority groups warned that the post-Hasina political climate had emboldened extremists to settle scores with Hindus, Buddhists and Christians. Tragically, those warnings proved prescient in Bhaluka, Mymensingh, when Dipu’s killers exploited a religious rumor to unleash lethal mob “justice.” Police and RAB have detained ten suspects, Mohammad Limon Sarkar, Mohammad Tarek Hossain, Mohammad Manik Mia, Ershad Ali, Nijum Uddin, Alomgir Hossain, Mohammad Miraj Hossain Akon, Mohammad Azmol Hasan Sagir, Mohammad Shahin Mia, and Mohammad Nazmul, aged 19 to 46. The interim regime’s, especially Mohammad Yunis’s own actions, from baiting an anti-Indian agitator to allowing Islamist hardliners back into public life, have fertilised the soil in which Islamist extremism and radicalisation grows. Perhaps most cynical of all has been the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry’s complicity and the atrocious attempt to downplay these horrors. When India officially protested the mob killing of a Hindu Bangladeshi (and even a small peoples demonstration in New Delhi decrying it), Dhaka’s response was dismissive. Foreign Affairs Adviser Mohammad Touhid Hossain bristled at the notion that Dipu Das’s lynching had anything to do with minority targeting. He then lectured that “such incidents occur across the region” and every country has a responsibility to address themas if mob lynching and immolation of religious minorities is just business as usual in South Asia, nothing special. This whataboutist shrug is nothing short of an attempt to normalise hate crimes. By equating a communal lynching with generic law-and-order problems everywhere, Bangladesh’s officials signal that the brutal murder of a Hindu for an unproven slur is not a national emergency but a routine matter that merits no extra soul-searching. This attitude is profoundly dangerous. Bangladesh was founded on principles of secularism and communal harmony in 1971, a legacy now under siege. To shrug off anti-Hindu violence as “common in the region” is to abandon the very idea of a pluralistic Bangladesh. It emboldens extremists and tells persecuted minorities that they are essentially on their own. Indeed, Islamist radicals have heard the message loud and clear. With the new regime’s indulgence, dormant terrorist networks are roaring back to life. Key jihadist leaders have re-entered the fray, for example,

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

A Nation at Risk While the World Watches

By R K Raina The events that unfolded in Dhaka this week should end any remaining illusion that Bangladesh’s current political drift is a contained or internal matter. On Wednesday afternoon, hundreds of protesters marched towards the Indian High Commission under the banner of July Oikya, raising anti-India slogans and issuing open threats against a diplomatic mission. Police restraint prevented immediate escalation, but the message was unmistakable: radical forces now feel emboldened enough to challenge diplomatic norms in broad daylight. The protest was not spontaneous. July Oikya, a front comprising several groups linked to the July mass uprising, had announced its “March to Indian High Commission” in advance. Its leaders warned that they would forcibly enter the High Commission if their demands were not met. These included the return of individuals convicted in the so-called July massacre case, including former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and an end to what they described as “Indian conspiracies” against Bangladesh. Such rhetoric mirrors the familiar language of Islamist mobilisation across the region, where external enemies are invoked to justify internal radicalisation. What makes this incident especially alarming is not merely the hostility directed at India, but the broader political context in which it occurred. Several fundamentalist and extremist figures, previously detained on terrorism-related charges, have been released in recent months under the current interim administration. Many of these elements are now active on the streets, shaping protest narratives and openly threatening foreign missions. This is not accidental. It is the predictable outcome of legitimising radical actors under the pretext of political transition. Threatening a foreign high commission violates the most basic norms of the diplomatic community. When such acts are tolerated, or downplayed as expressions of popular anger, the consequences extend far beyond bilateral relations. They signal a breakdown of state authority and a willingness to allow extremist mobilisation to dictate political space. This moment must be understood within Bangladesh’s longer historical arc. The country was born in 1971 as a rejection of Pakistan’s ideological model. Bengali nationalism asserted that language, culture and democratic choice mattered more than religious uniformity imposed by the state. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman articulated this vision decades earlier, insisting that Bengal’s history and identity could not be erased. That vision guided Bangladesh through its most successful periods of economic growth and social stability. The forces now gaining ground stand in direct opposition to that legacy. Pakistan’s role in this trajectory is being conspicuously ignored. Since 1971, Islamabad has never reconciled itself to the idea of a secular, culturally confident Bangladesh. Its historical hostility to Bengali identity culminated in genocide, and its ideological influence has since flowed through organisations that opposed Bangladesh’s independence. Jamaat-e-Islami, banned for its collaboration with Pakistan during the liberation war and now politically rehabilitated, remains the clearest example. Its ideological alignment with Pakistan is neither incidental nor historical trivia; it is central to the current moment. Yet while these forces resurface, much of the world has chosen silence. Worse, some have framed recent developments as a domestic political correction, urging restraint while avoiding any serious engagement with the ideological direction Bangladesh is being pushed towards. Treating the rise of radical street power, the intimidation of diplomatic missions and the release of extremist figures as internal matters is not neutrality. It is abdication. This selective blindness sets a dangerous precedent. Terrorism, it appears, is being judged differently depending on the target and the geography. Threats against Indian diplomatic property are brushed aside, while the same actors would be condemned instantly if they appeared near other embassies. Such double standards undermine the very international norms. The regional consequences are serious. South Asia is already burdened by fragile borders, unresolved conflicts and ideological fault lines. Allowing Bangladesh to slide towards Pakistan-style politics, marked by street radicalism, ideological hostility and economic uncertainty, risks destabilising an entire neighbourhood. The early economic signals are already troubling. Political instability and radical mobilisation have begun to erode confidence in what was once one of Asia’s most promising growth stories. Equally at stake is Bangladesh’s cultural future. The sustained assault on symbols of the liberation movement, and the replacement of Bengali nationalism with political Islam represent an attempt to rewrite the country’s founding narrative. History shows that such projects do not end with symbolism. They reshape education, law and social norms, often irreversibly. World policymakers should be under no illusion. Pakistan itself is a case study in how tolerating or enabling radical forces for short-term stability leads to long-term dysfunction. Decades of engagement have failed to undo the damage caused by ideological capture of the state. To allow Bangladesh to move down the same path is not a policy error; it is a strategic failure. The warning signs today are far clearer. Threats to diplomatic missions, the release of extremists and the open mobilisation of radical fronts are not normal features of democratic transition. They are indicators of state erosion. If the world continues to look away, it will share responsibility for what follows. The erosion of peace in this region, the empowerment of extremist networks and the slow destruction of Bengali cultural identity will not remain confined within Bangladesh’s borders. Silence, in this case, is not caution. It is complicity. (Author is a former diplomat and policy commentator focused on South Asian geopolitics, Tibet and India’s neighbourhood. He contributes to leading think tanks and policy platforms on regional and civilisational issues.)

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

1971 Genocide and the Unhealed Scars of Bangladesh

Bangladesh may paper over its wounds one by one, but the scars of systematic genocide during 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War will remain permanent. Pummy M. Pandita The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War was marked by a systematic campaign of genocide carried out by the Pakistan Army and its supporting forces, Razakars, against the Bengali population, pro-independence activists, intellectuals and civilians. The Razakar Force, officially established by the Pakistan Army under the command of General Tikka Khan and acknowledged as a proxy paramilitary entity, was pivotal in the perpetration of these offenses at the direct command from Pakistan. More than fifty years post-independence, Bangladesh persistently pursued international acknowledgment and a formal apology from Pakistan; however, these requests remain unmet. The enduring impact of violence and denial has resulted in lasting sociopolitical wounds that continue to manifest in both domestic and diplomatic contexts. Established pursuant to the East Pakistan Razakars Ordinance issued in August 1971, this militia group was intentionally created to serve as a local support mechanism for Pakistan’s counter-insurgency efforts against the Bengalis of erstwhile East Pakistan. The establishment and functioning of this militia group were crucial to the genocidal tactics employed by the military leadership of Pakistan in order to stifle the aspirations for independence from Pakistan. The contingent comprised roughly 50,000 volunteers, primarily sourced from Islamist groupings in Pakistan political groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, Al Badr, Al Shams and others that resisted Bengali autonomy. In stark contrast to purported accounts, the Razakars were not merely engaged in “internal security” operations; they were complicit in heinous acts of mass murder, sexual violence, torture and terror directed at civilians, with a particular focus on Hindu communities, political dissidents, scholars and advocates for independence from Pakistan. After the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, approximately 200,000 women and girls, predominantly Hindus, were raped by the Pakistani Army and its allied proxies (Razakars). These heinous acts were part of an effort to create a “pure” Muslim race in Bangladesh. The targeting of Hindu women has continued, with sexual violence being used to intimidate and displace Hindu families. Multiple thoroughly recorded massacres during 1971 by Razakars alongside the Pakistan Army, encompassing extensive killings in Jathibhanga (approximately 3,000–3,500 victims), Gabha Narerkathi (95–100 Hindu victims), Akhira and Char Bhadrasan, among others, each exemplifying methodical assaults on defenseless populations. In December 2019, almost fifty years post Bangladeshi independence, the Government of Bangladesh released an official enumeration of 10,789 individuals recognized as Razakars, a clear initiative to identify and document those who supported the Pakistan Army’s operations against the Bengali population. The aim was to guarantee that future generations retain awareness of the genuine perpetrators of violence and treason, opposing any efforts to obscure or sanitise this historical narrative. Notwithstanding these actions, the pursuit of justice remains unfulfilled and the scars of history endure. The lack of an official apology transcends mere diplomatic obstruction; it signifies a refusal to acknowledge historical responsibility, thereby exacerbating the anguish of survivors, the families of victims and the broader communities deeply affected by the events of 1971. For a significant segment of Bangladeshi society, especially among Hindu communities that were disproportionately targeted, the ongoing lack of recognition constitutes not merely an omission but a deliberate erasure. It denies victims and survivors both justice and historical recognition, making their suffering invisible and original crimes even worse. This silence reinforces impunity, invalidates experienced trauma and indicates a systemic reluctance to address the violence perpetrated by Razakars and Pakistan Army against these communities. The Razakar legacy stands as a profound and enduring mark in the collective consciousness of Bangladesh, serving as a proof to the genocidal tactics employed by the Pakistan Army and its accomplices. It highlights the necessity for healing from mass atrocities, which hinges on the pursuit of truth and formal accountability, elements that cannot be fully achieved without clear recognition and apology from those who hold historical responsibility. The plight of Hindu communities in present-day Bangladesh finds its roots in the tragic events of the 1971 Liberation War and this suffering has persisted in a sporadic manner throughout the subsequent decades. In the year 1971, the Pakistan Army, in conjunction with the Razakars, engaged in state-sanctioned violence that resulted in widespread atrocities, including mass killings, sexual violence and the deliberate persecution of the Hindu community as a distinct religious group. The immediate consequences resulted in significant refugee movements and a sustained demographic reduction of Hindus in Bangladesh. Since the attainment of independence from Pakistan, there has been a recurring pattern of communal violence, biased governance practices, assaults on property and places of worship and a prevailing sense of impunity for those who commit such acts. This troubling trend has notably escalated during periods of political instability in 2024–25, resulting in cycles characterised by fear, displacement and the erosion of rights. Historical context: targeted violence in 1971 “Operation Searchlight” on March 25, 1971, started the Bangladesh Liberation War, which lasted from March to December 1971. The campaign conducted by the Pakistan military specifically aimed at Bengali freedom fighters, scholars, students and, with notable intensity, Hindu civilians. Recent and ongoing research show that there were coordinated mass executions, gang rapes used as weapons against women (especially Hindu women) and communal cleansing in towns and rural areas where Hindus lived. Independent scholarly reviews, government compilations of incident reports and survivor testimonies delineate massacres nationwide, enumerating particular incidents with substantial civilian casualties. Scholars and post-war accounts emphasise that although Bengalis were the primary targets, Hindus were subjected to extreme brutality due to their perceived political and cultural alignment with India and the Bengali freedom struggle. The ongoing vulnerability of Hindu communities in Bangladesh from 1972 to 2024 has been perpetuated by a combination of systemic impunity, inadequate legal accountability and politicised justice. Post 1971 period promised justice, but convictions for war crimes were few and far between, allowing many criminals and their networks to become part of local power structures again. Even when accountability mechanisms like the International Crimes Tribunal were used, the idea and practice of

Bangladesh Pakistan Terrorism

Bangladesh’s self-goal: tilt to Pakistan

Jamat e Islami and Muhammed Yunus seek to shape Bangladesh into politically radical Islamic nation and threaten its Bengali Identity N. C. Bipindra During a 1955 debate in Pakistan’s Second Constituent Assembly on whether the eastern province should be called East Bengal or East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said, “We have demanded so many times that you should use East Bengal instead of East Pakistan. The word Bengal has a history and a tradition of its own.” Today, Bangladeshis share Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s sentiments: Bengali is their ethnicity and Bangladesh is their nation. In fact, Bangladesh’s formation in 1971 was built on Bengali nationalism spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Father of Bangladesh. In August 2024, during uprising that led to ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, radical Islamic groups with an affinity to Pakistan were unleashed under the garb of student protests who attempted to vandalise the legacy of true hero of Bangla identity Sheikh Mujibur. The same Sheikh Mujiibur who was hailed as greatest Bengali of all time ahead of Rabindranath Tagore by BBC Bengali Language Service Survey, about whom Cuban leader Fidel Castro once said, “I have not seen the Himalayas. But I have seen Sheikh Mujib.” Pakistan has historically rejoiced vandalism of Bengali identity (in fact, any identity other than their own). Urdu-speaking Pakistanis, who hate local languages including Punjabi or Sindhi, have neither sympathy nor commonality with Bengali culture, language, or societal beliefs. Since partition in 1947, the policies and outlook of Pakistan have been indifferent, irrational and mired in hatred for Bengali identity of Bangladesh. The entire world took note of utter neglect and callous treatment meted out to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in aftermath of cyclone Bhola in 1970 by the Pakistani central government. To date, the aid that was promised by Pakistan to East Pakistan has not been transferred. Rather than offering a nursing hand, a year later, Pakistan launched terror on the streets of Bangladesh under Operation Searchlight. The horror of ‘Operation Searchlight’ undertaken by Pakistani military on March 25, 1971, to crush Bengali nationalist movement after Awami League won a majority in the general elections is still fresh and painful for the conscience of Bengali people. The stark and ignoble truth about Pakistan’s genocide in Bangladesh is that it was a conscious military policy steered at the government level to undermine Bengali society and in some cases attempt to change Bengali gene pool. For over 52 years, Pakistan has neither established nor attempted open, direct, people-to-people connections with those inside Bangladesh who support Bangla nationalism. Of the hundreds of cuts inflicted by Pakistan on Bangladesh, the most noticeable is an ongoing attempt at systemic erosion of Bangla identity and its replacement with the ideology of political Islam, which is the basis of governance in Pakistan. The underlying role of Jamat e Islami, a radical organisation which was banned in 2013 (and such other organisations), is hard to miss in the ouster of a democratically elected government in 2024. No wonder Jamat e Islami has found favour with Bangladesh’s current interim administration under Muhammed Yunus, who lifted the ban on the radical organisation. While other Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh do have connections with Pakistan, since 1971, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh has been Pakistan’s true friend and partner. These radical Islamic groups have left no stone unturned to shred the fabric of Bangla identity and colour the whole of Bangladesh in politically radicalised Islam. Therefore, people of Bangladesh need to view Pakistan’s recent warming to Bangladesh through a historic and nationalistic lens. The recent developments coincide with an unusual wave of military and diplomatic engagement between Bangladesh and Pakistan, marked by the visit of Pakistan’s Navy Chief to Dhaka and the first docking of a Pakistani naval vessel at Chattogram port since 1971. Bangladesh, at this stage, must remember and side with friends who were steadfast with them through their biggest economic transformation and offered a helping hand in times of crisis. The more Bangladesh leans towards becoming Pakistan-like in text and tenor, its economy will further tank. Radicalism and a healthy economy simply cannot coexist. Over the past year alone, Bangladesh’s GDP growth has fallen from a flying 6.1% to crawling 3.76%. A year ago, Bangladesh’s growth was comparable to India’s and China’s and was considered one of the enterprising economies in Asia. Bangladesh must understand that Pakistan, which is mired with deep corruption, radicalism, a struggling economy, and is often part of the FATF ‘grey list’ and is home to most of the recognised terrorist organisations in the world, and works as a puppet state to China, cannot assist Bangladesh in any meaningful way. On the contrary, Bangladesh must seek a rational division of the pre-1971 assets of the state of Pakistan, and the aid that was promised in the aftermath of Cyclone Bhola. The evidence conclusively indicates that the recent shift in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations would further push political instability in Bangladesh, foster political Islam, provoke conflicts along shared borders, and, most importantly, pose a threat to the Bangla identity, which is the basis of the foundation of Bangladesh. Additionally, fondness towards Pakistan would dent Bangladesh’s image at world forums. Friendship with a failing (failed) state like Pakistan cannot bring more than this. The world has faith in Bangladesh; that Bangladesh would learn its lessons from history, as exact events of 1971 may not repeat themselves, but they may rhyme. Georg Hegel, a German philosopher, once said, “What experience and history teach is that nations and governments have never learned anything from history or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it.” This now sounds true and apt for Bangladesh’s recent shift towards Pakistan. (Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS)

Situational Analysis - Geopolitics, Hindu Hate, Islamisation and Decay of Democracy in Bangladesh

Bangladesh Hindus Human Rights Security

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Situational Analysis – Geopolitics, Hindu Hate, Islamisation and Decay of Democracy in Bangladesh

Decay of Democracy in Bangladesh Bangladesh faces a dangerous convergence of Islamic resurgence, targeted minority persecution, and democratic regression. This situational analysis explores convergence of internal unrest and external influence, especially through narrative warfare and strategic alignments, which has accelerated the deterioration of democratic governance and encouraged radical elements in the post-2024 scenario. For more details…….

Bangladesh

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Democracy Roiled in Bangladesh

In a move unprecedented in political history, Bangladesh’s caretaker government, headed by Muhammad Yunus, has imposed a blanket ban on the Awami League (AL), one of the nation’s most politically influential parties in history. The ban, put into effect via newly interpreted anti-terrorism and war crimes acts, represents an unprecedented turn in Bangladesh’s political history. With neither public trial nor parliament debate, this action has brought to fore serious issues of political impartiality, deterioration in democratic polity and legitimacy of transitional power.

Bangladesh

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Deepening Crisis

Shrinking democratic space, Yunus going jihadist way and western powers weary of his idiosyncrasies has turned Bangladesh a hotspot. Rohan Giri Bangladesh is in the midst of a major crisis given the political chessboard that exposes changing power dynamics, jihdist takeover, assertion of the military junta and people left to fend for them with the state giving up on governance. It’s not mere domestic political reconfiguration but a crisis in the making with both national and regional consequences. At the heart of this narrative lies decline of a figure once championed in Western capitals, Muhammad Yunus and subdued recalibration of power that tells extensively about where Bangladesh is headed and how the world must understand this transition. Muhammad Yunus, once hailed as a Nobel laureate and Grameen Bank microfinance model builder, was long seen as a link with Western liberal values. But in today’s Dhaka, Yunus no longer commands the stature of a unifying reformist and an elderly statesman. His legal troubles, political marginalisation and increasing distance from the country’s current power centres suggest a systemic and perhaps irreversible break from liberal-democratic experiment that he once symbolised. His estrangement from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), historically the principal opposition to erstwhile ruling Awami League, marks a decisive shift. Even Yunus lacks institutional support from security establishments, rendering such alliances practically ineffective. A recent massive rally titled “Rally for Establishing Youth Political Rights” was held in Dhaka by three BNP-affiliated groups, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, Jubo Dal, and Swechchhasebak Dal as Yunus left for a four-day visit to Japan. BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman addressed the rally virtually, criticising the Yunus-led government. Days earlier, a BNP delegation demanded an election roadmap by December and urged the interim government to avoid long-term policy decisions especially on issues like the Rohingya corridor and Chattogram port. The political gap left after fall from the Awami League’s unquestionable supremacy has not resulted in democratic transition, realignment of democratic forces. Once a prominent player in Bangladeshi politics, Awami League under Sheikh Hasina, has been accused of authoritarian drift, methodical repression of opposition and getting alienated from voters. The conditions are ripe for alternative centres of power to emerge not necessarily from existing political formations but actors whose influence is wielded from behind the veil of legitimacy. One such actor is Bangladeshi military that has distanced from Yunus. Historically, taking a cautious, if not aloof, approach to overt governance. The current climate indicates its willingness to fill the power vacuum. Notably, words and postures emanating from within the army reflect displeasure with both existing political leadership and personalities, like Yunus, who are frequently portrayed as associated with Western liberal objectives. The military’s reluctance to re-embrace Yunus reveals a deeper strategic concern: aligning too closely with an internationally admired but locally polarising individual risks alienating burgeoning nationalist sentiments and undermining internal cohesion. Compounding the uncertainty is reemergence of hardline Islamic factions, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami, long banned but far from being irrelevant. In times of institutional fragility, such groups often find space to maneuver, projecting themselves as defenders of moral order and religious authenticity. Their attempt to “call the shots” politically, often through proxies and sympathetic networks, is no longer a fringe development but a potential axis of influence, especially in disenfranchised and conservative constituencies. Under the guise of populism and faith-based legitimacy, ideological extremists are bound to acquire traction due to the Awami League and BNP’s combined weakness or non-existence in political arena. In this calculus, pro-democracy actors, while vocal and active, remain largely performative in impact. The civil society fabric of Bangladesh, which once brimmed with journalistic bravery, legal advocacy, and grassroots mobilisation, now finds itself overpowered by a combination of state repression, media censorship and judicial intimidation. Though aligned ideologically with purported liberal reformists such as Yunus, these elements are neither organised nor empowered to counter the influence of either the security apparatus or resurgent Islamist formations. Individuals who are more concerned with maintaining institutional or ideological domination than with preserving democracy are increasingly filling the gap left by middle-ground political participation. From a geopolitical standpoint, these internal realignments have not escaped the attention of regional and global powers. United States, under shifting administrations, have shown signs of strategic disinterest in Yunus continued involvement in Bangladeshi politics. At the same time, US seems to be investing in other forms of influence projection, most notably through declaration of interest in Saint Martin’s Island, a location with increasing significance due to its naval and logistical potential. Although formally within Bangladeshi territory, US maneuvers signal a willingness to challenge regional hegemonies through presence rather than partnership. Interestingly, the Bangladeshi army’s own worldview appears increasingly decoupled from traditional alignments. While military engagement with China continues through defence procurements and limited logistical cooperation, the army remains skeptical of Pakistan, a country with which historical scars and ideological differences remain deeply etched. Since New Delhi is well aware of Pakistan’s ongoing attempts to retain influence in Dhaka through both ideological and illegal means, this suspicion may be a means of fostering understanding with India. India’s own perspective on these developments is complex and evolving. New Delhi has traditionally favoured stability over unrest in its eastern neighbourhood. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has however articulated concerns about Bangladesh’s vulnerability to becoming a chokepoint, a potential “chicken neck” in a broader strategic contest involving China, US and radical Islamic networks. The parallel highlights a concern about India’s own strategic bottleneck, the Siliguri Corridor and how instability in Bangladesh could lead to logistical and security issues in the northeast. Indian engagement, therefore, is not only about diplomatic alignment but about protecting crucial linkages and resisting China’s growing influence. The present course of Bangladesh raises uneasy concerns for democracies in the West. Common trends that are frequently disregarded in favour of short-term strategic collaboration or economic stability include the emergence of hardline forces, dwindling liberal voices and the assertion of military prerogative. If these trends are not addressed, they run the risk of combining to

Hindus in Bangladesh Face Existential Threat

Bangladesh Hindus Human Rights Security

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Hindus in Bangladesh Face Existential Threat

CIHS, UN reports meticulously documented atrocities against minorities while Yunus government is on denial mode. Pummy M Pandita Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) had in August 2024 released a report titled “Hindu Genocide Unfolding in Bangladesh,” detailing systematic persecution of Hindus in that country. The report highlighted how minorities and in particular Hindus suffered oppression, forced conversions and violent attacks since partition of India in 1947. With the Hindu population dwindling from nearly 30 per cent in 1947 to less than 8 per cent today, the report documented the ” … ongoing ethnic cleansing.” CIHS report findings are further corroborated by United Nations Human Rights (UNHR) Office which released its own scathing report on the persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh. UN report reinforces the notion of targeted violence, displacement and systemic discrimination against Hindus, echoing concerns previously voiced by CIHS. The two reports underscore severity of crisis and the urgent need for international action. US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, in an interview, stated, “The long-time unfortunate persecution, killing, and abuse of religious minorities—Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Catholics, and others—have been a major area of concern for the United States government and, of course, President Trump and his administration”. Bangladeshi however was unmoved and went on a denial mode. As per media reports, Chief Adviser’s press wing of Bangladesh’s interim government stated, “Bangladesh as a nation traditionally practices Islam that is famously inclusive and peaceful and it has made remarkable strides in its fight against extremism and terrorism.” Such response starkly contrasts the reality documented in both CIHS and UNHR reports. UNHR observations highlight a harsh reality: a systematic record of violence, displacement and persecution against a religious minority group in a state that takes pride in pluralism. This report is presented against the backdrop when rising extremism in South Asia is drawing international attention to the region and makes it acutely necessary that the situation must be evaluated factually with recourse to historical reality. Some specific incidents highlighted in the report are torching of three temples and the looting of about 20 houses in Burashardubi, Hatibandha and Lalmonirhat. UN report identifies these attacks to factors like religious and ethnic discrimination, targeted attacks on supposed supporters of former Awami League government among minorities, local communal land disputes, and personal conflicts. It also mentions involvement of some members and supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in perpetuating violence. Even after initial denials, Bangladesh’s interim caretaker government admitted at least 88 incidents of violence against minorities, predominantly Hindus, after August 2024. These happenings have raised significant concerns both within the country and globally, emphasizing urgent need for effective measures to protect minority communities in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has witnessed a considerable increase in widespread violence erupted following the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, disproportionately affecting Hindu minorities. UN report documents that Hindu homes, businesses and temples were targeted on a systematic basis particularly in rural and historically tense areas. Some of the notable incidents include: Violence was not limited to these districts only. Other districts viz., Feni, Patuakhali, and Moulvibazar, also reported heinous crimes such as arson attacks on temples and brutal murder of Hindu individuals. These assaults, involving property destruction, arson and direct physical threats often exacerbated by inadequate police response suggest institutional impunity and perhaps political motivations. UN Report states that there are several Bangladeshi localities which have emerged as hotspots of anti-Hindu attacks. The incidents recorded in report: The report documents these attacks with descriptions of victims, as verified by independent human rights groups. It is disturbing to record that police responses have been tardy or ineffective, permitting perpetrators to operate with impunity. The magnitude of the atrocities is appalling. UN report puts the number of deaths during the protests and violence that followed between July 1 and August 15, 2024, at an estimated 1,400. The overwhelming majority of these were caused by actions of Bangladesh’s security forces, who were accused of gross human rights abuses, including summary killings and shooting unarmed protesters. Children comprised around 12 – 13 per cent of these victims. Violence in Bangladesh mid-last year (2024) is not a lone phenomenon. The Hindu population in Bangladesh has been progressively dwindling due to amalgamation of targeted violence, legal discrimination and systemic exclusion. According to census 2022 data, Bangladesh’s population was 165,191,648 with percentage breakup detailed below: Religion Population Per cent breakdown Muslims 150,360,406 91.04 Hindus 13,130,109 07.95 Buddhists 1,007,468 0.61 Christians 495,475 0.30 Others 198,190 0.12 The reason for this decline is threefold—state indifference, mob violence and land grabs through Vested Property Act which has traditionally allowed seizure of Hindu-held property on various pretexts. Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government in Bangladesh had presented itself as secular. The state’s inability to intervene strongly against perpetrators of violence against Hindus creates disquieting doubts about its commitment to protecting minorities. Though there have been some arrests after occurrence of violence, conviction is an exception and political convenience becomes the rule. The growing power of Islamist parties such as Hefazat-e-Islam has further intensified the issue as political parties are reluctant to act decisively against extremists for fear of electoral retribution. One of the worrying features brought out by UNHR report is the failure of law enforcement agencies to act. In spite of large-scale nature of the attacks, there was an overwhelming failure to intervene to save Hindu communities. This institutionalized impunity has encouraged perpetrators to continue perpetrating violence against minorities in a cycle of repetition. UN report also incriminates the former government and its security establishment for planning a calculated and well-coordinated effort to quell dissent. This included hundreds of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, detentions and cases of torture. These acts were said to have been committed with awareness and coordination of political leadership and top security officials, possibly constituting crimes against humanity. Global community has raised severe concerns regarding the developments. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has demanded serious probes into all deaths

Bangladesh Hindus

540

Coup, Chaos, Caliphate

Radical jihadists drawing support from influential elements in US, China and Pakistan are driving Bangladesh to anarchy, instability.

Hindus Human Rights

589

Dangerous Global Bias Goes Unchecked

Hindu Temples, places of worship, communities in Western democracies and Islamic nations face grave threat and metamorphosed into a huge crisis. Dr Shailendra Kumar Pathak There’s a pattern to it. Hate and violence against Hindu communities has gone global. From Hindu temples, individuals and organizations have experienced extreme violence, vandalism and intolerance. These acts and incidents of violence have been reported in continuum with no respite to Hindus that seek to practice their faith in peace or live the Dharmic way propagating peace, tranquility and provide hope to humanity that’s under stress. From Brampton and Mississauga in Canada to Bangladesh where scores of temples have either been vandalized or closed down ‘by force’, Hindu minorities have been at the receiving end. Khalistani terrorists, jihadists to Christian evangelists have targeted temples and places of worship even in Bharat that’s home to over a billion Hindus. Most disturbing is that these violent incidents that totaled to over 300 in last few months went largely unnoticed or unreported. Intolerance is something that’s common to most of the violent incidents. For instance, on November 3 in Brampton, Canada, aggressive Khalistani terrorists attacked Hindu mandir in Brampton as practicing Hindus lined up for peaceful worship and Indian government representatives were busy verifying documents of elderly Sikhs and Hindus to ensure continuity in payment of pension back home. Devotees were beaten up, harassed, roughed up and pushed around violently while the Canadian police played dumb and deaf. It’s not an isolated incident. Mississauga Hindu temple was also vandalized with anti-Hindu graffiti and intimidation of extreme variety. On November 12, 2024, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) released a comprehensive report documenting a series of attacks on Hindu communities around the world underscoring the need for attention to what many see as an escalating crisis. VHP report for 2024 documented hate crimes and attacks on temples in several nations like Canada, United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Sharp rise in hate crimes targeting temples, cultural centers, and individuals has sent shock waves globally among 1.4 billion strong hindus spread across about 100 countries. In Canada, multiple Hindu temples faced attacks over the year including desecration of Gauri Shankar Mandir in Brampton and BAPS Swaminarayan temple in Windsor, which were both defaced with anti-Hindu slurs. United States temples in New Jersey, California and Texas vandalized and practicing Hindus harassed and defacement that included hateful messages specifically targeting Hindu beliefs and symbols were reported. This disturbing pattern suggests that these incidents are not random but part of a broader anti-Hindu agenda that is spreading in Western democracies. In United Kingdom, similar wave of anti-Hindu violence has been reported. Just last year, Leicester, a city with large South Asian population, witnessed intense anti-Hindu violence. Hindu homes, businesses and temples were attacked as mobs chanted slogans against the community, forcing Hindu families to stay indoors in fear. VHP’s report underscore that incidents like these signal an emboldened campaign against Hindu communities in societies that have long prided themselves on tolerance and inclusivity. Australia, too, has not been immune to this wave of hostility. The VHP’s November 2024 report documents attacks on Hindu temples in Melbourne where Hindu symbols were defaced with graffiti linking Hinduism to unrelated political disputes. This graffiti, filled with hateful rhetoric, was intended to shame and intimidate the Hindu community. Such acts reflect a deepening Hinduphobia that is no longer limited to casual prejudice but has manifested into violent, organized attacks on religious and cultural symbols. For Hindus living in these Western democracies, these incidents are betrayal of the promise of freedom and equality. VHP’s comprehensive report also highlights a dire situation for Hindus in neighboring Islamic countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan where the situation is far more severe. In Pakistan, targeting Hindus has reached what some activists call protracted genocide. Hindu temples are routinely desecrated or destroyed, often with little to no response from authorities. Hindu girls, particularly in Sindh, face an alarming risk of abduction, forced conversion and marriage to much older Muslim men. VHP’s report included recent cases of Hindu girls being forcibly converted, torn from their families and left without any recourse for justice. Such violence and intimidation have become daily reality for Hindus in Pakistan where systemic discrimination allows these crimes to go largely unchecked. In Bangladesh, Hindus are staring at total erasure. VHP report notes that in early August 2024 in a span of five hours more than 50 attacks were recorded on Hindu homes, temples and businesses across various districts in Bangladesh. In places like Feni and Dinajpur, Hindu temples were desecrated and homes looted. Reports indicate that mobs of hundreds gathered to burn Hindu homes and assault community leaders as witnessed in multiple Bangladeshi districts such as Khulna, Satkhira and Bogura. This wave of violence has drawn international attention, as videos of the attacks went viral on social media showing mobs surrounding Hindu households, desecrating temples and forcing residents to flee their homes. VHP’s extensive list of incidents in its November 2024 report illustrates alarming scale and frequency of these attacks. It emphasizes that this violence against Hindus often has ideological backing, particularly from radical Islamic factions or Khalistani extremists which justify hostility toward Hindus under religious pretexts. VHP draws attention to anti-Hindu sentiment driven by certain missionary groups which promote aggressive conversion agendas in South Asia. This dynamic, the VHP argues, reveals that anti-Hindu prejudice is not only pervasive but systemic, fueled by a mix of religious and cultural biases. Equally concerning is general lack of accountability or response. When Hindu temples are attacked in Canada or Australia, political leaders and media outlets often remain mute spectators contrasting sharply with the swift response seen for crimes against other communities. This discrepancy has led many within the Hindu diaspora to question double standard practiced in international houses in reporting hate crimes. VHP has noted that Hinduphobia remains underreported and misunderstood, even as acts of Hindumisia (hatred for Hindu beliefs and practices) rise steadily. Unlike Islamophobia or anti-Semitism which are widely

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